In the present paper, we evaluate the grounds on which therapeutic approaches are determined in elderly demented patients as a typical group of patients who are conscious but lack the ability to make competent judgments. It is argued that none of the factors that the patient as an individual being has at present and that are complete in that individual - the age of the patient, dementia, personhood, and the ability to feel pain - is likely to be a genuine (...) reason for care-providers including health care workers and patient’s family to discontinue the treatment for severely demented patients. It is also claimed that reasons for discontinuation of the treatment for severely demented patients arise from the relationship between the patient and the care-providers, especially the patient’s family. The human relationships between the patient and the family may be maintained as long as the latter find some significance in the presence of the severely demented patient and recognize him/her as “one of them”. When the patient ceases to be “one of them” for the family and is excluded from “their company”, the reason for supporting the demented member of the family is lost. The benefit to the patient and the value of his/her presence lose the individuality or specificity and are subjected to interpretation by the family. Therefore, the reason for discontinuation of the treatment for a severely demented patient is termination of the relationship between the patient and his/her family. The significance of our conclusion is briefly discussed. (shrink)

Discussion of the posthuman has emerged in a wide set of fields through a diverse set of thinkers including Donna Haraway, Ray Kurzweil, Nick Bostrom, N. Katherine Hayles, and Francis Fukuyama, just to name a few. Despite his extensive critique of technology, commentators have not explored the fruitfulness of Heidegger's work for deciphering the various strands of posthumanism recently formulated in response to contemporary technological developments. Here, I employ Heidegger's critique of technology to trace opposing visions of the posthuman, visions (...) that are both tied intimately to new information technologies. For those seeking to extend humanist ideals, information technologies are employed to extend the vision of an ultra-humanist view of a ‘scientific posthuman’ that dangerously understands the body to be a forfeitable nuisance, rather than an inherent aspect of being human. Along Heideggerian lines, thinkers such as N. Katherine Hayles and Thomas Carlson have developed an alternative trajectory related to Dasein's Being-in-the-world. This trajectory posits the self as constituted by a lack or abyss, enabling the formulation of a ‘mystical posthuman,’ celebrating, rather than forfeiting, humanity's embodied existence. (shrink)

As philosophers in the continental tradition have taken an interest in the return of religion, anthropologists and sociologists have rejected the once-dominant secularization thesis. Bradley B. Onishi connects these lines of thought to reveal how philosophy's religious investigations have enabled critical reflections on the category of the secular.

In this paper I argue that an encounter with a tick can produce both fear and wonder. I make a distinction between the legitimate danger of tick borne-diseases and the non-danger of our entanglement with the nature revealed by the tick’s bite in order to highlight the goodness of the tick and the possibilities for post-human existences beyond narratives of conquest and control. Ultimately, I argue that wonder is a helpful mechanism for thinking through the goodness of the tick by (...) allowing an ungrounding of our assumptions about climate change, hospitality, and the danger of non-human agencies. (shrink)

In 2013, the first reader of Jean-Luc Marion’s works appeared, Jean-Luc Marion: The Essential Writings, meticulously edited by his friend and colleague Kevin Hart. Yet, if the appearance of volume marked Marion’s status as France’s most influential living philosopher, Hart’s Kingdoms of God marks the beginning of a systematic theology long in the making. In addition to serving as the prologemenon to his planned systematics, the work also serves to differentiate Hart’s phenomenological theology from Marion’s phenomenology of revelation and doctrine (...) of revelation through the rendering of what Hart calls the basilaic reduction, on the basis of which Hart builds a twofold theological criticism of Marion. He first criticizes Marion’s claim that revelation can gain phenomenological status like ordinary phenomena, and second contests the notion that revelation is always characterized by a saturation that bedazzles its receiver. I explore each thinker’s approach to the relationship between philosophy and theology, using their engagements with the works of Jacques Derrida and Karl Barth as points of comparison in order to contextualize Hart’s theological criticisms of Marion. I conclude by arguing that Hart’s, rather than Marion’s, approach to the relationship between philosophy and theology corresponds to the core concerns of the second generation of the “theological turn” of French phenomenology. (shrink)

The debate over scientific realism is one of the traditional topics in philosophy of science. Today there are various types of realism and anti-realism, including entity realism, (epistemic/ontic/moderate) structural realism, semirealism, eclectic realism, and constructive empiricism. However, the main point of the dispute, which is the validity of inference from observable evidence to unobservable events, seems to have been set aside in the recent debate. To improve this situation, I propose a new approach to the scientific realism issue that utilizes (...) the epistemological positions. As an example, I also demonstrate an analysis of the debate based on contextualism in epistemology. (shrink)

This book connects recent developments in speculative realism, new materialism, and eco-phenomenology to articulate an approach to wonder that escapes the connected traps of anthropocentrism and correlationism. Brian Onishi argues that wonder has explanatory power for the constitution of the world and the organization of meaning. To do this, he appeals to both fiction (speculative and Weird fiction in particular) and quantum physics. More specifically, he argues that the focus of Weird fiction on impossible experiences and a feeling of (...) something just beyond the limits of one’s grasp dramatizes the speculative reach beyond the limits of our understanding. But more than a tool for knowledge acquisition, wonder is an organizing property of objects. Like the collapse of superposition in quantum physics, reality is constituted when objects reveal themselves to other objects and thereby organize themselves into complex objects. Since no relation is exhaustive, the capacity to wonder remains at a material level, and the possibility of reorganization is ever present. Ultimately, Onishi argues for a speculative eco-phenomenology with wonder as an engine for a Weird environmental ethics. (shrink)

This paper aims to construct a logic of alternative-I that provides a proper conceptual framework for talk of possible-I in decision-making context, and thereby solves what we call the paradox of possible-I. The model of our logic, Alt-I model, is an adaptation of N. Belnap’s branching-time model, and the STIT (see to it that) operator defined on the model serves to represent choices and decisions made by actual and counterfactual agents. We conclude this paper by discussing the application of Alt-I (...) model to the case of digital twins, digital copies of a person. (shrink)

Lorsque nous parlons généralement d’un espace vide, ce vide n’est pas réellement vide physiquement. L’espace vide est rempli d’air, de matière invisible, mais il ne peut pas être vu ou capturé. Pourtant, nous savons bien que l’air, élément indispensable pour tous les êtres vivants, est également présent autour de nous. Devrions-nous alors considérer différemment l’espace vide et l’air dans l’installation? Pour Yasuaki Onishi, sculpteur et installateur in situ, l’espace vide est un lieu essentiel pour l’installation et l’inspiration. Il s’intéresse (...) à l’invisible, à l’espace, à l’air, à l’espace négatif, etc. Il révèle ce qui est invisible, en utilisant un matériau léger tel qu’un adhésif liquide noir et le support de matériaux immatériels tels que la lumière, l’air ou d’autres matériaux intangibles. Parmi ses travaux, en particulier, en analysant les œuvres de la série Vertical Volume, Daily Distance, Gawa, Shaping Air – A Breath of Mobility et Vertical Space, nous cherchons dans cette étude la signification de l’air invisible, du ki, du svi, du wonsang et le sens du vide du Tao et du bouddhisme. Quel est le sens du vide dans une installation de Yasuaki Onishi? Et quel est l’enjeu entre l’espace vide et l’espace plein, l’espace visible et l’espace invisible, la matérialité et l’immatérialité? Dans son travail, qui ne suit pas le processus général de la sculpture traditionnelle, nous trouverons le lien avec la signification de l’espace négatif et avec le terme coréen gan, l’espace-temps, avec le mot japonais ma qui constitue un concept esthétique au Japon. When we generally speak of an empty space, this empty is not really physically empty. The empty space is filled with air, invisible matter, but it cannot be seen or captured. However, we know that air, an essential element for all living things, is also present around us. So should we consider differently the empty space and air in the installation? For Yasuaki Onishi, sculptor and installator in situ, the empty space is an essential place for installation work and inspiration. The empty space that we think is empty is filled with substances that are invisible. The empty space is filled with air, but it can’t be seen or captured. He is interested in the invisible, space, air, negative space, etc. He reveals what is invisible, using a light material such as a black liquid adhesive, with the support of non-material materials such as light, air or other intangible materials. Among his works, in particular, by analyzing the works of the series Vertical Volume, Daily Distance, Gawa, Shaping Air – A Breath of Mobility and Vertical Space, we look for the meaning of invisible air, breath, ki, svi, the etymology of sunyata, wonsang 원상, and the meaning of emptiness of Tao and Buddhism. Through the work of Yasuaki Onishi, what is the meaning of the emptiness in his installation? And what is at stake between empty space and full space, visible space and invisible space, materialism and immateriality. In his work, which does not follow the general process of typical sculpture, we will find the connection with the meaning of “negative space” and the term Korean gan “간 ”, the space-time, as the Japanese word “ma ” that use as a concept of aesthetics in Japan. (shrink)

The homeostatic property cluster theory is widely influential for its ability to account for many natural-kind terms in the life sciences. However, the notion of homeostatic mechanism has never been fully explicated. In 2009, Carl Craver interpreted the notion in the sense articulated in discussions on mechanistic explanation and pointed out that the HPC account equipped with such notion invites interest-relativity. In this paper, we analyze two recent refinements on HPC: one that avoids any reference to the causes of the (...) clustering of properties and one that replaces homeostatic mechanisms with causal networks represented by causal graphs. We argue that the former is too slender to account for some inductive inference in science and the latter, thicker account invites interest-relativity, as the original HPC does. This suggests that human interest will be an un-eliminative part of a satisfactory account of natural kindness. We conclude by discussing the implication of interest-relativity to the naturalness, reality, or objectivity of kinds and indicating an overlooked aspect of natural kinds that requires further studies. (shrink)

This volume gathers together for the first time are all the key texts in a crucial debate in modern philosophy, centered on Leibniz's famous 1695 essay, the "New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication," in which he introduced his strikingly original theory of metaphysics. His "system" became increasingly famous and drew him into discussion and development of these ideas, both in public and in private, with a variety of thinkers, most notably the great French philosopher Pierre Bayle. (...) Woolhouse's and Francks's new English edition gives the only full representation of this debate, and will therefore be essential reading for anyone who wishes to gain a proper understanding of Leibniz's philosophy and its intelletual context. All the texts are newly translated and extensively annotated; many appear in English for the first time. (shrink)

We present substructural negations, a family of negations classified in terms of structural rules of an extended kind of sequent calculus, display calculus. In considering the whole picture, we emphasize the duality of negation. Two types of negative modality, impossibility and unnecessity, are discussed and "self-dual" negations like Classical, De Morgan, or Ockham negation are redefined as the fusions of two negative modalities. We also consider how to identify, using intuitionistic and dual intuitionistic negations, two accessibility relations associated with impossibility (...) and unnecessity. (shrink)

A star-free relational semantics for relevant logic is presented together with a sound and complete sequent proof theory. It is an extension of the dualist approach to negation regarded as modality, according to which de Morgan negation in relevant logic is better understood as the confusion of two negative modalities. The present work shows a way to define them in terms of implication and a new connective, co-implication, which is modeled by respective ternary relations. The defined negations are confused by (...) a special constraint on ternary relation, called the generalized star postulate, which implies definability of the Routley star in the frame. The resultant logic is shown to be equivalent to the well-known relevant logic R. Thus it can be seen as a reconstruction of R in the dualist framework. (shrink)

What sort of evidence can confer the strongest support to a hypothesis? A natural answer is that the evidence entails the hypothesis. Roush claims that the likelihood ratio measure of degree of incremental support can deliver this intuitively natural result, and regards it as unifying “[the] account of induction and deduction in the only way that makes sense”. In this paper, we highlight a difficulty in the treatment of this case, and question the great significance that is attached to this (...) measure and its alleged capacity to accommodate the logicality requirement. We contrast the likelihood ratio measure with other measures, and argue that problems still emerge in light of tensions with plausible requirements for confirmation measures more generally. (shrink)

Recent discussions of “eco-anxiety” have brought attention to feelings of hopelessness and despair associated with climate change and ecological disaster. When we accept the claims made by science about climate change and realize that our near future is full of unprecedented ecological crisis it is difficult to avoid feelings of anxiety about the future of human life on our planet. While these discussions have largely taken place in the context of psychology and psychoanalysis, there is a need to engage in (...) ethical deliberation about both “eco-anxiety” and “eco-trauma.” In this paper, I argue that an environmental virtue of wonder can help to articulate the intersection of environmental ethics and “eco-anxiety” by offering a mean between the excess of anxiety and the deficiency of boredom. I situate this discussion within trauma studies and make connections between the pre-trauma of climate change, wonder, and eco-cinema. More specifically, I argue for a weird environmental ethic that embraces fuzzy boundaries of entangled environments and show that the virtue of wonder allows for flourishing within this context. I use cinema, and specifically Eco-Weird cinema, to argue for a shift in narratives about our present and our future as it relates to climate change. (shrink)

Next‐generation sequencing (NGS) technologies have revolutionised the analysis of genomic structural variants (SVs), providing significant insights into SV de novo formation based on analyses of rearrangement breakpoint junctions. The short DNA reads generated by NGS, however, have also created novel obstacles by biasing the ascertainment of SVs, an aspect that we refer to as the ‘short‐read dilemma’. For example, recent studies have found that SVs are often complex, with SV formation generating large numbers of breakpoints in a single event (multi‐breakpoint (...) SVs) or structurally polymorphic loci having multiple allelic states (multi‐allelic SVs). This complexity may be obscured in short reads, unless the data is analysed and interpreted within its wider genomic context. We discuss how novel approaches will help to overcome the short‐read dilemma, and how integration of other sources of information, including the structure of chromatin, may help in the future to deepen the understanding of SV formation processes. (shrink)

What sort of evidence can confer the strongest support to a hypothesis? A natural answer is that the evidence entails the hypothesis. Roush (Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005) claims that the likelihood ratio measure of degree of incremental support can deliver this intuitively natural result, and regards it as unifying “[the] account of induction and deduction in the only way that makes sense” (p. 163). In this paper, we highlight a difficulty in the treatment of (...) this case, and question the great significance that is attached to this measure and its alleged capacity to accommodate the logicality requirement. We contrast the likelihood ratio measure with other measures (such as the Kemeny–Oppenheim measure and the difference measure), and argue that problems still emerge in light of tensions with plausible requirements for confirmation measures more generally. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues frequently criticize traditional Greek myth, yet Plato also integrates myth with his writing. Daniel S. Werner confronts this paradox through an in-depth analysis of the Phaedrus, Plato's most mythical dialogue. Werner argues that the myths of the Phaedrus serve several complex functions: they bring nonphilosophers into the philosophical life; they offer a starting point for philosophical inquiry; they unify the dialogue as a literary and dramatic whole; they draw attention to the limits of language and the limits of (...) knowledge; and they allow Plato to co-opt cultural authority as a way of defining and legitimating the practice of philosophy. Platonic myth, as a species of traditional tale, is thus both distinct from philosophical dialectic and similar to it. Ultimately, the most powerful effect of Platonic myth is the way in which it leads readers to participate in Plato's dialogues and to engage in a process of self-examination. (shrink)

We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief tasks. In this (...) study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people. (shrink)

We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief tasks. In this (...) study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people. (shrink)

We propose a formal framework for interpretable machine learning. Combining elements from statistical learning, causal interventionism, and decision theory, we design an idealised explanation game in which players collaborate to find the best explanation for a given algorithmic prediction. Through an iterative procedure of questions and answers, the players establish a three-dimensional Pareto frontier that describes the optimal trade-offs between explanatory accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. Multiple rounds are played at different levels of abstraction, allowing the players to explore overlapping causal (...) patterns of variable granularity and scope. We characterise the conditions under which such a game is almost surely guaranteed to converge on a optimal explanation surface in polynomial time, and highlight obstacles that will tend to prevent the players from advancing beyond certain explanatory thresholds. The game serves a descriptive and a normative function, establishing a conceptual space in which to analyse and compare existing proposals, as well as design new and improved solutions. (shrink)