First, this article considers the nature of quantum reality and the concept of realism in quantum theory, in conjunction with the roles of locality, causality, and probability and statistics there. Second, it offers two interpretations of quantum mechanics, developed by the authors of this article, the second of which is also a different theory of quantum phenomena. Both of these interpretations are statistical. The first interpretation, by A. Plotnitsky, “the statistical Copenhagen interpretation,” is nonrealist, insofar as the description or (...) even conception of the nature of quantum objects and processes is precluded. The second, by A. Khrennikov, is ultimately realist, because it assumes that the quantum-mechanical level of reality is underlain by a deeper level of reality, described, in a realist fashion, by a model, based in the pre-quantum classical statistical field theory, the predictions of which reproduce those of quantum mechanics. Moreover, because the continuous fields considered in this model are transformed into discrete clicks of detectors, experimental outcomes in this model depend on the context of measurement in accordance with N. Bohr’s interpretation and the statistical Copenhagen interpretation, which coincides with N. Bohr’s interpretation in this regard. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to the ongoing task of clarifying the relationships between reality, probability, and nonlocality in quantum physics. It is in part stimulated by Khrennikov’s argument, in several communications, for “eliminating the issue of quantum nonlocality” from the analysis of quantum entanglement. I argue, however, that the question may not be that of eliminating but instead that of further illuminating this issue, a task that can be pursued by relating quantum nonlocality to other key features of quantum (...) phenomena. I suggest that the following features of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, distinguishing them from classical phenomena and classical physics— the irreducible role of measuring instruments in defining quantum phenomena, discreteness, complementarity, entanglement, quantum nonlocality, and the irreducibly probabilistic nature of quantum predictions—are all interconnected, so that it is difficult to give an unconditional priority to any one of them. To argue this case, I shall consider quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics from a nonrealist or, in terms adopted here, “reality-without-realism” perspective. This perspective extends Bohr’s view, grounded in his analysis of the irreducible role of measuring instruments in the constitution of quantum phenomena. (shrink)

Reading Bohr: Physics and Philosophy offers a new perspective on Niels Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics as complementarity, and on the relationships between physics and philosophy in Bohr's work, which has had momentous significance for our understanding of quantum theory and of the nature of knowledge in general. Philosophically, the book reassesses Bohr's place in the Western philosophical tradition, from Kant and Hegel on. Physically, it reconsiders the main issues at stake in the Bohr-Einstein confrontation and in the ongoing debates (...) concerning quantum physics. It also devotes greater attention than in most commentaries on Bohr to the key developments and transformations of his thinking concerning complementarity. Most significant among them were those that occurred, first, under the impact of Bohr's exchanges with Einstein and, second, under the impact of developments in quantum theory itself, both quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. The importance of quantum field theory for Bohr's thinking has not been adequately addressed in the literature on Bohr, to the considerable detriment to our understanding of the history of quantum physics. Filling this lacuna is one of the main contributions of the book, which also enables us to show why quantum field theory compels us to move beyond Bohr without, however, simply leaving him behind. (shrink)

This article explores the relationships between the philosophical foundations of quantum field theory, the currently dominant form of quantum physics, and Deleuze's concept of the virtual, most especially in relation to the idea of chaos found in Deleuze and Guattari's What is Philosophy?. Deleuze and Guattari appear to derive this idea partly from the philosophical conceptuality of quantum field theory, in particular the concept of virtual particle formation. The article then goes on to discuss, from this perspective, the relationships between (...) philosophy and science, and between their respective ways of confronting chaos, a great enemy but also a great friend of thought, and its greatest ally in its struggle against opinion. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the role of fundamental principles in theoretical physics, especially quantum theory. The fundamental principles of relativity will be addressed as well, in view of their role in quantum electrodynamics and quantum field theory, specifically Dirac’s work, which, in particular Dirac’s derivation of his relativistic equation of the electron from the principles of relativity and quantum theory, is the main focus of this article. I shall also consider Heisenberg’s earlier work leading him to the discovery of (...) quantum mechanics, which inspired Dirac’s work. I argue that Heisenberg’s and Dirac’s work was guided by their adherence to and their confidence in the fundamental principles of quantum theory. The final section of the article discusses the recent work by D’Ariano and coworkers on the principles of quantum information theory, which extend quantum theory and its principles in a new direction. This extension enabled them to offer a new derivation of Dirac’s equations from these principles alone, without using the principles of relativity. (shrink)

A groundbreaking conception of interactive media, inspired by continuity, field, and process, with fresh implications for art, computer science, and philosophy of technology.

The point of departure for this article is Werner Heisenberg’s remark, made in 1929: “It is not surprising that our language [or conceptuality] should be incapable of describing processes occurring within atoms, for … it was invented to describe the experiences of daily life, and these consist only of processes involving exceedingly large numbers of atoms. … Fortunately, mathematics is not subject to this limitation, and it has been possible to invent a mathematical scheme—the quantum theory [quantum mechanics]—which seems entirely (...) adequate for the treatment of atomic processes.” The cost of this discovery, at least in Heisenberg’s and related interpretations of quantum mechanics, is that, in contrast to classical mechanics, the mathematical scheme in question no longer offers a description, even an idealized one, of quantum objects and processes. This scheme only enables predictions, in general, probabilistic in character, of the outcomes of quantum experiments. As a result, a new type of the relationships between mathematics and physics is established, which, in the language of Eugene Wigner adopted in my title, indeed makes the effectiveness of mathematics unreasonable in quantum but, as I shall explain, not in classical physics. The article discusses these new relationships between mathematics and physics in quantum theory and their implications for theoretical physics—past, present, and future. (shrink)

This article considers the relationships between the character of physical law in quantum theory and Bohr’s concept of complementarity, under the assumption of the unrepresentable and possibly inconceivable nature of quantum objects and processes, an assumption that may be seen as the most radical departure from realism currently available. Complementarity, the article argues, is a reflection of the fact that, as against classical physics or relativity, the behavior of quantum objects of the same type, say, all electrons, is not governed (...) by the same physical law in all contexts, specifically in complementary contexts. On the other hand, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics offers correct probabilistic or statistical predictions in all contexts, here, again, under the assumption that quantum objects themselves and their behavior are beyond representation or even conception. Bohr, in this connection, spoke of “an entirely new situation as regards the description of physical phenomena that, the notion of complementarity aims at characterizing.” The article also considers the relationships among complementarity, entanglement, and quantum information, by basing these relationships on this understanding of complementarity. (shrink)

Taking as its point of departure the question of light vis-à-vis the question of being in Derrida's work, this article discusses Derrida's radical conceptions of khoral spatiality and alterity, by linking his first book on Edmund Husserl's “The Origin of Geometry” and his early critique of Emmanuel Levinas to his exploration of the ethico-political problematics, in part, again, via Levinas, in his latest works. The article also considers Derrida's reading of Kafka in “Before the Law,” decisive for his analysis of (...) the problematics in question and for our understanding of the relationships between “geometry and democracy.” These relationships, the article argues, are an essential concern of much of Derrida's work and of our culture, from the pre-Socratics on. (shrink)

This article addresses the effectiveness of the predictive modeling of cognition and behavior based on quantum principles and some of the reasons for this effectiveness. It also aims, however, to explore the limitations of mathematical modeling so based, quantum-like modeling, and all mathematical modeling, including classical-like, in considering human cognition and behavior. It will discuss certain alternative approaches to both, essentially philosophical in nature, although sometimes found in literary works, approaches that, while not quantitative, may help compensate for limitations of (...) mathematical modeling there. Most Q-L and C-L approaches beyond physics are realist, insofar as they offer representations of human thinking by the formalism of quantum or classical physical theories. The position adopted in this article is based on the non-realist assumption that such a representation may not be possible, which is not the same as that it is impossible. I designate interpretations that do not make this assumption reality-without-realism, RWR, interpretations, and in considering mental processes as ideality-without-idealism, IWI, interpretations. (shrink)

Andrei Khrennikov's book returns us to the old question of whether reality, either material or mental, may be fundamentally mathematical. This question, however, creates difficulties for those not suitably trained in mathematics. While this was already a problem for the Greeks, the exceedingly abstract and complex character of modern mathematics makes it especially acute now. Khrennikov's book confronts its readers with one of the more arcane areas of modern mathematics, namely p-adics and the p-adic version of the mathematics used in (...) classical and quantum physics. At the same time, by dealing with Freudian and related theory, the book focuses primarily on the human mind rather than the material world or the brain as a physical object. Thus, while harking back to Greek thought on the possibly mathematical nature of mental reality, the project is unusual from a contemporary point of view. These days, the more usual role of mathematics lies in investigation of the biological, chemical, and physical bases of mental processes, including exploration of the possibility of their quantum origin . While using analogous mathematics, Khrennikov's project shifts the focus to the mathematical modeling of mental, rather than physical, processes. Andrei Khrennikov, Classical and Quantum Mental Models and Freud's Theory of Unconscious Mind, Vaxjo, Sweden: Vaxjo University Press, 2002, xix+207pp., ISBN 91-7636-315-5. (shrink)

The book considers foundational thinking in quantum theory, focusing on the role the fundamental principles and principle thinking there, including thinking that leads to the invention of new principles, which is, the book contends, one of the ultimate achievements of theoretical thinking in physics and beyond. The focus on principles, prominent during the rise and in the immediate aftermath of quantum theory, has been uncommon in more recent discussions and debates concerning it. The book argues, however, that exploring the fundamental (...) principles and principle thinking is exceptionally helpful in addressing the key issues at stake in quantum foundations and the seemingly interminable debates concerning them. Principle thinking led to major breakthroughs throughout the history of quantum theory, beginning with the old quantum theory and quantum mechanics, the first definitive quantum theory, which it remains within its proper (nonrelativistic) scope. It has, the book also argues, been equally important in quantum field theory, which has been the frontier of quantum theory for quite a while now, and more recently, in quantum information theory, where principle thinking was given new prominence. The approach allows the book to develop a new understanding of both the history and philosophy of quantum theory, from Planck's quantum to the Higgs boson, and beyond, and of the thinking the key founding figures, such as Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and Dirac, as well as some among more recent theorists. The book also extensively considers the nature of quantum probability, and contains a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, "the statistical Copenhagen interpretation." Overall, the book's argument is guided by what Heisenberg called "the spirit of Copenhagen," which is defined by three great divorces from the preceding foundational thinking in physics-reality from realism, probability from causality, and locality from relativity-and defined the fundamental principles of quantum theory accordingly. (shrink)

Guiseppe Vitiello, My Double Unveiled: The Dissipative Quantum Model of the Brain, Amsterdam: John Benjamin, 2001, 161pp. $44.95/?37.37, ISBN 1588110761.

Following Niels Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics as complementarity, this article argues that quantum mechanics may be seen as a theory of, in N. David Mermin's words, “correlations without correlata,” understood here as the correlations between certain physical events in the classical macro world that at the same time disallow us to ascertain their quantum-level correlata.

Following Asher Peres’s observation that, as in classical physics, in quantum theory, too, a given physical object considered “has a precise position and a precise momentum,” this article examines the question of the definition of quantum variables, and then the new type (as against classical physics) of relationships between mathematics and physics in quantum theory. The article argues that the possibility of the precise definition and determination of quantum variables depends on the particular nature of these relationships.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Logos and Alogon: Thinkable and Unthinkable in Mathematics, from the Pythagoreans to the Moderns by Arkady PlotnitskyNoam CohenPLOTNITSKY, Arkady. Logos and Alogon: Thinkable and Unthinkable in Mathematics, from the Pythagoreans to the Moderns. Cham: Springer, 2023. xvi + 294 pp. Cloth, $109.99The limits of thought in its relations to reality have defined Western philosophical inquiry from its very beginnings. The shocking discovery of the incommensurables in (...) Greek mathematics not only reintroduced these limits with greater force but also instigated two different forms of coping with the unthinkable in Western philosophy, mathematics, and science. As Arkady Plotnitsky sets forth, in response to the incommensurability crisis in the ancient Greek intellectual world, there appeared two different attitudes toward the alogon, that is, the unthinkable or irrational. Plato and his followers sought to overcome the unthinkable, of which the incommensurables in mathematics are only an example, through philosophy. In contrast, the Pythagoreans continued to hold on to mathematics as the primary means of knowing the world, but put a larger emphasis on geometry. Plotnitsky [End Page 359] claims that by not putting aside the primacy of mathematics, the Pythagorean shift from arithmetic to geometry established in Western thought a certain tolerance toward the unthinkable within the realm of the thinkable, “a possibility of the alogon in the logos.” Until modern times this remained no more than a possibility. However, in modern mathematics and mathematical physics Plotnitsky identifies a certain fulfillment of this potential, a “radical Pythagorean mathematics.” In his comprehensive and thought-provoking study, Plotnitsky recounts the development of such radical modern Pythagoreanism, not only to tell its history but also to suggest that the unthinkable is a condition of possibility for thought, and that a proper recognition of this role it plays is crucial for the advancement of mathematical thinking and thinking in general.Plotnitsky begins by portraying in broad strokes the two defining characteristics of radical Pythagorean mathematics: the presence of the unthinkable within mathematical thought itself, and the interplay of algebra and geometry. Relying on an extensive knowledge of the history of modern mathematics and physics, in the first two chapters of the book Plotnitsky gradually demonstrates the key role that the alogon plays in some theories of modern mathematical thought, such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and quantum mechanics. He also presents and clarifies his own conception of the history of Western thought as a creative process of concept-forming. By creating rather than discovering concepts, great mathematicians break new ground for thinking. The book as a whole argues in length for these two main theses.In chapter 3, the author addresses the thought of Bernhard Riemann to make the case that Riemann’s mathematical thought puts an emphasis on creative conceptual thinking and is not defined merely by calculations or logic. Such thinking is problem-posing rather than axiomatic. Riemann’s central innovation in this respect is the concept of manifold (Mannigfaltigkeit), which enabled him to think anew space and geometry in a radical non-Euclidean fashion, implying an infinite number of possible geometries. Plotnitsky argues—borrowing Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology—that this opened up a “plane of immanence,” which is to say that Riemann created a concept-generating movement of thought. However, we cannot grasp the generation of concepts in modern mathematics without giving proper attention to the interplay of algebra and geometry that defines it. Chapter 4 demonstrates this interweaving of the two fields by recounting the history of the idea of the curve in modernity, from the analytic geometry and calculus of Fermat and Descartes to its modification in the concept of a Riemann surface, up to its more recent developments in the algebraic geometry of Weil and Grothendieck. It gives a historical account of the algebraization of the curve that at the same time brings into relief the irreducible geometrical aspect, continuity, of all modern mathematical conceptualizations of the curve.The next two chapters provide further case studies. Chapter 5 expands and solidifies the argument of chapter 2. It discusses three examples of mathematical practice, each displayed by a pair of important [End Page 360] mathematicians: Abel and Galois, Lobachevsky and Riemann, Weil and Grothendieck. Each case... (shrink)

This is an exposition of what the author calls ‘non-classical epistemology’ in close relationship with the emergence and development of quantum mechanics. Guiding the reader along the meandering routes taken by the theory’s founders, Plotnitsky unfolds a nuanced presentation of the so-called ‘Copenhagen spirit’ or, more precisely, of the ideas of his central hero, Niels Bohr, taken to their logical conclusion. -/- Bohr’s inception and elaboration of his concept of complementarity, in conflict with his nemesis, Einstein, and alongside the (...) other pioneers of the quantum revolution is meticulously laid out in a thought-provoking narrative, punctuated with references to philosophers ranging from Aristotle and Hegel to Nietzsche and Deleuze, and to modern ground-breaking mathematical approaches to quantum mechanics. -/- Plotnitsky repeatedly stresses that he offers only ‘an’ interpretation, one among many, and a minority view at that. Nevertheless, it can arguably be said to constitute a most coherent ... (shrink)

From flea bites to galaxies, from love affairs to shadows, Paul Feyerabend reveled in the sensory and intellectual abundance that surrounds us. He found it equally striking that human senses and human intelligence are able to take in only a fraction of these riches. "This a blessing, not a drawback," he writes. "A superconscious organism would not be superwise, it would be paralyzed." This human reduction of experience to a manageable level is the heart of Conquest of Abundance, the book (...) on which Feyerabend was at work when he died in 1994. Prepared from drafts of the manuscript left at his death, working notes, and lectures and articles Feyerabend wrote while the larger work was in progress, Conquest of Abundance offers up rich exploration and startling insights with the charm, lucidity, and sense of mischief that are his hallmarks. Feyerabend is fascinated by how we attempt to explain and predict the mysteries of the natural world, and he looks at the ways in which we abstract experience, explain anomalies, and reduce wonder to formulas and equations. Through his exploration of the positive and negative consequences of these efforts, Feyerabend reveals the "conquest of abundance" as an integral part of the history and character of Western civilization. "Paul Feyerabend . . . was the Norman Mailer of philosophy. . . . brilliant, brave, adventurous, original and quirky."—Richard Rorty, New Republic "As much a smudged icon as a philosophical position holder, [Feyerabend] was alluring and erotic, a torch singer for philosophical anarchy."—Nancy Maull, New York Times Book Review "[A] kind of final testament of Feyerabend's thought . . . Conquest of Abundance is as much the product of a brilliant, scintillating style as of an immense erudition and culture. . . . This book is as abundant and rich as the world it envisions."—Arkady Plotnitsky, Chicago Tribune. (shrink)

From flea bites to galaxies, from love affairs to shadows, Paul Feyerabend reveled in the sensory and intellectual abundance that surrounds us. He found it equally striking that human senses and human intelligence are able to take in only a fraction of these riches. "This a blessing, not a drawback," he writes. "A superconscious organism would not be superwise, it would be paralyzed." This human reduction of experience to a manageable level is the heart of _Conquest of Abundance_, the book (...) on which Feyerabend was at work when he died in 1994. Prepared from drafts of the manuscript left at his death, working notes, and lectures and articles Feyerabend wrote while the larger work was in progress, _Conquest of Abundance_ offers up rich exploration and startling insights with the charm, lucidity, and sense of mischief that are his hallmarks. Feyerabend is fascinated by how we attempt to explain and predict the mysteries of the natural world, and he looks at the ways in which we abstract experience, explain anomalies, and reduce wonder to formulas and equations. Through his exploration of the positive and negative consequences of these efforts, Feyerabend reveals the "conquest of abundance" as an integral part of the history and character of Western civilization. "Paul Feyerabend... was the Norman Mailer of philosophy.... brilliant, brave, adventurous, original and quirky."—Richard Rorty, _New Republic_ "As much a smudged icon as a philosophical position holder, [Feyerabend] was alluring and erotic, a torch singer for philosophical anarchy."—Nancy Maull, _New York Times Book Review_ "[A] kind of final testament of Feyerabend's thought... Conquest of Abundance is as much the product of a brilliant, scintillating style as of an immense erudition and culture.... This book is as abundant and rich as the world it envisions."—Arkady Plotnitsky, _Chicago Tribune_. (shrink)

Of all twentieth century philosophers, it is Gilles Deleuze whose work agitates most forcefully for a worldview privileging becoming over being, difference over sameness; the world as a complex, open set of multiplicities. Nevertheless, Deleuze remains singular in enlisting mathematical resources to underpin and inform such a position, refusing the hackneyed opposition between ‘static’ mathematical logic versus ‘dynamic’ physical world. This is an international collection of work commissioned from foremost philosophers, mathematicians and philosophers of science, to address the wide range (...) of problematics and influences in this most important strand of Deleuze’s thinking. Contributors are Charles Alunni, Alain Badiou, Gilles Châtelet, Manuel DeLanda, Simon Duffy, Robin Durie, Aden Evens, Arkady Plotnitsky, Jean-Michel Salanskis, Daniel Smith and David Webb. (shrink)

Between Deleuze and Derrida is the first book to explore and compare the work of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida, two leading philosophers of French post-structuralism. This is done via a number of key themes, including the philosophy of difference, language, memory, time, event, and love, as well as relating these themes to their respective approaches to Philosophy, Literature, Politics and Mathematics. Contributors: Eric Alliez, Branka Arsic, Gregg Lambert, Leonard Lawlor, Alphonso Lingis, Tamsin Lorraine, Jeff Nealon, Paul Patton, Arkady (...) Plotnitsky, John Protevi, Daniel W. Smith. (shrink)

Metaphysics, including the metaphysics of justice, is forgetting or blinding oneself to the violence of the pure. Arkady Plotnitsky: 1. Without a master, one cannot be cleaned. - Purification, whether by fire or by the word, by baptism or by death, requires submission to the law. Dominique Laporte: 2. Pure and Impure until Homo Sacer - The pure and impure have long been of interest to Giorgio Agamben. In his first text, The Man Without Content, Agamben writes of (...) “pure culture” as an aesthetic relation to the world that idealizes the position of the disinterested spectator. 3. This culture…. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Between Deleuze and DerridaMary Beth MaderPaul Patton and John Protevi, editors. Between Deleuze and Derrida. New York: Continuum, 2003. Pp. ix + 207. Cloth, $105.00. Paper, $29.95.One of the many provisions of Gilles Deleuze's prodigious philosophical invention, Difference and Repetition, is an ontological account of how invention is actual. That book itself is an instance of that of which it offers an account. An element of this account (...) is the notion of an intensive system. The intensive system is proposed as a way in which novelty and movement come about. It requires as its basic constituents two heterogeneous organized series which are put into communication through their differences, producing a resonance internal to the system which then yields a novel forced movement. Several of the essays in Between Deleuze and Derrida so put the work of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida into communication as to themselves amount to intensive systems: movement and novelty emerge in our grasp of the separate oeuvres of the two philosophers.Essays by Daniel W. Smith and Leonard Lawlor tackle in detail the task of comparative explication. Since Deleuze and Derrida treat many of the same philosophical topics, often employing identical terms, these clear cases for their divergences and similarities are especially useful. Smith's historical situation of Deleuze and Derrida relative to the thought of Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche is exemplary. Dense with connections, Lawlor's decisive expositions pursue the implications of his interpretative distinctions rigorously to their ends, tracing the divergent constructions of the two thinkers to a common source in the notion of a simulacrum. Smith and Lawlor themselves part company, however, over the issue of whether Derrida and Deleuze are best characterized as philosophers of immanence or transcendence. Paul Patton crafts a sophisticated cross-reading of their shared vision of philosophy as a "utopian vocation," without homogenizing the differing voices they hear in this call or its unshared ontology.Branka Arsiæ's imaginative contribution on the topic of passive events and Melville's Bartleby is enlightening even without mention of Deleuze's notion of static ordinal genesis. The essays of John Protevi and Tamsin Lorraine are also rich in philosophical imagination. Protevi's extension of Derrida's aporias of the gift and friendship to an "aporia of love" illuminates Derrida's own evolution while refusing a version of undecidability that remains in static indecision. His discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the girl, with its isotropic implications for sexuality per se, is one of the best in print. Lorraine displays the novelty of Deleuze and Derrida's post-Heideggerian thought on the temporality of sense and the limits of representation in readings of Alice in Wonderland and Hamlet that clarify by example some of the more forbiddingly elaborate proposals in the philosophy of time that these thinkers offer.Arkady Plotnitsky's chapter addresses the crucial questions of Deleuze's and Derrida's relations to various sub-fields of mathematics and happily considers Derrida, with his deployment of a notion of undecidability, as a legatee of Gödel. It is confusing, however, that this stimulating essay treats Deleuze's and Derrida's invocations of algebra, geometry and topology by means of the "tropes" of "algebra, geometry and topology." This is especially puzzling in the case of Deleuze, whose use of mathematics in Difference and Repetition is avowedly not metaphorical. Further, although algebra is said to be the prime instrument of Plotnitsky's analysis, it turns out that "the general quasi-algebraic inscriptive structure or operation" (111; my italics) is most fundamental to that analysis. For this reason, it would be preferable to locate in both Deleuze and Derrida a post-structuralist concern with structure itself, making "algebra" another in the Derridean syntagmatic chain of names for a descendent of "structure."The book does contain some disappointing stretches. Eric Alliez's chapter does not read well despite its reliable translation. Alphonso Lingis's ruminations of a blithely bewildered Western roamer ("you" and then "me") on his "detour into exoticism" thanks to the "willing" concupiscence of an Asian female bed-mate ("she" and never "you" or "me") make one regret the era of easy... (shrink)

Explores the biographical, historical and philosophical connections between Jacques Derrida and Michel FoucaultBetween Foucault and Derrida explores the notorious Cogito debate and includes: the central articles, an important piece by Jean-Marie Beyssade, along with a letter Foucault wrote to Beyssade in response both these pieces available for the first time in English translation. In the second part of the book, 10 essays written by some of the most well-known scholars working in contemporary continental philosophy address the various philosophical intersections and (...) divergences of these two profoundly important thinkers.Key FeaturesThe first collection of the central essays involved in the Cogito debate between Foucault and DerridaIncludes the first English translations of Jean-Marie Beyssades important 1973 article on the debate and Foucault's letter in responseSome of the best-known scholars working in continental philosophy today examine where Foucault and Derrida converge and diverge, and how they ultimately shaped each others projectsContributorsAmy Allen, Penn State University, Pennsylvania, USA.Ellen Armour, Vanderbilt Divinity School, Tennessee, USA. Yubraj Aryal, University of Montreal, Canada and New York University, USA. Jean-Marie Beyssade, University of Paris IV, France.Vernon W. Cisney, Gettysburg College, Pennsylvania, USA.Fred Evans, Duquesne University, Pennsylvania, USA.Peter Gratton, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada.Leonard Lawlor, Penn State University, Pennsylvania, USA.Edward McGushin, Stonehill College, Massachusetts, USA.Nicolae Morar, University of Oregon, Oregon, USA. Jeff Nealon, Penn State University, Pennsylvania, USA.Christopher Penfield, Purdue University, Indiana, USA.Arkady Plotnitsky, Purdue University, Indiana, USA. Paul Rekret, Richmond, The American International University in London, UK. Alan Schrift, Grinnell College, Iowa, USA. (shrink)

The traditional analysis of the basic version of the double-slit experiment leads to the conclusion that wave-particle duality is a fundamental fact of nature. However, such a conclusion means to imply that we are not only required to have two contradictory pictures of reality but also compelled to abandon the objectiveness of the truth values, “true” and “false”. Yet, even if we could accept wave-like behavior of quantum particles as the best explanation for the build-up of an interference pattern in (...) the double-slit experiment, without the objectivity of the truth values we would never have certainty regarding any statement about the world. The present paper discusses ways to reconcile the correct description of the double-slit experiment with the objectiveness of “true” and “false”. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a constructive treatment of the mathematical formalism of quantum theory and a possible role of constructivist philosophy in resolving the foundational problems of quantum mechanics, particularly, the controversy over the meaning of the wave function of the universe. As it is demonstrated in the paper, unless the number of the universe’s degrees of freedom is fundamentally upper bounded or hypercomputation is physically realizable, the universal wave function is a non-constructive entity in the sense of constructive recursive (...) mathematics. This means that even if such a function might exist, basic mathematical operations on it would be undefinable and subsequently the only content one would be able to deduce from this function would be pure symbolical. (shrink)

Intuitively, the more powerful a theory is, the greater the variety and quantity of ideas can be expressed through its formal language. Therefore, when comparing two theories concerning the same subject, it seems only reasonable to compare the expressive powers of their formal languages. On condition that the quantum mechanical description is universal and so can be applied to macroscopic systems, quantum theory is required to be more powerful than classical mechanics. This implies that the formal language of Hilbert space (...) theory must be more expressive than that of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. However, as shown in the paper, such a requirement cannot be met. As a result, classical and quantum formalisms cannot be in a hierarchical relation, that is, include one another. This fact puts in doubt the quantum-classical correspondence and undermines the reductionist approach to the physical world. (shrink)

As a form of intellectual assault on traditional philosophical trends, pragmatism had appeared at the beginning of the 20th century both to show what is it like to solve the real epistemological problems and prevent us from possible blunders we can make in future. Weber and James, the two key thinkers, whose pragmatic moves towards the phenomenon of knowledge were revolutionary, will be of main interest in the present paper. Not all, of course, but just one aspect of pragmatism I (...) wish to examine: how should we really conduct ourselves and share our ideas in order to elaborate a more adequate knowledge about the world? (shrink)