Search results for 'substitutional quantification' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  72
    William Craig (2014). Peter van Inwagen, Substitutional Quantification, and Ontological Commitment. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (4):553-561.
    Peter van Inwagen has long claimed that he doesn’t understand substitutional quantification and that the notion is, in fact, meaningless. Van Inwagen identifies the source of his bewilderment as an inability to understand the proposition expressed by a simple sentence like “,” where “$\Sigma$” is the existential quantifier understood substitutionally. I should think that the proposition expressed by this sentence is the same as that expressed by “.” So what’s the problem? The problem, I suggest, is that (...)
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  2.  40
    Geoff Georgi (2015). A Propositional Semantics for Substitutional Quantification. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1183-1200.
    The standard truth-conditional semantics for substitutional quantification, due to Saul Kripke, does not specify what proposition is expressed by sentences containing the particular substitutional quantifier. In this paper, I propose an alternative semantics for substitutional quantification that does. The key to this semantics is identifying an appropriate propositional function to serve as the content of a bound occurrence of a formula containing a free substitutional variable. I apply this semantics to traditional philosophical reasons for (...)
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  3. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1987). Why Substitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence. Theory and Decision 50:67-75.
    Fundamental to Quine’s philosophy of logic is the thesis that substitutional quantification does not express existence. This paper considers the content of this claim and the reasons for thinking it is true.
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  4.  25
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1982). Indenumerability and Substitutional Quantification. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (4):358-366.
    We here establish two theorems which refute a pair of what we believe to be plausible assumptions about differences between objectual and substitutional quantification. The assumptions (roughly stated) are as follows: (1) there is at least one set d and denumerable first order language L such that d is the domain set of no interpretation of L in which objectual and substitutional quantification coincide. (2) There exist interpreted, denumerable, first order languages K with indenumerable domains such (...)
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  5.  65
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2002). There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification. Theoria 68 (1):4-12.
    Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a some-quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth-conditions of the sentences of the language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: it fails to articulate the truth-conditions of the quantifications with which it is concerned. This (...)
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  6.  25
    T. S. Weston (1974). Theories Whose Quantification Cannot Be Substitutional. Noûs 8 (4):361-369.
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  7. Universally Free First Order Quantification (forthcoming). A Note on Universally Free First Order Quantification Theory Ap Rao. Logique Et Analyse.
     
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  8. Saul A. Kripke (1976). Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification? In Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Oxford University Press 324-419.
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  9.  81
    Charles Parsons (1971). A Plea for Substitutional Quantification. Journal of Philosophy 68 (8):231-237.
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  10. Charles Parsons (1982). Substitutional Quantification and Mathematics. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (4):409-421.
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  11.  69
    B. J. Copeland (1985). Substitutional Quantification and Existence. Analysis 45 (1):1 - 4.
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  12.  3
    Dale Gottlieb (1980). Ontological Economy: Substitutional Quantification and Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
  13.  93
    Peter Inwagen (1981). Why I Don't Understand Substitutional Quantification. Philosophical Studies 39 (3):281 - 285.
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  14.  66
    R. D. Gallie (1975). Substitutionalism and Substitutional Quantification. Analysis 35 (3):97 - 101.
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  15.  13
    Guido Küng & John Thomas Canty (1970). Substitutional Quantification and Le'sniewskian Quantifiers. Theoria 36 (2):165-182.
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  16.  84
    Martin Davies (1980). A Note on Substitutional Quantification. Noûs 14 (4):619-622.
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  17.  11
    Michael Jubien (1982). Ontological Economy: Substitutional Quantification and Mathematics by Dale Gottlieb. Journal of Philosophy 79 (12):781-786.
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  18.  42
    Gilbert Harman (1971). Substitutional Quantification and Quotation. Noûs 5 (2):213-214.
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  19.  69
    Charles Parsons (1976). Much Ado About Substitutional Quantification. Journal of Philosophy 73 (18):651-653.
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  20.  65
    Michael Hand (1992). Meaning, Truth-Conditions, and Substitutional Quantification. Philosophical Studies 68 (2):195 - 216.
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  21.  46
    John Wallace (1971). Convention T and Substitutional Quantification. Noûs 5 (2):199-211.
  22.  43
    Dale Gottlieb & Timothy McCarthy (1979). Substitutional Quantification and Set Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):315 - 331.
  23.  25
    R. D. Gallie (1974). A. N. Prior and Substitutional Quantification. Analysis 34 (3):65 - 69.
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  24.  40
    H. A. Lewis (1985). Substitutional Quantification and Nonstandard Quantifiers. Noûs 19 (3):447-451.
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  25. Hartry Field (1984). Dale Gottlieb, Ontological Economy: Substitutional Quantification and Mathematics. [REVIEW] Noûs 18 (1):160-165.
  26.  21
    L. Jonathan Cohen (1974). Roger Gallie and Substitutional Quantification. Analysis 34 (3):69 - 73.
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  27. B. J. Copeland (1982). A note on the Barcan formula and substitutional quantification. Logique Et Analyse 25 (97):83.
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  28.  3
    T. S. Weston (1982). Review: Dale Gottlieb, Ontological Economy: Substitutional Quantification and Mathematics. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (2):473-475.
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  29.  4
    Mary Tiles (1982). Ontological Economy: Substitutional Quantification and Mathematics. Philosophical Books 23 (2):90-94.
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  30. P. Ludlow (1982). Substitutional quantification and the problem of expression types. Logique Et Analyse 25:413.
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  31.  50
    James E. Tomberlin (1997). Quantification: Objectual or Substitutional? Philosophical Issues 8:155-167.
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  32.  4
    Peter Ludlow, Substitutional Semantics and Natural Language Quantification.
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  33.  63
    Bartosz Więckowski (2010). Associative Substitutional Semantics and Quantified Modal Logic. Studia Logica 94 (1):105 - 138.
    The paper presents an alternative substitutional semantics for first-order modal logic which, in contrast to traditional substitutional (or truth-value) semantics, allows for a fine-grained explanation of the semantical behavior of the terms from which atomic formulae are composed. In contrast to denotational semantics, which is inherently reference-guided, this semantics supports a non-referential conception of modal truth and does not give rise to the problems which pertain to the philosophical interpretation of objectual domains (concerning, e.g., possibilia or (...)
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  34. Berit Brogaard (2008). Inscrutability and Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):21 - 42.
    There are two doctrines for which Quine is particularly well known: the doctrine of ontological commitment and the inscrutability thesis—the thesis that reference and quantification are inscrutable. At first glance, the two doctrines are squarely at odds. If there is no fact of the matter as to what our expressions refer to, then it would appear that no determinate commitments can be read off of our best theories. We argue here that the appearance of a clash between the two (...)
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  35.  46
    Andrea Iacona (2004). Modal Predicates. Australasian Journal of Logic (2):56-69.
    Despite the wide acceptance of standard modal logic, there has always been a temptation to think that ordinary modal discourse may be correctly analyzed and adequately represented in terms of predicates rather than in terms of operators. The aim of the formal model outlined in this paper is to capture what I take to be the only plausible sense in which ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ can be treated as predicates. The model is built by enriching the language of standard modal logic (...)
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  36.  13
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1991). Prior and Lorenzen on Quantification. Grazer Philosophishe Studien 41:150-173.
    A case against Prior’s theory of propositions goes thus: (1) everyday propositional generalizations are not substitutional; (2) Priorean quantifications are not objectual; (3) quantifications are substitutional if not objectual; (4) thus, Priorean quantifications are substitutional; (5) thus that Priorean quantifications are not ontologically committed to propositions provides no basis for a similar claim about our everyday propositional generalizations. Prior agrees with (1) and (2). He rejects (3), but fails to support that rejection with an account of (...) on which there could be quantifications that are neither substitutional nor objectual. The paper draws from the work of Lorenzen an alternative conception of quantification in terms of which that needed account can be given. (shrink)
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  37. Arvid Båve (2013). Formulating Deflationism. Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, <p> is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue (...)
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  38.  46
    Marian David (2006). A Substitutional Theory of Truth? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):182–189.
    Contribution to book symposium on C. Hill's: Thought and World. Focus is primarily on the intelligibility of Hill's substitutional quantification into propositions.
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  39.  19
    Burnham Terrell (1978). Quantification and Brentano's Logic. Grazer Philosophische Studien 5:45-65.
    Brentano's innovations in logical theory are considered in the context of his descriptive psychology, with its distinction between differences in quality and in object of mental phenomena. Objections are raised to interpretations that depend on a parallel between Urteil and assertion of a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion as subject to description in a metalanguage and the Urteil as secondary object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest a reinterpretation of (...)
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  40. Terrell Dailey Burnham (1978). Quantification and Brentano's Logic. Grazer Philosophische Studien 5:45-66.
    Brentano's innovations in logical theory are considered in the context of his descriptive psychology, with its distinction between differences in quality and in object of mental phenomena. Objections are raised to interpretations that depend on a parallel between Urteil and assertion of a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion as subject to description in a metalanguage and the Urteil as secondary object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest a reinterpretation of (...)
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  41. Shaughan Lavine (2000). Quantification and Ontology. Synthese 124 (1-2):1-43.
    Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form '' x '', assimilated to theEnglish ''there is something that is a ''. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first (...)
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  42. Daniel Bonevac (1984). Systems of Substitutional Semantics. Philosophy of Science 51 (4):631-656.
    I investigate substitutional interpretations of quantifiers that count existential sentences true just in case they have true instances in a parametric extension of the language. I devise a semantics meeting four criteria: (1) it accounts adequately for natural language quantification; (2) it provides an account of justification in abstract sciences; (3) it constitutes a continuous semantics for natural and formal languages; and (4) it is purely substitutional, containing no appeal to referential interpretations. The prospects for a purely (...)
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  43.  12
    David Dolby, The Ineliminability of Non-Nominal Quantification.
    Objectual interpretations of non-nominal quantification seems to offer a non-substitutional treatment of quantification which respects differences of grammatical category in the object language whilst only employing nominal quantification in the metalanguage. I argue that the satisfaction conditions of such interpretations makes use concepts that must themselves be explained through non-nominal quantification. As a result, the interpretation misrepresents the structure of non-nominal quantification and the relationship between nominal and non-nominal forms of generality.
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  44.  12
    T. F. Baxley (1980). Wittgenstein's Theory of Quantification. International Logic Review 21:46.
    The article examines wittgenstein's theory of quantification as it appears in the "tractatus". it is argued that wittgenstein advances a theory of quantification and a theory of generality where most contemporary writers on the subject hold a single theory of quantification incorporating both quantification proper and generality. having established this it is shown that wittgenstein theory of quantification is truth functional and not substitutional as recent authors have suggested.
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  45.  1
    Denis Vernant (1986). Quantification substitutionnelle, contextes intensionnels et question d'existence. Dialectica 40 (4):273-296.
    RésuméL'interprétation substitutionnelle de la quantification impose une redéfinition des principaux concepts du calcul logique.Son intérêt majeur réside dans le fait qu'elle permet d'esquisser une théorie de l'intensionnalité qui lève les difficultés résultant du traitement logique des contextes de modalité, de croyance et de citation.Pour autant, on ne saurait éluder la traditionnelle question de la référence et de l'existence. Celle‐ci relève maintenant d'une construction sémantique de modèles.SummaryThe substitutional interpretation of quantification modifies the main concepts of logical calculus.Its principal (...)
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  46. Ryan Christensen (2011). Propositional Quantification. Russell 31 (1).
    Ramsey defined truth in the following way: x is true if and only if ∃p. This definition is ill-formed in standard first-order logic, so it is normally interpreted using substitutional or some kind of higher-order quantifier. I argue that these quantifiers fail to provide an adequate reading of the definition, but that, given certain adjustments, standard objectual quantification does provide an adequate reading.
     
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  47.  48
    Friederike Moltmann (2003). Nominalizing Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):445-481.
    Quantified expressions in natural language generally are taken to act like quantifiers in logic, which either range over entities that need to satisfy or not satisfy the predicate in order for the sentence to be true or otherwise are substitutional quantifiers. I will argue that there is a philosophically rather important class of quantified expressions in English that act quite differently, a class that includes something, nothing, and several things. In addition to expressing quantification, such expressions act like (...)
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  48. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1981). Bound Variables and Schematic Letters. Logique Et Analyse 95 (95):425-429.
    The paper purports to show, against Quine, that one can construct a language , which results from the extension of the theory of truth functions by introducing sentence letter quantification. Next a semantics is provided for this language. It is argued that the quantification is neither substitutional nor requires one to consider the sentence letters as taking entities as values.
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  49.  13
    Rafal Urbaniak (2013). Plural Quantifiers: A Modal Interpretation. Synthese 191 (7):1-22.
    One of the standard views on plural quantification is that its use commits one to the existence of abstract objects–sets. On this view claims like ‘some logicians admire only each other’ involve ineliminable quantification over subsets of a salient domain. The main motivation for this view is that plural quantification has to be given some sort of semantics, and among the two main candidates—substitutional and set-theoretic—only the latter can provide the language of plurals with the desired (...)
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  50.  23
    Francesca Boccuni (2013). Plural Logicism. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1051-1067.
    PG (Plural Grundgesetze) is a consistent second-order system which is aimed to derive second-order Peano arithmetic. It employs the notion of plural quantification and a few Fregean devices, among which the infamous Basic Law V. George Boolos’ plural semantics is replaced with Enrico Martino’s Acts of Choice Semantics (ACS), which is developed from the notion of arbitrary reference in mathematical reasoning. Also, substitutional quantification is exploited to interpret quantification into predicate position. ACS provides a form of (...)
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