In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of BeingLatimah-Parvin Peerwani ArlingtonMullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being. By Sajjad H. Rizvi. Culture and Civilization in the Middle East Series, edited by Ian Richard Netton. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. Pp. xii + 222. Hardcover $135.00.In Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being, Sajjad H. Rizvi focuses on tashkīk (modulation), variously translated as the systematic ambiguity, analogical gradation, or just (...) gradation of being from the perspective of Mullā Ṣadrā, comparing it with classical Islamic philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy. He states that he makes two major claims in this study. First, he argues that modulation is a hermeneutic concept that describes the threefold division of being and its gradation. Second, gradation and modulation occur in each mode of being. Each mode of being refers to a branch of Ṣadrā's philosophy: mental being is a discussion of epistemology and psychology; 'being-in-language' is critical to Sadrian semantic theory; being in re focuses on 'traditional metaphysics.' But the philosophy of Ṣadrā is not compartmentalized; being cuts across these fields and unites them. Each mode of being as modulated shares features of intensification. According to Rizvi, Ṣadrā has extended the normal understanding of modulation and of being beyond the simple division of the two realms of mental and concrete existence to bring out the semantics of being. This aspect of Islamic philosophy, according to Rizvi, has often been neglected (p. 3). [End Page 278]This study consists of an Introduction and two parts. In the Introduction, Rizvi states the problem of tashkīk as the central hermeneutic of Ṣadrian ontology. An analysis of this critical concept, according to Rizvi, facilitates our understanding of Ṣadrā's position on a wide variety of important philosophical issues such as predication, the problem of reconciling unity and plurality in being, and God-world relationship. It provides an answer to the age-old problem of the One and the many, and the median way between the ontological monism of Ibn ʿArabi and the metaphysical pluralism of Avicenna. Rizvi says that according to Ṣadrā there are four levels of being: the concept of being, its reality, its uttered manifestation (sound), and its written manifestation.Part 1 consists of two chapters. In the first chapter Rizvi outlines his methodology and some of his assumptions about the cultural history of the period and the context of Ṣadrā. The significant contention, according to Rizvi, is that a proper understanding of Ṣadrā's philosophy requires an appreciation of philosophy in the Neoplatonic traditions "as a way of life" that is often closely related to spiritual practice and religious commitment. The aim of philosophical inquiry for Ṣadrā, according to Rizvi, is therapy for the rational soul and its perfecting and development in its path of return to its origins in the One.Four methodological approaches are utilized in this study. (1) Tashkīk is seen as the central hermeneutic of Ṣadrian metaphilosophy, and not ontology; Rizvi argues that tashkīk is a central guiding principle in Ṣadrā's metaphilosophy and permeates all branches of his philosophical system. (2) The aporetic method is used in analyzing Ṣadrā's philosophy. (3) Rizvi maintains that Ṣadrā's philosophy is processual, for it represents a shift from substance to process metaphysics. (4) Ṣadrian hikmat (philosophy, wisdom) is approached as a metaphilosophical inquiry. Metaphysics is a foundational science for Ṣadrā, instrumental in the possibility of acquiring knowledge and in the construction of definitions and meaningful discourse. Hikmat, according to Rizvi, is doubly transcendent, (1) as a higher synthesis of Avicennan, Illuminationist, Sufi, and esoteric Shiʿite systematic thought, and (2) as a prophetic philosophy that claims to be derived from direct 'revelation.'The second chapter introduces the tashkīk (modulation) of being. Rizvi traces its historical development from the Aristotelian pros hen homonym to Avicenna, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Ibn ʿArabi, and offers an account of an intensifying scale of being toward a hierarchy of being that is singular but with multiple degrees defined by their intensity, that is, in terms of scales of intensification and deliberation. He makes explicit the Neoplatonic logic of being that this implies and examines how... (shrink)

Mulla Sadra is one of the most prominent figures of post-Avicennan Islamic philosophy and among the most important philosophers of Safavid Persia. He was a prolific writer whose work advanced the fields of intellectual and religious science in Islamic philosophy, but arguably his most important contribution to Islamic philosophy is in the study of existence and its application to such areas as cosmology, epistemology, psychology, and eschatology. Sadra represents a paradigm shift from the Aristotelian metaphysics of fixed (...) substances, which had dominated Islamic philosophy, to an analysis of existence as the ultimate ground and dynamic source of things. He posits that all beings derive their reality and truth from their wujud and that a proper philosophical analysis must therefore start and eventually end with it. The present work's focus on Sadra's gradational ontology provides a strong foundation for the reader to understand Sadra's other works and later texts by other philosophers working in the same field. This edition contains parallel English-Arabic texts and a new translation by preeminent scholar of Islamic philosophy Seyyed Hossein Nasr. (shrink)

In this article, I will discuss Mulla Sadrā's proof of ideas together with his evaluations of Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī's views. The aim of the article is to try to provide a certain opinion about the proof that Sadrā developed. It is seen that Sadrā generally exhibits a dual attitude about ideas. Sadrā's first attitude is to match the theologians' teaching of names, Suhrawardi's view of the master of genres, the sufists' a'yan al-sābita theory and the Peripatetics’ concept (...) of universal with ideas. His second attitude is that he is alone at the point of understanding Plato and reaching the clearness of the issue. In other words, he states that there has been no one who have understood and explained the issue as it should be. Sadrā attributes his own success on the subject both to discovery and inspiration, and to his intellectual research on existence. The aim of Sadrā is to try to unite between Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, he also follows Plotinos and Fārābī, who had this purpose before him. Sadrā, who criticizes Avicenna on the subject, sees Suhrawardī as the philosopher who comes closest to the truth, but states that he is also inadequate in some points. (shrink)

Mulla Sadrā refers to ancient Greek philosophers in his writings quite often, especially when the subject matter is the soul. In this article, I will address how Mulla Sadra reiterates Avicenna’s summary and analyses of ancient theories of the soul as discussed in Safar 4, Bab 5, and Fasl 5 of, al-Hikmat al-Mutaʿāliya fi asfār al-ʿaqliyyat al-arbaʿa. The source of these discussions, when the structure and basic contents are considered, is Aristotle’s De Anima Book I. Before defining (...) the soul, Aristotle discusses what kind of a science, a science on the soul should be, and afterwards, he evaluates previous theories on the soul as those defining the soul through movement, perception, and life. We observe that this evaluation on previous theories play a preparatory role for his own definition of the soul as perfection and actualization. In a similar manner, in Safar 4, Bab 5, and Fasl 5 of Asfār al-aqliyyat al-arbaʿa, Mulla Sadrā reinterprets and discusses Ancient theories in such a way that the discussion leads us to a theory similar to Mulla Sadrā’s. In the presentation of this chapter, we find out that the soul is immaterial and modulated (tashkīkī) reality and is represented as a unity which is in a constant movement in its substance. The soul is matter in its origin, yet turns into an immaterial reality through substantial movement. In direct disagreement with Aristotelian philosophy, for Mulla Sadrā, movement in substance is possible as well as it is essential in understanding the reality of the soul. When Mulla Sadrā evaluates the ancient discussions and the criticisms by Avicenna, he finds that the discussion focuses on the source of mobility yet the soul is supposed to be defined as the source of immobility equally. Next in the discussion on movement, he focuses on the necessity of accepting the principle of substantial movement. According to Mulla Sadrā, Avicenna (following Aristotle’s presentation and interpretation) is misleading in his evaluation and criticisms of the ancient theories on the soul mainly because he follows a literalist reading. On the contrary, sources for Ancients’ knowledge is perennial wisdom, and their words on the soul have deeper meanings than what is understood at the first reading. When read with more trustful lenses, it will be manifested that the soul is an immaterial reality for them as well. For example, when they talk about the soul as a sphere, Mulla Sadrā thinks that they want to direct attention to the perfection. When fire is mentioned, the dynamic reality of the soul is brought to light. Mulla Sadrā, adds the principle of gradation (tashkīk) to his presentation and talks about modulation of fire from material fire to the immaterial light (nūr).The lowest level of fire is related to the changes in nature of the soul, the soul responsible of irascible and concupiscent establishes the next level. Once the soul is under total control, then it completes the passage to its incorporeality and becomes light. So this chapter is important in its structure because it allows us to read into how Sadrā’s historical reiteration is influenced by his own theoretical framework on the one hand. On the other hand, thanks to the long lineage of De Anima commentary literature, we can compare Sadrā with Aristotelian readings in this chapter. The interpretative reading of Mulla Sadrā, in opposition to the literalist reading of Avicenna on the ancient theories, also leans on a history of other philosophers before him. In this regard, a lineage of historiography might be traced back to Āmirī, Qādi Saʿīd, and Shahristāni. What the article comes to conclude is that a particular presentation found in Aristotles’ De Anima- Book I is molded in Mulla Sadrā’s hands with a more interpretative version of pre-Socratic theories to such an extent to support Mulla Sadra’s own theories on the soul. (shrink)

This study investigates the problem of the natural universal in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā. The problem of universals made its way into Arabic/Islamic philosophy via its Greek sources, and was transformed into the problem of natural universals by Avicenna. Weighing in on this problem, Ṣadrā reinterprets the nature of natural universals against the backdrop of his doctrine of “the primacy of being.” As he argues, a natural universal or quiddity qua quiddity is an “accidental being” that requireswujūdfor its existentiation. (...) Thus, Ṣadrā re-envisions the status of natural universals by stripping them of their disputed status as independently existing entities.RésuméDans cette étude je me propose de réfléchir sur le problème de l'universel naturel dans l’œuvre de Mullā Ṣadrā. Le problème des universaux s'est introduit dans la philosophie arabe et musulmaneviales sources grecques et s'est trouvé transformé en celui des “universaux naturels” aux mains d'Avicenne. En contribuant à son tour à l’évolution de ce problème, Ṣadrā réinterpréta le statut des universaux naturels à partir de sa propre doctrine de la “primauté de l’être”. Selon lui, un universel naturel ou “quiddité en tant que quiddité” est un “être par accident” qui requiertwujūdpour son existentiation. Ainsi, Ṣadrā re-envisage le statut des universaux naturels en les privant de leur statut contesté en tant qu'entités “indépendantes existantes”. (shrink)

Mullā Sadrā appeared in the philosophical field when the prevalent philosophical questions were principality of existence and principality of quiddity. Although he first held the theory of principality of quiddity, later in a cognitional rotation he accepted the theory of principality of existence. Such a rotation gradually causes a wide revolution in the realm of philosophy, and consequently it yields principles such as unity of existence, analogicity of existence, and intensification of existence. He propounds external objectivity of existence, knowledge, (...) beauty and other qualities of perfection as his philosophical principles. Thus, due to Mullā Sadrā’s basic principles, we can attain to principles such as principality of beauty, unity of beauty, analogicity of beauty, and intensification of beauty. (shrink)

Following Avicenna, many Muslim philosophers and logicians have identified ‘intellectual universal’ (kullī ʿaqlī) with the very mental concept dependent on mind. Apart from the controversies about Platonic Forms, they argue that they cannot be the very universals in logic. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentators have interpreted his view on intellectual universal in the Avicennian framework. In this interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā has embraced Avicenna’s explanation about mind-dependent universal concepts; however, he has modified some details of the issue as per his theory of (...) the primacy of existence and Plato’s theory of Forms. Having explained Sabzawārī and Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in his article, the author goes to propose a different interpretation according to which intellectual universals are identical with Platonic Forms, rather than the mind-dependent universal concepts. This Platonic interpretation is supported by three sets of evidences from Mullā Ṣadrā’s own texts. It also shows how Mullā Ṣadrā has answered Avicenna’s objection about the use of Platonic universal in logic. (shrink)

Avicenna believes that God must be understood in the first place as the Necessary Existent. In his various works, he provides different versions of an ingenious argument for the existence of the Necessary Existent—the so-called Proof of the Sincere —and argues that all the properties that are usually attributed to God can be extracted merely from God's having necessary existence. Considering the centrality of tawḥîd to Islam, the first thing Avicenna tries to extract from God's necessary existence is God's oneness. (...) The aim of the present Element is to provide a detailed discussion of Avicenna's arguments for the existence and unity of God. Through this project, the author hopes to clarify how, for Avicenna, the Islamic concept of monotheism is intertwined with the concept of essential existence. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra, on the one hand, proves detailed foreknowledge of God based on the rule of “simple reality is whole things” and using the rule of particular gradation in existence. On the other hand, from his standpoint, sometimes freedom is coextensive with willingness and sometimes relying on the same rule of "simple reality is whole things" – that analyzes causality in the form of epiphany – is equivalent to the subjectivity of God. In this philosophical system, the conflict (...) between divine foreknowledge and human freedom is resolved with regard to activity of divine knowledge–rather than passivity of divine knowledge–and, also, belonging of divine knowledge to the voluntary human action gets resolved. But it seems that Mulla Sadra’s antecedents and favorite solution is not very effective. (shrink)

In the whole universe, from the lowest beings to the highest ones, love permeates through the entire world of existence. Love is one of the hallmarks and perfections of existence in animals. This survey was done to illuminate and explain Mullah Sadra’s ontological viewpoint on the entity of sentiments and the inborn and innate love in the existence of non-human animals. The analytic and descriptive method was used to conduct this study and research. An animal is one of the (...) creatures in the essence of the existence that possesses its own perfect attributes. Animals have souls, the effects of which are life, perception, free choice, and emotions. Animals have an order for their existence, and they are attributed with perfection to the extent of their intensity and weakness. That is to say, all animals are not at the same level. Their perfection is also the same as their existence is. There is life, perception, and love in animals, but it depends on their proportion of existence. All animals are in love, but every animal having the highest share of its rank enjoys more love. Mullah Sadra’s ontological principles in proving the existence and flow of love in animals are that the existence is ‘original,’ ‘non-composite,’ ‘equivocal,’ and ‘coextensive’ with life, conception and love, and ‘God, the Almighty, is the true Beloved of all beings including animals’ souls.’ Evolutionarily, animals can only move to the point where humanity of human beings begins. (shrink)

The creation of the human being is an issue that has arisen from time to time in both Western and Eastern philosophy. Does the human soul have an eternal preexistence, or was it, just like the body, created at a point in time? If created at a point in time, does the soul join the body as a created but incorporeal existence or does it join the body as a physical thing that changes into an incorporeal existence? Finally, does God (...) produce the human soul instantaneously? The present essay is a comparative investigation of the views of Thomas Aquinas and Mullā Ṣadrā on this topic.In his writings Thomas treated the problem of the creation of the human being from both philosophical and theological perspectives. His .. (shrink)

This article wants to describe the science of ḥuḍūrī according to three great philosophers from Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, to Mullā Ṣadrā. Even though they both adopt ḥuḍūrī science, the three of them are different in terms of paradigm and also their implementation. This research uses general hermeneutic methods on the main books of Suhrawardī, Ibn Sīnā, and Mullā Ṣadrā as well as experts in the field. Ibn Sīnā accepted the science of ḥuḍūrī only as a science of the self because (...) he adopted the plurality paradigm of wujūd. Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā focus more on ḥuḍūrī knowledge, not only self-knowledge but also developing other forms of wujūd. Even for Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā the only true knowledge is ḥuḍūrī knowledge. Mullā Ṣadrā with his ḥuḍūrī theory of science succeeded in building unity between epistemology and ontology because he defined science with the presence of non-material in non-material. The soul is a non-material entity still weak because it is tied to the body and must undergo substantial transformation with knowledge and charity. The source of knowledge is the non-material, active mind which bestows knowledge on the subject who has carried out catharsis and then there is unity between the two. External objects are not sources of knowledge, but stimulants. Science in general and the science of ḥuḍūrī, in particular, were also later developed further into the science of God. (shrink)

Theories about the dawn of "principality of existence" or "principality of quiddity" stand in the realm of "confusion of term and concept fallacy". It is true that asalat as a term appeared for the first time in Mirdamad's works such as Taqwim al-Iman to mention the problem of principality of existence, but we should notice that its meaning as a concept can be tracked in Suhrawadi's works. If by the term asalat we mean having real extension, as it is used (...) in Mulla Sadra's work, we can, without any doubt, claim that Suhrawardi is among the proponents of principality of quiddity. Proposing the distinction of existence and quiddity by al-Faraby and Avicenna, some philosophers regarded this distinction as a real one. But Suhrawardi, by presenting about nine arguments, claimed that existence remains as a mental predicate and does not have any real extension. He made use of his theory in the realm of the Necessary Being through Itself. Avicenna had claimed that the essence of God is His Existence but Suhrawardi denied this Avicennan Peripatetic principle. He said that existence has no real extension and so the essence of God cannot be existence. He claimed that here iniyyah means indivisible life. It seems that Mulla Sadra's arguments for demonstrating the principality of existence posed versus Suhrawardi's arguments for the mental nature of existence. (shrink)

Avicenna, the most influential of Islamic philosophers, produced The Healing as his magnum opus on his religious and political philosophy. Now translated by Michael Marmura, The Metaphysics is the climactic conclusion to this towering work. Through Marmura’s skill as a translator and his extensive annotations, Avicenna’s touchstone of Islamic philosophy is more accessible than ever before. In The Metaphysics, Avicenna examines the idea of existence, and his investigation into the cause of all things leads him to a meditation on the (...) nature of God. From this discussion, Avicenna develops a theory of divine causation that synthesizes Neoplatonic, Aristotelian, and Islamic ideas. Within this emanative scheme, Avicenna establishes some of the basic ideas of his religious and political philosophy, as he discusses the divine attributes, divine providence, the hereafter, and the ideal “virtuous” city with its philosopher-prophet as the human link between the terrestrial and heavenly realms. With this edition, The Metaphysics can now be better seen as one of the most masterful works of classical Islamic philosophy. (shrink)

I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main strands of Islamic philosophy, and then consider some arguments for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I first overview Avicenna’s theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī) of the soul and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the physical incipience (al-ḥudūth al-jismānī) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on his (...) account. I then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments presented by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary physicalistic views of the nature of mind and mental states. I will then argue that arguments for the immateriality of the soul – dealt with here – do not indeed target or challenge any significant versions of contemporary physicalism. Moreover, these arguments involve conflations of epistemological or ontological issues. (shrink)

The concept of reincarnation is believed to be the rebirth of humans in the world as a form of part of their life journey in accordance with their actions during life with various forms of reincarnation—including being able to be reborn as humans or animals. This article aims to discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s eschatological thoughts, especially his criticism of the concept of reincarnation which has been believed by Hindus and Buddhists. Reincarnation is a topic of discussion for philosophers including Islamic philosophers (...) in discussing the spirit, soul, body, death, and resurrection. Ṣadrā’s rejection of the concept of reincarnation is found in one of his main works entitled al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah. By using analytical and descriptive methods, it was concluded that Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the concept of reincarnation with his five philosophical arguments, including the natural unity argument, the material and form needs argument, Kawn and Fasād’s argument, the vacuum argument, and the argument with five premises. These philosophical arguments are based on Ṣadrā’s main philosophical principle, namely the substantial movement of the soul. Even though he rejects the concept of reincarnation, Ṣadrā still believes in the resurrection of the soul and body after death, which will continue the journey towards the highest perfection in the afterlife. (shrink)

How can the presence of truth in art be philosophically justified? A fundamental question that can be answered in the wisdom of Mullā Ṣadrā, one of the most important philosophers of Islam. The importance of the question of the relationship between art and truth arises from the state of art in the present era. In fact, the degradation of reason in front of feeling from the nineteenth century until today has made the field of arts devoid of any representation of (...) the truth and caused the importance and originality of finding pleasure or evoking feelings in the arts. Therefore, with a philosophical approach and relying on the descriptive-analytical method, at first, it described the fundamental of truth and delusion, the unity of the world, and the known, practical reason and the function of imagination in shaping intellectual concepts based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s views, and then with relying on those principles, he has examined the formation of truth-based works of art. The most important conclusion of the article is that art is not the only product of the feelings and taste of its creator; Rather, the artist, in his understanding of the truth, prepares the ground for its manifestation in the work of art. With this characteristic, art finds a form of rational knowledge, and symbolic and mystical arts are among the most important examples of this type of artistic creation. (shrink)

This illuminating study by Christian Jambet explores the essential elements of the philosophical system of Mulla Sadra Shirazi, an Iranian Shi'ite of the seventeenth century. The writings of Mulla Sadra Shirazi bear witness to the divine revelation in every act of being, from the most humble to the most celebrated. More generally, Islamic philosophy employs an ontology of the real that is important to the destiny of metaphysics, an ontology that belongs to our own universe of (...) thought. The Act of Being, nourished by the Sufism of Ibn al-'Arabi, the philosophy of classical Islam, the thought inherited from the Greeks, and the esoteric and mystical dimension of Shi'ism, seeks to make sense of this intuition of the real.Mulla Sadra saw the world as moving ceaselessly in an uninterrupted revolution of its substances, in which infinite existence breaks through the successive boundaries of the sensible and the intelligible, the mineral and the angelic. In a flourish of epiphanies, in the multiplied mirror of bodies and souls, Mulla Sadra perceived absolute divine liberty. Revealing freedom in the metamorphosis of the believer and the sage, existence teaches the imitation of the divine that can be seen "in its most beautiful form." Reading Mulla Sadra reveals the nexus of politics, morality, liberty, and order in his universe of thought--a universe, as Christian Jambet shows, that is indispensable to our understanding of Islamic thought and spirituality. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma tradução da hermenêutica sobre a unicidade de Deus de um capítulo (sura) do Alcorão, de acordo com o pensamento de Avicena (Ibn Sῑnā). É o capítulo denominado capítulo do Monoteísmo, cujo número é 112 no Alcorão. Antes, porém, há uma introdução sobre o que representou o Alcorão nos primórdios do Islã e a sua influência no desenvolvimento da filosofia e da teologia em terras do Islã. Nesse texto, pode ser constatado que, na doutrina islâmica, o primeiro (...) fundamento e o mais rigoroso é a unicidade de Deus. É sobre isso que este artigo discorre. This paper presents a translation of the hermeneutics of the oneness of God from chapter (sura) 112 of the Qur'an (the Chapter on Monotheism), according to the thought of Avicenna (Ibn Sῑnā). First, however, there is an introduction which presents the Qur'an in the early days of Islam, as well as its influence on the development of philosophy and theology in Islamic lands. It may be noted in this text that the first and most rigorous foundation is Islamic doctrine is the oneness of God. (shrink)

This article aims at showing the potentiality of Transcendent Theosophy in the creation of peace and denial of religious violence. Belief in Necessary Being that is identical to beauty and perfection is one of the central issues in Islamic philosophy, particularly Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Theosophy. This belief has different stages, the highest one of which is a love-based sense of humbleness before God who is the source of beauty. Thus, faith in the thought of Mulla Sadra (...) is one of the aesthetic categories. Surrender to such a Being leads to love in him and his effects. Thus, in Transcendent Theosophy, love in God is followed by the love in people. This love is associated with the sense of responsibility and the effort for the realisation of people’s rights. In the final part of the article under the title ‘Mulla Sadra and Confrontation of Two Types of Religious Understanding’, through the analysis of Mulla Sadra’s dialogue with a religious radical, we have criticised the discourse of religious violence and concluded that Transcendent Theosophy is a defender of human rights and a pioneer of peace and a despiser of religious violence. The most important finding of this study is that according to Mulla Sadra, religious radical interpretations are the source of the emergence of religious violence, and the solution to this problem is the promotion of rational and conscious religiosity. The method used in this research is of descriptive-analytic type.Contribution: The article brought to fore the potentiality of Islamic philosophy for the realisation of peace and the denial of religious violence. The authors analytically studied Mulla Sadra’s pacifist foundations in order to ascertain its relation with non-violence towards humans. The main contribution of this article is that the teachings of Transcendent Theosophy are very useful for creating peaceful coexistence between human beings. (shrink)

This research endeavors to introduce a novel concept in ethics, namely ethics based on the primacy of existence, drawing upon Aṣālat al-wujūd, the theory of the primacy of existence in ontology. Mullā Sadrā's philosophy, which has three basic tenets—the primacy of existence, substantial motion (Ḥarakat-i Juharī), and gradation in existence (Tashkīk-i wujūd)—is the basis for this doctrine. The primacy of existence holds that quiddity is a mental construct and that existence is fundamental. The writers distinguished between two conceptions of ethics (...) in this regard: one based on existence and the other on quiddity. Human quiddity is fixed and does not grade, hence ethics based on quiddity's primacy will always be fixed and the same for every individual. Moral obligations are universal and shared by all individuals. On the other hand, moral obligations for humans might vary depending on their existential status, according to ethics grounded in the primacy of existence. Moral oughts and ought nots are established by human existential grades in this ethics. This ethical model is flexible and dynamic. (shrink)

Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī was an indispensable link in the transmission ofMullā Sadrā’s teachings and an important commentator of his works.In my article, I’ll focus on one of them – a short treatise, entitled“Basīt al-haqīqa wa wahdat al-wujūd,” which deals with the modes ofthingness and existence in general, and the socalled“illuminative relation” in particular.The most significant statements Nūrī makes in this brief work consistin the identification of thingness with existence and the “breath of theMerciful” with the “illuminative relation”. I intendto examine (...) these two important points and the employedargumentation in detail, showing how Nūrī exploited some ideas,current in the Kalām and theoretical Sufism, to the benefit of thedoctrine of Mullā Sadrā. (shrink)

A proper understanding of the Sufi doctrine of the unity of existence is essential for following the later developments of Islamic philosophy. The doctrine of the unity of existence is divided into introversive and extroversive aspects, the former dealing with the unity of the soul of the mystic with God, and the latter with the unity of the cosmos with God. Here this latter aspect of the doctrine is explained through a comparison of the views of (...) Ibn ‘Arabi and Meister Eckhart, both of whom are profoundly influenced by Ibn Sina at precisely the same crucial points, although Meister Eckhart makes explicit reference to Ibn Sina, while Ibn ‘Arabi generally avoids naming him. The theory of the extroversive unity of existence consists of four parts, or rather, it is the product of four steps, each of which is logically based on the previous one: (1) God is the only being or the absolute existence. (2) Everything other than God (i. e., human beings and the cosmos) is nothing or nonexistence. (3) The existence of all things is God’s existence (All are He). (4) The cosmos does not have existence but manifests existence. In other words, it is God’s self-disclosure. (shrink)

The present article analyzes and compares the idea of divine revelation to justify religious beliefs from the viewpoints of Paul Moser and Mulla Sadra. Moser suggests a kind of moral transformation experience that includes direct cognition and internal experience of self-revelation and God’s unselfish love while he considers mere theoretical reason to be inefficient and emphasizes God’s authority and His attributes and goals as well as the axis of divine revelation. Knowledge-by-presence and direct experience of God in (...) class='Hi'>Mulla Sadra’s philosophy which is the only way to access true recognition of God is close to divine revelation. The present article shows that, considering the relationship between love and salvation, and knowledge-by-presence and the practical intellect, in Sadrian belief in God, Moser’s approach is close to Mulla Sadra’s even though the method of argumentation of these two philosophers in representing this type of cognition is not completely the same. Considering the commonalities and differences between Moser and Mulla Sadra in justifying belief in God, it seems possible to revise Moser’s approach with a Sadrian reading with a combination of innate nature arguments and self-knowledge. (shrink)

This study examines a number of different answers to the question: wheredoes Avicenna demonstrate the existence of God within the Metaphysics of the Healing? Many interpreters have contended that there is an argument for God’s existence in Metaphysics of the Healing I.6–7. In this study I show that such views are incorrect and that the only argument for God’s existence in the Metaphysics of the Healing is found in VIII.1–3. My own interpretation relies upon a careful consideration of the scientific (...) order and first principles of the Metaphysics of the Healing, paying attention to Avicenna’s own explicit statements concerning the goals andintentions of different books and chapters, and a close analysis of the structure ofthe different arguments found in the relevant texts of the Metaphysics of the Healing. I conclude that Avicenna’s explicit goal in I.6–7 is to establish the properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence, which consists, not in ademonstration of God’s existence, but in a dialectical treatment of the first principlesof metaphysics. (shrink)

Anthropology in psychology under the title of "personality theories" has been able to be effective in the field of behavioral studies and interpersonal relationships. The need to explain and analyze the true nature of man in the field of "being" - contrary to psychological personality theories that generally identify human nature in the field of "appearance" - caused this article based on Sadra's anthropological opinions and view According to Allport's trait theory, which is one of the pioneers of the (...) trait approach, it should be organized by descriptive-analytical method. The individualistic approach based on traits is the main feature of Allport's and Mulla Sadra's personality theory. The foundation of personality in both theories is based on the most profound characteristics of person; However, in the analysis of Mulla Sadra's philosophical texts, the quality of the appearance of these traits and why they influence the structure of personality and, accordingly, human behavior, have been explained. "Self" or ego, contrary to its abstract concept in Alport's view, is a real and existential thing in Sadrai's system. The dynamism and unity of Alporti's personality can be rationally explained by the rule of "unity of the known and the known" and "intrinsic volitional movement". (shrink)

In this study, the rational criticism directed by Ibn Tayymiyya (d. 1338) to the philosophical evidence used to prove the unity of the necessary existent in the book Kitāb al-Is̲h̲ārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, which is accepted as a constitutive text in the history of Islamic philosophy, is examined. Author of the aforementioned book Avicenna (d. 1037) tries to prove the unity of the necessary existent from different ways in his books. Kitāb al-Is̲h̲ārāt wa al-tanbīhāt is a book that includes (...) one of these ways. The evidence that Avicenna uses in that book comprises of two preliminaries. The first preliminary is made up of specifying the relation between the thing that the different perceptible particular entities are common and are different. The second one is based on proving the existence not to be the cause of essence by centering the difference of existence and essence. Ibn Taymiyya, who criticizes philosophers in many ways, criticizes this evidence used by Avicenna in his work Mes’eletün fî tevḥîdi’l-felâsife. Rejecting the logic of Mashshaiyyun as science, Ibn Taymiyya also tried to refute the philosophical and logical rules that philosophers accept and use. In this context, Ibn Taymiyya argues that not only the preliminary presuppositions of the philosopher's argument to prove the unity of the necessary being, but also that the logical principles and rules previously accepted by the philosopher are false. One of the most important issues criticized by the thinker in relation to the subject is the reality of concepts, the existence of universals, how universals are moved to particulars, and the state of quiddity. According to him, concepts are mental and universals do not have a reality in the external world. Again, he thinks that universals like humanity are attributed to particulars as attributes, and therefore, in a way, he denies the universal being universal. Because, according to Ibn Taymiyya, a certain attribute of a being that is particular cannot be universal unlike itself. According to the thinker, the commonality in the concepts that logicians call universal consists only of a linguistic partnership. Undoubtedly, it can be said that Ibn Taymiyya's thought on the issue of concepts is close to nominalistic approach in a way. But he does not directly deny the reality of the concepts. For, according to him, the concepts that are universally formed in the minds are actually realized particularly. That is to say, the universal humanity has been realized particularly in individuals such as Ahmet and Mehmet. In other words, because the humanity in individuals is particular, Ahmet's humanity is different from Mehmet's humanity. For this reason, there can be no real partnership among the examples given. In this context, the unity distinction made by Ibn Taymiyya in understanding his thoughts is helpful. According to him, unity is of two types, real and qualitative. Real unity is the unity that exists in the essence of the individual. The qualitative unity is the unity that exists between the things under the concept of the universal. However, the qualitative unity is not considered as a unity since it does not occur in the external world. In fact, this is what distinguishes Ibn Taymiyya from nominalist thinkers. If we turn back to the evidence of Avicenna, based on the objections that Ibn Taymiyya made to the logic and philosophical principles of Mashshaiyyun in general, we can say that the thinker criticized the precedents of this argument by emphasizing the knowledge that universal concepts are intellectual entities. He emphasizes the examples that Avicenna uses to show the affiliation among the things are only made up of universal notions and alleges them not to have perceptible entity. Thus, he says that there is not a real affiliation among different particular entities that have perceptible existence. As to the second preliminary, Ibn Taymiyya says that this preliminary is also inaccurate for the reason that it is, like the first preliminary, based on the knowledge that the intellectual entities had come true in the physical world. According to him, the essence is made up of intellectual conceptualization. Therefore, it has not physical reality. After criticizing the preliminaries in this manner, Ibn Taymiyya says that the analogy that consists of these preliminaries is also erroneous. Because the analogy that is based on erroneous preliminaries does not give a correct result. (shrink)

At the title of this article, we have introduced Mulla Sadra as the "founder of the wisdom of Throne" and, thus, it is befitting to go to analyze the notions of ``wisdom'' and ``throne''.Given to Mulla Sadra's points of view about the "wisdom, some important points can be inferred:First: wisdom must deal, instead of particular things, with the understanding of universal ones.Second: wisdom is, in fact, to do good acts.Third: wisdom is to follow the Lord in (...) safeguarding the nation as well as in ruling on the subordinates.Fourth: wisdom means resemblance to God, to the extent of man's capability, in various aspects.Now we go to survey in the connotation of the Throne.Throne means, verbally, seat and roof.Sages and philosophers think that by the Throne, the macrocosm or the ``Supreme Throne''"is meant. In his al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah, however, Mulla Sadra writes: The sphere of Atlas, i.e. the ninth sphere, which encompasses, according to Ptolemaic system, all other spheres as well as the material world, is devoid of stars. And in terminology of the people of mysticism and wisdom, the Supreme Throne, which is the formal base of the Divine absolute decree, is beyond the human sense and intuition; for, because of its greatness and encompassing all the world and perfect connection with the world of ideas, it seems to be among the immaterial things and the world of ideas, which are free of, and beyond, the human senses. (shrink)

Immortality, or life after death one of the deep-rooted problamatics that most noteworthy backgrounded and never losing its freshness, in the philosophic-thelogical custom. While the expectations of people about the next life, is satisfied as ‘resurrection’ by the theistic beliefs doctorines-thoughts, it is also answered as ‘soul immortality’ by the philosophical approaches. But it is impossible to say both thesis have smootly aspects. In this study, we will rank how this ancient problematic in the history of thought is dealt with (...) in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Sadra offers an original doctrine of resurrection, which is based on the existential evolution of the self and continues to develop in a continuous process. This doctrine, in which the theories of substantive movement, abstractness of imagination and selestial-spiritual bodies are used as basic parameters, is a critical answer to the philosophical doctrine that acknowledges the continuity of spiritual existence with the classical thelogical thought that advocates the return of worldly bodies. In this respect, it appears as a third alternative alternative for Islamic eschatology, trapped between theories of de resurrection through biological body and spiritual immortality. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra and Leibniz are two philosophers of the East and the West, and belong to two different worlds. Though they were unaware of ideas of each other, they share certain points that are comparable. Monads constitute the basis of Leibniz's thought and he refer to their features in his various works. Mulla Sadra's philosophy also is based on being and he tried to deal with its reality in his philosophy. Though Leibniz's monads are many and (...) Mulla Sadras being is one, they use certain terms for monads and being which are very close to each other and are comparable from different points of view. Leibniz monads while being many are one as well. Similarly Mulla Sadra's philosophy too enjoys multiplicity in unity. Leibniz's monads enjoy perception and Mulla Sadra's being too coexist withknowledge. In this paper apart from comparing Leibniz's monads and Mulla Sadra's concept of being, their philosophies also have been compared and their common and different points have been unraveled. (shrink)

How an abstract immaterial being is connected to a physical thing has been viewed variously by western philosophers who considered the issue prior to their Muslim counterparts.Muslim theologians and philosophers, however, developed the related discussions which became heated following the translation of logical books and essays throughout the Translation Era.The focus of this article, besides clarifying the ideas raised by Muslim philosophers in this regard,is to shed light on Mulla Sadra's opinion and its influence on the later philosophers, (...) Abd-ul-Razzaq Lahiji in particular.To explain his opinion,Mulla Sadra primarily brings a proof to establish the unity of the soul,and to prove this,he has refuted the reasons used by the opposing philosophers through negation and affirmation.Using negation,he comments on why there can't be a unity of soul, and then refers to his opponent's inability to distinguish between specific unity and generic unity considering the latter equal to vegetable,animal and human spirits.Soul and body,Mulla Sadra reiterates,are attached to each other in two ways; in one way,soul is attached to body and yet it is contingent on itself and not on the person's being; in the other way,soul is attached to body while the person's potentialities are actualized; this second type of attachment relates to obtaining existential virtues.It must be noted that Mulla Sadra's belief in these two types of attachment results from his belief in the trans-substantial motion in which soul is also involved.Mulla Sadra works out a solution to the question of relation between soul and body and their effects on one another by proposing the mediation of a veiled spirit, since the soul which belongs to a world of pure light does not involve itself directly in the affairs of the dark body. The veiled spirit is as subtle as the non-material soul and as corporeal as it needs in connectionwith body.This view has been argued by Allameh Tabatabii who thinks corporeal qualities and ontological status must be kept separated and not be mixed.Lahiji,on the other hand, seems to have accepted Mulla Sadra's idea looking at it as a philosophical question,not a medical case. He,like Mulla Sadra, while considering unity for soul, thinks of it as having properties such as sensation imagination estimation intellection. According to Lahiji,the unity of soul and body is like the unity of matter and form; however,unlike natural forms,it does not subsist in matter and interestingly,this notion resembles Neo-Platonist views. (shrink)

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm; -1641; Islamic philosophy.

ABSTRACTDeath as an inevitable reality is a subject of study in various philosophical schools. This concept can be reviewed within three realms: semantics, ontology, and epistemology. The objective of this article is to examine death within the ontological realm in the thoughts of Mullā Sadrā and Schopenhauer, and it attempts to answer the question whether philosophical discussions on the concept of death in Sadrā’s transcendental wisdom, despite differences in principles, methods, and objectives, are comparable to Schopenhauer’s intellectual framework. Using a (...) descriptive-analytical approach, the present study first investigates the issue of death in the thought of both philosophers and then focuses on their comparative analysis. The findings of this study show that both philosophers believe in the dichotomy in the world, immortality of human nature after death, existence of suffering in the world, asceticism, austerity, love, and affection to all human beings. However, each of them analyzes and explains the issue of death within his own intellectual framework. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed, updated exposition and defense of five of the historically most important (but in recent years largely neglected) philosophical proofs of God’s existence: the Aristotelian, the Neo-Platonic, the Augustinian, the Thomistic, and the Rationalist. It also offers a thorough treatment of each of the key divine attributes—unity, simplicity, eternity, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and so forth—showing that they must be possessed by the God whose existence is demonstrated by the proofs. Finally, it answers at length (...) all of the objections that have been leveled against these proofs. This work provides as ambitious and complete a defense of traditional natural theology as is currently in print. Its aim is to vindicate the view of the greatest philosophers of the past— thinkers like Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz, and many others— that the existence of God can be established with certainty by way of purely rational arguments. It thereby serves as a refutation both of atheism and of the fideism that gives aid and comfort to atheism. (shrink)

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE has been taken to be central to Avicenna’s metaphysics and ontology of being. Due to the influence that this distinction had on Thomism, and to a lesser extent on Maimonides’s work, some Medievalists and Orientalists took Avicenna’s distinction between essence and existence to be characterized by essentialism. A.-M. Goichon’s books Léxique de la Langue Philosophique d’Ibn Sina, Vocabulaires Comparés d’Aristote et d’Ibn Sina, and La Philosophie d’Avicenne et son Influence en Europe all offer a (...) great contribution to the translation and understanding of Avicenna’s works. However the interpretive reception of Goichon’s works has had a strong influence on subsequent Medievalists as well as Orientalist scholars. This impact on scholars, along with the stress on Avicenna’s influence on Thomism, has led in some instances to an exaggerated stress on the centrality of the essence/ existence distinction in Avicenna’s metaphysics. This state of affairs has eventually overshadowed other important aspects of Avicenna’s ontology of being and of his metaphysical and logical analysis of being in terms of the modalities of necessity, contingency, and impossibility. The examination of Avicenna’s metaphysics under the spell of all of these factors leads to an intellectually discomforting position that construes his ontology as essentialism. Consequently this leads to the interpretation of his work as being that of a metaphysician who subordinates existence to essence. Such interpretation has been even adopted by experts on Avicenna’s work within the Western scholarship as well as among some Arabists. For instance, some scholars stress that Averroes and Mulla Sadra are the metaphysicians of existence, while taking Avicenna to be the metaphysician of essence. John Caputo, a leading interpreter of Heidegger’s thought, makes extensive references to the work of the Thomist scholar Étienne Gilson in the context of examining Aquinas’s adoption of the Avicennian distinction between essence and existence. Caputo’s discussion of the essence/existence distinction adopts the standpoint that Gilson reflects in the reading of Avicenna’s metaphysics as being the starting point of a longstanding essentialist tradition that culminates with Hegel’s Science of Logic. This line of argumentation already supplies Caputo with sufficient arguments that enable him readily to stamp Avicenna’s metaphysics with Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysical tradition. Caputo based himself on what the Thomist scholar Gilson offers in this regard, particularly in taking Aquinas’s metaphysics to be the metaphysics of esse. Gilson’s position may itself be questioned on the ground that its interpretation of Avicenna has been pervaded by Thomist inclinations; this is the case, given that Gilson and other scholars construe Avicenna’s metaphysics as being essentially the metaphysics of essence. Based on this, Caputo accepts the claim that Avicenna’s ontology is essentialist. Such readings lead to the conclusion that Avicenna subordinates existence to essence and consequently that his ontology is characterized by what Heidegger takes to be a mark of the oblivion of being. The question that ought to be raised in this regard is whether the position of secondary scholarly sources is accurate. This is the case, given that some of the scholars, who propagate the claim that Avicenna is an essentialist, are after all scholars who have not consulted or studied the primary sources. Rather, they primarily rely on secondary sources that mediate Avicenna’s metaphysics through the Thomist scholarship and Latin translations. This is clearly the case with Gilson’s consideration of Avicenna’s corpus, which is addressed from the standpoint of Latin renderings of Avicenna’s texts rather than consulting the original Arabic or Persian texts. Having said that, the issue becomes more complicated in the light of considering Arabist or Medievalist scholars who do consult the primary Arabic sources, yet still hold that Avicenna is an essentialist. Such scholars remain under the influence of earlier translations and interpretations that were offered by prominent Orientalist scholars, who addressed the essence/ existence distinction in the light of broad philosophical concerns with Medieval Latin and Jewish philosophy, or by tracing the Aristotelian and Peripatetic influences on Islamic and Arabic philosophy. Some scholars like Gilson might even go further in terms of considering the works of Avicenna and Averroes from the standpoint of mapping out the doctrinal quarrels between Scotism and Thomism. The Medievalists who consult primary sources, yet who are still under the spell of earlier Orientalist views, do not attempt to review some of their positions by going back to a closer examination of the texts and to a questioning reception of dominant translations and interpretations. There is a hermeneutic need to return to the primary texts and to reexamine them in the light of new philosophical concerns. This return and reexamination are also needed in the light of questioning and adopting new methodological inclinations in translation and interpretation. This becomes a pressing issue given the seriousness of the philosophical consequences that might arise if we readily take Avicenna’s metaphysics to be characterized by essentialism. The examination of Avicenna’s ontology must account for the renderings of the terms mahiya, dhat, and wujud, be it in Latin, English, or French, or in terms of the Arabic/persian semantic, syntactic, and grammatical structure and derivation. The nuances of translation are determined by how these terms are philosophically used within the text and in the course of the development of Avicenna’s arguments. Such linguistic investigations would elucidate the philosophical interpretation of the essence/existence distinction in the light of addressing contemporary philosophical concerns, as these are attested with the consideration of Heidegger’s critique of classical ontology. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas and Mulla Sadra both criticized the previous theories on the soul-body problem, which held that the body is a mere instrument in the employ of the soul. Instead, they, following Aristotle, regard the connection between the soul and the body as form and matter since, they thought of it as an essential connection not accidental. Despite this initial similarity there are differences between Aquinas and Sadra on this problem which in the end lead them to (...) two distinctive results. (shrink)

Recent research and numerous titles published in the West have proved views about “the end” of the Islamic philosophy after the death of Averroes to be unfounded, and testified to the existence of a rich intellectual tradition developed within Muslim intellectual circles. Epistemology, although inextricably linked to ontology and metaphysics, is one of the disciplines that are particularly cultivated within the later Islamic philosophical thought. This is shown in the article on the example of the doctrine of unification of intellector (...) and intelligible (ittiḥād al-‛āqil wa al- ma‛qūl), and also on the idea of knowledge-by-presence (‛ilm al-ḥudūrī), which are categories that predominantly belong to Sadrian philosophical tradition. (shrink)

Mīr Dāmād, in Qabasāt argues that existence cannot be a real property for essences. If existence, he argues, were a real property of an essence, there would remain no distinction between simple-if and compound-if questions. It is well-known that Mullā Sadrā has given three different accounts in order to explain essence’s being existent: first that existence is an analytical property for essence; second that none of existence or essence is a property of the other one; and third that essence is (...) a property of existence. In this paper, I will argue that the first account would be defeated by Mīr Dāmād’s argument. The second account concedes the conclusion of the argument and then it would be in contrary with Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence, unless this account is augmented with the third one. The third account, however, can evade the argument. But it should be noted that the third account is based on Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence and the primacy of existence to essence. Keywords: existence, to be existent, simple-if question, compound-if question, property. 1. Introductıon In al-’Ufuq al-Mubīn Mīr Dāmād claims that not all predicates of a subject manifest a real property for that subject. A real property of a subject is something which is superadded to the subject. Examples include a body’s being red or a body’s being above another body. In such cases, the predicates correspond with some feature of the subjects which are not the same as those subjects, in reality. This is opposed to the body’s being itself, for example. In this case, the body itself is not something which is superadded to the body. 2. Mīr dāmād agaınst the realıty of exıstence The controversial example is essence’s being existent. Is the existence of an essence something superadded to the essence? In Mīr Dāmād’s words, is existence a real property for essence? Mīr Dāmād, in Qabasāt argues that existence cannot be a real property for essences. For this end, he notifies that there is a distinction between propositions that is parallel to the distinction between real and non-real properties. If P is a real property for a, then the proposition that a is P is a compound-if proposition. On the other hand, it is a commonplace that the only example of simple-if propositions is one that contains existence as its predicate. Now, he continues, suppose that existence is a real property. Then, the proposition that a exists would become a compound-if proposition. But this contradicts the well-established premise that the proposition that a exists is a simple-if proposition. Consequently, he argues, if existence were a real property of an essence, there would remain no distinction between simple-if and compound-if questions. The major problem that Mīr Dāmād is dealing with is how to explain essence’s being existent. His view is that, in reality, essence’s being existent is nothing but the essence itself. He, then, goes a step forward and claims that existence is nothing in reality. We only have the concept of existence in our minds. With these moves Mīr Dāmād, in some sense, resolves the problem of the relationship between essence and existence, in reality. 3. Mullā sadrā on the relatıonshıp between exıstence and essence It is well-known that Mullā Sadrā, Mīr Dāmād’s pupil, was in disagreement with the teacher with respect to the reality of existence. He believes that existence is a real entity in the world as opposed to essence. So, he should explain how essence is existent. Actually, he has given three different accounts in order to explain essence’s being existent. Mullā Sadrā’s first account is that existence is an analytical property for essence. He defines analytical property as the following: P is an analytic property for a iff a cannot be but not has P. Mullā Sadrā’s second explanation is that none of existence or essence is a property of the other one. His third thesis is that essence is a property of existence. 4. Mullā sadrā v.s. mīr dāmād My major concern in this paper is this problem: which of these three accounts for essence’s being existent offered by Mullā Sadrā can overcome Mīr Dāmād’s seminal argument? The first account would be defeated by Mīr Dāmād’s argument, since, any kind of real property, whether it is analytical or not, are associated with a compound-if proposition. This causes essence’s being existent to be manifested by a compound-if proposition. The second account concedes the conclusion of the argument. As we saw, Mīr Dāmād claims that the conclusion of his argument guarantees that existence is nothing in the world. This cannot be swallowed by Mullā Sadrā whose own view is that existence is real. The third account, however, can evade the argument, insofar as existence is not a property of essence. But it should be noted that the third account is based on Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence and the primacy of existence to essence. 5. Concluding remarks If the arguments rendered above are sound, we reach to a criterion in order to interpret Mullā Sadrā’s view on the relationship between existence and essence: his thesis that existence is real is more fundamental than his explanation for the problem of essence’s being existence. (shrink)

The so-called "Theology of Aristotle" is a translation of the Enneads of Plotinus, the most important representative of late ancient Platonism. It was produced in the 9th century CE within the circle of al-Kindī, one of the most important groups for the early reception of Greek thought in Arabic. In part because the "Theology" was erroneously transmitted under Aristotle's authorship, it became the single most important conduit by which Neoplatonism reached the Islamic world. It is referred to by such thinkers (...) as al-Fārābī, in an attempt to demonstrate the agreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism, Avicenna, who wrote a set of comments on the text, and later on thinkers of Safavid Persia including Mullā Ṣadrā. Yet the "Theology" is not just a translation. It may in fact more accurately be described as a creative paraphrase, which takes frequent liberties with the source text and even includes whole paragraphs' worth of new material. Adamson's book offers a philosophical interpretation of the changes introduced in the Arabic version. It is argued that these changes were in part intended to show the relevance of Plotinus' thought for contemporary Islamic culture, for instance by connecting the Neoplatonist theory of the First Principle to theological disputes within Islam over the status of God's attributes. At the same time the paraphrase reflects a tendency to harmonize the various strands of Greek thought, so that a critique by Plotinus of Aristotle's theory of the soul is subtly changed into a defense of Aristotle's theory against a possible misinterpretation. The upshot, or so Adamson argues, is that the "Theology" needs to be read as an original philosophical work in its own right, and understood within the context of the ʿAbbāsid era. (shrink)

This study looks at how the seventeenth-century philosopher Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi, known as Mulla Sadra, attempted to reconcile the three major forms of ...

Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the (...) thesis of unified composition. If there is any difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. (shrink)