Like the first edition, this edition of The Development of Plato's Political Theory provides a clear, scholarly account of Plato's political theory in the context of the social and political events of his time. This second edition has been thoroughly revised to take into account scholarly developments during the last twenty years.

This is the first in-depth study of popular attitudes towards political obligations and how these are viewed by the state. Leading political theorist George Klosko provides a full defense of a theory of political obligation based on the principle of fairness, which is widely viewed as the strongest theory of obligation currently available. This theory is then extended into a developed 'multiple principle' theory of obligation.

In this now-classic work, he clearly and systematically formulates what others thought impossible_a principle of fairness that specifies a set of conditions which grounds existing political obligations and bridges the gap between the abstract accounts of political principles and the actual beliefs of political actors. Brought up-to-date with a new introduction, this new edition will be of great interest to all interested in political thought.

In this ground-breaking study, George Klosko combines a theoretical discussion of liberalism with an empirical analysis of the conditions under which people give their support to liberal democratic regimes and regard policies as legitimate.

In this paper, I respond to what is currently the most significant criticism of the principle fair play as a basis for political obligations. In a series of cases in which obligations appear to be established by fair play, important scholars contend that the moral principle at work is not fair play but a natural duty of justice to provide essential benefits to other people. Such natural duty accounts strikingly ignore requirements of reciprocity, to make appropriate return for benefits received. (...) In addition, careful examination of possible natural duty explanations of such cases indicates severe difficulties explaining exactly to whom the natural duties in question are owed and why they may require significant costs. (shrink)

In this now-classic work, he clearly and systematically formulates what others thought impossible_a principle of fairness that specifies a set of conditions which grounds existing political obligations and bridges the gap between the abstract accounts of political principles and the actual beliefs of political actors. Brought up-to-date with a new introduction, this new edition will be of great interest to all interested in political thought.

In this now-classic work, he clearly and systematically formulates what others thought impossible_a principle of fairness that specifies a set of conditions which grounds existing political obligations and bridges the gap between the abstract accounts of political principles and the actual beliefs of political actors. Brought up-to-date with a new introduction, this new edition will be of great interest to all interested in political thought.

In this now-classic work, he clearly and systematically formulates what others thought impossible_a principle of fairness that specifies a set of conditions which grounds existing political obligations and bridges the gap between the abstract accounts of political principles and the actual beliefs of political actors. Brought up-to-date with a new introduction, this new edition will be of great interest to all interested in political thought.

Current scholars generally view political obligations as "content independent." Citizens have moral reasons to obey the law because it is the law, rather than because of the content of different laws. However, this position is subject to criticism on both theoretical and practical grounds. The main consideration in favor of content independence, the so-called "self-image of the state," does not actually support it. Properly understood, the state's self-image is to comply with laws because of the underlying moral reasons that justify (...) them, rather than because they are laws. Because content independence has played a central role in the widespread belief that a suitable theory of political obligation is not possible, rejecting it allows the possibility of a theory that establishes moral requirements for virtually all citizens to behave in accordance with virtually all laws, although these requirements are particular to different laws, and subjects are not required to obey them because they are laws. (shrink)

Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation on the basis of individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or a natural duty of justice. A stronger position can result from combining different principles in a single theory. This chapter develops a multi-principle theory of political obligation, on the basis of the principle of fairness, a natural duty of justice, and what I call the ‘common good’ principle. The three principles interact in (...) three main ways: ‘cumulation’, combining the separate state services that different principles cover; ‘mutual support’, combining the force of different principles in regard to the same state services; and simple overlap. The result is a theory that can satisfy the main criteria of a theory of political obligation. (shrink)

Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation based on individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or a natural duty of justice. Astronger position can result fromcombining different principles in a single theory. I develop a multiprinciple theory of political obligation, based on the principle of fairness, a natural duty of justice, and what I call the “common good” principle. The three principles interact in three main ways: “cumulation,” combining the separate (...) state services that different principles cover; “mutual support,” combining the force of different principles in regard to the same state services; and simple overlap. The resulting theory is able to satisfy the main conditions for an adequate theory of obligation: demonstrating that all or nearly all inhabitants of society have moral requirements to obey the law, and that these extend to the full range of state services. (shrink)

The most powerful objection to political obligations based on the principle of fairness concerns alternative supply of necessary public goods. According to this line of argument, if the subject prefers not to receive particular benefits from the state, then he need not incur obligations through their provision. However, as the discussion in Ch. 2 shows, for certain essential public goods, there is no alternative to state provision. Moreover, the fact that a subject prefers that goods be provided in a different (...) form or by a mechanism other than the state is not ordinarily sufficient to dissolve obligations that they would otherwise incur. (shrink)

In arguing for the need for the state, this chapter establishes factual parameters within which discussions of political obligations should be conducted. Certain theorists argue that political obligations are not necessary, that various non-state organizations could fulfil the functions commonly assigned to states. However, these theorists do not satisfactorily address questions concerning the provision of essential public goods. Through detailed analysis of numerous alternative mechanisms, libertarian, free-market solutions are found to be unable to provide all necessary public goods. Similarly, technical (...) solutions to N-person prisoner's dilemma are unsuccessful, because of the special conditions they require. Non-state mechanisms, such as the protective associations familiar from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, are found to be unable to provide essential public goods, while the same is true of proposals based on a distinction between authority and legitimacy. (shrink)

Continues the analysis of focus group responses discussed in Ch. 9. It is argued that the way different people respond to examples of the kind commonly employed in contemporary moral and political argument provides some test of the examples' persuasiveness. The subject of investigation in this chapter is responses to a series of vignettes concerning connections between different forms of cooperative activity and the generation of obligations. In particular, is a strong sense of cooperation necessary to generate obligations? Subjects were (...) given vignettes that concerned cooperative schemes that provide excludable benefits, essential public goods, and trivial public goods, respectively. Their responses indicate strong connections between the generation of obligations and the nature of specific benefits provided, especially their weight or importance. Receipt of important benefits was viewed as generating obligations, even without a strong sense of cooperation. Receipt of benefits from activity characterized by a strong sense of cooperation was viewed as not establishing obligations, if benefits produced were not of significant importance. (shrink)

Reviews the basic features of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness, discusses the criteria a successful theory of obligation should satisfy, and explores the claim that most people believe that they have political obligations.

Examines opinions of ordinary people in regard to political obligations through small focus groups. Under certain circumstances, the views of ordinary people can lend support to the particular theories to which they subscribe and increase burdens of justification for proponents of alternative theories. Responses of participants in ten focus groups indicate strong consensus on basic points. Participants strongly believe they have political obligations, although they make exceptions for particular laws, which seem to them to serve no real social purpose. They (...) ground their obligations on benefits provided by the state, and strongly connect up their own requirements to obey the law with requirements that all other people behave similarly. The moral principle that appears to coincide most closely with their views is a variant of the principle of fairness. (shrink)

In recent years, certain theorists, most notably John Rawls, have attempted to establish general political obligations based on so-called ‘natural duties of justice’. However, because natural duties are of limited force, they cannot ground political obligations, which may well require significant sacrifice. Natural duty theories confront a dilemma: either they will not be sufficiently strong to ground obligations, or if they are, they will not be ‘natural’ duties. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls's argument for a natural duty to support (...) the state is flawed by running together arguments from behind and outside the veil of ignorance. Properly developed, behind the veil of ignorance, such a natural duty to support the state would be seen to be actually a variant of the principle of fairness. Because natural duties cannot establish adequate theories on their own, they can play a role in theories of political obligation only by working in conjunction with other principles. (shrink)

This and the following chapters explore the ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations through analysis of judicial decisions. Examining the reasons that states themselves provide to justify political obligations provides an empirical test of normative theories. Although judicial decisions have no claim to moral truth, the fact that justices regularly argue from certain principles rather than others adds to the plausibility of a theory based on the former and increases the burden of justification for proponents of other (...) principles. Supreme Court justices usually defend their opinions on the basis of statutory or constitutional interpretation and seldom appeal directly to moral principles. However, on occasion they do invoke moral principles to support their opinions, especially in difficult cases. Justices of the US Supreme Court consistently ground obligations on protection that individuals receive from society. The most likely basis of these ‘reciprocal obligations’ is a principle of fairness, as expressed most notably in Arver v. U.S., the most important of the 'Selective Draft Law Cases'. (shrink)

Examines judicial decisions in Germany and Israel in order to provide a comparative test of the analysis of US Supreme Court decisions in Ch. 7. Although questions of political obligation have been much discussed by scholars, little attention has been paid to moral reasons advanced by actual states to justify the compliance of their subjects. Because in US cases, justices appeal to moral reasons most explicitly in difficult cases that concern imposing military service on conscientious objectors, the analysis focuses on (...) this area. In spite of their important constitutional and judicial differences, Germany and Israel support military obligations along similar lines. German decisions emphasize norms of equality or fairness. Israeli Justices have generally appealed to the importance of each individual's contribution to national defence. However, in a recent decision, norms of fairness are invoked. (shrink)

With theories of political obligation based on consent now generally discredited because most people have not actually consented, certain theorists attempt to rescue consent by proposing mechanisms through which individuals could consent to government. Various mechanisms are examined, including ‘consent-or-leave’ and Michael Walzer's proposal that citizens who refuse to consent be allowed a lesser status, analogous to that of ‘resident aliens at home’. All these mechanisms confront insuperable difficulties concerning essential public goods. Because resident aliens at home will continue to (...) receive public goods, the alternatives are that they be allowed to receive them cost-free or that they incur obligations, even though they explicitly refused to consent. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy presents fifty original essays, each specially written by a leading figure in the field, covering the entire subject of the history of political philosophy. They provide not only surveys of the state of research but substantial pieces that engage with, and move forward, current debates. Part I addresses questions of method, and examines the value of the history of political philosophy and the history of the discipline itself. Part II, on chronological (...) periods, works through the entire history of Western political philosophy. Aspects of the history of political philosophy that transcend specific periods are the subject of Part III. The histories of major non-Western traditions-Muslim, Confucian, and Hindu-are discussed in the final Part, with special reference to their relationships to Western political thought. (shrink)

This is the first in-depth study of popular attitudes towards political obligations and how these are viewed by the state. Leading political theorist George Klosko provides a full defense of a theory of political obligation based on the principle of fairness, which is widely viewed as the strongest theory of obligation currently available.

The author examines Karl Popper's contribution to the study of Plato in The Open Society and Its Enemies. Assessment of Popper's claims that Plato is a totalitarian, a historicist, and a racist confirms what has become the general opinion of the work, that it played a major role in changing perceptions of Plato's political theory, in spite of significant problems with many of Popper's claims and the evidence he uses to support them.

Though consequentialist theories of political obligation have been widely criticized in recent years, a series of arguments presented by Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons, are now believed to have given this position new life.

In response to recent criticisms of traditional theories of political obligation, scholars have advanced moral reasons for complying with the law that focus on natural duties to assist other people who are in need. In discussions of political obligation, these ‘rescue principles’ are presented as alternatives to traditional principles. I argue that theories of political obligation based on rescue principles are not able to fulfill the role theorists assign them. If the underlying assumptions of rescue theories are uncovered, they can (...) be seen also to support more traditional obligations to obey the law. Accordingly, rather than serving as alternatives to traditional principles, rescue principles can only supplement them. Key Words: political obligation • rescue • Copp. (shrink)

History of Political Theory: An Introduction is an engaging introduction to the main figures in the history of Western Political Theory and their most important works. The second volume traces the origin and development of liberal political theory, and so the foundations for contemporary views.