This research examines the speeded detection and, separately, classification of photographic images of animals. In the initial experiments each display contained various images of animals and, in the detection task, participants responded whether a display contained only images of birds or also included an oddball target image of a cat or dog. In the classification search task, a target was always present and participants classified this as an image of a cat or a dog. Half of the target images depicted (...) the animal in a non-threatening state and the remaining half images depicted the animal in a threatening state. A complex pattern of effects emerged showing some evidence of more efficient detection of a threatening than non-threatening target. No corresponding pattern emerged in the data for the classification task. Next the tasks were repeated when the stimuli were more carefully matched in terms of general pose and salience of facial features. Now the effects in the detection task were reduced but more consistent than before. Threatening targets were more readily detected than non-threatening targets. In addition, non-threatening targets were more readily classified than threatening targets. The nature of these effects appears to reflect decisional/response mechanisms and not search processes. The performance benefit for the non-threatening images was replicated in a final classification task in which, on each trial, only a single peripheral image was presented. The results demonstrate that a number of different affective and perceptual factors can influence performance in speeded search tasks and these may well be confounded with the variation in threat content of the experimental stimuli. The evidence for the automatic detection of visual threat remains illusive. (shrink)

Current understanding of the development of quantity representations is based primarily on performance in the number‐line task. We posit that the data from number‐line tasks reflect the observer's underlying representation of quantity, together with the cognitive strategies and skills required to equate line length and quantity. Here, we specify a unified theory linking the underlying psychological representation of quantity and the associated strategies in four variations of the number‐line task: the production and estimation variations of the bounded and unbounded number‐line (...) tasks. Comparison of performance in the bounded and unbounded number‐line tasks provides a unique and direct way to assess the role of strategy in number‐line completion. Each task produces a distinct pattern of data, yet each pattern is hypothesized to arise, at least in part, from the same underlying psychological representation of quantity. Our model predicts that the estimated biases from each task should be equivalent if the different completion strategies are modeled appropriately and no other influences are at play. We test this equivalence hypothesis in two experiments. The data reveal all variations of the number‐line task produce equivalent biases except for one: the estimation variation of the bounded number‐line task. We discuss the important implications of these findings. (shrink)

Through the summer and fall of 1989, Hegel scholars in America were treated to the unusual spectacle of a debate in the mass media over the meaning and truth of Hegel’s philosophy of history, a debate running through the pages of major daily newspapers, the weekly news magazines, and the journals of opinion. The occasion for this unaccustomed attention devoted to Hegel was the appearance of an article by Francis Fukuyama in the Summer 1989 issue of The National Interest entitled (...) “The End of History?”. (shrink)

Difficulties in getting participants in agricultural research policy disputes to work fairly with four different and sometimes conflicting normative viewpoints might be lessened by attending to the deeper cultural differences that lie behind differences of normative view. Mediation of policy disputes might work better if cultural differences were better understood and described impartially. By treating deep differences as ideological, in a non-pejorative sense, descriptions can forestall impulses to combat, improve communication, and open fresh prospects for compromise without attempting to change (...) people's basic thinking. (shrink)

This translation from Russian of The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity marks the first appearance in English of any of the works of Russian philosopher Ivan Aleksandrovich Il’in. Originally published in 1918, on the eve of the Russian civil war, this two- volume commentary on Hegel marked both an apogee of Russian Silver Age philosophy and a significant manifestation of the resurgence of interest in Hegel that began in the early twentieth century. (...) Il’in’s colleague A. F. Losev accurately observed in the same year it appeared: “Neither the study of Hegel nor the study of contemporary Russian philosophical thought is any longer thinkable without this book of I. A. Il’in’s.” Some Hegel scholars may know this work through the abridged translation into German that Il’in produced himself in 1946. However, that edition omitted most of the original volume two. Noted Hegel scholar Philip T. Grier’s edition—with an introduction setting Il’in’s work in its proper historical, cultural, and philosophical contexts and annotation throughout—represents the first opportunity for non-Russian-speaking readers to acquaint themselves with the full scope of Il’in’s still provocative interpretation of Hegel. (shrink)

The publication of volume 2 of Philip T. Grier’s translation of _The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity _completes the first appearance in English of any of the works of Russian philosopher I. A.Il’in. Most of the contents of volume 2 will be unknown even to those who have read the 1946 German version prepared by Il’in, because in that version he omitted eight of the original ten chapters. These omitted chapters provide (...) an extended reflection on the central categories of Hegel’s moral, legal, and political philosophies, as well as of the philosophy of history. The topics examined are, in order: freedom, humanity, will, right, morality, ethical life, personhood and its virtue, and the state. Contained within these chapters are some notably insightful expositions of core doctrines in Hegel’s philosophy. Il’in’s colleague A. F. Losev accurately observed in the same year the text first appeared: “Neither the study of Hegel nor the study of contemporary Russian philosophical thought is any longer thinkable without this book of I. A. Il’in’s.”. (shrink)

This past February 22–24, the University of Virginia held a specially arranged conference on the subject of “Fukuyama and the End of History.” Invitations were extended to philosophers, historians, political scientists, sociologists, economists, and literary critics, with the host university contributing a number a speakers. Each person attending the conference received a copy of Francis Fukuyama’s well known article, “The End of History?” from The National Interest, 16 : 3–18, and Fukuyama himself was expected to attend. At the last minute (...) the organizers learned of the existence of Philip Grier’s “The End of History, and the Return of History,” which would within the next few weeks appear in The Owl, 21, 2 : 131–144. Upon receiving it, and the permission of the Editor of The Owl, the organizers decided to provide an advance copy of this article to everyone attending, along with the Fukuyama piece, so that the controversy over the latter’s possible mis-appropriation of Hegel would be a theme for discussion from the outset. (shrink)

This past February 22–24, the University of Virginia held a specially arranged conference on the subject of “Fukuyama and the End of History.” Invitations were extended to philosophers, historians, political scientists, sociologists, economists, and literary critics, with the host university contributing a number a speakers. Each person attending the conference received a copy of Francis Fukuyama’s well known article, “The End of History?” from The National Interest, 16 : 3–18, and Fukuyama himself was expected to attend. At the last minute (...) the organizers learned of the existence of Philip Grier’s “The End of History, and the Return of History,” which would within the next few weeks appear in The Owl, 21, 2 : 131–144. Upon receiving it, and the permission of the Editor of The Owl, the organizers decided to provide an advance copy of this article to everyone attending, along with the Fukuyama piece, so that the controversy over the latter’s possible mis-appropriation of Hegel would be a theme for discussion from the outset. (shrink)

As a young Victoria Scholar from South Africa studying at Oxford from 1931–33, Errol Harris encountered most of the prominent representatives of “Oxford Idealism” there. He discovered that, predominantly under the influence of Bradley, they were uniformly convinced that Hegel’s Naturphilosophie was a superfluous “addition” to his system, accomplishing nothing not already provided by the Science of Logic, and that, moreover, to treat Nature as a reality would introduce a fundamental contradiction into Hegel’s thought. In this general attitude they were (...) strongly supported by the Italian “neo-Idealists” with whom they were closely engaged. In work accomplished during those two years, Harris laid the foundations for a thorough reversal of this attitude, arguing that in the absence of a philosophy of nature Hegel’s system could be neither coherent nor complete. On this basis Harris would eventually succeed in constructing the outlines of a complete cosmology grounded in twentieth-century physical theory. (shrink)

This volume contains ten original essays by leading philosophers in America, Britain and Europe, all addressed to the dialectical holist philosophical position developed by the contemporary philosopher Errol Harris; it also contains an extensive introduction outlining and defending the general contours of that position. It serves not only as a Festschrift for Professor Harris, but also as a comprehensive, critical exposition of the neo-Hegelian system of philosophical thought for which Harris is widely known, a position which is attracting the particular (...) interest of contemporary physical cosmologists and philosophers of science, as well as that of other metaphysicians and students of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Contributors draw on Hegel’s account of identity and difference to challenge conventional theories of identity.

_Contributors draw on Hegel’s account of identity and difference to challenge conventional theories of identity._.

This chapter discusses two of Ilyin’s major philosophical works : The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity and The Essence of Legal Consciousness. Both are placed against the background of defining events in the often-difficult circumstances of Ilyin’s life. Ilyin provided a substantial exposition, interpretation, and critique of the whole of Hegel’s philosophy. While many elements of that exposition and interpretation deserve commendation, his critique fails in fundamental respects. Ilyin was formally educated in (...) the Faculty of Law of Moscow University, with special concentration on the history of philosophy and philosophy of law. The writing of his major work on legal philosophy stretched over much of his adult life, and was published only after his death. It focused on the concept of pravosoznanie, loosely translatable as “legal consciousness.” The work is a passionate defense of the necessity for the rule of law in any genuine state, and a detailed account of the likely consequences in practice of any corruption of that ideal—with historical examples drawn mainly from his own lifetime. (shrink)

The governing theme in Hegel’s account of the history of religions is the gradual emergence and separation of spirit from nature, culminating in the “infinite” transcendence of spirit over nature. Within the story of spirit itself, however, a more subtle and complex problem arises: the possible transcendence of infinite over finite spirit, of divine over human nature. Hegel firmly insisted that divine and human nature are one, a unity, thereby apparently ruling out the possibility of a transcendence of one over (...) the other. And yet, it is not easy to dismiss the notion that infinite spirit must nevertheless in some respects transcend finite spirit. The remainder of the essay attempts to tease apart several aspects of this problem, exploring possible senses of ‘transcendence’ that might be maintained, without violating Hegel’s central and profound theological claim. (shrink)

Robert R. Williams’s last book, Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God (Oxford University Press, 2017) undertakes to reconnect with and revive the largely forgotten “centrist” interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy from the early 1840s, associated especially with the work of Karl Michelet. An immediate consequence of this move is to direct renewed attention to the connection between Hegel’s Logic and his philosophy of religion. Taking this connection seriously appears to entail a re-interpretation of the absolute idea, adding an (...) explicit level of theological significance to it in retrospect which would not appear to be required when the Logic is read on its own. And yet the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion unambiguously seem to require such a re-reading of the Logic. Such a development may appear to raise questions about the possibility of a “presuppositionless” reading of the Logic, along with questions about how the truth claims of the Realphilosophie can be justified. A possible resolution of such questions could be found if one takes seriously George di Giovanni’s suggestion that the Logic must be regarded both as the first element of Hegel’s system, and also the final one. The appropriateness of such a second reading appears to be strongly supported by Errol Harris’s interpretation of the Logic. The additional layers of meaning, the theological interpretation, can be read into the Logic as the final element of the system, without affecting a “presuppositionless” reading of it as the first element. (shrink)

Robert R. Williams’s last book, Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God undertakes to reconnect with and revive the largely forgotten “centrist” interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy from the early 1840s, associated especially with the work of Karl Michelet. An immediate consequence of this move is to direct renewed attention to the connection between Hegel’s Logic and his philosophy of religion. Taking this connection seriously appears to entail a re-interpretation of the absolute idea, adding an explicit level of theological (...) significance to it in retrospect which would not appear to be required when the Logic is read on its own. And yet the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion unambiguously seem to require such a re-reading of the Logic. Such a development may appear to raise questions about the possibility of a “presuppositionless” reading of the Logic, along with questions about how the truth claims of the Realphilosophie can be justified. A possible resolution of such questions could be found if one takes seriously George di Giovanni’s suggestion that the Logic must be regarded both as the first element of Hegel’s system, and also the final one. The appropriateness of such a second reading appears to be strongly supported by Errol Harris’s interpretation of the Logic. The additional layers of meaning, the theological interpretation, can be read into the Logic as the final element of the system, without affecting a “presuppositionless” reading of it as the first element. (shrink)

The three papers published in this number of the Owl of Minerva provide a series of reflections upon the theme of Bildung in Hegel's philosophy. The first, by Jeffrey Reid, explores two contrasting conceptions of Bildung involved in the founding and earliest years of the University of Berlin. The first conception, espoused and developed by Fichte, Humboldt, and Schleiermacher treats Bildung as a spontaneous, natural instinct toward self-development, visible above all in the form of genius, attributed to individuals or to (...) nations. Reid connects this notion of Bildung in significant measure with the Sturm und Drang movement. Hegel opposed to it a very different conception of Bildung resting ultimately upon his distinction between nature and spirit. In Hegel's usage, Bildung refers to the process of development whereby the merely natural individual is transcended, raised to the level of spirit as a member of a moral community, or citizen of an ethical state. As Reid points out, these two conceptions of Bildung have conflicting implications for the role of the university, especially in relation to the state, and the choice between them remains a significant one today. (shrink)

The life and thought of Vladimir Solov’ëv have long fascinated students of Russian culture. Poet, philosopher, mystic, theologian, scholar, humorist, theosopher, ecclesiologist—a tale of Solov’ëv’s very considerable influence could be told by focusing on any single one of these terms. Attempting to encompass all of them at once in a grand summation of the significance of his life is a thoroughly daunting task. Perhaps it will never be accomplished to general satisfaction in a single work, which might partly explain the (...) steadily expanding stream of articles and monographs in several languages devoted to the study of this remarkable figure. Nemeth, perhaps wisely, declines any attempt to... (shrink)

All organisms live in close association with microbes. However, not all such associations are meaningful in an evolutionary context. Current debate concerns whether hosts and microbes are best described as communities of individuals or as holobionts (selective units of hosts plus their microbes). Recent reports that assortative mating of hosts by diet can be mediated by commensal gut microbes have attracted interest as a potential route to host reproductive isolation (RI). Here, the authors discuss logical problems with this line of (...) argument. The authors briefly review how microbes can affect host mating preferences and evaluate recent findings from fruitflies. Endosymbionts can potentially influence host RI given stable and recurrent co‐association of hosts and microbes over evolutionary time. However, observations of co‐occurrence of microbes and hosts are ripe for misinterpretation and such associations will rarely represent a meaningful holobiont. A framework in which hosts and their microbes are independent evolutionary units provides the only satisfactory explanation for the observed range of effects and associations. (shrink)

Structural equation modelling (SEM) is outlined and compared with two non-linear alternatives, artificial neural networks and ''fast and frugal'' models. One particular non-linear decision-making situation is discussed, that exemplified by a lexicographic semi-order. We illustrate the use of SEM on a dataset derived from 539 volunteers' responses to questions about food-related risks. Our conclusion is that SEM is a useful member of the armoury of techniques available to the student of human judgement: it subsumes several multivariate statistical techniques and permits (...) their flexible combination, and it provides robust goodness-of-fit statistics and is available in (generally) easy-to-use computer packages. Although the number of tasks for which SEM provides a persuasive psychological model is small, it is very useful in identifying the important variables and their inter-relations that contribute to task performance, and thus can constitute a valuable intermediate staging point between raw data and a fully fledged psychological theory. (shrink)

In 1955, Egon Brunswik presented a paper in which he argued that neglect of the environment and over emphasis of the organism was the major downfall of cognitive psychology. His critiques have largely been ignored and research is discussed that demonstrates the same organismic- asymmetry Brunswik detailed in 1955. This research is discussed in attribution terms since experimental psychologists make behavioral attributions. This organismic-asymmetry has resulted in a body of research that is guilty of the fundamental attribution error. Brunswik's theory (...) of representative design, proposed to address organismic-asymmetry, is discussed and contrasted with calls for ecological validity. Although calls for ecological validity are well intentioned, they lack any systematic theory of the environment and fall significantly short of Brunswik's ideal. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Three experiments examine the effect of base rate consistency under direct experience. Base rate consistency was manipulated by blocking trials and setting base rate choice reinforcement to be either consistent or inconsistent across trial blocks. Experiment 1 shows that, contrary to the usual finding, participants use base rate information more than individuating information when it is consistent, but less when it is inconsistent. In Experiment 2, this effect was replicated, and transferred in verbal questions posed subsequently. Despite experience with consistent (...) base rates increasing sensitivity to base rates in word problems, verbal responses were far from normative. In Experiment 3, participants’ use of base rates was once again moderated by its consistency, but this effect was itself moderated by the diagnosticity of base rate information. Participants were highly accurate in estimating experienced base rates. These studies demonstrate that base rate usage is complex and a function of how base rates are presented (experienced versus summary statistics) and response format (choice proportions versus probability estimates). Knowledge of base rates was insufficient for proper usage in verbal word problems. Although choice proportions showed a sophisticated sensitivity to experienced base rate information, participants seemed unable to demonstrate a similar sophistication when given typical word problems indicating that base rate neglect is a function of information representation and not an inherent processing bias. (shrink)