Jaakko Hintikka's concept of belief (aBp) as presented in his Knowledge and Belief is such that in his epistemic logic aKp —> aBp is a thesis. This concept (B-belief) is one important kind of belief and can be contrasted with a different concept of belief (G-belief, denoted by 'aOp') not discussed in Hintikka's book. It is to some extent opposite to the one above in the sense that it is knowledge-exclusive, whereas Hintikka's is knowledge-inclusive. This is shown by the thesis (...) aKp —> —laGp or aGp —> —laKp. My thesis is that this kind of belief is used as the belief in scientific hypothesis and as religious belief. Both G-belief and B-belief are applied to examples from physics and religion and consistency criteria are discussed for either concept. (shrink)

Jaakko Hintikka's concept of belief (aBp) as presented in his Knowledge and Belief is such that in his epistemic logic aKp —> aBp is a thesis. This concept (B-belief) is one important kind of belief and can be contrasted with a different concept of belief (G-belief, denoted by 'aOp') not discussed in Hintikka's book. It is to some extent opposite to the one above in the sense that it is knowledge-exclusive, whereas Hintikka's is knowledge-inclusive. This is shown by the thesis (...) aKp —> —laGp or aGp —> —laKp. My thesis is that this kind of belief is used as the belief in scientific hypothesis and as religious belief. Both G-belief and B-belief are applied to examples from physics and religion and consistency criteria are discussed for either concept. (shrink)

The first part of the papaer contains desiderata for a realistic epistemic system as opposed to idealistic ones. One of the main characteristics of idealistic epistemic systems is their deductive infallibility or deductive omniscience. The system presented avoids deductive infallibility though having a strong concept of knowledge. The second part contains the theorems of the system. The system is detailed in so far as it distinguishes between two concepts of belief and one of assumption and interrelates them to the concept (...) of knowledge. Though all concepts satisfy certain consistency criteria the strongest ones hold for the concept of knowledge; whereas a belief in or a assumption (assertion) of a proposition which has inconsistent consequences (not known or believed or assumed by the believer or assumer) does not entail the commitment of believing in (or assuming of) an explicit contradiction. Moreover the system contains a lot of distinctions and details concerning propositions with a second person involved like "a knows that b knows whether p is the case" etc. The third part of the paper contains the semantics of the system which consists of many-valued truth-tables. Since the matrices are finite the system is consistent and decidable. (shrink)

The first part of the papaer contains desiderata for a realistic epistemic system as opposed to idealistic ones. One of the main characteristics of idealistic epistemic systems is their deductive infallibility or deductive omniscience. The system presented avoids deductive infallibility though having a strong concept of knowledge. The second part contains the theorems of the system. The system is detailed in so far as it distinguishes between two concepts of belief and one of assumption and interrelates them to the concept (...) of knowledge. Though all concepts satisfy certain consistency criteria the strongest ones hold for the concept of knowledge; whereas a belief in or a assumption (assertion) of a proposition which has inconsistent consequences (not known or believed or assumed by the believer or assumer) does not entail the commitment of believing in (or assuming of) an explicit contradiction. Moreover the system contains a lot of distinctions and details concerning propositions with a second person involved like "a knows that b knows whether p is the case" etc. The third part of the paper contains the semantics of the system which consists of many-valued truth-tables. Since the matrices are finite the system is consistent and decidable. (shrink)

Discounting the importance of historical influences upon Simmel's philosophy, the author gives a straightforward exposition of Simmel's Lebensphilosophie his theory of history--ic representation of Reality;" and lastly his theory of philosophy--"Philosophy is the expression of certain types of philosophical attitudes." With the aid of numerous translated quotations, Weingartner counts up the pluses and minuses of Simmel's work and critically evaluates him as a near-great philosopher.--A. B.

This presentation uses the by-now customary division of philosophy of history into speculative and critical philosophy, devoting a volume to each. The text is mainly excerpts from the philosophers under study, with brief interpretative comments preceding the text and selected bibliographies following. The excerpts are generally well chosen and can be read with profit by those seeking an introduction to philosophy of history, as well as by more advanced students. The interpretations in a number of cases suffer from one-sidedness, especially (...) in the cases of Hegel and Marx. There are also some careless errors, the most glaring being the switching of the meaning of the German terms, Historie and Geschichte. The speculative philosophies of history are excerpted from Augustine, Vico, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Spengler, and Toynbee. There is also an interesting excerpt from Herder. The critical philosophies of history consist of selections from Comte, Mill, Dilthey, Collingwood, Walsh, Hempel, Dray, Mandelbaum, Weingartner, Beard, Becker, Nagel, Aron, Hook and Berlin. The inclusion of such a diversified and conflicting group of philosophies under the common heading of "critical philosophy" makes for an uneasy and tight fit. The final essay in Volume II is by Georges Florovsky, "The Study of the Past" and it appears in a chapter entitled "Conclusion"--all of which is a little puzzling, since Florovsky is presenting a theology of history as distinct from a philosophy of history.--H. B. (shrink)

The present article shows that there are consistent and decidable manyvalued systems of propositional logic which satisfy two or all the three criteria for non-trivial inconsistent theories by da Costa . The weaker one of these paraconsistent system is also able to avoid a series of paradoxes which come up when classical logic is applied to empirical sciences. These paraconsistent systems are based on a 6-valued system of propositional logic for avoiding difficulties in several domains of empirical science ).

In the first part of this paper some general theses concerning the difference between logic and mathematics are defended. In the second part four different views for a possible demarcation between logic and mathematics are stated.

The contributions to this volume are from participants of the international conference "Kreisel's Interests - On the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics", which took place from 13 to 14 2018 at the University of Salzburg in Salzburg, Austria. The contributions have been revised and partially extended. Among the contributors are Akihiro Kanamori, Göran Sundholm, Ulrich Kohlenbach, Charles Parsons, Daniel Isaacson, and Kenneth Derus. The contributions cover the discussions between Kreisel and Wittgenstein on philosophy of mathematics, Kreisel's Dictum, proof theory, the (...) discussions between Kreisel and Gödel on philosophy of mathematics, some bibliographical facts, and a collection of extracts from Kreisel's letters. (shrink)

The volume deals with the history of logic, the question of the nature of logic, the relation of logic and mathematics, modal or alternative logics (many-valued, relevant, paraconsistent logics) and their relations, including translatability, to classical logic in the Fregean and Russellian sense, and, more generally, the aim or aims of philosophy of logic and mathematics. Also explored are several problems concerning the concept of definition, non-designating terms, the interdependence of quantifiers, and the idea of an assertion sign. The contributions (...) concerned with Wittgenstein's investigations into the philosophy of logic and mathematics pursue issues relating to logical necessity, the undeniability of the law of the excluded middle, and the source of self-evidence, often characterized in the literature as the "rule-following considerations". Additionally, they examine Wittgenstein's attitudes towards the very idea of set-theory as a possible foundation for arithmetic. The volume also includes a number of contributions on specific issues concerning Wittgenstein's views on moral and religious judgements. (shrink)

Zawiera materiały konferencji zorganizowanej przez Instituts Görresgesellschaft für interdisziplinäre Forschung (31.8-5.9.1989).

Der Atheismus erlebte in den letzten Jahren eine Renaissance. Durch verschiedene Publikationen wurde der Atheismus in der Offentlichkeit und in den Wissenschaften wieder zum Thema. Religioser Glaube sei mit einem wissenschaftlichen Weltbild nicht vereinbar, so viele Atheisten. Diese Bewegung fasst man unter dem Namen Neuer Atheismus zusammen. Aber ist tatsachlich etwas neu am neuen Atheismus? Gibt es in den modernen Naturwissenschaften noch einen Platz fur Gott? Konnen Argumente der neuen Atheisten uberzeugend zeigen, dass es unvernunftig und unwissenschaftlich ist, an die (...) Existenz eines Gottes zu glauben? Dies sind nur einige Beispielfragen, die die Autoren dieses Bandes versuchen werden zu beantworten. Die Autoren kommen aus unterschiedlichsten Disziplinen: Aus der Physik, der Biologie, der Mathematik, der Philosophie und der Theologie.". (shrink)

Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts , content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not in conflict with each other, but (...) in agreement . We explain this fact by pointing towards the deep difference between possible-world- and the consequence-accounts, which does not lie in the difference between syntactic (object-language) versus semantic (meta-language) formulations, but in the difference between ‘disjunction-of-possible-worlds’ versus ‘conjunction-of-parts’ representations of theories. Drawing on earlier work, we explain in Sect. 4 how the shortcomings of Popper’s original definition can be repaired by what we call the relevant element approach. We propose a quantitative likeness-definition of verisimilitude based on relevant elements which provably agrees with the qualitative relevant content-definition of verisimilitude on all pairs of comparable theories. We conclude the paper with a plea for consequence-accounts and a brief analysis of the problem of language-dependence (Sect. 6). (shrink)

Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts, content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not in conflict with each other, but in (...) agreement. We explain this fact by pointing towards the deep difference between possible-world- and the consequence-accounts, which does not lie in the difference between syntactic versus semantic formulations, but in the difference between ‘disjunction-of-possible-worlds’ versus ‘conjunction-of-parts’ representations of theories. Drawing on earlier work, we explain in Sect. 4 how the shortcomings of Popper’s original definition can be repaired by what we call the relevant element approach. We propose a quantitative likeness-definition of verisimilitude based on relevant elements which provably agrees with the qualitative relevant content-definition of verisimilitude on all pairs of comparable theories. We conclude the paper with a plea for consequence-accounts and a brief analysis of the problem of language-dependence. (shrink)

This new edition of Introduction to Lattices and Order presents a radical reorganization and updating, though its primary aim is unchanged. The explosive development of theoretical computer science in recent years has, in particular, influenced the book's evolution: a fresh treatment of fixpoints testifies to this and Galois connections now feature prominently. An early presentation of concept analysis gives both a concrete foundation for the subsequent theory of complete lattices and a glimpse of a methodology for data analysis that is (...) of commercial value in social science. Classroom experience has led to numerous pedagogical improvements and many new exercises have been added. As before, exposure to elementary abstract algebra and the notation of set theory are the only prerequisites, making the book suitable for advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students. It will also be a valuable resource for anyone who meets ordered structures. (shrink)

This volume comprises a selection of papers that were contributed to the 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, which was held in Salzburg from the 11th - 16th July, 1983. There were 14 sections in this congress: 1. proof theory and foundations of mathematics 2. model theory and its applica ti on 3. recursion theory and theory of computation 4. axiomatic set theory 5. philosophical logic 6. general methodology of science 7. foundations of probability and induction (...) 8. foundations and philosophy of the physical sciences 9. foundati ons and phi 1 osophy of biology 10. foundations and philosophy of psychology foundations and philosophy 11. of the social sciences 12. foundati ons and philosophy of linguistics 13. history of logic, methodology and philosophy of science 14. fundamental principles of the ethics of science In each section, three or four invited addresses were given, which will be published in the Congress Proceedings (Ruth Barcan Marcus, Georg J. W. Dorn and Paul Weingartner, eds. : Logic, Metho dology and Philosophy of Science VII. Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of v PREFACE Science, Salzburg, 1983. - Amsterdam, New York, Oxford: North-Holland Publishing 'Company, 1985. ) Every section with the exception of section 14 also contained contributed papers. (shrink)