Pedro Abelardo apresenta na sua obra uma teoria da virtude de natureza, à primeira vista, aristotélica. Ao que parece, essa concepção também contém diferentes elementos estoicos, que não se opõem necessariamente à visão do Estagirita. Todavia, o essencial da interpretação da Escola do Pórtico acerca da virtude difere da explicação dada por Aristóteles. No presente estudo, pretendemos examinar, primeiro, a índole da virtude como habitus na obra de lógica de Abelardo. Nesse caso, não há dúvida de que predomina a influência (...) aristotélica. Em seguida, indicamos outras particularidades da virtude encontradas, desta vez, em tratados éticos e teológicos do nosso protagonista, as quais se revelam antes de caráter estoico. Em suma, projetamos identificar as diferentes fontes antigas e os principais intermediários latinos usados por Abelardo para elaborar a sua própria teoria da virtude. Trata-se de deixar clara a influência filosófica dominante em Abelardo sobre essa questão da virtude, já que este lógico não pode harmonizar teses substancialmente inconciliáveis. Peter Abelard in his work presents a theory of virtue, which is, at first sight, of Aristotelian nature. It seems that this view also contains different Stoic elements, but they are not necessarily opposed to Stagirite's vision. However, the essentials of the Stoa School about virtue differ from the explanation given by Aristotle. In this paper, we intend to examine, first, the nature of virtue as habitus in Abelard's work on logic. In this case, there is no doubt that Aristotle's influence on this topic predominates. Next, we specify other features related to virtue found, this time, in ethical and theological treatises of our protagonist that appear to be basically Stoic. In short, we want to identify the different ancient sources and the main Latin mediators used by Abelard to elaborate his own theory of virtue. In other words, we would like to shed light on the predominant philosophical authority on Abelard's theory of virtue since this logician cannot harmonize theses that are fundamentally irreconcilable. (shrink)

O VIIº Colóquio de História da Filosofia Medieval , realizado em novembro de 2009 em Brasília, foi dedicado ao tema: “Argumentação e interpretação na Filosofia Medieval”. Na ocasião, sete medievalistas brasileiros e estrangeiros encontraram-se para apresentar seu trabalho e discutir o assunto. O encontro foi possível graças à ajuda financeira do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília e da CAPES. Aproveitamos o espaço para agradecê-los. Apresentamos, no presente número temático, seis artigos ligados direta ou indiretamente a essa questão.

A ‘teoria da virtude’ contemporânea enfatiza a necessidade de voltar à formação moral do indivíduo, seguindo o modelo ético disponibilizado por Aristóteles. Segundo MacIntyre, representante importante dessa teoria, o estoicismo favoreceu o desenvolvimento da ética moderna e contemporânea, ao destacar noções como vontade, assentimento e lei natural ou divina. Por conseguinte, o desenvolvimento do próprio agente moral foi negligenciado. No século XII, Abelardo apresenta uma ética híbrida, que mantém, ao mesmo tempo, a teoria aristotélica da virtude e elementos da moral (...) estoica. No presente estudo, consideramos a crítica feita por MacIntyre da ética abelardiana, estimada ser na origem das concepções morais modernas e contemporâneas. (shrink)

Peter Abelard’s (1079-1142) conception of moral sin contains a fundamental element from Stoicism, which is the notion of “consent” (consensus). After the presentation of the essentials of that Abelardian theory, we return to the source of that same idea in ancient and imperial Stoicism. According to their main representatives, “consent” or “assent” (sugkata/qesij) has a determining function not only in ethics, but also in the process of knowledge as well. We emphasize in passing the resemblance between some important components of (...) Stoic epistemology and the theory expounded by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics on the origin of knowledge. Augustine represents without any doubt one of the main intermediaries through whom this notion of consent is transmitted up to the time of Abelard in the 12th century. Even if he was influenced by the Bishop of Hippo on moral questions in general, Abelard seems to distance himself from Augustine by considering that consent is more a rational matter than a volitional one. (shrink)

The intelectual virtue of discernment occupies a privileged position in Aristotle’s ethics, since it intervenes in judging and choosing the best option regarding our voluntary actions. As for the Stoics, the virtues are cognitions and can be reduced to only one. The person who possesses that unique virtue is called a ‘sage’ and is able to choose, for himself, the right action to reach happiness. Thus, we propose to discover if the Stoic sage can be compared to the prudent man (...) in Aristotle by examining some key ethical issues of theses philosophical schools. We conclude that the similar theses exceed the different ones, despite encountering a quite distinct vocabulary which deceives at first sight. (shrink)

The Stoic School takes up the tripartite division of philosophy of the post-Platonic Academy, in which physics occupies, alongside dialectics and ethics, a prominent place. In this tripartition, there is no metaphysics, nor in the two subdivisions of Stoic physics. For the thinkers of the Stoa, there is nothing beyond physics. In spite of this statement, we try to discover, in this article, the presence of a study devoted to first philosophy among the various topics investigated by the Stoics in (...) their physics. It is with this aim that we first examine what precisely Aristotle deals with in the Metaphysics. This preliminary investigation will serve as a point of reference for determining what can be considered as metaphysics, at least in ancient Greece. Afterwards, we are interested in the Stoic view of nature itself since nothing superior exists. This examination leads us to scrutinize the Stoic conception of the Good, a notion closely linked to the subject of physics. We then take a good look at each one of the topics found in the two Stoic divisions of physics, highlighting the matters approaching Aristotelian metaphysics. On that occasion, a specific analysis is devoted to the two Stoic principles, due notably to the relevance of the subject in relation to first philosophy. From the diversity of the elements found in the course of our study, we come to the final part, in which we establish the position of the Stoic School on metaphysics. (shrink)

Peter Abelard and William of Ockham represent the two main figures of the nominalism of the Middle Ages. Both share the fundamental thesis of that doctrine, according to which only individual entities exist. The repercussions of nominalism are quite evident in relation to the question of universals, which constitutes a subject that, until now, won the attention of the majority of contemporary studies on the two most important logicians of their time. Nevertheless the nominalism of each of these two protagonists (...) apparently diverges in a significant manner, especially in respect to the role exercised by the mind in the semantic process. Ockham seems to distance himself definitely from his predecessors, including Abelard, when he transfers grammar and semantic functions of conventional language to the level of mental language. In the present article, the chief intention is to expound the theory of sign and signification of each of the authors under consideration. The ultimate objective is to compare their respective semantic positions and indicate the principal points of agreement and disagreement, keeping in mind the hypothesis according to which these two medieval nominalists should have more theoretical elements in common than not. (shrink)

The central question raised in the present article concerns the ontological nature of the intentional act, previous to the proper moral action, in Aristotle’s and Abelard’s thinking. More precisely, we examine two subjects indirectly interconnected. First, we treat the secular problem of the exact nature of will (boulêsis) in Aristotle, which certainly refers to a rational act (logikos), the source of which is, however, the appetite (orexis). The second point is related to the notion of consent (consensus) in Abelard, which (...) also raises the question of its voluntary or rational ontological character. Both topics are connected in so far as the Abelardian consent is similar to the Aristotelian idea of choice (proairesis), and particularly to that of the Stoic assent (sunkatathesis), and not, as some commentators believe, to the Augustinian notion of will as a free and spontaneous act. This identification of the Abelardian consent with the Augustine’s will comes from a confusion, which is more terminological and perspectival than interpretative. (shrink)

Abelard closely follows the Augustinian view with regard to the notion of intention. However, he distances himself from him concerning the contribution of acts in the evaluation of moral responsibility. Independent thinker, the philosopher of the twelfth century, then, uses an ancient Stoic thesis according to which all actions are indifferent, except those related to virtue and vice. He also takes back another idea of the Stoa concerning, this time, the concept of will as habitus. In this paper, we first (...) expound Abelard’s position on these issues before presenting the main sources to which he has access directly. (shrink)

Le premier texte, traduit sous le titre Ethics, comporte deux livres dont le second, très bref, est incomplet. Dans le premier, Abélard traite essentiellement de questions qui tournent autour de la notion de faute morale. Il tente d’abord de préciser la nature exacte de cette faute, ce qui lui permet notamment de la démarquer du désir ou de la volonté mauvaise, du vice et de l’acte funeste. Le péché est alors proprement défini comme étant le fruit d’un consentement à ce (...) qui ne convient pas, qu’Abélard ramène finalement à un mépris de Dieu, à un mépris de sa volonté s’entend. Maître Pierre signale par la suite les trois principales étapes — penitence, confession, atonement — qui nous permettent sinon de nous détacher entièrement de nos fautes commises, du moins d’accomplir les gestes qui en atténueront la portée. La très brève section du second livre de l’Ethica est consacrée à la notion de vertu qui est définie, dans la lignée aristotélicienne, comme un état excellent de l’esprit. Ce qui retient habituellement le plus l’attention des historiens de la pensée dans cet ouvrage est l’accent mis à la fois sur la notion de consentement au mal, qui distingue clairement la faute morale d’autres manifestations humaines mauvaises, ainsi que sur celle d’intentio qui n’est le plus souvent que le pendant du consentement dans le bien. (shrink)

Na sua obra, Pedro Abelardo (1079-1142) destaca duas noções metafísicas que fundamentam sua teoria lógica: o status e o dictum propositionis , ao causar, respectivamente, a imposição ( impositio ) dos termos universais e o valor de verdade das proposições. Trata-se de expressões que se referem a naturezas ontológicas peculiares, na medida em que não são consideradas coisas ( res ), mesmo que constituem causas. Todavia, também não são nada. Abelardo as chama de ‘quase coisas’ ( quasi res ). No (...) presente artigo, explicamos, primeiro, essas duas noções essenciais da lógica abelardiana, antes de tentar, em seguida, encontrar a fonte dessa metafísica particular. Em oposição a comentadores importantes da lógica de Abelardo, que estimam que haja uma forte influência platônica sobre essa concepção específica, defendemos antes, com apoio de textos significativos e de acordo com o nominalismo abelardiano, que a maior ascendência sobre a metafísica do nosso autor é a do estoicismo, sobretudo, antigo. (shrink)

Le désir raisonnant ou, si l’on préfère, l’intellect désirant constitue un point d’ancrage crucial pour toute discussion se rapportant à la vie pratique. D’un point de vue à la fois historique et philosophique, l’apport d’Aristote représente non seulement une systématisation élaborée de cette question relative au principe de l’action morale, mais la position théorique qu’il défend demeure une référence pertinente et pose encore de nos jours un défi d’interprétation. Dans la longue série d’études consacrées à ce thème depuis les tout (...) premiers commentateurs aristotéliciens, il faut désormais compter celles qui furent présentées «lors d’une série de réunions de travail de professeurs de philosophie de l’Académie de Versailles», et que réunit Jean-Yves Chateau dans ce recueil. L’importance du livre VI pour la compréhension globale de l’éthique et de la philosophie d’Aristote est décisive, comme le souligne Chateau dans la présentation initiale de l’ouvrage: «Si nous ne le possédions pas [le livre VI], l’intelligibilité de sa pensée [d’Aristote] serait compromise ou très largement indéterminée [...]». Constituant l’un des trois livres communs à l’Éthique à Nicomaque et à l’Éthique à Eudème, le livre VI propose avant tout des éléments essentiels aux questions relatives à la coexistence de l’intellect et de l’agir moral. Le caractère bien délimité du thème du recueil rend possible une discussion à la fois élaborée et exhaustive. (shrink)

Leibniz comprenait la question pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose plutot que rien? sur un mode ontologique; il l'interpretait dans le cadre d'une physique continue, lineaire et necessaire; et il y repondait en invoquant le principe de raison suffisante. Nous comprenons desormais cette question sur un mode non ontologique, en substituant une notion relativiste et pragmatiste de realite a la notion absolue d'etre; nous l'interpretons dans le cadre d'une physique discontinue, non lineaire et probabiliste; et nous y repondons en denoncant, sur (...) un mode non sceptique, le principe de raison suffisante. Operer un tel renversement de l'analyse leibnizienne ne suffit toutefois pas. Car nous restons dans le cadre de la logique binaire adoptee par Leibniz, a savoir l'opposition entre le quelque chose (1) et le rien (0)... (shrink)

This book explores international trends in naming and contributes to the growing field of critical onomastic enquiry. The contributors to this publication examine why names are not only symbols of a person or place, but also manifestations of cultural, linguistic and social heritage in their own right.

Adorno’s reading of Hegel’s theory of civil society shapes his way of addressing the core question of his critical theory of society: “Why do social crises not lead to social transformation?” Our chapter investigates the philosophical innovations at the heart of Hegel’s and Adorno’s respective approaches to the problems revealed by the antagonisms of civil society. We will do this by asking the questions: 1. How does Hegel conceive of the antagonistic structure of civil society? 2. How does Hegel conceive (...) of the way civil society addresses crises of legitimacy? 3. How does Adorno think of the way modern welfare states silence crises of legitimacy? 4. How does Adorno’s conception of Bannkreis aim to illuminate the root structure of how all antagonistic societies silence crises of legitimacy? We will thereby focus on the basic antagonism at work in both Adorno’s and Hegel’s theories of society: the antagonism between the overwhelming power of social orders over individuals, and the fragile power of individuals to demand legitimacy from their social orders. First, we will briefly sketch Adorno’s surprisingly affirmative reading of Hegel’s theory of civil society. We then go on to assess what role antagonism plays in the latter. We will argue that Hegel sees education (Bildung) as the central operator in reconciling the antagonisms of civil society. This will allow us to take a new look at Adorno’s social theory as tracing Bannkreis through a plurality of models, which discloses the reproduction of the social totality as a form of counter-education (Halbbildung). We ultimately argue that Adorno conceptualises Bannkreis as an answer to the question of Hegel’s account of world-spirit that revives the insights of Hegel’s conception of civil society. We conclude by taking a closer look at how Bildung turns into the counter-education of Bannkreis, and what potential for socially transformative practice this dialogue between Adorno and Hegel uncovers. (shrink)

Psychiatry presents a unique array of difficult ethical questions. However, a major challenge is to approach psychiatry in a way that does justice to the real ethical issues. Recently there has been a growing body of research in empirical psychiatric ethics, and an increased interest in how empirical and philosophical methods can be combined. Empirical Ethics in Psychiatry demonstrates how ethics can engage more closely with the reality of psychiatric practice and shows how empirical methodologies from the social sciences can (...) help foster this link. -/- The book is divided into two sections. In the first section there are discussions of the possibility of empirical ethics from a theoretical standpoint and an overview of the history of empirical medical ethics in general. The second, larger section is made up of chapters, discussing specific research projects in empirical psychiatric ethics. The contributors reflect on their choice of method: how and why they combine empirical and philosophical work, and how the two approaches relate to each other. The chapters in the second part thus have two purposes. The first is to present examples of empirical ethics in psychiatry; the second is to reflect on the way in which empirical research can support ethical analysis. -/- Empirical Ethics in Psychiatry is a unique contribution to bioethics and will be fascinating reading for all those working within the field, as well as mental health care professionals. (shrink)

The ML community recognizes the importance of anticipating and mitigating the potential negative impacts of benchmark research. In this position paper, we argue that more attention needs to be paid to areas of ethical risk that lie at the technical and scientific core of ML benchmarks. We identify overlooked structural similarities between human IQ and ML benchmarks. Human intelligence and ML benchmarks share similarities in setting standards for describing, evaluating and comparing performance on tasks relevant to intelligence. This enables us (...) to unlock lessons from feminist philosophy of science scholarship that need to be considered by the ML benchmark community. Finally, we outline practical recommendations for benchmark research ethics and ethics review. (shrink)

Drawing on compelling material from research interviews with former hostages and political prisoners, Guy Saunders reworks three classic thought experiment stories: Parfit's 'Teleporter', Nagel's 'What is it like to be a bat?' and Jackson's 'Mary the colour scientist' to form a fresh look at the study of consciousness. By examining consciousness from a social psychology perspective, Saunders develops a 'cubist psychology of consciousness' through which he challenges the accepted wisdom of mainstream approaches by arguing that people can act freely. What (...) makes 'cubist psychology' is both the many examples taken from different viewpoints and the multiple ways of looking at the key issues of person, mind and world. This is a unique and engaging book that will appeal to students and academics in the field of consciousness studies and other readers with an interest in consciousness. (shrink)

L’éthique engage un jugement de valeur absolu et c’est la raison pour laquelle Wittgenstein, conscient que tout sens est relatif, l’estimait indicible. On peut vouloir revenir à une perspective métaphysique pour penser l’éthique, et la construire – comme avait pu le faire Spinoza en son temps – sur la base d’une théorie de la substance absolue. On peut aussi comprendre l’absolu relativement, comme le résultat d’un processus d’abstraction. L’approche n’est plus ontologique, mais sémantique. Telle est notre voie, qui ouvre un (...) espace non encore exploré par la tradition. Die Ethik nimmt für sich in Anspruch, ein Urteil von absoluter Geltung zu fällen, und aus diesem Grund hielt Wittgenstein - im Bewusstsein, dass jede Meinung relativ ist – es für unmöglich, über Ethik zu sprechen. Man kann sich vornehmen, zu einer metaphysischen Perspektive zurückzukehren, um die Ethik zu denken, und man kann sie konstruieren – wie es Spinoza in seiner Zeit vermochte – auf der Grundlage einer Theorie der absoluten Substanz. Man kann auch das Absolute in relativer Weise verstehen, als das Ergebnis eines Prozesses der Abstraktion. Der Gang der Untersuchung ist dann nicht mehr ontologisch, sondern semantisch. Dies ist unser Weg; er öffnet einen Raum, den die Tradition noch nicht erkundet hat. (shrink)

This book studies the occurrence (or not) of a case of circular reasoning in Kant's attempt to establish the foundation of knowledge. The response to this question instigates a commentary on the transcendental deduction of the categories, which lie at the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason, in both the 1781 and 1787 editions.

Le Commentaire du Traité de l'âme d'Aristote par Thomas d'Aquin est le cinquième des commentaires fondamentaux des oeuvres d'Aristote traduits en langue française. Avec celui des Physiques, de la Métaphysique, de l'Interprétation et des Analytiques, il fonde l'édifice de la philosophie de Thomas d'Aquin et assure les contreforts de sa théologie. Ce traité se présente comme un vaste essai de définition de l'âme et principalement de l'âme humaine, avec en filigrane, une question lancinante : cette âme est-elle immortelle? Si ce (...) traité est l'un des plus courts d'Aristote, et selon ses propres termes, encore à l'état d'ébauche, il est construit avec une rigueur méthodologique qui en fait une sorte de modèle pour toute réflexion philosophique. Thomas propose une explication reconnue comme des plus limpides, et introduit à un livre encore loué deux millénaires plus tard par Hegel, Marx ou Darwin. Comme le reste de l'oeuvre d'Aristote, il connaît aujourd'hui un regain d'intérêt remarquable et le commentaire de Thomas offre un guide très sûr pour son intelligence. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage propose d'unifier les sciences de l'homme entre elles et avec la philosophie en les articulant grâce à trois concepts fondamentaux: forme, sens et historicité.

Dans le sillage de la pensée rawlsienne, plusieurs défenseurs du « coopérativisme » soutiennent que l’étendue de la justice est strictement nationale et non mondiale. Dans cet article, nous défendons l’idée que la coopération internationale, malgré son caractère tantôt informel, tantôt imparfait, n’en est pas moins fondamentale, et qu’elle génère bel et bien une exigence égalitaire. Nous appuierons cette thèse par un examen attentif du rôle joué par le patrimoine cognitif mondial. Dans l’économie du savoir qui est la nôtre, ce (...) qui fait la richesse d’une société est l’ensemble de ses savoir-faire, techniques productives, etc. Mais le savoir est un bien public mondial puisque son partage ne s’arrête pas aux frontières nationales. Ainsi, la simple possibilité de créer la moindre richesse – au niveau prétendument « national » – dépend d’entrée de jeu d’un produit coopératif mondial. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges facing current generations is the environmental and climate crisis. Democracies, so far, have not distinguished themselves by their capacity to bring about appropriate political responses to these challenges. This is partly explicable in terms of a lack of state capacity in a globalized context. Yet we also argue that election-centered democracies suffer from several flaws that make them inapt to deal with this challenge properly: youth is not appropriately represented; parliaments suffer from a lack of (...) diversity; elected representatives’ time-horizon is too narrow; anti-regulation lobbies have too much influence. Considering this, we argue for rejuvenating our democratic systems by introducing a randomly selected legislative chamber, which would be permanently integrated to our political systems and would play a deliberative and scrutinizing role. We have identified four eco-political arguments in favor of such reform. The generational rebalancing argument, which we examine first, has some plausibility but is not the strongest. The other three arguments – its eco-epistemic promises; its wider time horizon; and the independence of its members from short-term corporate interests – however, appear to us to be much more convincing. (shrink)

So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...) theory of well-being (the desire-fulfilment theory). Fourth, I try to defuse the worry that objective-list theories are problematically arbitrary and show how the theory can and should be developed. (shrink)

Lire Spinoza au XXIe siècle en relisant une vie contemporaine? C'est se résoudre à regarder le monde sans fausses craintes ni faux espoirs. Amender les évidences, les opinions savantes et publiques. Regarder le monde en comprenant que chaque chose y est singulière. Plus les choses singulières sont intelligées, plus la nature infinie l'est. Ce thème éclaire les rapports entre imagination et connaissance, durée et éternité, ou encore écologie globale et nature de la liberté. On ne peut ni connaître ni donc (...) aimer l'infini comme tel, seulement les choses singulières connaissables, dans la proximité immense de la part d'univers de l'homme. (shrink)

Well-being occupies a central role in ethics and political philosophy, including in major theories such as utilitarianism. It also extends far beyond philosophy: recent studies into the science and psychology of well-being have propelled the topic to centre stage, and governments spend millions on promoting it. We are encouraged to adopt modes of thinking and behaviour that support individual well-being or 'wellness'. What is well-being? Which theories of well-being are most plausible? In this rigorous and comprehensive introduction to the topic, (...) Guy Fletcher unpacks and assesses these questions and many more, including: Are pleasure and pain the only things that affect well-being? Is desire-fulfilment the only thing that makes our lives go well? Can something be good for someone who does not desire it? Is well-being fundamentally connected to a distinctive human nature? Is happiness all that makes our lives go well? Is death necessarily bad for us? How is the well-being of a whole life related to well-being at particular times? Also included is a glossary of key terms, and annotated further reading and study and comprehension questions follow each chapter, making _The Philosophy of Well-Being_ essential reading for students in ethics and political philosophy, and also suitable for those in related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology. (shrink)

Faire comprendre la genèse et la construction de la pensée de Platon, et la méthode inédite qu’il met au point pour penser, tel est l’objet de ce livre. Riche de ses débats avec de grands penseurs de l’Antiquité : Pythagore, Héraclite, Parménide, Gorgias... la dialectique platonicienne, alliant exigence de vérité et recherche d’efficacité, invente ainsi la philosophie. Découvrir la force et les enjeux de cette invention permet d’explorer, aussi, le sens qu’une histoire de la philosophie peut avoir aujourd’hui, et les (...) défis qu’elle porte en elle. (shrink)

An increasing number of regulations propose the notion of ‘AI audits’ as an enforcement mechanism for achieving transparency and accountability for artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Despite some converging norms around various forms of AI auditing, auditing for the purpose of compliance and assurance currently have little to no agreed upon practices, procedures, taxonomies, and standards. We propose the ‘criterion audit’ as an operationalizable compliance and assurance external audit framework. We model elements of this approach after financial auditing practices, and argue (...) that AI audits should similarly provide assurance to their stakeholders about AI organizations’ ability to govern their algorithms in ways that mitigate harms and uphold human values. We discuss the necessary conditions for the criterion audit, and provide a procedural blueprint for performing an audit engagement in practice. We illustrate how this framework can be adapted to current regulations by deriving the criteria on which ‘bias audits’ for hiring algorithms can be performed, as required by the recently effective New York City Local Law 144 of 2021. We conclude by offering critical discussion on the benefits, inherent limitations, and implementation challenges of applying practices of the more mature financial auditing industry to AI auditing where robust guardrails against quality assurance issues are only starting to emerge. Our discussion as informed by experiences in performing these audits in practice highlights the critical role that an audit ecosystem plays in ensuring the effectiveness of such methodology. (shrink)

This chapter is divided into three parts. First I outline what makes something an objective list theory of well-being. I then go on to look at the motivations for holding such a view before turning to objections to these theories of well-being.

The concept of well-being is one of the oldest and most important topics in philosophy and ethics, going back to ancient Greek philosophy and Aristotle. Following the boom in happiness studies in the last few years it has moved to centre stage, grabbing media headlines and the attention of scientists, psychologists and economists. Yet little is actually known about well-being and it is an idea often poorly articulated. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being provides a comprehensive, outstanding guide and (...) reference source to the key topics and debates in this exciting subject. Comprising over forty chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into six parts: well-being in the history of philosophy current theories of well-being, including hedonism, and perfectionism examples of well-being and its opposites, including friendship and virtue and pain and death theoretical issues such as well-being and value, harm, identity and well-being and children well-being in moral and political philosophy well-being and related subjects including law, economics, and medicine. Essential reading for students and researchers in ethics and political philosophy, it will also be an invaluable resource for those in related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology. (shrink)