To recapitulate some of the points of Darwin's theory. It is worth distinguishing three things that might be said to have evolved in the history of mankind: 1. the body, 2. the inherited intellectual and moral capacities of individuals (if any are inherited), and 3. the social system, including culture. (Culture: what is learnt during the individual's life from other people.) Let us tie down the term 'evolve': in the present context it does not mean any and every sort of (...) development, but specifically change worked by selection, like the change produced over generations by plant and animal breeders. Thus it could be said that any good book contributes to human cultural 'evolution' (in a broad sense), but cultural evolution in this narrower sense will only be development due to the differing powers of competing cultures to propagate themselves through generations. Thus the invention of an easier to learn system of writing would contribute to cultural evolution, by making this culture easier to propagate: but probably not the publishing of a good book. One more terminological point: let us say that an individual or group is a 'bearer' of a characteristic if it is capable of passing it on to the next generation. (shrink)

What is philosophy about? According to the author of this work it is fundamentally the answer to the question: 'What can I know?' T. H. Huxley , the distinguished English scientist and disciple of Darwin, succeeds in giving a clear and succinct account of the way in which Scottish philosopher David Hume answered this question. The book is divided into two parts: in the first, Huxley provides the reader with a sketch of Hume's life, but the main emphasis (...) of the book is in Part 2, where by expounding Hume's views on the object of philosophy, consciousness, theology, language and free will, Huxley guides the reader towards an understanding of how Hume's philosophical principles can be regarded as a search for the ultimate element out of which all valid knowledge may be shown to emerge. (shrink)

Introduction: historical and critical, by J. Huxley.--Prolegomena, written by T. H. Huxley as an introd. to Evolution and ethics.--Evolution and ethics, Romanes lecture delivered by T. H. Huxley in 1893.--Evolutionary ethics, Romanes lecture delivered by J. Huxley in 1943.--The vindication of Darwinism, by J. Huxley (1945)--Conclusion, by J. Huxley.

“This is the enemy of true progress-this. belief that things have been already settled for is and the consequent result of considering proposals not on their merits but in reference to a system of principles which is for the most part a survival from primitive civilizations.” JULIAN HUXLEY.

Preface 9 PART I: RELIGIOUS, SCIENTIFIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND Introduction to Part I 19 1. The Bible 27 2. Natural Theology 33 William Paley 3. On the Origin of Species 38 Charles Darwin 4. Objections to Mr. Darwin’s Theory of the Origin of Species 65 Adam Sedgwick 5. The Origin of Species 73 Thomas H. Huxley 6. What Is Darwinism? 82 Charles Hodge 7. Darwinism as a Metaphysical Research Program 105 Karl Popper 8. Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Biology 116 (...) Michael Ruse 9. Human Nature: One Evolutionist’s View 136 Francisco Ayala 10. Universal Darwinism 158 Richard Dawkins PART II: CREATION SCIENCE AND THE McLEAN CASE Introduction to Part II 187 11. The Creationists 192 Ronald L. Numbers 12. Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evidence 231 Duane T. Gish 13. Witness Testimony Sheet: McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education 253 Michael Ruse 14. United States District Court Opinion: McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education 279 Judge William R. Overton 15. The Demise of the Demarcation Problem 312 Larry Laudan 16. Science at the BarùCauses for Concern 331 Larry Laudan 17. Pro Judice 337 Michael Ruse 18. More on Creationism 345 Larry Laudan 19. Commentary: Philosophers at the BarùSome Reasons for Restraint 350 Barry R. Gross PART III: INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND THE KITZMILLER CASE Introduction to Part III 369 20. But Isn’t It Creationism? The Beginnings of "Intelligent Design" in the Midst of the Arkansas and Louisiana Litigation 377 Nick Matzke 21. What Is Darwinism? 414 Phillip E. Johnson 22. Is It Science Yet? Intelligent Design, Creationism, and the Constitution 426 Matthew Brauer, Barbara Forrest, and Steven G. Gey 23. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District Expert Witness Testimony 434 Michael Behe 24. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District Expert Report 456 Robert T. Pennock 25. A Step toward the Legalization of Science Studies 485 Steve Fuller 26. What Is Wrong with Intelligent Design? 495 Elliott Sober 27. United States District Court Memorandum Opinion: Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al. 506 Judge John E. Jones II 28. Can’t Philosophers Tell the Difference between Science and Religion? Demarcation Revisited 536 Robert T. Pennock. (shrink)

Sir Julian Huxley (1887-1975), celebrated British scientist and philosopher, strove through most of his career to establish a non-theistic, rationalist belief system to replace Christianity and other world religions. Believing that the twentieth century provided a unique opportunity for this to happen, evolutionary humanism, as he termed his secular faith, gave direction to most of Huxley's diverse activities as a public intellectual. Rooted in evolutionary science, combined with Idealism, liberal values and a profound belief in progress, Huxley's (...) vision was also suffused with a strong desire for unity in human affairs. This paper examines that quest for unity, the purposes it served, and its reception. (shrink)

T. H. Huxley (1825-1895) was not only an active protagonist in the religious and scientific upheaval that followed the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution but also a harbinger of the sociobiological debates about the implications of evolution that are now going on. His seminal lecture Evolution and Ethics, reprinted here with its introductory Prolegomena, argues that the human psyche is at war with itself, that humans are alienated in a cosmos that has no special reference to their needs, (...) and that moral societies are of necessity in conflict with the natural conditions of their existence. Seen in the light of current understanding of the mechanisms of evolution, these claims remain as controversial today as they were when Huxley proposed them. In this volume George Williams, one of the best-known evolutionary biologists of our time, asserts that recent biological ideas and data justify a more extreme condemnation of the "cosmic process" than Huxley advocated and more extreme denial that the forces that got us here are capable of maintaining a viable world. James Paradis, an expert in Victorian studies, has written an introduction that sets the celebrated lecture in the context of cultural history, revealing it to be an impressive synthesis of Victorian thinking, as well as a challenge to eighteenth-century assumptions about the harmony of of nature. With Huxley's lecture as a focal point, the three parts of this book unite philosophy and science in a shared quest that recalls their common origins as systems of knowledge. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

From the time of its discovery, evolutionary theory has been shaped into dramatic narratives with human goals and value structures. Why has it been treated this way, often by its scientific proponents? Modern evolutionary psychology provides an answer. By appealing to universal human concerns, stories help map out the physical and social world, imbuing it with positive and negative values, visions of desirable and undesirable ways of life. Evolutionary theory contains no such imaginative mapping. As a nonmythological account of humanity, (...) it poses a universal challenge to the human mind, even as it stimulates by revealing unimagined facts. Darwin's contemporaries were the first to negotiate that balance. The new human self-narratives they created can help us understand the challenge we still face. In this article, I analyze two such narratives: one in T. H. Huxley's scientific monograph Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature and one in Arthur Conan Doyle's adventure novel The Lost World. (shrink)

In 1853, the young Thomas Henry Huxley published a long review of German cell theory in which he roundly criticized the basic tenets of the Schleiden-Schwann model of the cell. Although historians of cytology have dismissed Huxley's criticism as based on an erroneous interpretation of cell physiology, the review is better understood as a contribution to embryology. "The Cell-theory" presents Huxley's "epigenetic" interpretation of histological organization emerging from changes in the protoplasm to replace the "preformationist" cell theory (...) of Schleiden and Schwann (as modified by Albert von Kölliker), which posited the nucleus as the seat of organic vitality. Huxley's views influenced a number of British biologists, who continued to oppose German cell theory well into the twentieth century. Yet Huxley was pivotal in introducing the new German program of "scientific zoology" to Britain in the early 1850s, championing its empiricist methodology as a means to enact broad disciplinary and institutional reforms in British natural history. (shrink)

Recent debates over evolutionary ethics have often circled around T. H. Huxley's late claim that “Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step.” In writing “Evolution and Ethics” and its long Prolegomena, however, Huxley may instead be wrestling with the nature and origin of human agency. Early in his career he saw evolution and social progress as converging, but as he came to find cosmic process alien to human welfare, he found moral agency more (...) essential but more problematic. Within “Evolution and Ethics,” evolution retreats into a cyclical stasis while ethical challenges end up submitting to it. Huxley implies, however, that in acknowledging these cycles as “natural,” ancient sages begged the question of whether resistance to them were possible. And when evolutionary ethicists delimit humanity's potential by its simian origins, Huxley invokes Hume's “naturalistic fallacy,” asking them how factual evidence can support their prescriptive conclusions. Both his naturalist and idealist reviewers then drove him to turn his Prolegomena into a rebuttal to the original essay. Here, advocating a balance between altruism and selfishness, Huxley works to relegate agency to a question of degree. In both essays, Huxley's epigrammatic prose demarcates the dead ends of much Victorian thought and points toward alternate paths not explored until the twentieth century. (shrink)

Huxley, the visionary, was a key figure in creating modern science education. He was also an employee and bureaucrat of the Science and Art Department most of his working life. The Department was established to organize scientific education for the working class, and many of Huxley's activities on its behalf marked him as a friend of the artisan. It will be argued here that Huxley's vision of working-class scientific education was not in the least radical but reflected (...) the middle-class views of his contemporaries in the Department. Their views, by as late as the 1890s, were little different from those of the late 1840s. Huxley's attitudes were narrowly meritocratic and in no way egalitarian. By the time the movement for technical instruction gathered momentum in the 1880s, Huxley's ideas were distinctly old-fashioned. (shrink)

This is a long-overdue biography of the Huxleys: the Victorian natural historian T.H. Huxley ("Darwin's Bulldog") and his grandson, the scientist, conservationist, and zoologist Julian Huxley. Both T.H. and Julian suffered from depression, thinking and writing about the condition and genetic inheritance in highly curious ways. And between them, they communicated to the world the great modern story of the theory of evolution by natural selection. Because the grandson modeled himself so self-consciously on the grandfather, celebrated historian Alison (...) Bashford writes seamlessly about these omnivorous intellects together, almost as if they were one very long-lived man whose vital dates bookended the colossal shifts in world history from the age of sail to the Space Age, and from colonial wars to world wars to the cold war. The myriad questions that the Huxleys grappled with make them the perfect dynasty-companions for time travel over the age of evolution: What is the nature of time and how old is the Earth itself? What is the connection between human history and natural history? How are humans animals and how are we not? What is the deep past and the distant future of humankind? Can and should we actively seek to improve future generations? What might the planet look like 10,000 years hence? This momentous biography traces the problems and wonders of the modern world that the Huxleys themselves raised, postured, and pondered over lives that spanned the age of evolution. (shrink)

T. H. Huxley's essay and prolegomena of 1894 argued that the process and products of evolution are morally unacceptable and act in opposition to the ethical progress of humanity. Modern sociobiological insights and studies of organisms in natural settings support Huxley and justify an even more extreme condemnation of nature and an antithesis of the naturalistic fallacy: what is, in the biological world, normally ought not. Modern biology also provides suggestions on the origin of the human moral impulse (...) and on tactics likely to be effective in the combat against nature urged by Huxley. (shrink)

The legend of the encounter between Wilberforce and Huxley is well established. Almost every scientist knows, and every viewer of the BBC's recent programme on Darwin was shown,* how Samuel Wilberforce, bishop of Oxford, attempted to pour scorn on Darwin's Origin of Species at a meeting of the British Association in Oxford on 30 June 1860, and had the tables turned on him by T. H. Huxley. In this memorable encounter Huxley's simple scientific sincerity humbled the prelatical (...) insolence and clerical obscurantism of Soapy Sam; the pretension of the Church to dictate to scientists the conclusions they were allowed to reach were, for good and all, decisively defeated; the autonomy of science was established in Britain and the Western world; the claim of plain unvarnished truth on men's allegiance was vindicated, however unwelcome its implications for human vanity might be; and the flood tide of Victorian faith in all its fulsomeness was turned to an ebb, which has continued to our present day and will only end when religion and superstition have been finally eliminated from the minds of all enlightened men. Even churchmen concede that it was a disastrous defeat.1 Only Owen Chadwick strikes a note of caution, observing that the account given of the incident in Wilberforce's biography seems hardly consistent with an overwhelming defeat, and maintaining that the received account must be a largely legendary creation of a later date. (shrink)

Alan Hodgkin’s and Andrew Huxley’s mid-20th century work on the ionic currents generating neuron action potentials stands among that century’s great scientific achievements. Unsurprisingly, that case has attracted widespread attention from neuroscientists, historians and philosophers of science. In this paper, I do not propose to add any new insights into the vast historical treatment of Hodgkin’s and Huxley’s scientific discoveries in that much- discussed episode. Instead, I focus on an aspect of it that hasn’t received much attention: Hodgkin’s (...) and Huxley’s own assessments about what their famous “quantitative description” accomplished. The “Hodgkin-Huxley model” is now widely recognized as a foundation of contemporary computational neuroscience. Yet Hodgkin and Huxley expressed serious caveats about their model and what it added to their scientific discoveries, as far back as their (1952d), in which they first presented their model. They were even more critical of its accomplishments in their Nobel Prize addresses a decade later. Most notably, as I argue here, some worries they raised about their quantitative description seem still to be relevant to current work in ongoing computational neuroscience. (shrink)