Explication usually plays the role of the method of language revision. The paper sticks to the Carnapian project of explication and develops some of the formal requirements imposed on the explicatum. However, it departs from Carnap’s view when it comes to how to construe the simplicity condition. It is suggested that in some cases the simplicity condition, which in the Carnapian project plays the derived role with respect to the other three conditions—the similarity, exactness, and fruitfulness conditions—may be substantive for (...) the overall evaluation of explications. Based on a case study of three different explications of the H-D concept of confirmation :391–437, 1991; Erkenntnis 41:183–188, 1994; Gemes in Philos Sci 60:477–487, 1993; Erkenntnis 49:1–20, 1998; Sprenger in Philos Compass 6:497–508, 2011), we show that there are cases where competing explicata of a common explicandum satisfy the first three conditions equally well. In those cases, then, the simplicity condition is supposed to make the difference. However, instead of using Carnap’s construal of simplicity, we suggest a Principle of instrumental simplicity according to which, ceteris paribus, the simpler the explicatum is, the more likely is its ‘survival’ in competition with other explicata. Moreover, it is suggested that whereas the similarity, exactness and fruitfulness conditions are, in some sense, formal criteria, the simplicity condition is rather tested empirically. (shrink)

Explikácia patrí medzi kľúčové metódy analytickej filozofie. V tejto práci predstavujem návrh explicitného odlíšenia metódy explikácie od jej výsledku. V nadväznosti na prácu Rudolfa Carnapa sa snažím jeho explikačný projekt rozvinúť. Poukazujem na otvorené problémy Carnapovych kritérií adekvátnej explikácie; ukazujem, v čom sa explikácie od definícií líšia, aká je ich logická forma a ktoré explicitné kroky sú typické pre metódu explikácie. Napokon, približujem dôvody, pre ktoré je možné explikáciu chápať ako reláciu nahradenia medzi významovou charakterizáciou a definíciou určitého druhu.

Developing the ideas presented in Jacquette (2011), the paper presents an indispensability argument aimed at justification of induction. First, Hume’s problem of induction is introduced via slightly different reconstructions. Second, several traditional attempts to solve Hume’s problem are presented. Finally, Jacquette’s(2011) proposal to justify induction by an indispensability argument is developed. I conclude with presenting a kind of indispensability argument for induction.

The paper focuses on the problem of identification of laws of nature and their demarcation from other kinds of regularities. The problem is approached from the viewpoint of several metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological criteria. Firstly, several dominant approaches to the problem are introduced. Secondly, the logical and semantic explicatory framework – Transparent Intensional Logic – is presented for the sake of clarification of logical forms of sentences that are supposed to express the laws of nature. Finally, a complementary strategy (...) to the demarcation problem is proposed, including reconsideration of relevant metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological requirements and principles behind the former conceptions. (shrink)

The paper presents a two-level approach to an assessment of meaning theories. To begin with, language is distinguished from lan guage-model and, analogously, meaning is discerned from a model of meaning. The first level of a theory assessment is presented as dealing with the relation of a model of meaning to intra-theoretical aims and assumptions of a theory with specific language-model. The second level of assessment concerns ontological, epistemological, logical and other assumptions underlying the respective language-model. Finally, several questions are (...) set forth as methodological directives for elucidating hidden assumptions behind the theories of meaning. (shrink)

The so-called „Covering Law Model“ of explanation proposed by C. Hempel and R. Oppenheim was claimed to have been applied as an explanatory model in natural sciences as well as in humanities. Several objections were raised against this explanatory model during the second half of 20th century. This article considers the proposed criteria of adequacy of scientific explanation and, in particular, the possibilities and limitations connected with the idea of its applicability in the process of logical reconstruction of historical explanations. (...) In the final part of the paper I introduce some remarks concerning the „methodological“ relation of dependence between the explanandum and the explanans which could also illuminate the proper role of this explanatory model in history. (shrink)

The paper presents the logical milieu of the Paradox of ravens, identified by Hempel in his Studies in the Logic of Confirmation. It deals with Hempel’s interpretations of Nicod’s criterion of confirmation as well as with its inadmissible consequences. I, subsequently, suggest an epistemological and semantic specification of empirical properties, i.e., of their identity; then I formulate a criterion of the test of properties expressed by empirical hypothesis. Finally, I propose a procedural conception of confirmation by means of the testing (...) procedure schema. The confirmation is, therefore, conceived as an attribute which can be ascribed to a hypothesis through the process of its testing. The methods of testing are central to the hypothesis’s qualifica-tion as confirmed. (shrink)

The paper deals with some logical, semantic and methodological aspects of defining and definitions. First of all, basic features of the background semantic theory are specified. Next, three different kinds of definitions are distinguished: codifying definitions, objectual analytic definitions and meaning analytic definitions. It is shown that the relationships between the definiendum and the definiens in a given definition differ with respect to these different kinds of definition. Furthermore, it is argued that definitions and defining are intrinsically connected with so (...) called conceptual systems. Finally, definitions are distinguished from explications. (shrink)

Carnap’s analysis of the language of science had presupposed too close a connection between the semantics and testability. The core problem of the logical empiricist tradition was to show how to provide the interpretation of theoretical terms and hence the explanation of their application to observable entities by means of observation terms. It is argued that the utilization of a much more expressive semantic theory which identifies meanings with hyperintensional entities leads to a clarification of the competencies of semantics and (...) methodology. It is claimed that the observability or unobservability of term’s referents does not determine the meaning of the term. Carnap’s reduction sentences are therefore conceived only as methodological devices for the determination of unobservables via the theory-presupposed observable aspects. (shrink)

The paper deals with the New Riddle of Induction set forth by N. Goodman in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. The problem is introduced through the definition of grue-predicate. The relation between the grue-hypothesis and empirical evidence is examined. Goodman’s underlying thesis about the neutrality of empirical evidence is undermined. The intelligibility of the idea that disjunctive properties such as Grue can be observed and seen is questioned. A solution of Goodman’s riddle is outlined by means of the definition of (...) the identity of empirical properties and further deve- loped through postulating of the necessary condition of induction executability which prohibits the inference from “Some a, b, c, d emeralds are green” to the hypothesis “All emeralds are grue”. (shrink)

When does a group justifiedly believe that p? One answer to this question has been developed first by Schmitt and then by Hakli: when the group members jointly accept a reason for the belief. Call this the joint acceptance account of group justification. Their answer has great explanatory power, providing us with a way to account for cases in which the group's justification can diverge from the justification individual members have. Unfortunately, Jennifer Lackey developed a powerful argument against joint acceptance (...) accounts. She argues that these accounts lead to epistemically arbitrary reasons and therefore justification at will. Group justification loses the necessary connection to the world to be truth-conducive. In this paper I develop a new form of a joint acceptance account that can deal with Lackey's examples: the anchored joint acceptance account of group justification. I argue that properly understanding the role of epistemic expectations can help us form the best version of a joint acceptance account. While justification is only generated by joint acceptance of evidence, the evidential expectations towards a group are anchored in the group members. This anchoring guarantees that groups cannot manipulate their ultima facie justification illegitimately. (shrink)

Higher-order realists about properties express their view that there are properties with the help of higher-order rather than first-order quantifiers. They claim two types of advantages for this way of formulating property realism. First, certain gridlocked debates about the nature of properties, such as the immanentism versus transcendentalism dispute, are taken to be dissolved. Second, a further such debate, the tropes versus universals dispute, is taken to be resolved. In this paper I first argue that higher-order realism does not in (...) fact resolve the tropes versus universals dispute. In a constructive spirit, I then develop higher-order realism in a way that leads to a dissolution, rather than a resolution, of this dispute too. (shrink)

The internet has become an ubiquitous epistemic source. However, it comes with several drawbacks. For instance, the world wide web seems to foster filter bubbles and echo chambers and includes search results that promote bias and spread misinformation. Richard Heersmink suggests online intellectual virtues to combat these epistemically detrimental effects . These are general epistemic virtues applied to the online environment based on our background knowledge of this online environment. I argue that these online intellectual virtues also demand a particular (...) view of cognitive integration. Online intellectual virtues are incompatible with a popular conception of extended minds proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers . I suggest that if we want to hold on to both a conception of online intellectual virtues and some conception of the extended mind, we have to accept a more gradual theory of cognitive integration along the lines of second-wave theories of the extended mind. (shrink)

Sentences with disjunction in the scope of a universal quantifier, Every A is P or Q, tend to give rise to distributive inferences that each of the disjuncts holds of at least one individual in the domain of the quantifier, Some A is P & Some A is Q. These inferences are standardly derived as an entailment of the meaning of the sentence together with the scalar implicature that it is not the case that either disjunct holds of every individual (...) in the domain of the quantifier, \Every A is P &\Every A is Q. As we show, this derivation faces a challenge in that distributive inferences may obtain in the absence of plain negated inferences. We address this challenge by showing that on particular assumptions about alternatives, a derivation of distributive inferences as scalar implicatures can be maintained without in fact necessitating plain negated inferences. These assumptions accord naturally with the grammatical approach to scalar implicatures. We also present experimental data that suggest that plain negated inferences are not only unnecessary for deriving distributive inferences, but might in fact be unavailable. (shrink)

Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that collective self-knowledge of vices is partially based (...) on evidence that a group can generate by performing internal promptings. Whereas these promptings are done mentally in individual self-knowledge, these promptings are done by interactions of group members in the collective case. The group can then acquire inferential self-knowledge of their vices based on the evidence generated by the interactions within the group. Groups thereby bring themselves into a position from which they can combat and change those vices intentionally. (shrink)

This paper addresses a theory of intergenerational justice that we refer to as “needs-based sufficientarianism”. According to needs-based sufficientarianism, the present generation ought to enable future generations to meet their basic needs — for example, their needs for drinkable water, food and health care. Our aim is to explain and defend this theory in a programmatic way. First, we introduce what we regard as the most plausible variant of needs-based sufficientarianism. Then we argue that this variant is superior to several (...) alternative ways of thinking about intergenerational justice. In particular, we defend basic needs as the currency of intergenerational justice and sufficiency as its principle. Our arguments for these claims are neither fully comprehensive nor fully conclusive. Yet, we hope that they suffice to show that needs-based sufficientarianism is a major contender, with significant pro tanto advantages over other views. (shrink)

Ethical statements and position papers on genome editing often refer to “the public” that should get involved, and a public discussion that should take place. It is not self-evident what this reference to the public means and why such a public engagement should take place. This chapter explores the concept of the public as discussed in key position papers on genome editing and puts it into relationship with the notion of the public in political theory. The fuzzy notion of the (...) public is presented in these statements on genome editing as a tool to solve problems and to allow for hitherto unheard points of view to be considered. It is sometimes understood as a general tool for reciprocal education and social self-determination. Other times still it is used in an instrumental way to gain public support and foster an environment friendly to research and innovation. There is disagreement about the aims, the reason, and the norms guiding public discussion and the possibility of a neutral form of communication. Last but not least awareness is required for the way the public debate is framed by the very use of “genome” and “editing” rather than other concepts. (shrink)

Fictionalists maintain that possible worlds, numbers or composite objects exist only according to theories which are useful but false. Hale, Divers and Woodward have provided arguments which threaten to show that fictionalists must be prepared to regard the theories in question as contingently, rather than necessarily, false. If warranted, this conclusion would significantly limit the appeal of the fictionalist strategy rendering it unavailable to anyone antecedently convinced that mathematics and metaphysics concern non-contingent matters. I try to show that their arguments (...) can be resisted by developing and defending a strategy suggested by Rosen, Nolan and Dorr, according to which the fiction-operator is to be analysed in terms of a counterfactual that admits of non-trival truth-values even when the antecedent is impossible. (shrink)

This chapter discusses a problematic relation between user-friendly design and manipulation. Some specific features of the design of a website can make it a more or less potent tool for manipulation. In particular, features that can be summed up as creating a user-friendly experience are also manipulation-friendly. The ease of using a website also makes it easier to be manipulated via the website. The chapter provides an argument that this can be explained as a less intellectually virtuous engagement with websites (...) that are more user-friendly. It is simply more difficult to mobilize suitable intellectual virtues when the website is quick and easy to use. For instance, when Google Search presents search results quickly and easily users become less intellectually cautious and independent than they ought to be. The chapter discusses a mechanism that links user-friendly design to an overly trusting attitude towards a website that leads to this intellectually careless behaviour. This link is support with empirical evidence based on processing fluency effects. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore an under-investigated question concerning the class of formal models that aim at providing normative guidance. We call such models normative models. In particular, we examine the question of how normative models can successfully exert normative guidance. First, we highlight the absence of a discussion of this question – which is surprising given the extensive debate about the success conditions of descriptive models – and motivate its importance. Second, we introduce and discuss two potential accounts of (...) the success conditions of normative models. Our tentative conclusion is that the second account is more promising. (shrink)