14 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Marc Alspector-Kelly (Western Michigan University)
  1. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2012). Constructive Empiricism Revisited. Metascience 21 (1):187-191.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2011). Why Safety Doesn't Save Closure. Synthese 183 (2):127-142.
    Knowledge closure is, roughly, the following claim: For every agent S and propositions P and Q, if S knows P, knows that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is so implied, then S knows Q. Almost every epistemologist believes that closure is true. Indeed, they often believe that it so obviously true that any theory implying its denial is thereby refuted. Some prominent epistemologists have nevertheless denied it, most famously Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick. There are closure advocates (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2010). The NOAer's Dilemma. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):307-322.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Kenneth Aizawa, Liliana Albertazzi, Keith Allen, Sarah Allred, Marc Alspector-Kelly, Kristin Andrews, André Ariew, Valtteri Arstila, Anthony Atkinson & Edward Averill (2009). We Would Like to Thank the Following for Contributing to the Journal as Reviewers This Past Year: Fred Adams Jonathan Adler. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):817-818.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Timothy J. McGrew, Marc Alspector-Kelly & Fritz Allhoff (eds.) (2009). The Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology. Wiley-Blackwell.
    speaking there are only two sorts of opposition to be found here. One is the opposition between motion and rest, together with the opposition between ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2006). Constructive Empiricism and Epistemic Modesty: Response to van Fraassen and Monton. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 64 (3):371-379.
    Bas van Fraassen claims that constructive empiricism strikes a balance between the empiricist’s commitments to epistemic modesty – that one’s opinion should extend no further beyond the deliverances of experience than is necessary – and to the rationality of science. In “Should the Empiricist be a Constructive Empiricist?” I argued that if the constructive empiricist follows through on her commitment to epistemic modesty she will find herself adopting a much more extreme position than van Fraassen suggests. Van Fraassen and Bradley (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Marc Alspector-kelly (2006). Knowledge Externalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):289–300.
    A popular counterexample directed against externalist epistemological views is that of an agent (Lehrer's "Truetemp" for example) whose beliefs are clearly neither justified nor known but that were generated in the manner that the externalist requires, thereby demonstrating externalism to be insufficient. In this essay I develop and defend an externalist account of knowledge – essentially an elaboration of Fred Dreske's information-theoretic account – that is not susceptible to those criticisms. I then briefly discuss the relationship between knowledge and justification.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2006). Pretending to See. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):713-728.
    There are three distinct projects - ontological, phenomenological, and conceptual - to pursue in the philosophy of perception. They are, however, rarely distinguished. Failure to distinguish them has resulted in their being pursued as one. Their completion then requires that they admit of the same solution, while accommodating the existence of misperception and the scientific facts concerning the perceptual process. The lesson to learn from misperceptions and those facts is, however, that no such common solution is possible, and that the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2004). Seeing the Unobservable: Van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience. [REVIEW] Synthese 140 (3):331-353.
    I. Introduction “We can and do see the truth about many things: ourselves, others, trees and animals, clouds and rivers—in the immediacy of experience.”1 Absent from Bas van Fraassen’s list of those things we see are paramecia and mitochondria. We do not see such things, van Fraassen has long maintained, because they are unobservable, that is, they are undetectable by means of the unaided senses.2 But notice that these two notions—what we can see in the “immediacy” of experience and what (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2003). The NOAer's Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):307 - 322.
  11. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2002). Stroud's Carnap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):276-302.
  12. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2001). On Quine on Carnap on Ontology. Philosophical Studies 102 (1):93 - 122.
    W. V. Quine assumed that in _Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Rudolf Carnap was attempting to dodge commitment to abstract entities--without either renouncing quantification over them or demonstrating their dispensability--by wielding the analytic/synthetic distinction against ontological issues. Quine's interpretation of Carnap's intent--and his criticism of it--is widely endorsed. But Carnap objected, I argue, not to abstract entities, but to his critics' suggestion that empiricism implies nominalism. Quine's and Carnap's views are therefore more akin than Quine ever suspected. Unfortunately, Quine's misinterpretation of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2001). Should the Empiricist Be a Constructive Empiricist? Philosophy of Science 68 (4):413-431.
    Van Fraassen does not argue that everyone should be a constructive empiricist. He claims only that constructive empiricism (CE) is a coherent post-positivist alternative to realism, notwithstanding the realist's charge that CE is arbitrary and irrational. He does argue, however, that the empiricist is obliged to limit belief as CE prescribes. Criticism of CE has been largely directed at van Fraassen's claim that CE is a coherent option. Far less attention has been directed at his claim that empiricists should be (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation