When St. Thomas wrote the Summa Contra Gentiles in the first half of the 1260s, he was contributing to a long-standing Christian effort to receive Aristotle’s writings without accepting his errors. If Aristotle was to be in the Christian world what everybody was proclaiming, namely, the Philosopher, he could not remain an ancient pagan thinker nor could his philosophy remain subject to the errors and, even more, the limitations that historically it contained. Clearly enough, an Aristotle who was merely freed (...) from his errors would not do. For if, though purified, he retained the perspective of his own ancient world, he could not speak for philosophy in a Christian climate and his philosophy could not serve as a human instrument in the exposition of Christian teaching. What Aristotle needed—so St. Thomas thought—was, beyond correction, a reconstruction and even a reestablishment of his doctrine on a different foundation from his own. (shrink)

When St. Thomas wrote the Summa Contra Gentiles in the first half of the 1260s, he was contributing to a long-standing Christian effort to receive Aristotle’s writings without accepting his errors. If Aristotle was to be in the Christian world what everybody was proclaiming, namely, the Philosopher, he could not remain an ancient pagan thinker nor could his philosophy remain subject to the errors and, even more, the limitations that historically it contained. Clearly enough, an Aristotle who was merely freed (...) from his errors would not do. For if, though purified, he retained the perspective of his own ancient world, he could not speak for philosophy in a Christian climate and his philosophy could not serve as a human instrument in the exposition of Christian teaching. What Aristotle needed—so St. Thomas thought—was, beyond correction, a reconstruction and even a reestablishment of his doctrine on a different foundation from his own. (shrink)

I. The following essay aims to compare the proofs for the existence of God in four medieval theologians, namely, St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, Being theologians, all four men believed in a divine revelation and their personal intellectual activity took place within the world of revelation. Fides quaerens intellectum, which was St. Anselm’s title for the Proslogion before he gave it a name, is a formula that can be applied to all these (...) thinkers in their individual religious adventures. Their lives were spent in seeking after the God who had met them on earth and in responding to that meeting. St. Anselm belongs to the end of the eleventh century, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas were active during the third quarter of the thirteenth century, and Henry of Ghent’s literary activity falls mainly in the embattled twenty years after Aristotelianism in all its forms was condemned in 1277 in Paris. This was the time when Christian theologians were beginning to build a new religious synthesis that reflected the conservative mood one can still read in the text of Giles of Rome’s De Erroribus Philosophorum. (shrink)

A traditional approach to teaching medical ethics aims to provide knowledge about ethics. This is in line with an epistemological view on ethics in which moral expertise is assumed to be located in theoretical knowledge and not in the moral experience of healthcare professionals. The aim of this paper is to present an alternative, contextual approach to teaching ethics, which is grounded in a pragmatic-hermeneutical and dialogical ethics. This approach is called moral case deliberation. Within moral case deliberation, healthcare professionals (...) bring in their actual moral questions during a structured dialogue. The ethicist facilitates the learning process by using various conversation methods in order to find answers to the case and to develop moral competencies. The case deliberations are not unique events, but are a structural part of the professional training on the work floor within healthcare institutions. This article presents the underlying theory on ethics and illustrates this approach with an example of a moral case deliberation project in a Dutch psychiatric hospital. The project was evaluated using the method of responsive evaluation. This method provided us with rich information about the implementation process and effects the research process itself also lent support to the process of implementation. (shrink)

In the light of increasing public mistrust, there is an urgent need to clarify the moral status of the medical profession and of the relationship of the clinician to his/her patients. In addressing this question, I first establish the coherence, within moral philosophy generally, of the concept of supererogation . I adopt the notion of an act of “unqualified” supererogation as one that is non-derivatively good, praiseworthy, and freely undertaken for others' benefit at the risk of some cost to the (...) agent. I then argue that committing oneself to the profession of clinical medicine is an act of this kind. This is the case, not because the aim of medicine is to help patients, but because of the open ended commitment of time and the vulnerability to the consequences of failure that the clinician must accept. (shrink)

Logical monism is the claim that there is a single correct logic, the 'one true logic' of our title. The view has evident appeal, as it reflects assumptions made in ordinary reasoning as well as in mathematics, the sciences, and the law. In all these spheres, we tend to believe that there aredeterminate facts about the validity of arguments. Despite its evident appeal, however, logical monism must meet two challenges. The first is the challenge from logical pluralism, according to which (...) there is more than one correct logic. The second challenge is to determine which form of logicalmonism is the correct one. One True Logic is the first monograph to explicitly articulate a version of logical monism and defend it against the first challenge. It provides a critical overview of the monism vs pluralism debate and argues for the former. It also responds to the second challenge by defending a particularmonism, based on a highly infinitary logic. It breaks new ground on a number of fronts and unifies disparate discussions in the philosophical and logical literature. In particular, it generalises the Tarski-Sher criterion of logicality, provides a novel defence of this generalisation, offers a clearnew argument for the logicality of infinitary logic and replies to recent pluralist arguments. (shrink)

In her groundbreaking book, Epistemic Injustice, renowned moral philosopher and social epistemologist Miranda Fricker coined the term epistemic injustice to draw attention to the pervasive impact of epistemic oppression on marginalized social groups. Fricker’s account spurred a flurry of scholarship regarding the discriminatory impact of epistemic injustice and gave birth to a domain of philosophical inquiry that has extended far beyond the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. In this interview, Fricker responds to questions posed by A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston C. (...) Thompson that address the ways in which epistemic injustice intersects with education as a human endeavour and social institution. In doing so, Fricker reflects on her motivations in writing her book more than fifteen years ago and explicitly addresses some of the most significant contributions of the concept of epistemic injustice as a tool for analysing issues in education. She also offers insights on the purpose of education, outlines educational manifestations of epistemic injustice, and discusses the virtues that educators must exhibit and inculcate in their students in order for epistemic justice to obtain. (shrink)

This paper notes how Jim influenced my own use of Foucault and also focuses on two of James Marshall's New Zealand oriented texts. In the first, Discipline and Punishment in New Zealand Education he provides a Foucauldian genealogy of New Zealand approaches to both punishment and discipline, in particular corporal punishment. The second, his 1996 book co‐written with Michael Peters, Individualism and Community: Education and Social Policy in the Postmodern Condition, analyses political philosophy and social and educational policy as New (...) Zealand changed from being a welfare state since the 1930s to a neoliberal one since the mid 1980s. Foucauldian understandings about power, bio‐power, governmentality, autonomy and subjectivity are brought to bear in their analysis. (shrink)

In this paper I shall use terms such as “intrinsically good” which may be deemed old fashioned by many readers and which certainly to my own mind presuppose an objective non-naturalistic theory of ethics. I still hold such a theory and I have not mastered the new jargon by which a sort of higher synthesis between that and other theories is supposed to have been effected, but I do not think that such a view as mine of ethics in general (...) is necessarily presupposed if one is to understand or even agree with the contentions of my article. These relate to a specific problem as to certain ethical actions, which will arise on any view that admits the possibility of giving any sort of legitimate reasons for ethical judgments, as we all do in practice. After all a naturalist can easily translate “intrinsically good” into his own terms, say, valued for its own sake by most people who experience it, and there will still be a question as to what is intrinsically and what is merely instrumentally good and other questions as to what is the logical nature of certain arguments in ethics. (shrink)