Search results for 'logical determinism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Alfred J. Freddoso (1983). Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 80 (5):257-278.score: 60.0
    This paper attempts to construct a systematic and plausible account of the necessity of the past. The account proposed is meant to explicate the central ockhamistic thesis of the primacy of the pure present and to vindicate Ockham's own non-Aristotelian response to the challenge of logical determinism.
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  2. Susanne Bobzien (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, moral character, fatalism, logical determinism and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.
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  3. Susanne Bobzien (ed.) (2011). Afterword to The Philosophy of Aristotle. Signet.score: 45.0
    ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading Aristotle at the beginning and end, with sandwiched in between, a brief and much simplified discussion of some common misunderstandings of Aristotle's philosophy, concerning spontaneity, causal indeterminism, freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice, agent causation, logical determinism, teleological determinism, artistic creativity and freedom (eleutheria).
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  4. Z. Jordan (1963). Logical Determinism. Studia Logica 14 (1):1-38.score: 45.0
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  5. Tobias Chapman (1972). On a New Escape From Logical Determinism. Mind 81 (324):597-599.score: 45.0
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  6. Nicholas Rescher (1982). McTaggart's Logical Determinism. Idealistic Studies 12 (3):231-241.score: 45.0
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  7. Jacopo Agnesina (2011). Anthony Collins and Logical Determinism. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 66 (3):409-430.score: 45.0
  8. Karel Sebela (2010). The Question of so-Called Logical Determinism in Antiquity and in Modern Logic. Filosoficky Casopis 58 (4):589-603.score: 45.0
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  9. Gregory Williams (1987). McTaggart's Logical Determinism. Idealistic Studies 17 (3):219-229.score: 45.0
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  10. Arnon Avron, Logical Non-Determinism as a Tool for Logical Modularity: An Introduction.score: 37.0
    It is well known that every propositional logic which satisfies certain very natural conditions can be characterized semantically using a multi-valued matrix ([Los and Suszko, 1958; W´ ojcicki, 1988; Urquhart, 2001]). However, there are many important decidable logics whose characteristic matrices necessarily consist of an infinite number of truth values. In such a case it might be quite difficult to find any of these matrices, or to use one when it is found. Even in case a logic does have a (...)
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  11. Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron (2009). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291 - 309.score: 36.0
    In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
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  12. Bernard Mayo (1958). A Logical Limitation on Determinism. Philosophy 33 (124):50 - 55.score: 36.0
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  13. Lennart Åqvist (2003). Future Contingents and Determinism in Aristotle's De Interpretatione IX: Some Logical Aspects of the So-Called Second Oldest Interpretation. Logique Et Analyse 46 (181):13-48.score: 36.0
  14. Norman M. Swartz, Foreknowledge and Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 33.0
    Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will (...)
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  15. Vladimir Marko (2011). Looking for the Lazy Argument Candidates. Organon F 18 (3 & 4):363-383; 447-474.score: 33.0
    The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favor of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the nonuniversal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The (...)
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  16. Ari Maunu (1999). Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will. Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)score: 30.0
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
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  17. Norman Swartz, Lecture Notes on Free Will and Determinism.score: 24.0
    For an expansion of the discussion of Sections 2-5 (Logical Determinism, Epistemic Determinism, and Modal Concepts) see Foreknowledge and Free Will ", in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  18. Michael Ayers (1968). The Refutation of Determinism: An Essay in Philosophical Logic. London, Methuen.score: 24.0
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  19. Marius Backmann & Jan G. Michel (eds.) (2009). Physikalismus, Willensfreiheit, Künstliche Intelligenz. Mentis.score: 24.0
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  20. Tim Fernando (1999). A Modal Logic for Non-Deterministic Discourse Processing. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):445-468.score: 22.0
    A modal logic for translating a sequence of English sentences to a sequence of logical forms is presented, characterized by Kripke models with points formed from input/output sequences, and valuations determined by entailment relations. Previous approaches based (to one degree or another) on Quantified Dynamic Logic are embeddable within it. Applications to presupposition and ambiguity are described, and decision procedures and axiomatizations supplied.
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  21. Tuomas E. Tahko (forthcoming). The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth. In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models. (...)
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  22. Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2002). What is Logical Form? In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Clarendon Press. 54--90.score: 21.0
    Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the External World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as (...)
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  23. Mauro Dorato (2002). Determinism, Chance, and Freedom. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic. 321--38.score: 21.0
    After a brief but necessary characterization of the notion of determinism, I discuss and critically evaluate four views on the relationship between determinism and free will by taking into account both (i) what matters most to us in terms of a free will worth-wanting and (ii) which capacities can be legitimately attributed to human beings without contradicting what we currently know from natural sciences. The main point of the paper is to argue that the libertarian faces a dilemma: (...)
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  24. Michael Heidelberger (2003). The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism. In Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee Salmon (eds.), Logical Empiricism: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 233--262.score: 21.0
    It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, de- riving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967). Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik of analytical philosophy, and launched the (...)
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  25. Seth Shabo (2010). Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):239-252.score: 21.0
    Here I motivate and defend a new counterexample to logical (or non-causal) versions of the direct argument for responsibility-determinism incompatibilism. Such versions purport to establish incompatibilism via an inference principle to the effect that non-responsibility transfers along relations of logical consequence, including those that hold between earlier and later states of a deterministic world. Unlike previous counterexamples, this case doesn't depend on preemptive overdetermination; nor can it be blocked with a simple modification of the inference principle. In (...)
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  26. Scott Sehon (2011). A Flawed Conception of Determinism in the Consequence Argument. Analysis 71 (1):30 - 38.score: 21.0
    According to the Consequence Argument, the truth of determinism plus other plausible principles would yield the conclusion that we have no free will. In this paper I will argue that the conception of determinism typically employed in the various versions of the Consequence Argument is not plausible. In particular, I will argue that, taken most straightforwardly, determinism as defined in the Consequence Argument would imply that the existence of God is logically impossible. This is quite an implausible (...)
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  27. Peter van Inwagen (1974). A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism. Theoria 40 (1):9-22.score: 21.0
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  28. Alba Papa-Grimaldi (2008). Temporal Relations Vs. Logical Reduction: A Phenomenal Theory of Causality. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 18 (3):339-358.score: 21.0
    Kant, in various parts of his treatment of causality, refers to determinism or the principle of sufficient reason as an inescapable principle. In fact, in the Second Analogy we find the elements to reconstruct a purely phenomenal determinism as a logical and tautological truth. I endeavour in this article to gather these elements into an organic theory of phenomenal causality and then show, in the third section, with a specific argument which I call the “paradox of phenomenal (...)
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  29. Raymond D. Bradley, Determinism.score: 21.0
    The abstract noun "Determinism" functions like a family name for a group of philosophical doctrines each of which asserts that, in some sense or other, events occur of necessity when and as they do. Different members of the family stake out different doctrinal territories, some construing the necessity involved in purely logical terms, some in causal terms, and still others in terms of predictability. Each has to do with necessary connections between past, present and future.
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  30. Elijah Millgram (2009). John Stuart Mill, Determinism, and the Problem of Induction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):183-199.score: 21.0
    Auguste Comte's doctrine of the three phases through which sciences pass (the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive) allows us to explain what John Stuart Mill was attempting in his magnum opus, the System of Logic: namely, to move the science of logic to its terminal and 'positive' stage. Both Mill's startling account of deduction and his unremarked solution to the Humean problem of induction eliminate the notions of necessity or force—in this case, the 'logical must'—characteristic of a science's (...)
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  31. Bogusław Wolniewicz (1983). Logical Space and Metaphysical Systems. Studia Logica 42 (2-3):269 - 284.score: 21.0
    The paper applies the theory presented in A Formal Ontology of Situations (this journal, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations. Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that theory to the situation semantics of Perry and Barwise is discussed.
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  32. Mark Jago (2007). Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience. Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.score: 21.0
    I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which (...)
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  33. Michael Stöltzner (2003). The Principle of Least Action as the Logical Empiricist's Shibboleth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (2):285-318.score: 21.0
    The present paper investigates why Logical Empiricists remained silent about one of the most philosophy-laden matters of theoretical physics of the day, the Principle of Least Action (PLA). In the two decades around 1900, the PLA enjoyed a remarkable renaissance as a formal unification of mechanics, electrodynamics, thermodynamics, and relativity theory. Taking Ernst Mach's historico-critical stance, it could be liberated from much of its physico-theological dross. Variational calculus, the mathematical discipline on which the PLA was based, obtained a new (...)
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  34. M. Stoltzner (2003). The Principle of Least Action as the Logical Empiricist's Shibboleth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (2):285-318.score: 21.0
    The present paper investigates why logical empiricists remained silent about one of the most philosophy-laden matters of theoretical physics of their day, the principle of least action (PLA). In the two decades around 1900, the PLA enjoyed a remarkable renaissance as a formal unification of mechanics, electrodynamics, thermodynamics, and relativity theory. Taking Ernst Mach's historico-critical stance, it could be liberated from much of its physico-theological dross. Variational calculus, the mathematical discipline on which the PLA was based, obtained a new (...)
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  35. Yaroslav Shramko (forthcoming). The Logical Way of Being True: Truth Values and the Ontological Foundation of Logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy.score: 21.0
    In this paper I reject the normative interpretation of logic and give reasons for a realistic account based on the ontological treatment of logical values.
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  36. Mark Thomas Walker (2001). Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):199 – 227.score: 21.0
    Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment (...)
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  37. Gardner Williams (1945). Logical and Natural Compulsion in Free Will. Journal of Philosophy 42 (March):185-191.score: 21.0
  38. Andrzej Pietruszczak (2004). The Consequence Relation Preserving Logical Information. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:89-120.score: 21.0
    Information is contained in statements and «flows» from their structure and meaning of expressions they contain. The information that flows only from the meaning of logical constants and logical structure of statements we will call logical information. In this paper we present a formal explication of this notion which is proper for sentences being Boolean combination of atomic sentences. 1 Therefore we limit ourselves to analyzing logical information flowing only from the meaning of truth-value connectives and (...)
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  39. G. Robles & J. M. Méndez (2011). A Class of Simpler Logical Matrices for the Variable-Sharing Property. Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (3):241-249.score: 21.0
    In our paper “A general characterization of the variable-sharing property by means of logical matrices”, a general class of so-called “Relevant logical matrices”, RMLs, is defined. The aim of this paper is to define a class of simpler Relevant logical matrices RMLs′serving the same purpose that RMLs, to wit: any logic verified by an RML′has the variable-sharing property and related properties predicable of the logic of entailment E and of the logic of relevance R.
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  40. Andrzej Pietruszczak (2004). The Axiomatization of Horst Wessel's Strict Logical Consequence Relation. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:121-138.score: 21.0
    In his book from 1984 Horst Wessel presents the system of strict logical consequence Fs (see also (Wessel, 1979)). The author maintained that this system axiomatized the relation |=s of strict logical consequence between formulas of Classical Propositional Calculi (CPC). Let |= be the classical consequence relation in CPC. The relation |=s is defined as follows: phi |=s psi iff phi |= psi, every variable from psi occurs in phi and neither phi is a contradiction nor psi is (...)
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  41. John Thorp (1980). Free Will: A Defense Against Neurophysiological Determinism. Routledge.score: 21.0
  42. Peter van Inwagen (1972). Lehrer on Determinism, Free Will, and Evidence. Philosophical Studies 23 (October):351-357.score: 21.0
     
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  43. Corine Besson, Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication (2010).score: 19.0
    Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. (...)
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  44. Patrick Allo (2007). Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.score: 19.0
    Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we (...)
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  45. William H. Hanson (1999). Ray on Tarski on Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):605-616.score: 19.0
    In "Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski" (Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 617-677), Greg Ray defends Tarski's account of logical consequence against the criticisms of John Etchemendy. While Ray's defense of Tarski is largely successful, his attempt to give a general proof that Tarskian consequence preserves truth fails. Analysis of this failure shows that de facto truth preservation is a very weak criterion of adequacy for a theory of logical consequence and should be replaced (...)
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  46. Gil Sagi (forthcoming). Models and Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-22.score: 19.0
    This paper deals with the adequacy of the model-theoretic definition of logical consequence. Logical consequence is commonly described as a necessary relation that can be determined by the form of the sentences involved. In this paper, necessity is assumed to be a metaphysical notion, and formality is viewed as a means to avoid dealing with complex metaphysical questions in logical investigations. Logical terms are an essential part of the form of sentences and thus have a crucial (...)
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  47. David J. Anderson & Edward N. Zalta (2004). Frege, Boolos, and Logical Objects. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):1-26.score: 19.0
    In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of "logical objects" (extensions, numbers, truth-values) and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the 'eta' relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the 'eta' relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract (...)
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  48. Owen Griffiths (2012). Reinflating Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-9.score: 19.0
    Shapiro (Philos Q 61:320–342, 2011) argues that, if we are deflationists about truth, we should be deflationists about logical consequence. Like the truth predicate, he claims, the logical consequence predicate is merely a device of generalisation and more substantial characterisation, e.g. proof- or model-theoretic, is mistaken. I reject his analogy between truth and logical consequence and argue that, by appreciating how the logical consequence predicate is used as well as the goals of proof theory and model (...)
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  49. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2000). A Note on Formality and Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):529-539.score: 19.0
    Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truthpreserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truthpreserving. But he did not offer the proof. The question (...)
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  50. Gustavo Fernández Díez (2000). Five Observations Concerning the Intended Meaning of the Intuitionistic Logical Constants. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (4):409-424.score: 19.0
    This paper contains five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants: (1) if the explanations of this meaning are to be based on a non-decidable concept, that concept should not be that of 'proof'; (2) Kreisel's explanations using extra clauses can be significantly simplified; (3) the impredicativity of the definition of → can be easily and safely ameliorated; (4) the definition of → in terms of 'proofs from premises' results in a loss of the inductive character (...)
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