Intentionality is one of the most frequently discussed topics in contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This book investigates intentionality from the point of view of intentional objects. According to the classical approach to this concept, whatever can be consciously experienced is regarded as an intentional object. Thus, not only ordinary existing individuals but also various kinds of non-existents and non-individuals are considered as intentional. Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, is particularly well-known as the `inventor' of an abundant ontology of objects (...) among which even incomplete and impossible ones, like `the round square', find their place. Drawing inspirations from Meinong's ideas, the author develops a simple logic of intentional objects, M-logic. M-logic closely resembles classical first-order logic and, as opposed to the formally complicated contemporary theories of non-existent objects, it is much more friendly in apprehending and applications. However, despite this resemblance, the ontological content of M-logic far exceeds that of classical logic. In this book formal investigations are intertwined with philosophical analyses. On the one hand, M-logic is used as a tool for investigating formal features of intentional objects. On the other hand, the study of intentionality phenomena suggests further ways of extending and modifying M-logic. Audience: The book is addressed to logicians, cognitive scientists, philosophers of language and metaphysics with either a phenomenological or an analytic background. (shrink)

Contemporary formalisations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid. However, in the same formalisations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties (relations). Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes (...) of size (not of self-referentiality): too many objects or too many properfies are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuifive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics (like a stratificafion of formulas). We need however to look for phenomenologically well grounded protecfions against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects. (shrink)

Putting individual constants and quantifiers into the same syntactic category within first-order language promises to have far-reaching consequences: a syntax of this kind can reveal the potential of any such language, allowing us to realize that a vast class of noun phrases, including non-denoting terms, can be accommodated in the new syntax as expressions suited to being subjects of sentences. In the light of this, a formal system that is an extension of classical first-order logic is developed here, and is (...) equipped with an appropriate semantics. An ontological interpretation of the new logic is then also provided, with several categories of object and notions of existence being distinguished. Last but not least, a modal version of the logic, with some interesting formal features, is proposed. (shrink)

A. Meinong’s views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong’s views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong’s ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology 1 . However there (...) still remains a need to discuss the problem of ways of reference to Meinongian objects regarding their specific structure of predication, and the interrelated problem of ontological commitment of those theories. Meinong’s ontological theory seems to be not so bizzare if we interpret it as a theory of possible intentional objects, i.e. possible objects of consciousness. And this interpretation perfectly agrees with phenomenological tradition from Brentano to Husserl and with the contemporary philosophy of mind. Needless to say reference is a special form of intentional relation so semantical investigations into these objects are of great relevance for general theory of intentionality. (shrink)

Contemporary formalisations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid. However, in the same formalisations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties (relations). Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes (...) of size (not of self-referentiality): too many objects or too many properfies are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuifive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics (like a stratificafion of formulas). We need however to look for phenomenologically well grounded protecfions against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Leśniewskian Ontology (LO) is a system in which the basic subject-predicate formula takes the form of a b and express one-argument predication, e.g. John is a student. In LO’s language, there is no many-argument form of predication given that would allow for the structural expression of, for example, the sentence John is Anne’s son. In this article, a simple and natural extension of LO is suggested to encompass many-argument predication. The system thus obtained corresponds to polyadic second-order logic.

Contemporary formalisations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid. However, in the same formalisations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties . Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes (...) of size : too many objects or too many properfies are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuifive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics . We need however to look for phenomenologically well grounded protecfions against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects. (shrink)

The paper discusses main issues concerning truthmakers: (1) what is the ontological status of truthmakers (are they ordinary objects, situations, tropes etc?), (2) what are deduvtive properties of truthmakers. A simple logic of truthmakers is developed. The logic consists of an axiomatic system and a possible world semantics.

Ramsey questions the distinction between subject and predicate in sentences. Since the distinction mirrors the ontological distinction object/property (particular/universal) he questions the latter distinction as well. There is a symmetry between the category of objects and the category of properties: an object can possess a number of properties and a property can be exemplified by a number of objects. Consequently, it may be claimed that the two categories are formally indiscernible. The paper develops Ramsey's thesis on the ground of logic. (...) Different senses of indiscernibility are discussed and various systems of logic are examined with respect to these senses. Most systems do not distinguish objects from properties in at least one sense. (shrink)

We assess Cartwright's models for probabilistic causality, and in particular, her models for EPR-like experiments of quantum mechanics. We show that her models for the EPR are mathematically incorrect and physically implausible. Finally, we argue that her models are not adequate for EPR-phenomena, since they ignore modal and spatiotemporal aspects inherent in their setup.

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 99-156.

It is argued that the assignment of truth values to future contingents is threatened not by a tensed metaphysics but by a temporally “local” notion of truth, i.e., by the assumption that whatever is true at a given time needs to be grounded in what exists at that time. If this assumption is accepted, tensed and tenseless metaphysics are equally vulnerable; if it is rejected, both can accommodate true future contingents. This means that semantic decisions are largely independent of metaphysical (...) considerations. The work of Correia and Rosenkranz (2018) is a clear example of how the tensed metaphysics of the growing block can incorporate true future contingents. Two potential worries are discussed in the context of their work: (a) that their grounding strategy overgeneralizes and admits true counterfactual contingents; and (b) that the growing block theory lacks sufficient resources to distinguish the unique possible future course of events that is relevant for the grounding of future contingents. (shrink)

This paper discusses the problem of inconsistencies in the metaphorical conceptualizations of time that involve motion within the framework of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT). It demonstrates that the TIME AS A PURSUER metaphor contrasts with the reverse variant TIME AS AN OBJECT OF PURSUIT, just as the MOVING TIME metaphor contrasts with the MOVING OBSERVER variant. Such metaphorical conceptualizations of time functioning as pairs of minimally differing variants based on Figure-Ground reversal are, strictly speaking, inconsistent with one another. Looking at (...) these inconsistencies from a wider perspective suggests that time may belong to a separate category of conceptual phenomena. This paper puts forward a proposal to approach time from the perspective of “phenomena of the third kind”, which according to Keller’s thesis include conceptual establishments resulting from human cognition, but not of human design. (shrink)

Obcy Inny. Analiza przypadków. 2017, ed. Małgorzata Karwatowska, Robert Litwiński, AdamSiwiec. Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin.Obcy/Inny, Propozycje aplikacji pojęciowych. 2018, ed. M. Karwatowska, R. Litwiński, A. Siwiec,Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin.

In 1968 the authors of the so-called Harvard Report, proposed the recognition of an irreversible coma as a new criterion for death. The proposal was accepted by the medical, legal, religious and political circles in spite of the lack of any explanation why the irreversible coma combined with the absence of brainstem reflexes, including the respiratory reflex might be equated to death. Such an explanation was formulated in the President’s Commission Report published in 1981. This document stated, that the brain (...) is the central integrator of the body, therefore the destruction of the brain results in the lack of that integration and the death of the organism. Therefore, according to that document, the so-called “brain dead” patients are really, biologically dead; strictly speaking they are not any more biological organisms but collections of organs and tissues. Their death was masked by the use of the medical equipment, but it was a real, biological death. Thus, the explanation given by the President’s Commission Report constituted a biological rationale for the new concept of death, known as “brain death.” However, after the long discussion, this rationale was refuted because of the evidence given by many medical authorities, that the bodies of the “brain dead” and “brainstem dead” patients are alive. In the context of the discussion about the neurological criteria for death, some authors follow the idea of Plato, that human being is the soul or mind, and the body does not belong to the human essence. Therefore, the loss of consciousness, which may be identified with the mind, constitutes the loss of personhood and may be interpreted as human death. The other group stresses the Aristotelian and Thomistic concept that the body belongs to the essence of every living creature, including human. Therefore, as long as the body is alive, the human being is alive and we cannot call the given patient dead even if he is deeply comatose. Moreover, in spite of the opinions dominating in the mass-media, these patients should be considered not only alive but also may be conscious to some degree and their state can be reversible. Their brains are lacking the electrical functions, but the neuronal tissue is alive and that state is reversible for at least first 48 hours since the onset of coma; this phenomenon is called “global ischemic penumbra” and is responsible for the regularly happening events interpreted as miracles, when some of the “brain dead” or “brainstem dead” patients turn to be alive and come back to normal life. Therefore, the neurological criteria of death are still lacking generally accepted scientific basis and should not be used in medicine and in the legal systems as a basis for diagnosing comatose/having no brainstem reflexes/apneic patients dead. (shrink)

Let J be any proper ideal of subsets of the real line R which contains all finite subsets of R. We define an ideal J * ∣B as follows: X ∈ J * ∣B if there exists a Borel set $B \subset R \times R$ such that $X \subset B$ and for any x ∈ R we have $\{y \in R: \langle x,y\rangle \in B\} \in \mathscr{J}$ . We show that there exists a family $\mathscr{A} \subset \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ of power ω (...) 1 such that $\bigcup\mathscr{A} \not\in \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ . In the last section we investigate properties of ideals of Lebesgue measure zero sets and meager sets in Cohen extensions of models of set theory. (shrink)

Recently I defended a hybrid view of persistence whereby simple objects endure while composite objects are stage related. I argued that it deserves further investigation given the explanatory work it does with regard to two problems raised in the literature on the metaphysics of the persistence of objects. In this paper I look at two further problems that have been raised—one from natural explanation, the other from time travel. I show how the hybrid view is able to deal with these (...) problems. In doing so I further build the case that the hybrid view is a serious contender in the persistence debate based on the explanatory work it can do. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Aufsatz berührt zwei bis heute nur im geringen Maße erforschte und thematisierte Probleme der Übersetzungstheorie. Es geht hier vor allem um eine möglichst kompakte Darstellung einer Diskussion über solche Begriffe wie Kultur, Fremderfahrung, Fremdverstehen, oder Alienation und Alterität. Der wissenschaft1iche Diskurs, in welchem beide der erwähnten Themen immer wieder zur Sprache kommen, gewinnt heutzutage für eine einheitliche Beschreibung der literarischen Übersetzung einen interessanten, obwohl methodologisch noch nicht ganz sicheren Boden. In erster Linie liegt das Problem des Kulturphänomens auf (...) dem Gebiet der Übersetzung in der Art und Weise seiner Analyse. Wie funktioniert der fremde und fremdsprachige Kontext in der kommunikativen Situation der Übersetzung, was doch eine Begegnung der Kulturen bedeutet? Wie ist es mit den Artefakten der fremden Kultur, Kunst und Literatur umzugehen? Welche Sprache soll die Aufgabe der Beschreibung leisten? Es werden hier nur die wichtigsten Fragen einer kulturspezifisch orientierten Übersetzungswissenchaft aufgezahlt. Ein Versuch, nur auf diese Fragen eine allgemeine Antwort zu erteilen, würde den Rahmen jenes kurzen Aufsatzes mit großter Sicherheit sprengen. Nichtsdestotrotz lohnt es sich über die immer aktuellen Quästionen der literarischen Übersetzung ein paar Worte zu sagen. Ich heiter, meine kurze und notwendigerweise oberflächliche Arbeit möge doch als ein guter Ansatz zum Thema: Kultur in der literarischen Übersetzung dienen. (shrink)