Tolérance et laïcité sont des notions sans cesse convoquées dans le débat public. Sans grand souci de leur genèse, de leur histoire, de leur complexité théorique ou de la plurivocité de leur signification, ces notions sont, le plus souvent, soit confondues l’une avec l’autre, soit opposées de manière antinomique. La mécompréhension conceptuelle a resurgi, il y a peu, sous la forme d’une polémique sous-tendue d’arrière-pensées politiques : la laïcité elle-même serait devenue, dit-on, le masque de l’exclusion intolérante des (...) confessions religieuses. Cette affirmation aux consé­quences redoutables est l’occasion d’une rapide mise au point sur les concepts, connexes mais distincts, de laïcité et de tolérance, de leur filiation, de leur logique et de leur champ d’application. (shrink)

Certains contre-révolutionnaires ont combattu la laïcité comme une contre-religion à laquelle il fallait opposer une théologie politique de l’autorité. Cette position impossible signale une tension réelle : dès la « religion laïque » de Renouvier et Buisson, la laïcité a été exposée à la tentation de sa propre sacralisation. Une réflexion théologico-politique pourrait servir ici à appuyer l’effort laïque pour échapper à toute « religion civile ».

Cet article interroge les conditions du renversement actuel des principes libéraux et anti-discriminatoires de la laïcité en leur application répressive : un « méta-laïcisme », au sens où l’on a pu parler d’un métaracisme, avec lequel il a partie liée. Plutôt que dans les instrumentalisations tactiques hétéroclites faites du discours de la laïcité – qui sont une dimension du problème plutôt que son explication –, on interroge ce renversement à partir des conditions historico-politiques d’une constitution matérielle laïque, du (...) développement inégal qui marque sa synthèse historique, et des effets résultants de la crise de son hégémonie. L’issue qui s’en dessine n’est pas seulement hypothétique, mais doublement hyperbolique, appelant un surcroît de luttes émancipatrices égalitaires, mais sur fond d’un non moins nécessaire surcroît de libéralisme politique pour accepter de reconnaître dans les cultures de l’Islam les ressources de forces idéologiques ayant droit de cité dans le champ des affrontements idéologico-politiques. (shrink)

The relationship between constitutional secularism and gender equality acquires peculiar dimensions in the context of the laïcité project in republican France – particularly, in the contemporary conflict between a laïcité interpreted as a politics of emancipatory social transformation, and the more minimalist liberal conception prevailing in French law. The dominant narrative in the republican establishment, shared between left and right, has been that laïcité will lead to gender emancipation not only by dissolving any sectarian dimensions of women’s (...) citizenship – that is, by sustaining a religiously neutral public sphere – but also, by preventing the domination as well as the coercion of religious choice in the intimate and private spheres of family and community. In this narrative, laïcité represents a more ambitious project of gender emancipation than that promised by the liberalisms more redolent of the Anglo-American world. The apogee of this expansionary interpretation of constitutional secularism is expressed in the 2004 prohibition on conspicuous markers of religious affiliation in the public schools, and the recent debate on the ‘full’ Islamic veil. This article considers the relationship of laïcité to gender equality through the lens of the broader theoretical debate surrounding the relationship of political liberalism to the politics of non-domination. The elusive challenge is to craft a constitutional secularism that can sustain a viable politics of non-domination – going beyond the formalist voluntarism redolent of classical liberalisms, offering undominated as well as uncoerced religious choice – yet also avoiding an overzealous emancipatory stance that itself assumes a regulative role for women’s religious choices. (shrink)

I. Questions to the French “Model” in the Postsecular Condition There are a number of compelling reasons why we—in our “ postsecular societies”1—should be paying closer attention to that debate which has been raging in France in recent decades, namely, that concerning the separation of “religion” and “politics.” For one, during the past decade, some Europeans—and especially my Dutch compatriots—have been looking with undisguised jealousy at the strict simplicity and transparency of the French “model” of secular government, the laïcité, (...) one that seems to guarantee a neat and orderly separation of religion and politics. Yet in France…. (shrink)

Our public debate over secularism has suffered from a kind of amnesia about the historical genesis of the modern, secular, and tolerant state. The transition away from the highly intolerant and persecutory regimes of late-medieval and early-modern Europe was greatly facilitated by four important developments. First, Europeans learned that social order and cohesion are threatened less by diversity than by intolerance of diversity. Second, the traditionally paternalist vision of the state’s role was called into question by a new valuation of (...) the individual conscience and consequently of individual liberties. Third, the assumption that the meaning of symbols is objectively determined was replaced by the idea that symbols are intersubjectively determined by convention. Fourth, Europeans began to distinguish two senses of publicity: visibility and representativeness. The proposed Charter of Quebec values harked back to a medieval mindset on all four counts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Otherwise than Laïcité? Toward an Agonistic Secularism in LevinasMark Cauchi (bio)Levinas and SecularismAlong with the so-called “return of the religious” in contemporary Western philosophy and politics, there has been a renewed effort in recent years to rethink secularism, the political doctrine of the separation of religion and politics.1 It would not be difficult to show that Emmanuel Levinas has been a substantial force in the resurgence of interest (...) in religion among philosophers, but his impact on thinking about secularism is less evident. Part of the reason for this uncertainty, and part of the reason it is not taken up by scholars, is doubtless the fact that Levinas’s conception of secularism is difficult to discern.2 Although he often discusses religion, politics, and even their relationship, he rarely addresses the question of secularism directly. He certainly uses the term laïcité, and, especially in Difficult Freedom, often discusses both the place of Judaism in secular society and what he calls the “Christian atmosphere” of modernity, but he never articulates, either here or elsewhere, a complete account of the concept.In addition to the paucity of Levinas’s writings on secularism, a further difficulty is that what Levinas does say about secularism can often seem contradictory and unclear. Consider, for example, his view [End Page 187] of the most basic issue of secularism: the separation of church and state. Is such a separation wholly compatible with Levinas’s thinking? On the one hand, Levinas is unambiguous about his endorsement of the separation. He writes in “How Is Judaism Possible?” (1959) that the separation “is the citadel that protects us [French Jews] against injustice,” and therefore that “we must beware of tampering with it.” And yet, as he will immediately add, the “luminous and incontestable formula” separating church and state must be given “its best content,” as if in its common understanding it does not possess its best meaning (DF 245). This specific double move, where he simultaneously endorses and criticizes the separation of church and state, is indicative of Levinas’s more general attitude from the 1950s onward toward the whole of the standard liberal conception of secularism.What I mean by the latter conception will be fleshed out in the following sections, but it can be defined now, in a preliminary fashion, as the entire liberal enterprise of creating a culturally neutral state and public sphere for the sake of protecting the rights and liberties of the individual citizen. Because the individual citizen is defined as possessing the right to, or liberty of, thought, expression, and association—all of which together, in effect, produce freedom of religion, whether explicitly proclaimed or not—the state and public sphere must be constituted in particular ways to guarantee these liberties; in particular, they must be culturally neutralized so that any citizen, from whichever cultural background, can participate in public institutions without bias and thus without the violation of their liberties. Such neutralization is achieved by the reciprocal move wherein participants in these institutions—that is to say, individual citizens—are not allowed to bring their cultural frameworks with them into the constitutions and operations of these institutions, leading to the so-called privatization of religion.Because Levinas criticizes this model of secularism while seeming to endorse some notion of it, what I would like to do in this essay is to determine what is precisely Levinas’s criticism of secularism and, in addition, what a “Levinasian secularism” might be. My central contention will be that the latter (Levinasian secularism) is not equivalent [End Page 188] to the former (his stated views about secularism). The reason for this discrepancy is that Levinas critiques standard liberal secularism on the basis of his more general philosophy of ethical alterity, but then reinstates liberal secularism (or an unspecified version of it) as the best way to protect institutionally ethical alterity. This double movement raises the question, how can ethical alterity at once be consistent and inconsistent with liberal secularism? The question is naturally related to the much-discussed one about the relation of ethics and politics in Levinas’s thinking. Levinas’s approach to the latter relation is consistently... (shrink)

This paper traces the history of the philosophical and political justification of religious tolerance from the late 17th century to modern times. In the Anglo-Saxon world, John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) gave birth to the doctrine of the separation of Church and State and to what is now called secularization. In France, Pierre Bayle refuted, in his Philosophical Commentary (1685), the justification of intolerance taken from Saint Augustine. Following him, Voltaire campaigned for tolerance following the Calas affair (1763), and (...) the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) imposed religious freedom which, a century later, resulted in the uniquely French notion of laïcité, which denies religion any supremacy, and any right to organize life in its name. Equality before the law takes precedence over freedom: the fact of being a believer does not give rise to the right to special statutes or to exceptions to the law. (shrink)

Si la laïcité est un terme qui plaît au débat public ordinaire depuis près de cent cinquante ans, elle n’est pas pour autant devenue un des grands concepts de la philosophie morale et politique, à la différence par exemple d’autres notions comme celles de justice, de devoir ou de tolérance. Or s’il est bien un concept qui structure spécifiquement la communauté politique républicaine française depuis près d’un siècle et demi, c’est celui de laïcité. Au point que la définition (...) la plus élémentaire de la laïcité pourrait consister à énoncer qu’elle est ce par quoi les citoyens font communauté. Au sens républicain du terme, la laïcité résonne du son d’un supposé admis vivre-ensemble dont elle tient lieu de principe fondateur évident. Ce texte se propose de questionner cette forme de communauté politique singulière qu’est la communauté républicaine des citoyens à l’aune du concept de laïcité en essayant de définir progressivement ce qu’est une communauté civique laïque. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-021-00616-2.

Dans le premier essai, Siegfried L. Mathelet interprète la pointe d’islamophobie qui s’est manifestée pendant le débat sur la « Charte des valeurs » dans le cadre,posé par Fanon, des mésaventures de la conscience nationale postcoloniale. L’auteur revient sur cette discussion issue des études postcoloniales et explore les stéréotypes nativistes et islamophobes à partir des notions de « dissémiNation » et d’« ambivalence » avancées par Homi Bhabha. Il avance ainsi que cette pointe d’islamophobie accompagne une politique identitaire qui trahit (...) le confinement du nationalisme québécois dans un état de résistance passive à l’horizon de l’impérialisme mondial et de l’État postcolonial du Canada. Dans le second essai, Philippe Bernier Arcand revient sur la montée récente du populisme dans la société québécoise. Il esquisse l’émergence d’un nouveau type de discours populiste. Celui-ci tisse un consensus politique en évoquant d’éventuels « ennemis » présents à l’intérieur des frontières et qui menaceraient d’infiltrer les institutions politiques. L’auteur montre comment se scelle au Québec aussi une alliance contre nature rassemblant des conservateurs et des progressistes autour de l’image fantasmée du musulman. (shrink)

How should one define the republican democratic and ‘laïque’ spirit in both the most concise and effective manner, as well as that most suited to the French case? The republican spirit resides without doubt in refusing submission to any single individual whoever that individual may be. The democratic spirit does not consist of decreeing the sovereignty of the people, but in developing formal modalities of political life allowing the people not to be divested of it. The ‘laïque’ spirit rejects all (...) distinctions concerning the nature and rights of citizens; it also equally rejects religious laws being imposed over political law. (shrink)

How should one define the republican democratic and ‘ laïque’ spirit in both the most concise and effective manner, as well as that most suited to the French case? The republican spirit resides without doubt in refusing submission to any single individual whoever that individual may be. The democratic spirit does not consist of decreeing the sovereignty of the people, but in developing formal modalities of political life allowing the people not to be divested of it. The ‘ laïque’ spirit (...) rejects all distinctions concerning the nature and rights of citizens; it also equally rejects religious laws being imposed over political law. (shrink)

Since the late twentieth century, republicanism has been the subject of renewed interest in contemporary political theory. In France, subsequent to 1989, this revival brought debates about cultural and religious diversity to the philosophical forefront. Thus, it is now possible to distinguish between a plurality of perspectives, each claiming specific interpretations of republicanism and each positioning itself differently to meet these cultural and religious challenges. This article situates the Report of the Committee of Reflection on the Application of the Principle (...) of Secularity in the Republic with regard to these issues. (shrink)

The display of religious symbols in public spaces has been controversial in Europe for the past twenty years. The debate moved to Quebec some ten years ago. At the heart of the controversy, the hijab or headscarf has stirred passions that have led to heated social tensions. For some people, it is a vehicle for expressing their faith; for others, it symbolizes the oppression of women and is often associated with fundamentalism and the rise of a more radical Islam that (...) fights against Western democratic values. Is secularism the solution to these issues? (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it offers a critique of the normative foundations of the 2019 Quebec Act respecting the laicity of the State. This is primarily based on the theses we developed in La nation pluraliste. Repenser la diversité religieuse au Québec (Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2018), and elaborates a suitable diversity management model for Quebec using the republican liberalism described in Rawls’ later work. This discussion draws attention to certain pitfalls in the concept of (...) secularism as defended by the Coalition Avenir Québec government. Second, we present a methodological discussion on how political philosophy can contribute to the formation of law, by examining how our criticism of Act respecting the laicity of the State corresponds to an exercise in implementing Rawls’ own method of thoughtful balance. (shrink)

Le concept de modernité et des notions qui lui sont apparentées - sécularisation, laïcité, libéralisme, séparation de l'Église et de l'État, discours sur les droits et libertés - souffrent d'une imprécision définitionnelle à la source de nombreuses incompréhensions. La distinction entre deux paradigmes historiques de référence, soit une modernité américaine attachée à son héritage judéo-chrétien et une modernité française fermée à la transcendance et historiquement hostile à l'Église, offre une grille d'analyse susceptible de clarifier les débats transatlantiques et la (...) posture philosophique des uns et des autres. Ces deux modèles rivaux résultent de lectures fondatrices antagoniques des droits de l'homme et de la laïcité. Partisans des deux modernités s'opposent, souvent avec âpreté, dans l'ensemble des diverses cultures nationales de la Civilisation occidentale. Discréditée par les grands totalitarismes athées et les hécatombes du XXe siècle, la modernité comprise comme auto-nomie ne saura se relever qu'en se réconciliant avec ses sources originelles chrétiennes. Garant de la dignité de la personne humaine, l'imago Dei - l'anthropologie biblique - constitue le fondement ultime et le cadre interprétatif nécessaire aux droits fondamentaux de la personne. (shrink)

This theoretical paper examines the context-sensitivity of the impact of cultural norms on prejudice regulation. Granting the importance of understanding intergroup dynamics in cultural-ecological contexts, we focus on the peculiarities of the French diversity approach. Indeed, the major cultural norm, the Laïcité is declined today in two main variants: The Historic Laïcité, a longstanding egalitarian norm coexisting with its amended form: The New Laïcité, an assimilationist norm. In fact, these co-encapsulated Laïcité variants constitute a fruitful ground (...) to cast light on the processes underlying prejudice regulation. Indeed, it is documented that the assimilationist New Laïcité is linked to higher levels of prejudice as compared to the egalitarian Historic Laïcité. To this day, research mainly explored interindividual determinants of Laïcité endorsements and specified how these endorsements shape prejudice. Crucially, this “indirect-endorsement path” does not account for the more straightforward causal relationship between Laïcité and prejudice. Moreover, recent experimental evidence suggests that the normative salience of both Laïcité norms shape intergroup attitudes beyond personal endorsement. Therefore, in this contribution, we complement previous work by investigating the possible socio-cognitive processes driving this “direct-contextual path.” In doing so, we seek to bridge the gap of causality by investigating how the Laïcité norms can set the stage for specific regulatory strategies. Our reasoning derives from an application of the Justification-Suppression Model bolstered by classical work on mental control, modern racism and diversity ideology. From this, we sketch out the operative functioning of two distinct regulation processes: one that prevents prejudicial attitudes but which can have unexpected consequences on stereotyping within the Historic Laïcité context and one that helps realize prejudice within the New Laïcité context. From this analysis, we discuss the consequences for intergroup relations within and beyond the French context. In particular, we outline the importance of an adequate framing of egalitarian ideologies so that they achieve their goal to foster harmonious intergroup relations. (shrink)

Lors des débats qui ont accompagné en 2005 la commémoration du centenaire de la loi de séparation des Églises et de l’État, la question du genre a occupé une place particulière. Quelques années auparavant, une partie des polémiques sur le foulard islamique s’était cristallisée autour de l’obligation faite à la République d’œuvrer en faveur de l’égalité des sexes au nom de la laïcité. Il en est allé de même des combats pour l’homoparentalité ou la reconnaissance des identités sexuelles minorit...

Some cases of countries and cultures in which traditional Catholicism has played a major role in defining public culture are undergoing accelerated secularization processes; the result should be relevant for the diagnoses underlying contemporary post-secular proposals. It is argued, first, that in these countries (Spain has been taken as a main example), where the Catholic Church lost its institutional power, it is also losing its ethical hegemony. While public and political debates still retain the sense of symbolically laden, communal ethical (...) accord, they are no longer understood with religious overtones. It is suggested, second, that laïcité — a non-aggressive stance concerning religion — could adequately describe this predicament, though it retains a trait of self-defence vis-à-vis the Church that is normally attached to the term ‘laicism’. It is proposed, third, that secularization takes place at the ethical level, in which no sense of loss can be attached to the secular citizen. It is at this level, where the conflicts around meanings and values, which can be framed in religious or secularized terms, set the agenda for legal and political discussions, and where the equal standing of religious and secular interpretations should be assessed. (shrink)

Cette étude a un double objectif: 10 dégager les grandes lignes de l'ouvrage de Georges de Lagarde, La Naissance de l'Esprit laïque au Moyen Age, tout spécialement du volume V, Guillaume d'Ockham, Critique des structures ecclésiales; 20 retracer les origines de la doctrine actuelle de la laïcité de l'État et ses incidences dans la Constitution dogmatique de l'Église. En un temps où l'Église catholique prend pleinement conscience d'elle-même et approfondit le message qu'elle doit transmettre au monde, l'histoire des manifestations (...) de l'esprit laïque, à une époque qui passe pour avoir réalisé mieux qu'aucune autre l'idéal de la chrétienté, mérite de retenir l'attention. Car cette histoire se prolonge jusqu'à nous. (shrink)