Building on the strengths of the first edition, the second edition of the Irwin Nicomachean Ethics features a revised translation (with little editorial intervention), expanded notes (including a summary of the argument of each chapter), an expanded Introduction, and a revised glossary.

This exceptional book examines and explains Plato's answer to the normative question, "How ought we to live?" It discusses Plato's conception of the virtues; his views about the connection between the virtues and happiness; and the account of reason, desire, and motivation that underlies his arguments about the virtues. Plato's answer to the epistemological question, "How can we know how we ought to live?" is also discussed. His views on knowledge, belief, and inquiry, and his theory of Forms, are examined, (...) insofar as they are relevant to his ethical view. Terence Irwin traces the development of Plato's moral philosophy, from the Socratic dialogues to its fullest exposition in the Republic. Plato's Ethics discusses Plato's reasons for abandoning or modifying some aspects of Socratic ethics, and for believing that he preserves Socrates' essential insights. A brief and selective discussion of the Statesmen, Philebus, and Laws is included. Replacing Irwin's earlier Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), this book gives a clearer and fuller account of the main questions and discusses some recent controversies in the interpretation of Plato's ethics. It does not presuppose any knowledge of Greek or any extensive knowledge of Plato. (shrink)

Exploring Aristotle's philosophical method and the merits of his conclusions, Irwin here shows how Aristotle defends dialectic against the objection that it cannot justify a metaphysical realist's claims. He focuses particularly on Aristotle's metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics, stressing the connections between doctrines that are often discussed separately.

Terence Irwin presents a historical and critical study of the development of moral philosophy over two thousand years, from ancient Greece to the Reformation. Starting with the seminal ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, he guides the reader through the centuries that follow, introducing each of the thinkers he discusses with generous quotations from their works. He offers not only careful interpretation but critical evaluation of what they have to offer philosophically. This is the first of three volumes (...) which will examine the history of ethics in the Socratic tradition, up to the late 20th century. (shrink)

The Gorgias is a vivid introduction to the central problems of moral and political philosophy. In the notes to his translation, Professor Irwin discusses the historical and social context of the dialogue, expounds and criticises the arguments, and tries above all to suggest the questions a modern reader ought to raise about Plato's doctrines. No knowledge of Greek is necessary.

Editor's IntroductionWhen Oxford University Press sent us the three enormous volumes of Irwin's The Development of Ethics, we had two thoughts: First, the book is very important and demands a review; second, since human sacrifice is abolished in North America, it will be very difficult to find a reviewer. We handed the volumes to several interested persons, who in the end returned the books saying the task was beyond them. Then, my wife, a lifetime worker at that center of (...) communal thought, the United Nations, suggested that we form a team to review the book. We put an announcement out on the Web, asking for reviewers to do a chapter each, at 250 words a review. We got several hundred volunteers, and chose 82 to review the 96 chapters of Irwin. We got 81 of 82 reviews, 75 before the deadline, six slightly later. For purposes of completeness, I filled in the sole missing review. Would that the students in my seminars were so punctual! I would like to thank Elyse Turr at Oxford University Press for the PDFs, and my 82 reviewers for their expertise and diligence. I am grateful to all the volunteers who showed an interest in this strange and perhaps unprecedented project, and who patiently endured the vetting process. Special thanks is due to Laura di Summa, who coordinated all the pieces of this incredible puzzle. Did we accomplish something, something new, by mobilizing 82 minds to review one book? I hope so, but I can now only say what they say on television: “America, it's up to you.”. (shrink)

The core of the fifth chapter is the study of the problems that appear to be involved in Socrates’ prospective. After a consideration of the difficulties that seem to emerge from Socrates’ instrumentalist approach to happiness, attention is devoted to the role played by the craft analogy. According to this analogy, virtue is similar to a craft since a knowledge of the means is necessary for a separate end. This doctrine is illustrated making reference to Aristotle because, although used by (...) Socrates, the craft analogy is never defined in the dialogues. (shrink)

Chapter 1 examines both what is Plato’s fundamental moral problem and how to read the Platonic dialogues as philosophical works. Concerning the former aspect, it is observed that Plato articulates the basic moral question, “What is the good life?” into two different problems: an epistemological one, “How ought we to live?” and a normative one, “How can we know how ought we to live?” Respecting the way Plato’s writings have to be interpreted, the so-called doctrinal approach is followed, i.e., the (...) most important doctrines are formulated by the principal speaker of the dialogue, while the other characters present several steps relevant for the argument. In conclusion, both Plato’s and Aristotle’s ways of interpreting Socrates’ theories are taken into account. (shrink)

The main task of chapter 3 is to consider how Socrates regards virtues. To start with, the aporetic character of Plato’s early dialogues is recalled. Then, it is investigated why Socrates refuses to define virtues in moral terms and rather prefers non-moral terms. Finally, a careful consideration of how Socrates evaluates some virtues and how he defines them is offered.

Chapter 4 focuses on the Euthydemus to discuss Socrates’ theories of happiness and wisdom. Firstly, it is pointed out that Socrates may be labelled as “eudamonist” because of the claim he makes in the Euthydemus that happiness is a general and not a particular virtue. Secondly, Socrates’ instrumentalist view according to which the different virtues may be means to one end, i.e., happiness, is examined. Thirdly, several arguments are discussed according to which Socrates demonstrates that wisdom is the only good.

The goal of chapter 2 is to analyse Socrates’ method. Firstly, it is argued that theSocratic method is not able to reach definitive conclusions. Secondly, it is shown that this occurs because of the use of real rather than nominal definitions. Finally, it is noted that, although this method cannot provide any proper knowledge, it constitutes a very good starting point to address moral problems with great care.

Covering over 1000 years of classical philosophy from Homer to Saint Augustine, this accessible, comprehensive study details the major philosophies and philosophers of the period--the Pre-Socratics, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Neoplatonism. Though the emphasis is on questions of philosophical interest, particularly ethics, the theory of knowledge, philosophy of mind, and philosophical theology, Irwin includes discussions of the literary and historical background to classical philosophy as well as the work of other important thinkers--Greek tragedians, historians, medical writers, and (...) early Christian writers. The most complete one-volume introduction to ancient philosophy available, the book will be an invaluable survey for students of philosophy and classics and general readers. (shrink)

Terence Irwin presents a historical and critical study of the development of moral philosophy over two thousand years, from ancient Greece to the Reformation. Starting with the seminal ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, he guides the reader through the centuries that follow, introducing each of the thinkers he discusses with generous quotations from their works. He offers not only careful interpretation but critical evaluation of what they have to offer philosophically. This is the first of three volumes (...) which will examine the history of ethics in the Socratic tradition, up to the late 20th century. (shrink)

Terence Irwin presents a historical and critical study of the entire development of Western moral philosophy. The first volume covers ancient and medieval thought; the second the early modern period; the third goes from the late 18th to the late 20th century. Irwin offers illuminating discussion of every important thinker in the history of ethics.

Aristotle''s account of vice presents a puzzle: (1) Viciouspeople must be guided by reason, since they act on decision(prohairesis), not on their non-rational desires. (2) And yet theycannot be guided by reason, since they are said to pay attention totheir non-rational part and not to live in accordance with reason. Wecan understand the conception of vice the reconciles these two claims,once we examine Aristotle''s account of (a) the pursuit of the fine andof the expedient; (b) the connexion between vice and (...) the pursuit ofpleasure; (c) the particular kind of regret to which the vicious personis subject. (shrink)

First Published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This Oxford Reader seeks to introduce some of the main philosophical questions raised by the Greek and Roman philosophers of classical antiquity. Selections from the writings of ancient philosophers are interspersed with Terence Irwin's incisive commentary, and sometimes with contributions from modern philosophers expounding relevant philosophical positions or discussing particular aspects of classical philosophy. The arrangement of the book is thematic, rather than chronological, allowing the reader to focus on philosophical problems and ideas, but a general introduction places (...) philosophers and schools within their historical context. Irwin brings together contributions which shaped debates about knowledge, freedom, ethics, politics, and religious belief - debates which continue to be contested today, 2500 years from their conception. (shrink)

Kant takes autonomy to be recognizably valuable. In claiming that non-Kantian views of morality treat the morally good will as heteronomous, he intends to present an objection to these views. He expects proponents of these views to recognize that the implication of heteronomy is a serious objection; his task is not to convince them that heteronomy is bad, but to convince them that their views imply heteronomy.

Scotus believes it is clear that the pursuit of happiness is not psychologically supreme. If the will necessarily pursued happiness, it follows that whenever both x and y are open, x rather than y promotes happiness. But Scotus replies that sometimes we are aware that x rather than y promotes happiness, but we can simply choose to pursue neither x nor y. If we suspend further action, we choose to be indifferent toward happiness. Scotus agrees with Anselm's argument from responsibility. (...) In his view, the affection for justice is nobler than the affection for advantage, because it causes us to will something that is not directed toward ourselves. It manifests freedom in the will, because an agent who is capable of choosing the just rather than the advantageous is not necessitated by nature to pursue only his own advantage. (shrink)

According to G.E.M Anscombe’s paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, modern moral philosophy has introduced a spurious concept of moral obligation, and has therefore made a mistake that the Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, avoided. Anscombe argues that the modern concepts of obligation, duty, and the moral ‘ought’ are the remnants of an earlier, but post-Aristotelian conception of ethics, and that they ought to be abandoned. An examination of Anscombe’s historical and philosophical claims shows that we have no reason to take them (...) seriously. In particular, they rest on a misinterpretation of Scholastic views on ‘ought’ and obligation. (shrink)

This is the second of three volumes which together comprise a selective historical and critical study of the development of moral philosophy. This volume covers ethics from the 16th to the 18th century, and features illuminating discussion of such great thinkers as Suarez, Grotius, Hobbes, Hutcheson, Hume, Reid, Butler, and Rousseau.

Chapter 8 contains a detailed discussion of the consequences that may be inferred by the doctrines discussed in the Gorgias. The position of the Gorgias recalls that of the Protagoras. Then, it is claimed that, although the Gorgias tries to refute the earlier dialogue’s hedonist view, Plato nevertheless still holds that happiness is the state in which all desires are fulfilled. Consequently, virtues are considered valuable only because they are means to attain a further end. Finally, it may be suggested (...) that the Gorgias makes a sort of transition from the early dialogues to the mature position of the Republic. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on how some crucial doctrines of the Republic are then developed in the Philebus. Firstly, the problem of whether pleasure or intelligence is the good in a more articulated way than the one of the Republic is treated. Secondly, the different types of knowledge and their role in the good life are examined. Thirdly, more generally, it is discussed how the Philebus presents a more exhaustive and precise account of what are, in Plato’s view, intelligence, pleasure, and (...) good. Finally, it is underlined how the Philebus is important for understanding the connection between Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethics. (shrink)

The main goal of chapter 18 is to emphasise the importance of love in the Republic but also more generally in Plato’s ethics. To begin with, it is considered how love is able to fill the gap between the rational and the irrational part of the soul. Thus, it is shown how love can be the key element to link self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. Finally, how love allows Plato to consider justice as a non-instrumental good is investigated.

The last chapter analyses how Plato’s ethical views are developed in the later dialogues. In the last dialogue Plato tries to harmonise the different virtues. The relations between pleasure, happiness, and desire are analysed. Finally, the role played by the cardinal virtues in the later dialogues is examined, in particular, a certain attention toward the condition of wisdom and how it is related to the other virtues.

Chapter 11 considers book I of the Republic and mainly treats the role book I plays in the dialogue. It is argued that book I is written to illustrate how the Socrates of the early dialogues would have tried to find a definition of justice. Hence, the goal of this book appears to show the limits of a certain way of searching for definitions and to dismiss it. The role of the other characters of book I--Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus-- is (...) relevant in order to describe fully the aporetic character of this approach. (shrink)

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a satisfactory account of Plato’s theory of justice. Firstly, a study of the role and the functions of the rational part of the soul are offered. Secondly, some crucial aspects of happiness are illustrated. These considerations are important to introduce the account on justice. Two kinds of justice are distinguished: psychic justice and common justice. The former expresses the relation between the different parts of the soul, whereas the latter refers to (...) the interaction among people. In conclusion, it is analysed why P-justice is self-regarding, while C-justice is other-regarding. (shrink)

In this chapter, Plato’s view of justice is presented, which possibly differs from Socrates’. Plato’s “sufficient thesis”, is compared with the “comparative thesis”, held by Glaucon and Adeimantus. A detailed discussion of all the relevant problems of book II, the relation between happiness and justice, is outlined. In conclusion, some aspects of Plato’s view are critically evaluated.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the moral relevance of the theory of the division of soul. Firstly, it is examined why it is impossible to reconcile this doctrine with instrumentalism. Secondly, how the desires of the three different parts of the soul may be harmonised is investigated. Thirdly, after an elaborate study of the different parts of the soul, the reasons for this tripartition of the soul are introduced. Finally, it is examined whether or not the partition (...) of the soul results in different kinds of happiness. (shrink)

The mature version of Plato’s doctrine of the virtue is examined through a detailed study of the several virtues. The theory of virtues expressed in the Republic represents a definitive improvement of the position of the early dialogues. Plato does not reduce any more virtues to something else but rather considers them as ends in themselves. This change is due to the different perspective according to which the definitions of the virtue have not to be expressed in non-moral language. Moreover, (...) a key role is played by the doctrines of the tripartition of the soul, which suggests virtue to be the condition of the soul in which each part acts properly. (shrink)