Partiendo de la distinción filosófica entre las leyes de la ciencia y las leyes de la naturaleza, en el presente artículo se defiende la indispensabilidad explicativa de las leyes de la ciencia en el campo de las ciencias cognitivas. Se sostiene que las leyes de la ciencia desempeñan un papel epistémico indispensable tanto en el análisis funcional como en la explicación mecanicista de las capacidades cognitivas. De esta manera, se ofrece una elucidación plausible del poder explicativo de las ciencias cognitivas (...) en términos del papel epistémico de las leyes de la ciencia, suspendiendo el juicio, de manera prudente, respecto del controvertido estatus metafísico de las leyes naturales. Se pone en evidencia que tanto quienes defienden como quienes rechazan el compromiso ontológico con leyes causales intencionales presuponen que esas leyes no contribuyen a la explicación funcionalista ni mecanicista de los fenómenos que describen. Sin embargo, en el presente trabajo se argumenta, primero, que el análisis funcional requiere la especificación de leyes científicas no causales y, segundo, que la representación científica precisa de las actividades y de la organización dinámica de un mecanismo se despliega mayoritariamente, en el contexto de un modelo mecanicista, mediante la especificación de leyes científicas. La conclusión es que las leyes científicas (aunque no necesariamente las leyes de la naturaleza) desempeñan un papel indispensable en la explicación en ciencias cognitivas. (shrink)

We discuss the axiomatization of generalized consequence relations determined by non-deterministic matrices. We show that, under reasonable expressiveness requirements, simple axiomatizations can always be obtained, using inference rules which can have more than one conclusion. Further, when the non-deterministic matrices are finite we obtain finite axiomatizations with a suitable generalized subformula property.

The problem of deviant causation has been a serious obstacle for causal theories of action. We suggest that attending to the problem of deviant causation reveals two related problems for causal theories. First, it threatens the reductive ambitions of causal theories of intentional action. Second, it suggests that such a theory fails to account for how the agent herself is guided by her reasons. Focusing on the second of these, we argue that the problem of guidance turns out to be (...) related to a number of other issues in the literature on action explanation, and that it is much more general: it threatens not only causal theories but any theory of action. Finally, we suggest that a certain version of the view that acting has a constitutive or formal aim can overcome this problem. (shrink)

We consider a 2-valued non-deterministic connective \({\wedge \!\!\!\!\!\vee }\) defined by the table resulting from the entry-wise union of the tables of conjunction and disjunction. Being half conjunction and half disjunction we named it _platypus_. The value of \({\wedge \!\!\!\!\!\vee }\) is not completely determined by the input, contrasting with usual notion of Boolean connective. We call non-deterministic Boolean connective any connective based on multi-functions over the Boolean set. In this way, non-determinism allows for an extended notion of truth-functional connective. (...) Unexpectedly, this very simple connective and the logic it defines, illustrate various key advantages in working with generalized notions of semantics (by incorporating non-determinism), calculi (by allowing multiple-conclusion rules) and even of logic (moving from Tarskian to Scottian consequence relations). We show that the associated logic cannot be characterized by any finite set of finite matrices, whereas with non-determinism two values suffice. Furthermore, this logic is not finitely axiomatizable using single-conclusion rules, however we provide a very simple analytic multiple-conclusion axiomatization using only two rules. Finally, deciding the associated multiple-conclusion logic is \(\mathbf {coNP}\) -complete, but deciding its single-conclusion fragment is in \({\mathbf {P}}\). (shrink)

In the present paper we study systematically several consequence relations on the usual language of propositional intuitionistic logic that can be defined semantically by using Kripke frames and the same defining truth conditions for the connectives as in intuitionistic logic but without imposing some of the conditions on the Kripke frames that are required in the intuitionistic case. The logics so obtained are called subintuitionistic logics in the literature. We depart from the perspective of considering a logic just as a (...) set of theorems and also depart from the perspective taken by Restall in that we consider standard Kripke models instead of models with a base point. We study the relations between subintuitionistic logics and modal logics given by the translation considered by Došen. Moreover, we classify the logics obtained according to the hierarchy considered inAlgebraic Logic. (shrink)

The present paper introduces and studies the variety WH of weakly Heyting algebras. It corresponds to the strict implication fragment of the normal modal logic K which is also known as the subintuitionistic local consequence of the class of all Kripke models. The tools developed in the paper can be applied to the study of the subvarieties of WH; among them are the varieties determined by the strict implication fragments of normal modal logics as well as varieties that do not (...) arise in this way as the variety of Basic algebras or the variety of Heyting algebras. Apart from WH itself the paper studies the subvarieties of WH that naturally correspond to subintuitionistic logics, namely the variety of R-weakly Heyting algebras, the variety of T-weakly Heyting algebras and the varieties of Basic algebras and subresiduated lattices. (shrink)

Although cognitive science was multidisciplinary from the start, an under-emphasis on anthropology has left the field with limited research in small scale, indigenous societies. Neglecting the anthropological perspective is risky, given that once-canonical cognitive science findings have often been shown to be artifacts of enculturation rather than cognitive universals. This imbalance has become more problematic as the increased use of Western theory-driven approaches, many of which assume human uniformity (“universality”), confronts the absence of a robust descriptive base that might provide (...) clarifying or even contrary evidence. We highlight the need for remedies to such shortcomings by suggesting a two-fold methodological shift. First, studies conducted in indigenous societies can benefit by relying on multidisciplinary research groups to diminish ethnocentrism and enhance the quality of the data. Second, studies devised for Western societies can readily be adapted to the changing settings encountered in the field. Here, we provide examples, drawn from the areas of emotion and facial expressions, to illustrate potential solutions to recurrent problems in enhancing the quality of data collection, hypothesis testing, and the interpretation of results. (shrink)

El concepto de público en Dewey permite reconciliar dos intuiciones en conflicto. Por un lado la idea de que la ciencia requiera de expertos entra en conflicto con la construcción de una sociedad democrática, y por la otra la idea de que las complejas sociedades del presente requieren para el desarrollo de la democracia de ciencia y tecnología. El concepto de público de Dewey permite superar ese conflicto en la medida en que permite superar la oposición tradicional en la filosofía (...) de la tecnología entre substantivistas y construccionistas. (shrink)

Contrasting two models of deliberative democratic multiculturalism, one by Seyla Benhabib and another by Luis Villoro, this paper contends that the differences between these two models outweigh the similarities, and that Villoro’s model is more promising insofar as it preserves the trust required in the institutions that mediate democratic deliberation in multicultural societies.

La filosofía de la ciencia se desarrolló durante la primera mitad del siglo xx bajo el supuesto de que la ciencia podía caracterizarse por la estructura lógica tanto del conocimiento articulado en las teorías más exitosas como de sus explicaciones. En la segunda mitad del siglo xx se cuestiona fuertemente esa idea, pero se sigue asumiendo que la filosofía de la ciencia debe hacerse siguiendo los cánones de una epistemología fundamentalista que considera que el avance de la ciencia pasa por (...) una ontología cada vez mas austera guiada por la idea de "mientras menos mejor". Desde esta perspectiva fundamentalista, el que las diferentes ciencias hablen de diferentes tipos de cosas es un obstáculo al entendimiento, producto de la imperfección del conocimiento actual. Este ideal nos invita a pensar que la epistemología debe hacerse reflexionando sobre el conocimiento articulado en nuestras teorías más austeras y nos compromete con propuestas reduccionistas problemáticas que no permiten explicar la diversidad de recursos epistémicos que de hecho utilizan los científicos. En este libro promovemos una epistemología que no sigue el lema de "mientras menos mejor", sino el de "organizar nuestros recursos epistémicos de manera que se genere entendimiento". Así, la misma estructura de las explicaciones y las prácticas (que incluye métodos y normas respecto de lo que se considera plausible y valioso) es lo que nos da la pauta para responder a la pregunta de qué es lo que hay. Esta estrategia epistémica nos obliga a hacer una filosofía de la ciencia muy cercana a la ciencia, reconociendo la pluralidad de sus métodos, objetivos y prácticas, sin reducir la filosofía de la ciencia a la sociología o a cualquier otra ciencia en particular. (shrink)

In this note we introduce the variety $${{\mathcal C}{\mathcal D}{\mathcal M}_\square}$$ of classical modal De Morgan algebras as a generalization of the variety $${{{\mathcal T}{\mathcal M}{\mathcal A}}}$$ of Tetravalent Modal algebras studied in [ 11 ]. We show that the variety $${{\mathcal V}_0}$$ defined by H. P. Sankappanavar in [ 13 ], and the variety S of Involutive Stone algebras introduced by R. Cignoli and M. S de Gallego in [ 5 ], are examples of classical modal De Morgan algebras. (...) We give a representation theory, and we study the regular filters, i.e., lattice filters closed under an implication operation. Finally we prove that the variety $${{{\mathcal T}{\mathcal M}{\mathcal A}}}$$ has the Amalgamation Property and the Superamalgamation Property. (shrink)

During the 19th century, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of continuity, according to which methods and explanatory patterns of biology should have an important say in the social sciences. In the 20th century, this thesis was considered unacceptable as part of the sharp separation of biology from the social sciences. Recent advances in the biological sciences suggest a way in which a version of the thesis of continuity can be reinstated, to suggest new ways of explaining innovation (...) in the social sciences. Key kinds of innovation can be explained in terms of the evolution of robust complex systems, interpreted as processes of path creation. (shrink)

In this note we introduce and study algebras of type such that is a bounded distributive lattice and ⌝ is an operator that satisfies the condition ⌝ = a ⌝ b and ⌝ 0 = 1. We develop the topological duality between these algebras and Priestley spaces with a relation. In addition, we characterize the congruences and the subalgebras of such an algebra. As an application, we will determine the Priestley spaces of quasi-Stone algebras.

We show that for an arbitrary logic being locally tabular is a strictly weaker property than being locally finite. We describe our hunt for a logic that allows us to separate the two properties, revealing weaker and weaker conditions under which they must coincide, and showing how they are intertwined. We single out several classes of logics where the two notions coincide, including logics that are determined by a finite set of finite matrices, selfextensional logics, algebraizable and equivalential logics. Furthermore, (...) we identify a closure property on models of a logic that, in the presence of local tabularity, is equivalent to local finiteness. (shrink)

The search for understanding is a major aim of science. Traditionally, understanding has been undervalued in the philosophy of science because of its psychological underpinnings; nowadays, however, it is widely recognized that epistemology cannot be divorced from psychology as sharp as traditional epistemology required. This eliminates the main obstacle to give scientific understanding due attention in philosophy of science. My aim in this paper is to describe an account of scientific understanding as an emergent feature of our mastering of different (...) (causal) explanatory frameworks that takes place through the mastering of scientific practices. Different practices lead to different kinds of representations. Such representations are often heterogeneous. The integration of such representations constitute understanding. (shrink)

This paper focuses on order-preserving logics defined from varieties of distributive lattices with negation, and in particular on the problem of whether these can be axiomatized by means Hilbert-style calculi that are finite. On the negative side, we provide a syntactic condition on the equational presentation of a variety that entails failure of finite axiomatizability for the corresponding logic. An application of this result is that the logic of all distributive lattices with negation is not finitely axiomatizable; we likewise establish (...) that the order-preserving logic of the variety of all Ockham algebras is also not finitely axiomatizable. On the positive side, we show that an arbitrary subvariety of semi-De Morgan algebras is axiomatized by a finite number of equations if and only if the corresponding order-preserving logic is axiomatized by a finite Hilbert-style calculus. This equivalence also holds for every subvariety of a Berman variety of Ockham algebras. We obtain, as a corollary, a new proof that the implication-free fragment of intuitionistic logic is finitely axiomatizable, as well as a new corresponding Hilbert-style calculus. Our proofs are constructive in that they allow us to effectively convert an equational presentation of a variety of algebras into a Hilbert-style calculus for the corresponding order-preserving logic, and vice versa. We also consider the assertional logics associated to the above-mentioned varieties, showing in particular that the assertional logics of finitely axiomatizable subvarieties of semi-De Morgan algebras are finitely axiomatizable as well. (shrink)

A dominant theme in the ninth of the Heroides, Deianira's letter to Hercules, is Deianira's indignation that Hercules has been defeated by a woman: first by Iole ; then by Omphale . The theme is exploited so insistently that Vessey, who regards the epistle as spurious, sees in this insistence a sign of the forger's clumsiness. consider the exploitation of the motive of‘victor victus’ in Heroides 9, on the contrary, as a strong sign of Ovidian authorship. From the very beginning (...) of the letter, the reader is reminded that if a woman, Iole, has metaphorically destroyed Hercules, another woman is on the point of destroying Hercules in a much more real and literal way, and this woman is none other than Deianira herself. When Deianira writes the letter, she has just sent to Hercules the garment soaked in Nessus' poison that will provoke Hercules' horrible death : thus Deianira, rather than Iole or Omphale, is the woman who vanquishes the unvanquished hero. But this is not only a matter of dramatic irony based on the general lines of the story. Heroides 9 is an elegiac rewriting of Sophocles' Trachiniae , and at the same time is inserted in the time and the ‘body’ of the tragedy. Ironic prefiguration in Heroides is normally realized through intertextual anticipation: thefuture events that are prefigured are present in the texts of the model epic or tragedy. Deianira blames Hercules for bis defeat: quern numquam Iuno seriesque immensa laborum fregerit, huic Iolen imposuisse iugum quem non mille ferae, quern non Stheneleius hostis, non potuit Iuno vincere, vincit amor. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the humanism articulated by Jean-Paul Sartre in Existentialism is a humanism and I show that his proposal is underpinned by some problematic assumptions and biases that shape its deployment. I also argue that the Mexican philosopher Emilio Uranga offers us in his most important work, Analísis del Ser del Mexicano, some conceptual resources that allow us to articulate a humanism that does not fall prey to the problems faced by that of Sartre.

Designers’ intentions are important for determining an artifact’s proper function (i.e., its perceived real function). However, there are disagreements regarding why. In one view, people reason causally about artifacts’ functional outcomes, and designers’ intended functions become important to the extent that they allow inferring outcomes. In another view, people use knowledge of designers’ intentions to determine proper functions, but this is unrelated to causal reasoning, having perhaps to do with intentional or social forms of reasoning (e.g., authority). Regarding these latter (...) social factors, researchers have proposed that designers’ intentions operate through a mechanism akin to social conventions, and that therefore both are determinants of proper function. In the current work, participants learned about an object’s creation, about social conventions for its use and about a specific episode where the artifact was used. The function implemented by the user could be aligned with the designer’s intended function, the social convention, both, or neither (i.e., an opportunistic use). Importantly, the use episode always resulted in an accident. Data show that the accident negatively affected proper function judgments and perceived efficiency for conventional and opportunistic functions, but not for designers’ intended functions. This is inconsistent with the view that designers’ intentions are conceptualized as causes of functional outcomes and with the idea that designers’ intentions and social conventions operate through a common mechanism. (shrink)

The present paper introduces and studies the variety [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL W]ℋn of n-linear weakly Heyting algebras. It corresponds to the algebraic semantic of the strict implication fragment of the normal modal logic K with a generalization of the axiom that defines the linear intuitionistic logic or Dummett logic. Special attention is given to the variety [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL W]ℋ2 that generalizes the linear Heyting algebras studied in [10] and [12], and the linear Basic algebras introduced in [2].

Hilbert algebras provide the equivalent algebraic semantics in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi to the implication fragment of intuitionistic logic. They are closely related to implicative semilattices. Porta proved that every Hilbert algebra has a free implicative semilattice extension. In this paper we introduce the notion of an optimal deductive filter of a Hilbert algebra and use it to provide a different proof of the existence of the free implicative semilattice extension of a Hilbert algebra as well as a (...) simplified characterization of it. The optimal deductive filters turn out to be the traces in the Hilbert algebra of the prime filters of the distributive lattice free extension of the free implicative semilattice extension of the Hilbert algebra. To define the concept of optimal deductive filter we need to introduce the concept of a strong Frink ideal for Hilbert algebras which generalizes the concept of a Frink ideal for posets. (shrink)

En este texto se examina críticamente la teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas de Andoni Ibarra y Thomas Mormann. El núcleo de la crítica va dirigido a mostrar que una serie de estudios sobre la ciencia, que ellos mismos mencionan, sugiere que la clasificación en tipos de representaciones propuesta es problemática. Es más, esos mismos estudios muestran que por lo menos muchas representaciones tienen una dimensión histórica que parece imposible capturar por medio del tipo de formalismo propuesto. /// Ibarra and (...) Mormann's combinatorial theory of scientific representations is subject to critical scrutiny. It is argued that the classification of types of representations offered cannot serve as a basis for an analysis of the variety of representations that happen to arise in science. Empirical studies on ways of representing used in science strongly suggest that a formal theory of representations of the kind proposed is not able to capture the historical dimension of the structure of representations. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Una tendencia importante en la filosofía de la educación contemporánea toma de la sociología del conocimiento la manera de entender la naturaleza del conocimiento científico. Esta tendencia parte de una crítica al "cognitivismo" individualista, asociado con una concepción tradicional del conocimiento y defiende una posición consensualista según la cual el conocimiento es la búsqueda de consenso. El objetivo del trabajo es mostrar que los consensualistas asumen una falsa dicotomía. Contrario a lo que los consensualistas asumen la cognición puede entenderse (...) a la vez como un logro social y como el resultado del ejercicio de capacidades individuals. Concluyo haciendo ver algunas consecuencias del abandono de esa dicotomía para entenderel papel de la autoridad en la educación.ABSTRACT: An important trend in contemporary philosophy of education follows a view of knowledge promoted by sociologists of knowledge. According to this view a critique of the cognitive individualism implicit in the traditional account of knowledge leads to "consensualism ", the view that knowledge is the search for consensus. The aim of this paper is to show that the consensualists assume a false dichotomy. Cognition can be understood both as a social achievement and as the display of individual capacities. I conclude by exploring some consequences of the abandoning of this dichotomy for our understanding of the role of authority in education. (shrink)

In this paper I formalize the notion of minimal disturbance, as this seems to be required by usual interpretations of the theory of quantum mechanics, and construct a quantum logical (lattice) model of the type of situation that seems to be at the root of the problem of the interpretation of Luders’ projection rule as a criterion of minimal disturbance for individual state transformations. What is particularly interesting in the situation to be depicted here is that, on the basis of (...) a simple model, which depends only on some very general features of the lattice structure of the theory (and its semantical interpretation), usual interpretive assumptions on minimal disturbance appear to be wanting.If we restrict our attention to the statistics of measurement results, Luders’ rule can, easily be interpreted as a formula describing ‘minimal change’ for statistical states. (shrink)

This paper explores some of the philosophical difficulties involved in the task of clarifying the idea of an irreducible statistical law, by means of an analysis of the paradigmatic example of such a law in the Quantum theory.These are two alternative strategies that can be pursued in clarifying this question. One is to understand this irreductibility by means of one or another interpretation of the Quantum theory. But, as will be shown, the different interpretations of Quantum mechanics lead to radically (...) different and fundamentally incompatible answers to the problem. The second strategy is to try to caracterize this irreducibility “directly”, via a proof of the impossibility of a hidden-variable extension of the statistical formalism of the theory. This strategy culminates with Bell’s theorem which indeed establishes the impossibility of constructing “Iocal” theories of hidden variables. This impossibility result, however, fails to provide us with a satisfying interpretation of the quantum irreductibility, rather, it merely shows how far we are from a solution to the problem. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Following the line of thought articulated by Gallegos-Ordorica (2019), the main goal of this article is to argue that the 19th century Venezuelan-Chilean polymath Andrés Bello should be included within the history of the pragmatist tradition as an important precursor insofar as his masterpiece, Filosofía del Entendimiento (Philosophy of the Understanding), exhibits many views and attitudes that are characteristic of pragmatism. A second and narrower goal of this article is to show that the specific kind of proto-pragmatist position that Bello (...) endorses in Philosophy of the Understanding bears remarkable similarities to the neo-pragmatist view of Huw Price and to argue that Bello’s metaphorical idea-signs can be potentially useful in explaining the great variety of functions that what Price calls “i-representations” have within his functional pluralism. (shrink)

In this paper we shall introduce the variety FWHA of frontal weak Heyting algebras as a generalization of the frontal Heyting algebras introduced by Leo Esakia in [ 10 ]. A frontal operator in a weak Heyting algebra A is an expansive operator τ preserving finite meets which also satisfies the equation $${\tau(a) \leq b \vee (b \rightarrow a)}$$, for all $${a, b \in A}$$. These operators were studied from an algebraic, logical and topological point of view by Leo Esakia (...) in [ 10 ]. We will study frontal operators in weak Heyting algebras and we will consider two examples of them. We will give a Priestley duality for the category of frontal weak Heyting algebras in terms of relational spaces $${\langle X, \leq, T, R \rangle}$$ where $${\langle X, \leq, T \rangle}$$ is a WH -space [ 6 ], and R is an additional binary relation used to interpret the modal operator. We will also study the WH -algebras with successor and the WH -algebras with gamma. For these varieties we will give two topological dualities. The first one is based on the representation given for the frontal weak Heyting algebras. The second one is based on certain particular classes of WH -spaces. (shrink)