Despite the recent increase in interest in philosophy about ignorance, little attention has been paid to the question of what makes it possible for a being to become aware of their own ignorance. In this paper, I try to provide such an account by arguing that, for a being to become aware of their own ignorance, they must have the mental capacity to represent something as being unknown to them. For normal adult humans who have mastered a language, mental representation (...) of an unknown is enabled by forming linguistic expressions whose content is grasped, but whose referent is unknown. I provide a neo-Fregean, a neo-Russellian, and then a unified account of this. On that basis, I then argue further that the content of ignorance can always be captured by a question. I then distinguish between propositional ignorance and non-propositional ignorance and argue that propositional ignorance attributions can be of three types, that-ignorance, whether-ignorance, and fact-ignorance. I conclude by arguing that the acquisition of truths, even when it yields knowledge that is certain, does not always eliminate one’s ignorance and that there is a degree of ignorance in almost everything we claim to know. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 22 This essay explores the influence of Benjamin’s fragmentary historiography on Arendt’s understanding of narrative. I argue that Arendt and Benjamin shared a common understanding of the problems of modernity. For both thinkers contemporary conditions of existence were defined on the one hand, by a similar conception of history, and on the other hand, a break with the tradition of philosophy. I demonstrate that Benjamin’s fragmented history, adopted by Arendt in response to this contemporary politico-philosophical crisis, (...) allowed her to redeem the past as a basis of a future-oriented philosophy by creating a space for arresting the continuum of history and asserting the importance of human agency. (shrink)

This article evaluates the role of art – particularly mechanically reproduced forms of art – in the writings of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno. The central claim is that both thinkers share the same conviction as to the emancipatory potentials of the work of art. Yet, they evaluate the effects of technological innovation differently. The underpinnings of this later resolved discord, however, are philosophical. In contrast to Benjamin’s belief in the possibility of mass mobilization, for Adorno the relevant category (...) remains unequivocally the individual subject. (shrink)

The sense of shame is part of human nature. What, then, is the role and significance of such a particular sensation, one that causes mental anxiety in a sick person’s weakest and the most vulnerable state? We know from historical documents going back as far as ancient Greece and Egypt that respecting patient privacy should be regarded as a moral duty for physicians in charge of treatment. However much today’s healthcare may have changed compared to centuries past, we note that (...) patient privacy has not lost its importance. In the current healthcare system, digital recording of private information and images enables others, in principle, to access these personal data quite easily. While we cannot reject the advantages offered by modern medicine, we need to consider how to design a healthcare system that respects patient privacy. What should be the standards of privacy in emergency services where urgent decisions and interventions have to be made? How should we guarantee patient privacy during medical education? The chapters of this book approach questions like these from the perspectives of different disciplines. The writings illustrate the increasing complexity of patient privacy issues in modern healthcare systems, particularly the growing difficulty to protect confidential data. At the same time, we can observe that patients are becoming more aware of their rights and their sensitivity in this area has increased. In our opinion, an approach that requires us to choose between the two values –health and privacy – would be wrong. Therefore, the question we should focus on is: “what kind of healthcare system should be developed to ensure the greatest respect for humans’ natural right to privacy?” If we want to answer this question and find sustainable solutions for these problems, it is crucial to use a multidisciplinary approach. From this perspective, the present volume is a first contribution to be published in Turkey to pursue this aim, including articles offered from various disciplines. (shrink)

What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...) rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its extension essentially. I argue that this account is significantly mistaken for various reasons: it conflates a metaphysical notion (essentialism) with a semantic one (rigidity); it fails to countenance the fact that any term can be introduced into a language by stipulating that it be a rigid designator; it limits the extension of rigid terms so much that terms such as ‘meter’, ‘rectangle’, ‘truth’, etc. do not turn out to be rigid, when they obviously are; and it wrongly concentrates on the predicative use of a general term in applying a certain test offered by Kripke to determine whether a term is rigid. (shrink)

A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we (...) do not know. In the first part, I try to explicate the notion of inostensible reference, both for singular and for general terms, as well as full declarative sentences, and in the second part, I argue that our capacity to enjoy conceptual curiosity is essentially based upon our aptitude for inostensible reference. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

ZusammenfassungIn wertpluralen Gesellschaften begegnen uns in der medizinischen Versorgung zahlreiche Konflikte, bei denen die kulturellen und religiösen Wertvorstellungen und Einstellungen des Patienten eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Besonders komplex wird es, wenn die betroffene Person nicht mehr in der Lage ist, selbst über die medizinischen Maßnahmen zu entscheiden. Ob eine Patientenverfügung in solchen Konfliktsituationen einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu einer ethisch angemessenen Lösung leisten kann, bleibt eine berechtigte Frage. Im Folgenden werden die ethischen Aspekte im Umgang mit muslimischen Patienten und die Nutzung (...) einer kultursensiblen und kultursensitiven Patientenverfügung bei diesen Patienten differenziert behandelt.Die Vielfalt an Haltungen zu Entscheidungen am Lebensende innerhalb der islamischen Welt, der Einfluss der Familie und traditioneller sittlicher Einstellungen, heterogene Formen der Religiosität und das Gesundheitssystem des jeweiligen Landes erweisen sich als wichtige normative Anhaltspunkte für die Anwendung einer Patientenverfügung bei muslimischen Patienten. Trotz zahlreicher Schwierigkeiten kann eine kultursensible und kultursensitive Patientenverfügung einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Berücksichtigung und Umsetzung der Entscheidungen eines entscheidungsunfähig gewordenen muslimischen Patienten leisten. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn wertpluralen Gesellschaften begegnen uns in der medizinischen Versorgung zahlreiche Konflikte, bei denen die kulturellen und religiösen Wertvorstellungen und Einstellungen des Patienten eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Besonders komplex wird es, wenn die betroffene Person nicht mehr in der Lage ist, selbst über die medizinischen Maßnahmen zu entscheiden. Ob eine Patientenverfügung in solchen Konfliktsituationen einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu einer ethisch angemessenen Lösung leisten kann, bleibt eine berechtigte Frage. Im Folgenden werden die ethischen Aspekte im Umgang mit muslimischen Patienten und die Nutzung (...) einer kultursensiblen und kultursensitiven Patientenverfügung bei diesen Patienten differenziert behandelt.Die Vielfalt an Haltungen zu Entscheidungen am Lebensende innerhalb der islamischen Welt, der Einfluss der Familie und traditioneller sittlicher Einstellungen, heterogene Formen der Religiosität und das Gesundheitssystem des jeweiligen Landes erweisen sich als wichtige normative Anhaltspunkte für die Anwendung einer Patientenverfügung bei muslimischen Patienten. Trotz zahlreicher Schwierigkeiten kann eine kultursensible und kultursensitive Patientenverfügung einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Berücksichtigung und Umsetzung der Entscheidungen eines entscheidungsunfähig gewordenen muslimischen Patienten leisten. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

Background: For an effective treatment of patients, quality-assured safe implementation of drug therapy is indispensable. Fasting during Ramadan, an essential religious practice for Muslims, affects Muslim diabetics’ drug use in a number of different ways. Objectives: Ethical problems arising from fasting during the month of Ramadan for practicing Muslim patients are being discussed on the basis of extant research literature. Relevant conflicts of interest originating in this situation are being analysed from an ethical perspective. Material and methods: A number of (...) databases have been searched systematically in view of the stated objectives to identify relevant studies. Starting point for this review are the following questions: What information is available regarding the fasting behaviour of Muslim diabetics during Ramadan? What kind of ethical problems can be identified in the context of this religious practice? Results: The present review established a number of problems concerning medication adherence and drug use of practising Muslim diabetics during Ramadan, notably insufficient compliance, reduced frequency of consultations with their doctor, and inadequate, not sufficiently goal-oriented doctor-patient conversations about fasting. Conclusions: Deficiencies in medical as well as religious knowledge about fasting in Ramadan and a lack of sensitivity have been found among Muslim patients as well as among doctors. Compliance management and drug use in this area can be improved by effective, goal-oriented action plans and projects through which linguistic and cultural barriers can be addressed. (shrink)

On May 13, 2014, a fire due to the combustion of accumulated methane gas in the Soma Eynez Mine in Turkey killed 301 miners. This case chronicles the events on the day of the accident and investigates the factors leading up to it. It depicts the chaos and confusion resulting from missing emergency protocol, inadequate responses of major stakeholders such as safety experts in the mine, company executives, and the political leadership at the ministry and prime ministry levels. It shows (...) how the interplay of a culture of leniency towards mining safety, insufficient mining policies and even less effective inspections coupled with nepotism and the local population’s desperation for work, all led to serious neglect in a major mine resulting in needless deaths. The Soma Eynez Mine disaster highlights how corporate greed fed into breaches of mining protocol and ethical conduct, eventually leading to the bankruptcy of a mining conglomerate and the imprisonment of 14 men. (shrink)

I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer.

In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresimir Agbaba 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's gen- eralized accounts|an attributive use of a denite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon.

There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names. With respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature. On the other hand there have been attempts (...) to extend Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of proper names, the most popular one being due to Kripke. However the argument Kripke gives to this end in his ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’ seems to be inconsistent with the position he takes in Naming and Necessity. I suggest that the reason we seem to have conflicting intuitions with respect to the uses of such terms, is because there is not one but two separate distinctions inherent in Donnellan’s examples; a pragmatic distinction based on the speaker’s intentions in using a term , and an epistemic one based on the notion of having an object in mind. In the light of this, I argue that the issue of whether there are attributive uses of proper names, in the latter sense, relates to the epistemic problem of whether a speaker can have de re attitudes toward an object that he does not have in mind. On this epistemic issue Kripke and Donnellan are on opposite sides as revealed by their debate over the issue of whether there are contingent a priori propositions. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

One barrier to optimal pain management in the neonatal intensive care unit is how the healthcare community perceives, and therefore manages, neonatal pain. In this paper, we emphasise that healthcare professionals not only have a professional obligation to care for neonates in the NICU, but that these patients are intrinsically worthy of care. We discuss the conditions that make neonates worthy recipients of pain management by highlighting how neonates are vulnerable to pain and harm, and completely dependent on others for (...) pain management. We argue for a relational account of ethical decision-making in the NICU by demonstrating how an increase in vulnerability and dependence may be experienced by the healthcare community and the neonate’s family. Finally, an ethical framework for decisions around neonatal pain management is proposed, focussing on surrogate decision-making and the importance of compassionate action through both a reflective and an affective empathy. As empathy can be highly motivating against pain, we propose that, in addition to educational programs that raise awareness and knowledge of neonatal pain and pain management, healthcare professionals must cultivate empathy in a collective manner, where all members of the NICU team, including parents, are compassionate decision-makers. (shrink)

The goal of the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) was to reconstruct the history of human evolution and the historical and geographical distribution of populations with the help of scientific research. Through this kind of research, the entire spectrum of genetic diversity to be found in the human species was to be explored with the hope of generating a better understanding of the history of humankind. An important part of this genome diversity research consists in taking blood and tissue samples (...) from indigenous populations. For various reasons, it has not been possible to execute this project in the planned scope and form to date. Nevertheless, genomic diversity research addresses complex issues which prove to be highly relevant from the perspective of research ethics, transcultural medical ethics, and cultural philosophy. In the article at hand, we discuss these ethical issues as illustrated by the HGDP. This investigation focuses on the confrontation of culturally diverse images of humans and their cosmologies within the framework of genome diversity research and the ethical questions it raises. We argue that in addition to complex questions pertaining to research ethics such as informed consent and autonomy of probands, genome diversity research also has a cultural–philosophical, meta-ethical, and phenomenological dimension which must be taken into account in ethical discourses. Acknowledging this fact, we attempt to show the limits of current guidelines used in international genome diversity studies, following this up by a formulation of theses designed to facilitate an appropriate inquiry and ethical evaluation of intercultural dimensions of genome research. (shrink)