Syrianus, originally from Alexandria, moved to Athens and became the head of the Academy there after the death of Plutarch of Athens. Syrianus attacked Aristotle in his commentary on Books 13 and 14 of the "Metaphysics", just as his pupil Proclus was to do later in his commentaries on Plato. This is because in "Metaphysics 13-14", Aristotle himself was being thoroughly polemical towards Platonism, in particular against the Academic doctrine of Form-numbers and the whole concept of separable number. (...) In reply, Syrianus gives an account of mathematical number and of geometrical entities, and of how all of these are processed in the mind, which was to influence Proclus and all subsequent Neoplatonists. (shrink)

Les deux textes mis a la disposition du public dans cette edition critique, accompagnee d'une traduction et de notes, nous ont ete transmis sous le nom de Syrianus. Ils sont contemporains du philosophe et commentateur neoplatonicien Syrianus d'Alexandrie (437), et tres probablement de lui. Ce Syrianus, maitre notamment de Proclus, pratiquait dans son enseignement le commentaire de textes anciens. On connait de lui des commentaires sur Aristote, Platon, Homere, et donc, peut-on croire, d'Hermogene (sur les etat de (...) cause et le style), ce qui met ce rheteur en tres bonne compagnie, et ce qui constitue un temoignage de plus de l'interet porte a la rhetorique par les philosophes de ce temps. Sur la question des etats de cause, on a de lui les deux ouvrages edites ici, un commentaire et un traite, dans cet ordre. Le commentaire est fait de scolies, qui reprennent et expliquent pas a pas le texte d'Hermogene. Ces scolies continuent et enrichissent la doctrine de nombreux commentateurs devanciers. Plus tard, sur la base de ce travail, Syrianus a choisi d'exposer ce sujet sous la forme d'un traite a part entiere, remarquable notamment par ses definitions rigoureuses des quatorze, et non plus treize, etats de cause. C'est une synthese des progres de la doctrine a cette epoque. (shrink)

This paper analyzes and explains certain parts of Syrianus’s Commentary on book M of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which details Syrianus’s response to Aristotle’s attack against the Platonic position of the separate existence of numbers. Syrianus defends the separate existence not only of eidetic but also of mathematical numbers, following a line of argumentation which involves a hylomorphic approach to the latter. He proceeds with an analysis of the mathematical number into matter and form, but his interpretation entails that (...) form is the constituent of number, which has the status and role of a Platonic Form. This solution allows him not only to explain and justify the unity of number, but also to apply the Platonic thesis of the separate existence of numbers, to the mathematical or monadic numbers themselves. It also betrays its tendency to combine theses of the Platonic Ontology with fundamental Aristotelian doctrines. (shrink)

Contrairement à la plupart des écrits néoplatoniciens sur Aristote, le commentaire de Syrianus sur les Livres M et N de la Métaphysique revêt un ton particulièrement polémique. Certes, il s’agit là peut-être d’une réaction prévisible au contenu fortement antiplatonicien de M et N, mais il n’en demeure pas moins que Syrianus choisit délibérément de commenter ces textes-là. À cette fin, il a recours à divers procédés de polémique rhétorique, qu’il manie avec grande habilité. La première stratégie consiste à (...) traiter Aristote avec condescendance, en lui exposant simplement, ainsi qu’à nous, la doctrine platonicienne véritable. Ailleurs, il l’affronte en échangeant sarcasme pour sarcasme. Cependant il lui arrive aussi de chercher à réfuter le Stagirite dans les termes mêmes de ce dernier, en citant Aristote contre Aristote. Je discute quelques exemples de ces trois procédés en les traitant l’un après l’autre puisque chacun présente un intérêt particulier. Je conclus toutefois que cette polémique ne signifie pas forcément que Syrianus rejette le consensus néoplatonicien sur l’accord fondamental entre Platon et Aristote. (shrink)

This books delves into the major tenets of Syrianus' philosophical teachings on the Timaeus and Parmenides based on the testimonia of Proclus, as found in Proclus' commentaries on Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides , and Damascius, as reported in his On First Principles and commentary on Plato's Parmenides.

This article describes Syrianus' teachings on the One, as found in his testimonia on the Parmenides . In order to preserve the transcendence of the One, while still providing a fluid universe connected to the One, Syrianus shows how the nature of the One is seen in the structure of the Parmenides itself: the first hypothesis of the Parmenides outlines the primal God, while the intelligible universe is the subject of the second hypothesis, in so far as the (...) intelligible universe is a product of the One. Thus, whatever is negated of the One in the first hypothesis contains a positive analogue in the second hypothesis. With this description of the One in the Parmenides , Syrianus is able to create a complete, fluid universe. Readings of two lemmata, in particular, illuminate Syrianus' manner of interpreting the Parmenides to show how the One is both transcendent and connected to the universe. In his interpretations of Parmenides 137d and 138a, Syrianus shows how the One is partless with respect to itself, but contains parts with respect to the rest of the universe; and that the One is in itself and in another, again, with respect to itself and with respect to the rest of the universe. With his interpretation of the Parmenides , moreover, one can see how Syrianus differs from the interpretations of Porphyry and Iamblichus, and how he paves the way for Proclus' reading of the dialogue. (shrink)

This article describes Syrianus’ teachings on the One, as found in his testimonia on the Parmenides. In order to preserve the transcendence of the One, while still providing a fluid universe connected to the One, Syrianus shows how the nature of the One is seen in the structure of the Parmenides itself: the first hypothesis of the Parmenides outlines the primal God, while the intelligible universe is the subject of the second hypothesis, in so far as the intelligible (...) universe is a product of the One. Thus, whatever is negated of the One in the first hypothesis contains a positive analogue in the second hypothesis. With this description of the One in the Parmenides, Syrianus is able to create a complete, fluid universe. Readings of two lemmata, in particular, illuminate Syrianus’ manner of interpreting the Parmenides to show how the One is both transcendent and connected to the universe. In his interpretations of Parmenides 137d and 138a, Syrianus shows how the One is partless with respect to itself, but contains parts with respect to the rest of the universe; and that the One is in itself and in another, again, with respect to itself and with respect to the rest of the universe. With his interpretation of the Parmenides, moreover, one can see how Syrianus differs from the interpretations of Porphyry and Iamblichus, and how he paves the way for Proclus’ reading of the dialogue. (shrink)

In Metaphysics B 3 Aristotle sets out a famous argument for the thesis that being is not a genus. In his commentary on Metaphysics B, Syrianus criticizes this argument and explains in what sense being is to be regarded as a genus. I reconstruct both Syrianus’ criticisms and his own view. I bring out ways in which they can help us rethink key assumptions of Aristotle’s ontology and shed light both on Syrianus’ critical attitude towards Aristotle and (...) on some of Syrianus’ main views in metaphysics. (shrink)

In two passages in particular of his Commentary on the Timaeus, Proclus attributes to his master Syrianus a series of arguments in favour of not confining gods or daemons to any particular level of the universe, either hypercosmic or encosmic, as had been the more or less universal practice of earlier Platonists, but asserting the ubiquity of all classes of ‘higher being’ at every level, and criticising earlier doctrine as in effect cutting the gods off from contact with man, (...) thus undermining the power of theurgy. This interesting development was in fact initiated by his Syrian forerunner Iamblichus of Chalkis, and it is this doctrine that this essay seeks to explore. (shrink)

In the last decades Orphic scholarship has found itself in rather fortunate circumstances: there have been not only spectacular finds such as the Derveni Papyrus and the so-called Orphic Gold Tablets, but these texts together with all the other fragments ascribed to the authoritative author-figure Orpheus have been made accessible in the new and extensive edition by Alberto Bernabé . Understandably, recent discussions have focussed especially on the new material. Nevertheless, much work remains to be done on those fragments with (...) which we have long been familiar. The present study puts a new complexion on a text long taken as evidence for an Orphic theogony. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 4, pp 449 - 476 While we know that the interpretation of the ‘soul’s pilot’ found in Hermias’ _Scholia on Plato’s Phaedrus_ differs considerably from that of Syrianus and Proclus, this difference has not shifted the prevailing opinion that the _Scholia_ are a faithful transcript of Syrianus’ lectures on the _Phaedrus_. I argue, however, that the difference over the soul’s pilot is only the first in a series of elements which are difficult, if (...) not impossible, to ascribe to Syrianus. This, I believe, is compelling evidence that the _Scholia_ contain the ideas of both Syrianus and Hermias. (shrink)

Hermias of Alexandria wrote down the lectures given on the Phaedrus by his teacher Syrianus, Head of the Neoplatonic School of Athens. In the preserved text the Platonic distinction of madness is presented in a Neoplatonic way. In the first section of the article we discuss Hermias’ treatment of possession. The philosopher examines four topics in his effort to present a Neoplatonic doctrine concerning possession. As he holds that divine possession is evident in all parts of the soul, he (...) first argues that it is primarily applied to the one-in-the-soul. Secondly, he explains that possession is also applied to reason, opinion, imagination, thymos and desire, all the above being distinctive parts of the human soul, but not as important as the one-in-the-soul. The third issue he discusses is whether all causes of possession are identical to the divine. Then, Hermias examines the fact that possession is to be traced not only in the human soul but also in the statues. In the second section of the article Hermias’ analysis of the four kinds of Platonic madness is presented. The philosopher first analyzes the interdependence between all four divine kinds of madness and then describes their function on two levels, inside and outside the soul. The function within the soul is richer and is realized in four fields: the restoration of the soul after its fall, the restoration of the human being as a whole, the Pythagorean mathematical system and the logic processes. The function outside the soul deals with the manifestations of the soul in human society. Under this perspective, Hermias clearly proposes an original classification of the kinds of madness, on the basis of which we encounter poetic madness. After that follow the madness of the seer, the telestic madness, and the madness of love. The whole analysis incorporates Platonic, Aristotelian, Pythagorean and theurgic elements that cover the fields of psychology, logic and metaphysics. (shrink)

This commentary records, through notes taken by Hermias, Syrianus' seminar on Plato's Phaedrus, one of the world's most influential celebrations of erotic beauty and love. It is the only Neoplatonic commentary on Plato's Phaedrus to have survived in its entirety. Further interest comes from the recorded interventions by Syrianus' pupils - including those by Proclus, his eventual successor as head of the Athenian school, who went on to teach Hermias' father, Ammonius. The second of two volumes of Hermias' (...) commentary, the chapters translated here begin with a discussion of how the discarnate soul is visualised as a winged chariot team whose charioteer may gain some glimpse of beauty itself, which can explain subsequent erotic longing. This volume provides a translation is accompanied by explanatory notes, an introduction detailing the significance and context of the treatise and a scholarly apparatus including multiple indexes, glossaries and a bibliography. (shrink)

The paper discusses the development of metaphysics understood as a philosophical discipline or science. I would like to propose that the last period of Greek philosophy, that going from about the 3rd to the 6th centuries A.D., made new and interesting contributions to metaphysics as a philosophical discipline, indeed made metaphysics into a metaphysical science, while also bringing out the limits of such a science. The paper has four parts. In part I, I introduce the way in which the great (...) Aristotelian commentator of the early 3rd century, Alexander of Aphrodisias, in interpreting Aristotle's metaphysical treatise, sought to find in it a metaphysical science. In part II of the paper, I attempt to show how the Neoplatonist philosopher of the early 5th century Syrianus, not only adopted Alexander's reading of Aristotle, but was also inspired by it in finding this same metaphysical science already in Plato. In part III of the paper, I will show how all of this resulted in a masterpiece of metaphysics, the Elements of Theology written by Syrianus' pupil Proclus. Finally, in part IV, I would like to refer to what is perhaps the last great metaphysical work of Greek philosophy, the Treatise on First Principles written by Damascius, a work in which the limits of metaphysical science are explored with extraordinary subtlety and insistence. In adapting Alexander's formalization of Aristotelian metaphysical science to Platonism, Syrianus knew that such a science was a means towards, not the equivalent of, knowledge of the transcendent. Proclus knew it too, even if his Elements of Theology, in presenting metaphysical science with such systematic beauty, could give the impression of being a definitive statement. And, lest we have any illusions about the adequacy of our metaphysical science, Damascius could cure us of these, opening our minds to what lay behind, or above, our own metaphysical efforts. (shrink)

The origin of the Neoplatonist doctrine of the henads has been imputed to Iamblichus, mostly on indirect evidence found in later Neoplatonists, chiefly Proclus. Is there any trace of this concept to be found in the extant works or fragments of Iamblichus himself? The best candidates among his surviving texts are the excerpts in Psellus of his volume on Theological Arithmetic from his Pythagorean series, and the first book of de Mysteriis , where Iamblichus answers Porphyry's questions on the nature (...) of the gods. Such evidence as can be found there would most likely deal with the divine henads, given the subject matter of the text. Certain repeated items of vocabulary appear as technical usages that form the basis for arguing that Iamblichus already has in mind if not the explicit concept henad at least its functional equivalent: the term monoeides occurring in both the Psellan excerpts and de Mysteriis, and in the latter, mostly in Book I, the stated attributes of a high, divine principle uniting the gods which are also designated by Proclus as typical of the divine henads, particularly in the propositions of the Elements of Theology defining the henads. Iamblichus in Book I also ascribes to the gods the same role in the process of ellampsis as Proclus does for the divine henads. A theory is also advanced concerning the possible development of the concept of the henad by Iamblichus, based in part on the polemical nature of de Mysteriis and his relationship to Porphyry. (shrink)

Ancient philosophers -- The history of philosophy -- Philosophy within quotation marks? -- Anglophone attitudes -- Brentano's Aristotle -- Heidegger in the cave -- 'There was an old person from Tyre' -- The Presocratics in context -- Argument in ancient philosophy -- Philosophy and dialectic -- Aristotle and the methods of ethics -- Metacommentary -- An introduction to Aspasius -- Parmenides and the Eleatic One -- Reason and necessity in Leucippus -- Plato's cyclical argument -- Death and the philosopher -- (...) Aristotelian arithmetic -- The principle of plenitude -- 'Aristotle's opinion concerning destiny and what is up to us' -- 'Belief is up to us' -- The same again : the Stoics and eternal recurrence -- Bits and pieces -- Partial wholes -- 'Drei Sonnen sah ich ...' : Syrianus and astronomy -- Immaterial causes. (shrink)

Les platoniciens se sont beaucoup souciés de définir de quoi il y a des formes. À l’époque de Syrianus et Proclus, une réponse s’est imposée : des substances naturelles et universelles, ainsi que de leurs perfections et propriétés constitutives. Si Simplicius suit cette ligne directrice, le contexte de ses commentaires le conduit à clarifier certains points aveugles. Cet article examine en quoi le monde et quelques formes connexes lui offrent l’occasion d’interroger le critère de l’universalité. Il montre que ses (...) modifications résultent d’une différence de contexte exégétique mais sans s’y limiter. Résoudre la difficulté posée par Aristote l’amène à développer une théorie qui, contrairement à ses prédécesseurs, évite de postuler une hiérarchie des formes ou une forme pour certains individus. (shrink)

The Pythagorean idea that numbers are the key to understanding reality inspired philosophers in late Antiquity (4th and 5th centuries A.D.) to develop theories in physics and metaphysics based on mathematical models. This book draws on some newly discovered evidence, including fragments of Iamblichus's On Pythagoreanism, to examine these early theories and trace their influence on later Neoplatonists (particularly Proclus and Syrianus) and on medieval and early modern philosophy.

This chapter defends the thesis that Proclus defended pagan theology against Christianity by displaying its agreement with Platonic philosophy. The author addresses the sense in which Platonic philosophy is, and has to be, a theology, according to Proclus. He then explains how Proclus defended the agreement of Platonic theology with ‘other’ theologies, specifically the Mysteries, first by following Iamblichus in retracing it to Orpheus and Pythagoras, and second by following Syrianus in including the Orphic poems and Chaldaean Oracles in (...) the school’s curriculum. These two sources are moreover shown to be suitable for inclusion, due to their kinship with Platonism, and their agreement with it is elaborated. Finally, the author explains how Proclus’ defence of paganism theory was interweaved with ritual practice, which includes theurgic rites, but also the practice of exegesis. (shrink)

One of the main difficulties that Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle face is the different treatment that the Categories and the Metaphysics offer to the question of the substance. After describing briefly the status quaestionis ousiae in Aristotle, and after tracing the main Neoplatonic interpretations of this doctrine, this article attempts to demonstrate that the Neoplatonists of Athens and Alexandria, Syrianus and Ammonius, inaugurate a new interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine. With regard to the category of substance in general and (...) to the question of substantiality of “immanent form” in particular, this new interpretation goes beyond the positions of Plotinus and Porphyry and returns the ontological value to the Aristotelian substances. Unlike Plotinus, who recognized as ousia only that one intelligible, that is five genres of the Platonic Sophist, and unlike Porphyry, who defused the anti–Platonic fuse of the Categories, giving to this treaty a mainly semantic skopos, these philosophers, through their original study of the theory of the three states of katholou, already shed in the Porphyrian Eisagôgê, fit the immanent forms of Aristotle, recognized as substances and as a reflection of the transcendental universal, into the late antique Neoplatonic metaphysical triadic structure. (shrink)

Sur la toile de fond de la theologie negative, tissee par la discussion des apories que soulevent les notions de l'ineffable et de l'un, Damascius, le dernier diadoque de l'Ecole d'Athenes, elaboreson systeme metaphysique, sans se departir de la rigueur de sa methode aporetique, qui est une critique radicale du langage a l'interieur des coordonnees fixees par le Parmenide de Platon et par les Oracles Chaldaiques. Damascius, dans une enquete unique par son ampleur et son originalite questionne tour a tour (...) Porphyre, Jamblique, Syrianus et Proclus sur les principes; il examine les problemes que pose, en derivation de l'un, la formation de la trinite; de l'un-tout (la limite), du tout-un (l'infini) et de l'unifie (le mixte ou l'etre). Lien a priori entre l'un-tout et le tout-un, l'unifie est le principe de constitution de tout ordre et de toute realite. Damascius etudie sa nature de mixte originaire et autoconstituant, d'etre exemplaire et de premier intelligible. Cette notion lui permet de pas au crible, pour la mieux fonder, la problematique neoplatonicienne de la manence, de la procession et de la conversion. Les divers niveaux d'unification de la pluralite intelligible l'amenent a construire une theorie generale des elements, des parties et des formes Au passage, de nombreux textes, capitaux du point de vue de l'ontologie et de la doctrine de la connaissance, font regretter qu'ils aient ete inconnus du Moyen Age et qu'ils le demeurent pour beaucoup de nos contemporains. (shrink)

The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a (...) definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate ‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary, is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today. (shrink)

In discussing Socrates's argument for Plato's principle of change in the Phaedo, Syrianus asks, To what kind of opposites is Socrates referring? I offer a new answer to Syrianus's question. I start from David Sedley's view that the opposites in question are converse contraries, which behave as converses in comparative contexts. I show that the quantitative pairs that Socrates cites fit Sedley's view because they are implicit comparatives. Nonetheless, I argue that Socrates's evaluative pairs are better understood as (...) asymmetrical opposites because the Phaedo and the Republic reveal that these pairs have independent, not relational, meanings. So my answer to Syrianus's question is that implicit comparatives and asymmetrical opposites are the kinds of opposites to which Socrates is referring. (shrink)

Ancient Greek Philosophy routinely relied upon concepts of number to explain the tangible order of the universe. Plotinus' contribution to this tradition, however, has been often omitted, if not ignored. The main reason for this, at first glance, is the Plotinus does not treat the subject of number in the Enneads as pervasively as the Neopythagoreans or even his own successors Lamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus. Nevertheless, a close examination of the Enneads reveals that Plotinus systematically discusses number in relation (...) to each of his underlying principles of existence--the One, Intellect, and Soul. Plotinus on Number offers the first comprehensive analysis of Plotinus' concept of number, beginning with its origins in Plato and the Neopythagoreans and ending with its influence on Porphyry's arrangement of the Enneads. It's main argument is that Plotinus adapts Plato's and the Neopythagoreans' cosmology to place number in the foundation of the intelligible realm and in the construction of the universe. Through Plotinus' defense of Plato's Ideal Numbers from Aristotle's criticism, Svetla Slaveva-Griffin reveals the founder of Neoplatonism as the first post-Platonic philosopher who purposefully and systematically develops what we may call a theory of number, distinguishing between number in the intelligible realm and number in the quantitative, mathematical realm. Finally, the book draws attention to Plotinus' concept as a necesscary and fundamental linke between Platonic and late Neoplatonic schools of philosophy. (shrink)

This is the first full discussion of Philoponus' account of matter. It is shown here that philosophical problems in Neoplatonism motivated the definition of prime matter as three-dimensional extension, and that Plotinus, Syrianus, and Proclus prepared the way for Philoponus.

The idea that mythos and logos are incompatible, and that truth is a product of scientific and dialectical thinking, was certainly disproven by later Platonic philosophers. Deploying the works of Hesiod and Homer, Homeric Hymns and other such literature, they considered myth a valuable and significant augment to philosophical discourse. Plato’s denigration of myth gave his followers an incentive to read myth as allegory. The Stoics and first-century philosophers such as Philo, treated allegory as a legitimate interpretive strategy. The Middle (...) Platonists incorporated myth, for example, deifying the Monad and Dyad, as did 2nd century Platonists. Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris, for example, equates Isis and Osiris with form and matter: the god sows in matter logoi from himself. Porphyry’s allegorizing of Plato’s Cave of the Nymphs is another example. Plotinus is a strong influence on how the late Neoplatonists regarded myth. This paper argues that these philosophers’ use of allegory prepared the way for the Neoplatonists treatment of myth as inspired symbolism. Proclus and Syrianus, as reported by Hermias, did something more extreme by using mythology to construct inspired symbolic argument. Mythos becomes another type of logos, a vehicle for representing the invisible world of being, another kind of truth that can even serve a function in anagogic ascent. (shrink)

This paper sets out to analyze Proclus’ exegesis of Socrates’ suggestion in Parmenides 132d1-3 that Forms stand fixed as patterns, as it were, in the nature, with the other things being images and likenesses of them. Proclus’ analysis of the notion of being pattern reveals the impact of the Aristotelian conception of the form as paradigm on his views, as we can infer from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Simplicius’ explanation of the paradigmatic character of the Aristotelian form. Whereas Aristotle and (...) Alexander of Aphrodisias refute the efficient causality of the Platonic Forms and support that μέθεξις is just a metaphor, Syrianus, Proclus and Asclepius defend the Platonic theory, and specifically Proclus, who brings to the fore the multilateral role of the Forms as patterns with regard to the secondary things of this realm.[1] [1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Symposium Platonicum XII: Plato’s Parmenides, organized by the International Plato Society, Paris, 15-19 July 2019. (shrink)