This article is based on a discussion held in Athens in April 2002, in the framework of a research visit, supported by the National Technical University of Athens, among the following participants: Alexander Pavlovits Ogurtsov (APO), Svetlena Sergeevna Neretina (SSN), and Michalis Assimakopoulos (MA) who translated and annotated the Russian text. The later wishes to thank his Russian teachers in philosophy, E.A. Mamchur and language, A.A. Nekrasova The translation was reviewed and emended by E.M. Swiderski, editor of SEET.Svetlana Neretina (...) is senior researcher in the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), doctor of philosophy, titled professor for medieval philosophy, author of: The Conceptualism of Peter Abelard (1994), Believing Reason (1995), Tropes and Concepts (1999), Time of Culture (2000, with A. Ogurtsov), articles and translations on Philosophy of culture, email, [email protected]. (shrink)

As we know, the category of practice is a focal point in Marxist philosophy. The revolutionary upheaval in philosophy carried out by Marxism involves the interpretation of the essence of practice and its role in the process of cognition. In the fifty years of the development of Soviet philosophy, much has been done to clarify the nature of this problem, to render it concrete and work it out. The development of Marxist philosophical thought in other countries has also yielded much.

Stalinism is above all a regime, a personal power, an autocracy that repudiates democratic principles of social and political life, unifies culture, and embraces a repressive ideology formed around a mythological cult of a single person—the Master, and one value—Order. Here politics is replaced by intrigue, science—by servicing utilitarian and pragmatic ends, and philosophy—by the ideology of the ruling clique at the helm of a command-bureaucratic system, which also oppressed by the despotic will of the autocrat.

I have several comments and I will try to present the essence of the problem. The papers that we read on the computer give an idea of a certain structure of the future dictionary of culturology, or of culture- I don't know which is intended. It seems to me, that, according their approach, the papers are strictly scientific and attempt to apply the methods and concepts of scientific knowledge to culturology. Indeed, there is a scientific approach to cultural phenomena, for (...) example, the morphology of culture. It proceeds from the ideas of general validity, objectivity, and conceptuality. All this is legitimate and was sufficiently justified. I have some comments on Orlova's text regarding the identification of formal and eidetic logic. It is not exactly so. Eidetic logic has no bearing on contemporary logic, which does not coincide with formal logic. (shrink)

Speech in the publication of A.P. Ogurtsov talks about the contemporary understanding of culture by M. Heidegger, which testifies to the spiritual fall of the world and the replacement of the concept of “spirit” with the concept of “culture” in a specific meaning — as a value, which Heidegger considers “the highest sacrilege”, because God appears among the values. This understanding of culture is associated with “the secularization of thought and the oblivion of being; value thinking is rooted in (...) the will to power”. It is significant that in our time it is not uncommon to understand culture as a value. (shrink)

The article discusses the concept of the humanitarian-anthropological turn formulated by the famous Russian philosopher Alexander Pavlovich Ogurtsov. He analyzes Dilthey's views, showing that he is not only the initiator of humanitarian discourse, but, in fact, is developing a new direction of philosophy alternative to the natural science approach. The author analyzes the situation that necessitated the development of this direction, as well as the concepts of "life", "history", "understanding", "expression" and "experience", which Dilthey puts at the basis of (...) his philosophical system. He shows that the essential feature of these concepts is a double modality. On the one hand, history (respectively, life, understanding, expression, experience) is “singular”, that is, it changes not according to some law, but due to random circumstances, on the other hand, life changes quite lawfully, under the influence of the mechanisms of culture, language, economics, relationships between people, technology. Dilthey's interest in a holistic analysis of life is explained. The author shows that within the framework of humanitarian and anthropological study, the integrity of life is determined by a number of factors: the problem that the researcher solves, the narratives and texts available to him, the methodology of humanitarian knowledge. In other humanitarian studies, these factors will change, and therefore the integrity of life will also change. It turns out that the integrity of life, over which Dilthey struggled, is not independent of the researcher, his personality and life, it is constituted in the very process of humanitarian knowledge, partly as a singular, partly natural phenomenon. (shrink)

It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as merely an effect of being blamed, or as a reliable indicator of moral responsibility, but not itself an explanation of moral responsibility. In this paper, (...) I argue that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for that transgression. I argue that this alternative view offers all that the predominant blame-focused view offers, while also solving some puzzling features of moral responsibility. Specifically, it offers a compelling way to reconcile conflicting intuitions about the suberogatory, and allows those who do not understand what Darwall calls ‘second-personal’ reasons to be morally responsible for their immoral acts. (shrink)

When should we make use of the criminal law? Suppose that a responsible legislature seeks to enact a morally justifiable range of criminal prohibitions. What criteria should it apply when deciding whether to proscribe conduct? Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs is a philosophical analysis of the nature, significance, and ethical limits of criminalisation. The authors explore the scope and moral boundaries of harm-based prohibitions, proscriptions of offensive behaviour, and 'paternalistic' prohibitions aimed at preventing self-harm. Their aim is to develop guiding principles (...) for these various grounds of state prohibition, including an analysis of the constraints and mediating factors that weigh for and against criminalisation. Both authors have written extensively in the field. In Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs they have reworked a number of well-known essays and added several important new essays to produce an integrated, accessible, philosophically-sophisticated account that will be of great interest to legal academics, philosophers, and advanced students alike"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Aristotle's definition of the soul should be interpreted as: 'the soul is the entelechy of a natural body that serves as its instrument'.

The book opens with a description of the smooth transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian behaviour from electrons as their energy is progressively increased, ...

The criminal law presently distinguishes between actions and omissions, and only rarely proscribes failures to avert consequences that it would be an offense to bring about. Why? In recent years it has been persuasively argued by both Glover and Bennett that, celeris paribus, omissions to prevent a harm are just as culpable as are actions which bring that harm about. On the other hand, and acknowledging that hitherto “lawyers have not been very successful in finding a rationale for it,” Tony (...) Honoré has sought to defend the law's differential treatment. He proposes a “distinct-duties theory” that in addition to the general duties we owe to everyone, we also owe distinct duties to a more limited collection of people and associations, specified by features of our relationship with them. Where a distinct duty holds, breach by omission may well be no better than breach by positive action. But absent a distinct duty, omissions, per Honoré, are less culpable. They are mere failures to intervene and improve or rectify things, whereas actions are positive interventions which make things worse. And, thus, the law has good reason to differentiate between them. (shrink)

In 1956, a few writings of Wittgenstein that he didn't publish in his lifetime were revealed to the public. These writings were gathered in the book Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956). There, we can see that Wittgenstein had some discontentment with the way philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians were thinking about paradoxes, and he even registered a few polemic reasons to not accept Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

A Companion to Analytic Philosophy is a comprehensive guide to many significant analytic philosophers and concepts of the last hundred years. Provides a comprehensive guide to many of the most significant analytic philosophers of the last one hundred years. Offers clear and extensive analysis of profound concepts such as truth, goodness, knowledge, and beauty. Written by some of the most distinguished philosophers alive, some of whom have entries in the book devoted to them.

A Companion to Analytic Philosophy is a comprehensive guide to many significant analytic philosophers and concepts of the last hundred years. Provides a comprehensive guide to many of the most significant analytic philosophers of the last one hundred years. Offers clear and extensive analysis of profound concepts such as truth, goodness, knowledge, and beauty. Written by some of the most distinguished philosophers alive, some of whom have entries in the book devoted to them.

It has often been charged that the doctrine of papal infallibility is either false or incoherent. These charges stem, I believe, from a misunderstanding of the logical character of infallible papal utterances, a misunderstanding shared alike by friends and foes of the doctrine. In this paper, I shall argue that the doctrine is both coherent and correct. I devote section I to uncovering some of the sources of this misunderstanding and thereby defending what might be called my negative thesis, namely, (...) that infallible papal utterances are not statements. In section II, I continue defending my negative thesis, not now as an end in itself, but rather as a means of advancing my positive thesis that infallible papal utterances are declarations and have the same logic as other declarations. The latter thesis requires a discussion of the difference between statements and declarations. Section III contains a formal speech act analysis of successful and non-defective statements and declarations with some additional explanatory notes. In section IV, I speak rather generally about the task of philosophical theology in the light of the results and procedures of sections I–III. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes is recognized as one of the fathers of modern philosophy and political theory. In his own time he was as famous for his work in physics, geometry, and religion. He associated with some of the greatest writers, scientists, and politicians of his age. Martinich has written a complete and accessible biography of Hobbes. The book takes full account of the historical and cultural context in which Hobbes lived, drawing on both published and unpublished sources. It will be a (...) great resource for philosophers, political theorists and historians of ideas. The clear, crisp prose style will also ensure that the book appeals to general readers with an interest in the history of philosophy, the rise of modern science and the English Civil War. (shrink)

In animal husbandry in The Netherlands, as in a wide variety of other societal areas, we see an increased awareness of the fact that progress cannot be attained anymore by simply repeating the way we modernized this sector in the decades before, due to the multiplicity of the problems to be dealt with. The theory of reflexive modernization articulates this macro-social phenomenon, and at the same time serves as a prescriptive master-narrative. In this paper, I analyse the relationship between Feenberg's (...) instrumentalization theory and reflexive design; that is, the approach of doing reflexive modernization. Feenberg's analytical distinction between primary and secondary instrumentalization is useful in highlighting the way social and political values are inscribed into technological arrangements, but is not meant as a method. Reflexive design, on the other hand, is meant to be a reflective and deliberative method that aims to articulate, assess and reintegrate hitherto unquestioned values and presuppositions into new designs of production systems. Reflexive design thus may be seen as a conscious strategy of making explicit the separate stages of instrumentalization in advance, instead of criticizing the implicit embedding of dominant values in technological artefacts once they have been realized. The approach is illustrated with a case from animal husbandry. (shrink)