Intentionality is one of the most frequently discussed topics in contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This book investigates intentionality from the point of view of intentional objects. According to the classical approach to this concept, whatever can be consciously experienced is regarded as an intentional object. Thus, not only ordinary existing individuals but also various kinds of non-existents and non-individuals are considered as intentional. Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, is particularly well-known as the `inventor' of an abundant ontology of objects (...) among which even incomplete and impossible ones, like `the round square', find their place. Drawing inspirations from Meinong's ideas, the author develops a simple logic of intentional objects, M-logic. M-logic closely resembles classical first-order logic and, as opposed to the formally complicated contemporary theories of non-existent objects, it is much more friendly in apprehending and applications. However, despite this resemblance, the ontological content of M-logic far exceeds that of classical logic. In this book formal investigations are intertwined with philosophical analyses. On the one hand, M-logic is used as a tool for investigating formal features of intentional objects. On the other hand, the study of intentionality phenomena suggests further ways of extending and modifying M-logic. Audience: The book is addressed to logicians, cognitive scientists, philosophers of language and metaphysics with either a phenomenological or an analytic background. (shrink)

Putting individual constants and quantifiers into the same syntactic category within first-order language promises to have far-reaching consequences: a syntax of this kind can reveal the potential of any such language, allowing us to realize that a vast class of noun phrases, including non-denoting terms, can be accommodated in the new syntax as expressions suited to being subjects of sentences. In the light of this, a formal system that is an extension of classical first-order logic is developed here, and is (...) equipped with an appropriate semantics. An ontological interpretation of the new logic is then also provided, with several categories of object and notions of existence being distinguished. Last but not least, a modal version of the logic, with some interesting formal features, is proposed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Leśniewskian Ontology (LO) is a system in which the basic subject-predicate formula takes the form of a b and express one-argument predication, e.g. John is a student. In LO’s language, there is no many-argument form of predication given that would allow for the structural expression of, for example, the sentence John is Anne’s son. In this article, a simple and natural extension of LO is suggested to encompass many-argument predication. The system thus obtained corresponds to polyadic second-order logic.

Contemporary formalisations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid. However, in the same formalisations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties (relations). Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes (...) of size (not of self-referentiality): too many objects or too many properfies are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuifive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics (like a stratificafion of formulas). We need however to look for phenomenologically well grounded protecfions against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects. (shrink)

Contemporary formalisations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid. However, in the same formalisations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties (relations). Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes (...) of size (not of self-referentiality): too many objects or too many properfies are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuifive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics (like a stratificafion of formulas). We need however to look for phenomenologically well grounded protecfions against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects. (shrink)

A. Meinong’s views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong’s views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong’s ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology 1 . However there (...) still remains a need to discuss the problem of ways of reference to Meinongian objects regarding their specific structure of predication, and the interrelated problem of ontological commitment of those theories. Meinong’s ontological theory seems to be not so bizzare if we interpret it as a theory of possible intentional objects, i.e. possible objects of consciousness. And this interpretation perfectly agrees with phenomenological tradition from Brentano to Husserl and with the contemporary philosophy of mind. Needless to say reference is a special form of intentional relation so semantical investigations into these objects are of great relevance for general theory of intentionality. (shrink)

Contemporary formalisations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid. However, in the same formalisations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties . Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes (...) of size : too many objects or too many properfies are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuifive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics . We need however to look for phenomenologically well grounded protecfions against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects. (shrink)

The paper discusses main issues concerning truthmakers: (1) what is the ontological status of truthmakers (are they ordinary objects, situations, tropes etc?), (2) what are deduvtive properties of truthmakers. A simple logic of truthmakers is developed. The logic consists of an axiomatic system and a possible world semantics.

Ramsey questions the distinction between subject and predicate in sentences. Since the distinction mirrors the ontological distinction object/property (particular/universal) he questions the latter distinction as well. There is a symmetry between the category of objects and the category of properties: an object can possess a number of properties and a property can be exemplified by a number of objects. Consequently, it may be claimed that the two categories are formally indiscernible. The paper develops Ramsey's thesis on the ground of logic. (...) Different senses of indiscernibility are discussed and various systems of logic are examined with respect to these senses. Most systems do not distinguish objects from properties in at least one sense. (shrink)

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

Who, whom, why and how? -- The subject between extremes -- Genesis: the Socratic-Platonic deception or the irrepressible need for immortality -- Modern man: the adventures of Robinson Crusoe -- The scientific foundations of modern man -- The evolution of modern man, Nietzsche's moustache, the fittest man and the man without qualities: the four pillars of modern man -- Evolution and zoodicy: the animality of modern man -- Modernity as false consciousness -- Technology and the mind, God-machine, the individual vs. (...) Facebook -- That which returns -- The death of death and late-modern man. (shrink)

Jacek Urbaniec: Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics does not necessarily imply that there are links between the temporal physical world and the eternal world of mathematics..

Specialists on issues of sexual abuse in religious institutions unanimously stress that this kind of experience significantly affects the victims’ spirituality. Particularly devastating and distorting for their spirituality is sexual abuse committed by clergy. In order to explore this issue for the first time in Poland, the authors conducted a qualitative study in the form of semi-structured interviews with five women who had experienced sexual abuse by Catholic clergy and/or religious in adolescence and young adulthood. The interviews were analyzed using (...) the interpretative phenomenological analysis and narrative methodology. The results showed that four respondents experienced or had experienced religious struggles in three areas: interpersonal, intrapsychic, and relationship with God. These struggles are complex and intense enough to be referred to as “spiritual trauma”, “religious trauma”, or “spiritual violence”. The results of the study may be of importance for people helping or having any other kind of contact with victims of clergy sexual abuse. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to examine differences in the quality of life as well as gratitude, meaning in life and positive orientation to life between diocesan and religious seminarians and secular students. The influence of religiosity on quality of life and subjective well-being is the subject of numerous studies, but seminarians have rarely been included in them. The present research was carried out for the first time with a group of diocesan and religious seminarians in Poland and secular (...) students. The study involved 296 participants—98 diocesan seminarians, 96 religious seminarians and 102 secular students in the control group. Results showed significant differences in the quality of life. Religious and diocesan seminarians scored higher than the control group members in the psychophysical, personal, psychosocial and metaphysical spheres. In addition, in terms of gratitude, and the presence of meaning in life, religious and diocesan seminarians achieved higher scores than the control group but lower scores in searching for the meaning in life. There were no significant differences between diocesan and religious seminarians except that only diocesan seminarians obtained significantly higher scores on positive orientation to life than the control group. Overall, results support the idea that seminarians have higher quality of life and subjective well-being than secular students. Research implications are discussed. (shrink)

The paper briefly presents a genesis of the research project called the theology of science initiated by Michał Heller in early 1980s, but also enriched by the remarks of Józef Życiński. Then the main features of the new Heller’s book Science and theology – not necessarily exclusively on one planet are discussed. The book develops and strengthens the early ideas of theology of science. The paper draws also attention to another author—C.B. Kaiser who—since a dozen years—has been developing a similar (...) project: theology of scientific endeavor. It is also suggested that the Heller’s project, especially in its axiological and praxeological aspects, could take advantage of the achievements of several Francophone authors who once developed a field of the so-called theology of earthly realities. (shrink)

In the present article I explain the role of the figure of “the last god” in Heidegger’s thought after the so-called Heideggerian “turn.” Drawing on Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), it is argued that the figure of “the last god” demonstrates Heidegger’s path to “being itself,” which I distinguish from the path to being presented by him in his earlier thought, mainly laid out in Being and Time. The figure of the last god is not to be understood as (...) a god in a religious framework, but rather as an explication of metaphysical radical thinking, rendered as Heidegger’s view of “divinity of the other beginning.” The notion of the last god is presented against the background of several of Heidegger’s ideas (as specifications) discussed in Contributions namely: disclosure of being itself, the renewal of metaphysics, the understanding of nothing/nothingness in relation to being, the problem of the “sign” (Wink) or the ontic and ontological differences. In a metaphorical form, Heidegger leads us – by means of the specifications given – towards the experience of the “last god,” whose “passage” is for Dasein the experience of being itself, is the event of being. In the text presented here, I will “lead” the reader along such “path.” At the same time, I will engage Heidegger’s language without neglecting its semantic “depth,” showing how Heidegger extracts hidden meanings from words. (shrink)

This book is dedicated to the life and work of logician Janusz Czelakowski on the topic of logical consequence. It consists of three parts – a biography, a survey and research sections. The volume begins with an autobiographic chapter by Janusz Czelakowski followed by a historical chapter written by Jacek Malinowski. The survey section forms the backbone of the volume with each chapter covering one of Janusz Czelakowski’s results. They focus on his results in the area of logical consequence, (...) demonstrate how his results influenced following research, and presents potential future results, problems and applications. This volume is of interest to logicians and mathematicians. (shrink)

The article attempts to show that the Italian philosophy of “dialogue” (Guido Calogero, Aldo Testa) from the 1950s and the 1960s is not a “philosophy of dialogue”, understood as “New Thinking”, as a radical abandonment of the Cartesian egological perspective. The reception of that “New Thinking” of the 1920s (mainly: Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig) in Italy is significantly belated and essentially consists of simplifications and overlooks that we are dealing with a radically new thinking paradigm. Italian philosophers, as they (...) themselves define it, went “their own way”. It means, however, that they have not at all opened themselves to the authentic philosophy of dialogue. (shrink)

The paper is an introduction to the anthropology of infrastructures. We define how infrastructure is understood on the grounds of anthropology and science and technology studies. We show what is the significance of various infrastructures for the functioning of modern and late societies. The text discusses extensively the methodological challenges of studying infrastructures. We not only explain why analyzing infrastructures is difficult but also discuss several methodological tricks we can resort to when trying to uncover infrastructures. We elaborate the methodological (...) guidelines on the margins of two research projects. The first dealt with social aspects of epidemics, and the second with urban clusters of innovative companies. (shrink)