Contemporary food supply chains are generating externalities with high economic and social costs, notably in public health terms through the rise in diet-related non-communicable disease. The UK State is developing policy strategies to tackle these public health problems alongside intergovernmental responses. However, the governance of food supply chains is conducted by, and across, both private and public spheres and within a multilevel framework. The realities of contemporary food governance are that private interests are key drivers of food supply chains and (...) have institutionalized a great deal of standards-setting and quality, notably from their locations in the downstream and midstream sectors. The UK State is designing some downstream and some midstream interventions to ameliorate the public health impacts of current food consumption patterns in England. The UK State has not addressed upstream interventions towards public health diet at the primary food production and processing stages, although traditionally it has shaped agricultural policy. Within the realities of contemporary multilevel governance, the UK State must act within the contexts set by the international regimes of the Common Agricultural Policy and the World Trade Organization agreements, notably on agriculture. The potential for further upstream agricultural policy reform is considered as part of a wider policy approach to address the public health externalities issuing from contemporary food supply chains within this multilevel governance context. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the auction to allocate an indivisible good when each potential buyer has a private and independent valuation for the item and suffers a negative externality if a competitor acquires it. In that case, the outside option of each buyer is mechanism-dependent, which implies that participation is endogenous. As several works in the literature have shown, the optimal auction entails strong threats to induce full entry and maximal expected revenue. This results from the full commitment assumption, (...) which ensures that threats are credible. We show that absent credible threats, the entry process does not lead to full participation: the equilibrium entails screening of agents in the entry stage and a trade-off between reserve prices and entry fees. Besides, we discuss the conditions under which the impossibility to use threats does not prevent the seller from ensuring a minimal screening and reaching a high expected revenue. (shrink)

We study the one-seller/two-buyer bargaining problem with negative identity-dependent externalities with an alternating offer bargaining model in which new owners of the object have the opportunity of resale. We identify the generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. The resale opportunity increases the competition among the buyers and therefore benefits the seller. When competition between buyers is very fierce, the seller may prefer to respond to bids rather than to propose an offer herself: a first-mover disadvantage.

The methodology of external cost calculations has been continuously developed. Still, due to lack of sufficient data and imperfect analytical tools, one can give only some estimates rather than precise results. The impact of primary pollutants is dominating in the local domain. The secondary pollutants are negligible in the local domain; however, they have a strong impact in the regional domain. The impacts of primary and secondary pollutants were estimated with the best URBAN algorithm and SUWM formulation, respectively.