Related categories
Subcategories:
194 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 194
Material to categorize
  1. Metaethics After Moore (2008). The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Utilitas 20 (4).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. S. Ahmed (1999). `She'll Wake Up One of These Days and Find She's Turned Into a Nigger': Passing Through Hybridity. Theory, Culture and Society 16 (2):87-106.
    In this article, I examine racial narratives of passing and their relationship to discourses of hybridity. Rather than defining passing as inherently transgressive, or as one side of identity politics or the other, I suggest that passing must be understood in relationship to forms of social antagonism. I ask the following questions: how are differences that threaten the system recuperated? How do ambiguous or hybrid bodies get read in a way which further supports the enunciative power of those who are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Andrew Altman (2003). Review of Joseph Raz's Value, Respect and Attachment. Utilitas 15 (3):376-378.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Gregory J. Anderson (1999). A Fitting 50th Celebration. BioScience 49 (12):943-943.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Charles M. Bakewell (1904). Professor Strong on the Passing Thought. Philosophical Review 13 (5):552-559.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Matt Bedke (2011). Passing the Deontic Buck. Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6 6:128.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Borden Parker Bowne (1923). The Passing of Educational Fiatism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (2):77.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. W. J. Brown (1903). The Passing of Conviction. Hibbert Journal 2:553.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Brenda Brueggemann (2006). Interlude 1: On (Almost) Passing. In Lennard J. Davis (ed.), The Disability Studies Reader. Psychology Press. 321--330.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. K. Bykvist (2009). No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails. Mind 118 (469):1-30.
    Understanding value in terms of fitting attitudes is all the rage these days. According to this fitting attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis for short) what is good is what it is fitting to favour in some sense. Many aspects of the FA-analysis have been discussed. In particular, a lot of discussion has been concerned with the wrong-reason objection: it can be fitting to have an attitude towards something for reasons that have nothing to do with the value the thing has (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jonathan Dancy (2005). Should We Pass the Buck? In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 33--44.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Julia Driver (2011). Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Pp. 178. Utilitas 23 (2):235-237.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Guy Fletcher (2013). A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being. Utilitas 25 (2):206-220.
    So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Adolf Grünbaum (1963). Comments on Professor Roger Buck's Paper "Reflexive Predictions.". Philosophy of Science 30 (4):370-372.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Pamela Hieronymi, Research Overview.
    In this document I survey my work to date (i.e., to September 2010) and connect it to the larger themes that have been animating it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Joyce L. Jenkins (2011). Dead and Gone. Utilitas 23 (2):228-234.
    I argue that desire satisfaction theories of welfare are not committed to the view that changes in welfare levels can happen after death, or that events that occur after death impact the agent's welfare levels now. My argument is that events that occur after death have only epistemological import. They may reveal that the person was successful (unsuccessful) in life, but the desire was already frustrated or satisfied before the person died. The virtue of the account is that it gives (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jens Johansson & Karl Ekendahl (2013). Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins. Utilitas 26 (2):1-3.
    In a recent article, Joyce L. Jenkins challenges the common belief that desire satisfactionists are committed to the view that a person's welfare can be affected by posthumous events. Jenkins argues that desire satisfactionists can and should say that posthumous events only play an epistemic role: though such events cannot harm me, they can reveal that I have already been harmed by something else. In this response, however, we show that Jenkins's approach collapses into the view she aims to avoid.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Mark Johnson (2014). Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding From the Perspective of Cognitive Science. University of Chicago Press.
    What is the difference between right and wrong? This is no easy question to answer, yet we constantly try to make it so, frequently appealing to some hidden cache of cut-and-dried absolutes, whether drawn from God, universal reason, or societal authority. Combining cognitive science with a pragmatist philosophical framework in Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science, Mark Johnson argues that appealing solely to absolute principles and values is not only scientifically unsound but even morally suspect. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (2003). Can Scanlon Avoid Redundancy by Passing the Buck? Analysis 63 (4):328–331.
    Scanlon suggests a buck-passing account of goodness. To say that something is good is not to give a reason to, say, favour it; rather it is to say that there are such reasons. When it comes to wrongness, however, Scanlon rejects a buck-passing account: to say that j ing is wrong is, on his view, to give a sufficient moral reason not to j. Philip Stratton-Lake 2003 argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his (Scanlon’s) view of wrongness (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. In J. Myung & Mark A. Pitt (2003). Model Fitting. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Péter Nádas (2005). The Citizen of the World and the Buck Goat. Common Knowledge 11 (1):8-17.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Jonas Olson (2013). Buck‐Passing Accounts. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Philip Pettit (2012). A Question for Tomorrow: The Robust Demands of the Good. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 7 (3):7-12.
  24. Engaging Reason (2006). Darwall on Rational Care. Utilitas 18 (4).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Kathryn Rummell (2007). Rewriting the Passing Novel: Danzy Senna's< Em> Caucasia. The Griot 26 (2).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Dave Salerno (2005). Versatile Buck-Boost Converter Offers High Efficiency in a Wide Variety of Applications. In Alan F. Blackwell & David MacKay (eds.), Power. Cambridge University Press. 10--1.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Lars Samuelsson (2013). The Right Version of 'the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'. Utilitas 25 (3):383-404.
    In a recent article in Utilitas, Gerald Lang suggests a solution to the so-called (WKR problem) for the buck-passing account of value. In two separate replies to Lang, Jonas Olson and John Brunero, respectively, point out serious problems with Lang's suggestion, and at least Olson concludes that the solution Lang opts for is of the wrong kind for solving the WKR problem. I argue that while both Olson and Brunero have indeed identified considerable flaws in Lang's suggestion for a solution (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Fritz Senn (forthcoming). " In the Original": Buck Mulligan and Stephen Dedalus. Arion.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Yonatan Shemmer (2011). Full Information, Well-Being, and Reasonable Desires. Utilitas 23 (2):206-227.
    According to Railton: x is good for me iff my Fully Informed Self (FIS) while contemplating my situation would want me to want x. I offer four interpretations of this view. The first three are inadequate. Their inadequacy rests on the following two facts: (a) my FIS cannot want me to want what would be irrational for me to want, (b) when contemplating what is rational for me to want we must specify a particular way in which I could rationally (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Michael Smith (2013). The Ideal of Orthonomous Action, or the How and Why of Buck-Passing. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. 50.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Michael Smith (2013). Why of Buck—Passing. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. 50.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Philip Stratton-Lake (2013). Dancy on Buck-Passing. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Ryan Tanner (2008). Ouch, That Doesn't Fit There. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:419-426.
    According to the “fitting-attitudes” (FA) account of value, for a thing to be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude. Value here is analyzed in terms of reasons for and against favoring, admiring, desiring, preferring, loving, etc. a thing. Whichever particular FA analysis you prefer, the basic idea is just that a thing’s value depends on extant reasons to be favorably (or disfavorably) disposed toward it. Of course, proponents of FA analyses deny that just any (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. I. Terminology (2010). JS Mill's Conception of Utility. Utilitas 22 (1).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Cain Todd (2012). Fitting Attitudes And Essentially Contestable Concepts. Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Flynn Tom (2003). No Passing. Free Inquiry 23 (3):26.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit, Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Pp. IX + 231. Utilitas 21 (4):532-535.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Buck-Passing Accounts of Moral Value
  1. Michael Brady (ed.) (2011). New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Metaethics occupies a central place in analytical philosophy, and the last forty years has seen an upsurge of interest in questions about the nature and practice of morality. This collection presents original and ground-breaking research on metaethical issues from some of the very best of a new generation of philosophers working in this field.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Michael S. Brady (2008). Value and Fitting Emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4):465-475.
  3. Johan Brännmark (2009). Goodness, Values, Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):329 - 343.
    Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like "good" or "valuable", the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Franz Brentano (1990). L'origine de la connaissance morale (1889). Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 95 (1):3 - 32.
  5. Franz Brentano (1889/1969). The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. Routledge.
    First published in 1969. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Franz Brentano (1889). Vom Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis. Duncker & Humblot.
    Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Ein Vortrag. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittl, Erkenntnis, 1 I. Die Einladung zu einem Vortrage, welche die Iuristische Gesellschaft Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis Ein Vortrag Seite Wert der Geschichte und ...
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. C. D. Broad (1942). Certain Features in Moore's Ethical Doctrines. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston and Chicago.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Antoine C. Dussault (2014). Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.
    This paper examines the debate as to whether something can have final value in virtue of its relational (i.e., non-intrinsic) properties, or, more briefly put, whether final value must be intrinsic. The paper adopts the perspective of the fitting-attitude analysis (FA analysis) of value, and argues that from this perspective, there is no ground for the requirement that things may have final value only in virtue of their intrinsic properties, but that there might be some grounds for the alternate requirement (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Richard Yetter Chappell (2012). Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.
    This paper draws on the 'Fitting Attitudes' analysis of value to argue that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorising. Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye colours are normatively on a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Timothy Chappell (2001). J. J. Kupperman, Value … And What Follows, New York, OUP, 1999, Pp. Vi + 168. Utilitas 13 (03):373-.
  11. Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Brentano's Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion. Revue Interntionale de Philosophie 20 (4):395-415.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Philip Cook (2008). An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck. Utilitas 20 (4):490-507.
    Roger Crisp has inspired two important criticisms of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. I defend buck-passing from the wrong kind of reasons criticism, and the reasons and the good objection. I support Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's dual role of reasons in refuting the wrong kind of reasons criticism, even where its authors claim it fails. Crisp's reasons and the good objection contends that the property of goodness is buck-passing in virtue of its formality. I argue that Crisp conflates general and formal (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Christian Coons (2012). Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal Value. [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (1):183-188.
1 — 50 / 194