This volume is the second instalment in the new critical edition of Lev Shestov's complete works which has been entrusted to the Director of the Lev Shestov Society, Dr Ramona Fotiade, by the French publisher, Le Bruit du Temps.

This volume is the second instalment in the new critical edition of Lev Shestov's complete works which has been entrusted to the Director of the Lev Shestov Society, Dr Ramona Fotiade, by the French publisher, Le Bruit du Temps.

This volume is the second instalment in the new critical edition of Lev Shestov's complete works which has been entrusted to the Director of the Lev Shestov Society, Dr Ramona Fotiade, by the French publisher, Le Bruit du Temps.

This volume is the second instalment in the new critical edition of Lev Shestov's complete works which has been entrusted to the Director of the Lev Shestov Society, Dr Ramona Fotiade, by the French publisher, Le Bruit du Temps.

This volume is the second instalment in the new critical edition of Lev Shestov's complete works which has been entrusted to the Director of the Lev Shestov Society, Dr Ramona Fotiade, by the French publisher, Le Bruit du Temps.

Kierkegaard a donne a sa philosophie le nom d'existentielle; il sait certes aussi bien que tout le monde que du point de vue de la philosophie speculative, la philosophie existentielle est la pire des absurdites. Mais cela ne l'arrete pas, cela le ravit au contraire. C'est dans l'"objectivisme" de la philosophie speculative qu'il voit son vice essentiel. "les hommes, ecrit-il, sont devenus trop objectifs pour obtenir la beatitude eternelle, car la beatitude eternelle consiste justement en un interet personnel infiniment passionne". (...) Et cet interet infini est le commencement de la foi. (shrink)

In his Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty (1717), the English deist Anthony Collins proposed a complete determinist account of the human mind and action, partly inspired by his mentor Locke, but also by elements from Bayle, Leibniz and other Continental sources. It is a determinism which does not neglect the question of the specific status of the mind but rather seeks to provide a causal account of mental activity and volition in particular; it is a ‘volitional determinism’. Some decades later, (...) Diderot articulates a very similar determinism, which seeks to recognize the existence of “causes proper to man” (as he says in the Réfutation d’Helvétius). The difference with Collins is that now biological factors are being taken into account. Obviously both the ‘volitional’ and the ‘biological’ forms of determinism are noteworthy inasmuch as they change our picture of the nature of determinism itself, but my interest here is to compare these two determinist arguments, both of which are broadly Spinozist in nature – and as such belong to what Jonathan Israel called in his recent book “the radical Enlightenment,” i.e. a kind of underground Enlightenment constituted by Spinozism – and to see how Collins’ specifically psychological vision and Diderot’s specifically biological vision correspond to their two separate national contexts: determinism in France in the mid-1750s was a much more medico-biological affair than English determinism, which appears to be on a ‘path’ leading to Mill and associationist psychology. (shrink)

At the very beginning of L’Homme-Machine, La Mettrie claims that Leibnizians with their monads have “rather spiritualized matter than materialized the soul”; a few years later Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and natural philosopher with a strong interest in the modes of transmission of ‘genetic’ information, conceived of living minima which he termed molecules, “endowed with desire, memory and intelligence,” in his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés. This text first (...) appeared in Latin in 1751 under the title Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali naturae systemate, with the pseudonym Dr Baumann; it was translated by Maupertuis in 1754 as Essai sur la formation des corps organisés and was later included in his 1756 Œuvres under the title Système de la nature. Now, it is clear that Maupertuis was a kind of Leibnizian; and that his molecule possessed higher-level, ‘mental’ properties. In that sense he falls under the first category described by La Mettrie. But he was also involved in a debate on this issue with Diderot, who put forth a sustained critique of Maupertuis’ theory of the molecule in the additions to his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature. Where Maupertuis attributes higher-level properties to his living minima, Diderot argues that these properties are ‘organizational’, i.e., they can only be properties of the whole. At issue here is the degree of commitment to a form of materialism. (shrink)