The paper tries to illustrate the influence of Aristotle's thought upon Brentano by arguing that the view that all psychological phenomena have objects was proably derived from the Aristotelian conception that the mind can know itself only en parergo, and that this knowledge presupposes that some other thing be in the mind "objectively". Brentano's contribution to Aristotle scholarship is illustrated by reviewing some of his arguments against Zeller's claim that Aristotle's God, contemplating only himself, is ignorant of the world. The (...) paper concludes with an attempt to explain the relative neglect into which Brentano's exegetical efforts have fallen. (shrink)

It is pointed out against the two critics (a) that an identity or partial identity of meanings and facts is logically impossible, (b) that the logical grammar of ?identify? and ?explain? is different from that of ?understand? and that hence understanding can never be an operation of identifying or explaining, and (c) that rational understanding does not involve a ?reproduction? of the subject matter in any controversial sense.

Summary A. Vagueness is not definable in terms of behaviour (Section 4).

ZusammenfassungDer Text versucht in Auseinandersetzung mit den Ansätzen von Jürgen Moltmann, Johann Baptist Metz und Odo Marquard und im Anschluss an lutherische Theologie zu einer Verhältnisbestimmung von Theodizeefrage und Kreuzestheologie zu gelangen. Dabei wird Luthers Einsicht fruchtbar gemacht, dass Gott verborgen im Leiden wirkt, das Leiden aber nicht zu seiner Wesenseigenschaft wird. Vielmehr eröffnet sich in der Klage des leidenden Menschen die Möglichkeit, das Leiden an Gott zu beenden und gegen Gott zu Gott zu fliehen. Von Luthers Kreuzestheologie her ist (...) eine gegenseitige Durchdringung von Theodizeefrage, Hamartiologie, Kreuzestheologie und Eschatologie anzumahnen. Gleichzeitig verhelfen Klage und Anklage dazu, sich aufgrund von erfahrenen Leiden nicht in sich selbst zu verschließen, sondern kontrafaktisch an Gott festzuhalten.SummaryDiscussing the thoughts of J. Moltmann, J. B. Metz and O. Marquard the essay attempts – whilst following Martin Luther's theologia crucis – to find a relation between the theodicy-question and the theology of the cross. For this concern it refers to the aspect that God acts in suffering in a hidden way but does not posses suffering as an intrinsic characteristic. Rather, the lament of suffering people address to God, as we find it in the Psalms, gives the opportunity of bringing suffering from God's hiddenness to an end and to “flee from God to God”. Returning to Luther's theologia crucis should lead to further reflections on theodicy, sin, theology of the cross and eschatology. At the same time, lamentation as bringing human suffering before God provides an aid for suffering people not to lock their suffering in themselves, but to maintain the relationship to God – even against the supposedly factual evidence of the experience of suffering. (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIm Rekurs auf Luthers Verständnis der communicatio idiomatum, also der gegenseitigen Mitteilung und Partizipation von Göttlichem und Menschlichem in der Person Jesu Christi, versucht der Text eine Annäherung zu leisten an eine kommunikative theologische Anthropologie innerhalb einer relationalen und kommunikativen Ontologie. Mit einem solchen Konzept erscheint es als möglich, innerhalb der Debatte um Leib und Seele beziehungsweise Gehirn und Geist, die in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten aufgrund der Forschungsergebnisse der Neurowissenschaften von neuem in die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit gerückt ist, zu einer Klärung (...) zu gelangen und sowohl einen Leib-Seele-Dualismus als auch eine naturalistische Reduzierung mentaler Prozesse auf rein physische Vorgänge zu vermeiden. Luthers Modell der communicatio idiomatum dient in diesem Zusammenhang als Strukturmodell für die Kommunikation von Mensch und Gott im Glauben und für die leib-seelische Existenz des Menschen selbst.SUMMARYThe article tries – in referring to Martin Luther's understanding of communicatio idiomatum, thus the communication of divine and human nature in the person of Jesus Christ – to outline a communicative anthropology and ontology, in order to help to clarify the body-mind-problem and to overcome both the body-mind-dualism and a naturalistic approach currently favoured by several neuroscientist concepts. In comparing Luther's view of the communication of immaterial and material processes within the person of Jesus Christ and his concept of communication that takes place between Christ and the believer, the essay concludes that Luther seems to conceive a constitutively relationally structured view of man. In taking this approach seriously, there could be a way for Christian theology to appropriately deal with the challenges caused by the contemporary neuroscientist debate. Following Luther's concept of communication within the person of Jesus Christ, of Christ and man and within man himself, this communicative concept could turn out to be helpful in outlining a relational and communicational theological anthropology. (shrink)

This article notes differences in legislation in Germany and Great Britain regarding human embryo research and looks for an explanation in their divergent intellectual traditions. Whereas the German Stem Cell Act invokes an anthropological concept of human dignity to ground its ban on using embryos for research, there is no definition of what it means to be human in either the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act or in the advisory Warnock-Report. After studying the differences and providing some philosophical background, (...) the essay distinguishes two notions that are significant for understanding human dignity. It then proposes from a theological point of view a basic understanding within a relational anthropology, and comes to the conclusion that because of continuity in development and their relational constitution, humans embryos should be accepted as human from the moment of conception. (shrink)

Körner's notion of vagueness, its relation to ostension and the alledged gulf between logic and experience are examined. Ostension is seen not to cause vagueness ~ there are precise concepts of mathematics which can be ostensively introduced. A distinction is drawn between classical logic not applying to the vague world and not applying to the vague language. The claims about logic and the vague world are unverifiable claims about existence. Körner's attempt to elimmate the seeming incompatibility between vague language and (...) logic leads to a Protagorean relativism which is rejected. It is denied that the incompatibility between vagueness and classical logic causes a gulf between two sublanguages; instead, ordinary language is held to contain both and so to be inconsistent. (shrink)

Körner's notion of vagueness, its relation to ostension and the alledged gulf between logic and experience are examined. Ostension is seen not to cause vagueness ~ there are precise concepts of mathematics which can be ostensively mtroduced. A distinction is drawn between classical logic not applymg to the vague world and not applymg to the vague language. The claims about logic and the vague world are unverifiable claims about existence. Körner's attempt to elimmate the seeming incompatibility between vague language and (...) logic leads to a Protagorean relativism which is rejected. It is denied that the incompatibility between vagueness and classical logic causes a gulf between two sublanguages; mstead, ordinary language is held to contam both and so to be inconsistent. (shrink)