Search results for 'logical determinism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Alfred J. Freddoso (1983). Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 80 (5):257-278.
    This paper attempts to construct a systematic and plausible account of the necessity of the past. The account proposed is meant to explicate the central ockhamistic thesis of the primacy of the pure present and to vindicate Ockham's own non-Aristotelian response to the challenge of logical determinism.
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  2. Tobias Chapman (1972). On a New Escape From Logical Determinism. Mind 81 (324):597-599.
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  3.  12
    Gregory Williams (1987). McTaggart's Logical Determinism. Idealistic Studies 17 (3):219-229.
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  4.  13
    Nicholas Rescher (1982). McTaggart's Logical Determinism. Idealistic Studies 12 (3):231-241.
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  5.  19
    Z. Jordan (1963). Logical Determinism. Studia Logica 14 (1):1-38.
  6. Jacopo Agnesina (2011). Anthony Collins and Logical Determinism. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 66 (3):409-430.
     
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  7. Ashok Kumar Gangadean (1971). Time, Truth and Logical Determinism. Dissertation, Brandeis University
     
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  8. Zbigniew Jordan (1963). Logical Determinism. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 4 (1):1-38.
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  9. Karel Sebela (2010). The Question of so-Called Logical Determinism in Antiquity and in Modern Logic. Filosoficky Casopis 58 (4):589-603.
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  10. Susanne Bobzien (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, moral character, fatalism, logical determinism and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.
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  11. Arnon Avron, Logical Non-Determinism as a Tool for Logical Modularity: An Introduction.
    It is well known that every propositional logic which satisfies certain very natural conditions can be characterized semantically using a multi-valued matrix ([Los and Suszko, 1958; W´ ojcicki, 1988; Urquhart, 2001]). However, there are many important decidable logics whose characteristic matrices necessarily consist of an infinite number of truth values. In such a case it might be quite difficult to find any of these matrices, or to use one when it is found. Even in case a logic does have a (...)
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  12.  2
    Bernard Mayo (1958). A Logical Limitation on Determinism. Philosophy 33 (124):50 - 55.
    I begin with some elementary observations about assertion. In spite of recent criticisms of philosophers who have been too ready to take the subject-predicate indicative sentence as the standard form of assertion, there is no doubt that this form of sentence does represent something very fundamental about assertion. To put the matter in a rough-and-ready way: if we are to assert anything at all, it seems obvious that we must first draw our listener's attention to something that we propose to (...)
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  13. Bernard Mayo (1958). A Logical Limitation On Determinism. Philosophy 33 (124):50.
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  14. Lennart Åqvist (2003). Future Contingents and Determinism in Aristotle's De Interpretatione IX: Some Logical Aspects of the So-Called Second Oldest Interpretation. Logique Et Analyse 46 (181):13-48.
  15. Susanne Bobzien (ed.) (2011). Afterword to The Philosophy of Aristotle. Signet.
    ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading Aristotle at the beginning and end, with sandwiched in between, a brief and much simplified discussion of some common misunderstandings of Aristotle's philosophy, concerning spontaneity, causal indeterminism, freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice, agent causation, logical determinism, teleological determinism, artistic creativity and freedom (eleutheria).
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  16. Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron (2009). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291 - 309.
    In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
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  17.  32
    Ari Maunu (1999). Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will. Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
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  18. Vladimir Marko (2011). Looking for the Lazy Argument Candidates. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (3 & 4):363-383; 447-474.
    The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favor of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the nonuniversal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The (...)
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  19. Norman M. Swartz, Foreknowledge and Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will (...)
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  20. P. Roger Turner (2016). Shabo on Logical Versions of the Direct Argument. Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2125-2132.
    In a recent paper, Seth Shabo sets out to show that logical renderings of the Direct Argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism, an influential incompatibilist argument for this conclusion, fail. In particular, Shabo argues that the Direct Argument—cashed out in logical terms—fails because it rests on an invalid rule of inference, Rule B. Shabo argues that Rule B, rendered logically, is subject to a counterexample that he constructs. If he’s right about this, it follows (...)
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  21.  86
    Norman Swartz, Lecture Notes on Free Will and Determinism.
    For an expansion of the discussion of Sections 2-5 (Logical Determinism, Epistemic Determinism, and Modal Concepts) see Foreknowledge and Free Will ", in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  22. Seth Shabo (2010). Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):239-252.
    Here I motivate and defend a new counterexample to logical (or non-causal) versions of the direct argument for responsibility-determinism incompatibilism. Such versions purport to establish incompatibilism via an inference principle to the effect that non-responsibility transfers along relations of logical consequence, including those that hold between earlier and later states of a deterministic world. Unlike previous counterexamples, this case doesn't depend on preemptive overdetermination; nor can it be blocked with a simple modification of the inference principle. In (...)
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  23. Scott Sehon (2011). A Flawed Conception of Determinism in the Consequence Argument. Analysis 71 (1):30 - 38.
    According to the Consequence Argument, the truth of determinism plus other plausible principles would yield the conclusion that we have no free will. In this paper I will argue that the conception of determinism typically employed in the various versions of the Consequence Argument is not plausible. In particular, I will argue that, taken most straightforwardly, determinism as defined in the Consequence Argument would imply that the existence of God is logically impossible. This is quite an implausible (...)
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  24.  19
    M. Stoltzner (2003). The Principle of Least Action as the Logical Empiricist's Shibboleth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (2):285-318.
    The present paper investigates why logical empiricists remained silent about one of the most philosophy-laden matters of theoretical physics of their day, the principle of least action (PLA). In the two decades around 1900, the PLA enjoyed a remarkable renaissance as a formal unification of mechanics, electrodynamics, thermodynamics, and relativity theory. Taking Ernst Mach's historico-critical stance, it could be liberated from much of its physico-theological dross. Variational calculus, the mathematical discipline on which the PLA was based, obtained a new (...)
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  25.  7
    P. Roger Turner (forthcoming). Shabo on Logical Versions of the Direct Argument. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    In a recent paper, Seth Shabo sets out to show that logical renderings of the Direct Argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism, an influential incompatibilist argument for this conclusion, fail. In particular, Shabo argues that the Direct Argument—cashed out in logical terms—fails because it rests on an invalid rule of inference, Rule B. Shabo argues that Rule B, rendered logically, is subject to a counterexample that he constructs. If he’s right about this, it follows (...)
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  26.  30
    Elijah Millgram (2009). John Stuart Mill, Determinism, and the Problem of Induction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):183-199.
    Auguste Comte's doctrine of the three phases through which sciences pass (the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive) allows us to explain what John Stuart Mill was attempting in his magnum opus, the System of Logic: namely, to move the science of logic to its terminal and 'positive' stage. Both Mill's startling account of deduction and his unremarked solution to the Humean problem of induction eliminate the notions of necessity or force—in this case, the 'logical must'—characteristic of a science's (...)
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  27.  67
    Raymond D. Bradley, Determinism.
    The abstract noun "Determinism" functions like a family name for a group of philosophical doctrines each of which asserts that, in some sense or other, events occur of necessity when and as they do. Different members of the family stake out different doctrinal territories, some construing the necessity involved in purely logical terms, some in causal terms, and still others in terms of predictability. Each has to do with necessary connections between past, present and future.
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  28.  13
    Michael Stöltzner (2003). The Principle of Least Action as the Logical Empiricist's Shibboleth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (2):285-318.
    The present paper investigates why Logical Empiricists remained silent about one of the most philosophy-laden matters of theoretical physics of the day, the Principle of Least Action (PLA). In the two decades around 1900, the PLA enjoyed a remarkable renaissance as a formal unification of mechanics, electrodynamics, thermodynamics, and relativity theory. Taking Ernst Mach's historico-critical stance, it could be liberated from much of its physico-theological dross. Variational calculus, the mathematical discipline on which the PLA was based, obtained a new (...)
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  29.  44
    Alba Papa-Grimaldi (2008). Temporal Relations Vs. Logical Reduction: A Phenomenal Theory of Causality. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 18 (3):339-358.
    Kant, in various parts of his treatment of causality, refers to determinism or the principle of sufficient reason as an inescapable principle. In fact, in the Second Analogy we find the elements to reconstruct a purely phenomenal determinism as a logical and tautological truth. I endeavour in this article to gather these elements into an organic theory of phenomenal causality and then show, in the third section, with a specific argument which I call the “paradox of phenomenal (...)
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  30.  31
    Bogusław Wolniewicz (1983). Logical Space and Metaphysical Systems. Studia Logica 42 (2-3):269 - 284.
    The paper applies the theory presented in A Formal Ontology of Situations (this journal, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations. Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that theory to the situation semantics of Perry and Barwise is discussed.
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  31.  9
    Mark Thomas Walker (2001). Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):199 – 227.
    Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment (...)
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  32.  25
    David Atkinson & Porter Johnson (2010). Nonconservation of Energy and Loss of Determinism II. Colliding with an Open Set. Foundations of Physics 40 (2):179-189.
    An actual infinity of colliding balls can be in a configuration in which the laws of mechanics lead to logical inconsistency. It is argued that one should therefore limit the domain of these laws to a finite, or only a potentially infinite number of elements. With this restriction indeterminism, energy nonconservation and creatio ex nihilo no longer occur. A numerical analysis of finite systems of colliding balls is given, and the asymptotic behaviour that corresponds to the potentially infinite system (...)
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  33. A. J. Ayer (1991). Free-Will and Determinism. In Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press
     
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  34. A. J. Ayer (1990). The Meaning of Life and Other Essays.
     
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  35.  12
    Gardner Williams (1945). Logical and Natural Compulsion in Free Will. Journal of Philosophy 42 (March):185-191.
  36. Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Natural Freedom. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):449-458.
    Three critics of Freedom Evolves (Dennett 2003) bring out important differences in philosophical outlook and method. Mele’s thought experiments are supposed to expose the importance, for autonomy, of personal history, but they depend on the dubious invocation of mere logical or conceptual possibility. Fischer defends the Basic Argument for incompatibilism, while Taylor and I choose to sidestep it instead of disposing of it. Where does the burden of proof lie? O’Connor’s candid expression of allegiance to traditional ideas that I (...)
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  37.  20
    Richard Double (1999). In Defense of the Smart Aleck: A Reply to Ted Honderich. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):305-9.
    In “Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism” I argued that contrary to Ted Honderich’s thesis in his How Free Are You? determinism has no consequences, whether logical, moral, or psychological, about how we must view persons we beIieve to be determined. Honderich replied in “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck” that there is a sense in which our belief in determinism has consequences that any reasonable human being must recognize. My present paper examines Honderich’s reply.
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  38.  21
    Jan Woleński (2008). Applications of Squares of Oppositions and Their Generalizations in Philosophical Analysis. Logica Universalis 2 (1):13-29.
    . This papers examines formal properties of logical squares and their generalizations in the form of hexagons and octagons. Then, several applications of these constructions in philosophical analysis are elaborated. They concern contingency (accidentality), possibility, permission, axiological concepts (bonum and malum), the generalized Hume thesis (deontic and epistemic modalities), determinism, truth and consistency (in various senses. It is shown that relations between notions used in various branches of philosophy fall into the same formal scheme.
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  39.  50
    Gordon Belot (1995). Determinism and Ontology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1):85 – 101.
    Abstract In the philosophical literature, there are two common criteria for a physical theory to be deterministic. The older one is due to the logical empiricists, and is a purely formal criterion. The newer one can be found in the work of John Earman and David Lewis and depends on the intended interpretation of the theory. In this paper I argue that the former must be rejected, and something like the latter adopted. I then discuss the relevance of these (...)
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  40.  7
    Philipp Frank (1941). Between Physics and Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.,Harvard University Press.
    Introduction: Historical background.--The law of causality and experience (1908)--The importance of Ernst Mach's philosophy of science for our times (1917)--Physical theories of the twentieth century and school philosophy (1929)--Is there a trend today toward idealism in physics? (1934)--The positivistic and the metaphysical conception of physics (1935)--Logical empiricism and the philosophy of the Soviet Union (1935)--Philosophical misinterpretations of the quantum theory (1936)--What "length" means to the physicist (1937)--Determinism and indeterminism in modern physics (1938)--Ernst Mach and the unity of science (...)
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  41. Gregg Caruso, Origination, Moral Responsibility, Punishment, and Life-Hopes: Ted Honderich on Determinism and Freedom.
    Perhaps no one has written more extensively, more deeply, and more insightfully about determinism and freedom than Ted Honderich. His influence and legacy with regard to the problem of free will—or the determinism problem, as he prefers to frame it—looms large. In these comments I would like to focus on three main aspects of Honderich ’s work: his defense of determinism and its consequences for origination and moral responsibility; his concern that the truth of determinism threatens (...)
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  42.  6
    Paulo Renato Jesus (2016). A Inteligência Dos Futuros Contingentes: Interrogando G. W. Leibniz Sobre Deus E a Verdade. Trans/Form/Ação 39 (1):9-36.
    RESUMO: A presente investigação questiona a essência teo-lógica dos futuros contingentes. Para o efeito, analisa-se, primeiramente, a argumentação segundo a qual, sob certas condições lógicas, teológicas, ontológicas e cosmológicas antinecessitantes, detetadas por G. W. Leibniz, a abertura contingente do futuro parece ser compatível com o regime das "verdades contingentes pré-determinadas", regime enquadrado teologicamente pelo princípio do "futuro melhor" ou do "único futuro verdadeiro". No entanto, os futuros contingentes incitam, com e contra Aristóteles, ao desenvolvimento de uma lógica temporal e plurivalente, (...)
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  43.  28
    Alfred Freddoso (1982). ``Accidental Necessity and Power Over the Past&Quot. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):54-68.
    The thesis of this paper is that an agent S has the power to bring it about that a proposition p is or will be true at a moment t only if S has at the same time the power to bring it about that it has always been the case that p would be true at t. The author first constructs a prima facie compelling argument for logical determinism and then argues that whoever accepts an Ockhamistic response (...)
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  44.  9
    Büter (2011). Wilhelm von Ockhams Prädestinationstraktat: Von der ontologischen Sparsamkeit zum logischen Determinismus. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (3):346-366.
    In seinem Traktat über Prädestination diskutiert Ockham die philosophischen Schwierigkeiten, die das christliche Dogma der Vorherbestimmung des Menschen zu ewiger Seligkeit oder Verdammnis aufwirft als einen spezifischen Fall des Problems des logischen Determinismus. Es gelingt Ockham nicht, dieses Problem zu lösen, was einerseits in seinem semantischen Wahrheitsbegriff, andererseits in einer fehlenden Differenzierung zwischen einem ontologischen und einem logischen Verständnis von Kontingenz begründet liegt. Diese Punkte führen zu einer Reihe von Ambivalenzen in Ockhams Argumentation, die darauf hindeuten, dass dieser zwar über (...)
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  45. Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe (2015). What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism? Cognitive Science 40 (3).
    Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features. We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were (...)
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  46. Mark Jago (2007). Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience. Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.
    I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which (...)
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  47.  92
    Arthur Jabs, A Conjecture Concerning Determinism, Reduction, and Measurement in Quantum Mechanics. arXiv:1204.0614.
    It is shown that it is possible to introduce determinism into quantum mechanics by tracing the probabilities in the Born rules back to pseudorandomness in the absolute phase constants of the wave functions. Each wave function is conceived to contain an individual phase factor exp(i alpha). In an ensemble of systems the phase constants alpha are taken to be pseudorandom numbers. A reduction process (collapse) of the wave function, independent of any measurement, is conceived to be a spatial contraction, (...)
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  48. Tuomas E. Tahko (2014). The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth. In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge University Press 233-248.
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models. (...)
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  49. Andrea Iacona (forthcoming). Two Notions of Logical Form. Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of (...)
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  50. Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2002). What is Logical Form? In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Clarendon Press 54--90.
    Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the External World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as (...)
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