Adolf von Harnack auf schloss Elmau, von J. Müller.--Briefe Adolf von Harnacs an Johannes Müller.--Leben und erkennen, von A. Harnack.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Sokrates und die alte Kirche" verfügbar.

In the course of his active teaching career of over fifty years, Adolf von Harnack only once lectured on the „Encyclopaedia of Theology“. This occured in the summer of 1884 when he was a young university professor in Gießen, lecturing twice a week from 9 to 10 in the morning. The handwritten script of the dictation booklet has so far gone unnoticed in the literature. It is documented here for the first time and in a full reproduction. These (...) lecture notes present a condensed, overall impression of Harnack's concept of theology, probably unlike any other his texts. Of particular interest is the detailed outline of a concept of religion that Harnack developed through an intense examination of drafts on this topic by Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl as well as Ritschl's prominent students, Julius Kaftan and Wilhelm Herrmann. Within the history of Harnack's opus, the lecture for the Encyclopaedia was done in close working relationship with the great literary project of the Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. (shrink)

Anhand von unveröffentlichten Briefen an die Herausgeber Hans Delbrück und Karl Muth wird im vorliegenden Beitrag nachgewiesen: Bernarda von Nell, die Mutter des Jesuitenpaters und Sozialethikers Oswald von Nell-Breuning, ist die Verfasserin des anonymen Artikels „Wie denkt Professor Harnack über die Enzyklika Pascendi?“ . Ihr Angriff auf Adolf Harnack ist Teil einer über Jahre andauernden, teils kritischen, teils bewundernden Auseinandersetzung mit dem protestantischen Gelehrten. Harnacks Antwort an die – ihm namentlich bekannte – Angreiferin ist vor dem Hintergrund (...) seiner Unterstützung für das „Bildungsstreben der Frauen“ zu sehen.Anhang; aus: A. Harnack, Die päpstliche Enzyklika des Jahres 1907. Ein Schlußwort.*[Man ist] der Enzyklika die Erklärung schuldig, die mir in den Kritiken kaum entgegengetreten ist, daß sie nach langer, langer Zeit von höchster katholischer Stelle die Glaubens- und Weltanschauungsfrage, nicht aber die Frage des Papsttums, in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Wir sind daran gewöhnt worden, von Rom aus vor allem diese Frage uns aufgerückt zu sehen; in der Enzyklika aber tritt sie ganz hinter jene andere zurück. Ich stehe nicht an, darin einen Fortschritt zu erkennen. Fast möchte ich sagen, der Papst rüttelt die Gewissen seiner Gläubigen auf! Sollten wir uns darüber nicht freuen? Er zwingt sie freilich alsbald auf einen ganz bestimmten Weg und bringt seine Macht in den Disziplinarvorschriften, die er erläßt, in eine fürchterliche Erinnerung; aber er lenkt ihre Aufmerksamkeit doch auf Glaubensfragen, er lenkt sie auf den „Modernismus“, den er nicht ohne Aufbieten von Kenntnissen eingehend schildert! Er nimmt also die unausbleiblichen Folgen aller geistigen Unruhe in den Kauf, weil er die Sache, den wahren, rechten Glauben, für so wichtig hält. Wäre es ihm nur um die eigene Herrschaft zu tun, so wäre diese Enzyklika das ungeschickteste Schriftstück von der Welt – es ist ihm wirklich um den christlichen Glauben und die rechte Theologie zu tun, wie er sie versteht, also um das Seelenheil seiner Gläubigen! Das soll man nicht verkennen, und darin liegt bei aller Rückständigkeit in bezug auf das Wesen des Wahrheitssinns und der Wissenschaft doch ein erfreuliches Moment. Auch wird ja der Versuch gemacht, den „Modernismus“ zu widerlegen, und so kläglich dieser Versuch auch ausgefallen ist – einige unvermeidliche Schatten und Fehler der modernen Wissenschaft sind nicht ungeschickt benutzt, und auf die Abgründe, die sie umgeben, ist nicht ohne Recht hingewiesen.Drawing its evidence from hitherto unpublished letters to the editors Hans Delbrück and Karl Muth , the present study proves the following fact: Bernarda von Nell, mother of the Jesuit priest and professor of social ethics Oswald von Nell-Breuning, is the author the anonymous article „Wie denkt Professor Harnack über die Enzyklika Pascendi?“ . This attack on Adolf Harnack is part of her continuous, sometimes critical, sometimes admiring discussion of the protestant scholar. Harnack’s reply to his challenger – known to him by name – should be appreciated in connection with his public support of “women’s pursuit of education”. (shrink)

The article deals with the so-called „System Althoff“, that is the network of advisers Friedrich Althoff, ministerial director of the Prussian ministry of cultural affairs, created and employed in order to administer the faculties of theology at Prussian universities. In addition to leading the process of decision making in the ministry itself, he recruited a number of theology professors from the two dominant Church parties to advise him on appointing new professors. Famously, he consulted the opponents Hermann Cremer, a “positive” (...) biblicistic Systematic professor in Greifswald, and Adolf Harnack, a Ritschlian Church Historian in Berlin, but he also counted theologians like Friedrich Loofs and Martin Kähler among his advisers. The article’s main body focusses on Althoff’s correspondence with Cremer and Harnack in order to analyse the minister’s practice of administration in depth. In a second step the paper will relate the minister’s relationship with his two most prominent theological advisers to the wider „System Althoff“ in theology. Both parts serve to show that Althoff rationalized and professionalized the process of decision making in the ministry of cultural affairs by carefully considering different professorial advises in light of the current (church) political climate. (shrink)

This study of the reorganisation of the Straßburg theological faculty in the wake of the Franco-Prussian war traces the tormented path of that academic body towards the eventual calling of its own candidate Paul Lobstein to the professorship of lutheran dogmatics. The paper provides detailed insight into the welter of crossfire and intrigue that ensued as proponents of pietism, confessional lutheranism, mediating theology, and liberalism contended with strong-willed theological colleagues and with Bismarck on behalf of the Alsatian faculty. Among others, (...) the young Adolf von Harnack was briefly considered for the post in dogmatic theology. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie öffentliche Theologie geht von der Kritik an der Privatisierung der Theologie aus und richtet sich auf das aktive Teilnehmen an den öffentlichen Diskursen der Gesellschaft für das gemeinschaftliche Wohl. Der vorliegende Aufsatz fasst den Ausgangs- sowie Zielpunkt der öffentlichen Theologie unter dem Begriff Entprivatisierungsthese zusammen. Während öffentliche Theologie auf die Überwindung von Säkularisierung und Individualisierung zielt, die unter dem Begriff von Privatisierung mitbegriffen sind, sind hier die positiven öffentlichen Bedeutungen von Säkularisierung und Individualisierung verdeutlicht. Ausgehend von Harnacks privatisierter theologischer (...) Auffassung vom Evangelium und seiner Teilnahme an politischen und sozialen Fragen wird herausgestellt, dass die öffentliche Dimension der Theologie nicht in der Exklusion von Säkularisierung und Individualisierung, sondern in ihrer positiven Aufnahme zurückzugewinnen ist. (shrink)

abstract: One of the most prolific approaches to the comparative study of Buddhist and Christian philosophy has been the use of Buddhist anti-metaphysicism to overcome the allegedly obsolete metaphysical discourse of Christianity. This approach has been practiced, among others, by Edgar Bruns, Frederik Streng, Joseph O'Leary, and John Keenan. Keenan's 1980–1990s seminal works were determinative in that they appeared to rely on intuitive and evident premises: Christianity became infused with Greek metaphysical concepts early on; consequently, it adopted the forms of (...) essentialism and ontological discourse practiced in metaphysics. That discourse has now become obsolete and must be overcome; Buddhist anti-metaphysicism helps overcome it; hence, Christianity can learn from Buddhism. In this paper, I show that although Keenan presents the first of these claims as self-evident, it is in fact highly polemical. Its origins lie in Albrecht Ritschl's and Adolf von Harnack's Hellenization theory. While the theological and historical background to this theory has been debated, Keenan does not engage in these debates. Even more, he transforms the theory in such a way that it becomes incongruent with its inherent aim. Following the problems implied on these two levels, I suggest that Keenan's project makes itself vulnerable to incoherencies. In the end, I argue for the overcoming of antimetaphysicism as a basis for Buddhist-Christian dialogue. (shrink)

Distinguishes two senses of 'judgment' on the one hand as meaning a state of 'conviction' or 'belief', and on the other hand as meaning an act of 'affirmation' or 'assertion'. Certainly conviction and assertion stand in close relation to each other, but they delineate two heterogeneous logical spheres, and thereby divide the total field of the theory of judgment into two neighbouring but separate sub-fields. Once this is done it is shown to have implications for our understanding especially of the (...) phenomenon of negation, and of the distinction between negation as affirmation of a negative state of affairs, and negation as act of contradicting the judgment someone else has made. (shrink)

This paper offers a refutation of P. Duhem's thesis that the falsifiability of an isolated empirical hypothesis H as an explanans is unavoidably inconclusive. Its central contentions are the following: 1. No general features of the logic of falsifiability can assure, for every isolated empirical hypothesis H and independently of the domain to which it pertains, that H can always be preserved as an explanans of any empirical findings O whatever by some modification of the auxiliary assumptions A in conjunction (...) with which H functions as an explanans. For Duhem cannot guarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility of O from an explanans constituted by the conjunction of H and some revised non-trivial version R of A: the existence of the required set R of collateral assumptions must be demonstrated for each particular case. 2. The categorical form of the Duhemian thesis is not only a non-sequitur but actually false. This is shown by adducing the testing of physical geometry as a counterexample to Duhem in the form of a rebuttal to A. Einstein's geometrical articulation of Duhem's thesis. 3. The possibility of a quasi a priori choice of a physical geometry in the sense of Duhem must be clearly distinguished from the feasibility of a conventional adoption of such a geometry in the sense of H. Poincare. And the legitimacy of the latter cannot be invoked to save the Duhemian thesis from refutation by the foregoing considerations. (shrink)

Prompted by the "Panel Discussion of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Science" (Philosophy of Science 36, December, 1969) and other recent literature, this essay ranges over major issues in the philosophy of space, time and space-time as well as over problems in the logic of ascertaining the falsity of a scientific hypothesis. The author's philosophy of geometry has recently been challenged along three main distinct lines as follows: (i) The Panel article by G. J. Massey calls for a more precise and more (...) coherent account of the Riemannian conception of an intrinsic as opposed to an extrinsic metric, which the author has invoked as his basis for the distinction between non-conventional and convention-laden ascriptions of metrical equality and inequality; (ii) the latter distinction has been claimed to suffer from the liabilities of the so-called "standard conception" of scientific theories [36]; and (iii) pursuant to H. Putnam's "An Examination of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Geometry" [56], J. Earman [16, 17] and R. Swinburne [65] have contended that the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic metrics is scientifically unilluminating, and that the associated distinction between non-conventional and convention-laden metrical comparisons does not have the kind of relevance to extant scientific theories that the author has claimed for it. The essay consists of two installments. The present installment, comprising the Introduction and Part A, is devoted to the clarification, correction and further development of the author's prior writings on the philosophy of geometry. Its main objective is constructive elaboration rather than offering polemics. But rebuttals to Earman, [16, 17], Swinburne [65] and Demopoulos [13] are included, because their inclusion conduced to clarity in giving the new exposition. Part B is to appear in a subsequent issue and will be devoted to replies to critiques contained in the Panel Discussion and in other recent literature. It will range over issues in the philosophy of geometry and in the logic of ascertaining the falsity of a scientific hypothesis. By way of merely elliptical anticipation of much more precise statements given in Part A, section 3(ii), the Introduction dissociates the notion of convention-ladenness developed in Part A from the quite different notion integral to the so-called "standard conception" of scientific theories. Thereby, the Introduction prepares the ground for seeing, as a corollary to Part A, section 3(ii), that the notion advocated in the present essay has nothing to fear from the following fact, noted by C. G. Hempel ([36]; cf. also his 1970 Carus Lectures): "even though a sentence may originally be introduced as true by stipulation, it soon joins the club of all other member-statements of the theory and becomes subject to revision in response to further empirical findings and theoretical developments." Part A, which begins with a fairly detailed table of contents, endeavors to meet the aforementioned three-fold challenge to the author's philosophy of geometry. Massey's call for the provision of clear and detailed characterizations of intrinsic and extrinsic metrics is answered with the invaluable aid rendered personally by Massey himself. These characterizations are shown to permit a precise explication of the portions of Riemann's Inaugural Dissertation relevant to (1) Riemann's brilliant anticipation of Einstein's dynamical conception of physical geometry, and (2) the author's philosophical characterization of the metrics and geometries of space, time, and space-time {section 2(c)}. A byproduct of the analysis is to raise two major philosophical doubts concerning Clifford's sketch of a so-called "space-theory of matter" as elaborated in J. A. Wheeler's relativistic geometrodynamics. That theory's vision of understanding matter as a manifestation of empty curved space is questioned in regard to (1) the existence of an intra-geometrodynamic basis for individuating the metrically homogeneous world points of its space-time manifold {section 1(a)}, and (2) the compatibility of the theory with the Riemannian metrical philosophy apparently espoused by its proponents {section 2(c)(i)}. (shrink)

This study is a philosophical critique of the foundations of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis. As such, it also takes cognizance of his claim that psychoanalysis has the credentials of a natural science. It shows that the reasoning on which Freud rested the major hypotheses of his edifice was fundamentally flawed, even if the probity of the clinical observations he adduced were not in question. Moreover, far from deserving to be taken at face value, clinical data from the psychoanalytic treatment setting are (...) themselves epistemically quite suspect. (shrink)

According to some cosmologists, the big bang cosmogony and even the (now largely defunct) steady-state theory pose a scientifically insoluble problem of matter-energy creation. But I argue that the genuine problem of the origin of matter-energy or of the universe has been fallaciously transmuted into the pseudo-problem of creation by an external cause. A fortiori, it emerges that the initial "true" and "false" vacuum states of quantum cosmology do not vindicate biblical divine creation ex nihilo at all.

Ellis and Bowman's account of nonstandard signal synchronizations is examined as a prolegomenon to this paper. Attention is called to some consequences of an important ambiguity in their account of the transitivity of nonstandard synchrony. Then an analysis is given of the principle of relativity to assess E & B's claim that this principle either restricts nonstandard signal synchronisms or rules them out altogether. It is argued that the latitude for choices of nonstandard synchronisms is not circumscribed by the factual (...) content of the principle of relativity; instead, the exclusion of such synchronisms by this principle depends on a tacit appeal to the particular conventions implicit in certain formulations of the principle. Hence E & B's claim is rejected as an argument against the factual tenability of nonstandard synchronisms. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in the analytic geometry of physical space-time that an extended straight line segment, having positive length, is treated as “consisting of” unextended points, each of which has zero length. Analogously, time intervals of positive duration are resolved into instants, each of which has zero duration.