: Santayana's materialism is often the target of attack by critics past and present that are sympathetic to pragmatism. A common theme found in the objections of Santayana's critics is that matter is "unknowable". After briefly outlining Santayana's materialism and discussing his relationship to the pragmatist movement, four formulations of the "unknowable" objection are presented: (1) Matter is unknowable because it is not given in experience, (2) Matter is unknowable because its true nature cannot be revealed in perception, (3) Matter (...) is unknowable because it has no properties, (4) Matter is unknowable because existence is a surd. It is argued that these objections are based in part on persistent misunderstandings of Santayana's materialism and that some of the more controversial aspects of his ontology are similar to ideas found in the writings of James and Peirce. (shrink)

Santayana's materialism is often the target of attack by critics past and present that are sympathetic to pragmatism. A common theme found in the objections of Santayana's critics is that matter is "unknowable". After briefly outlining Santayana's materialism and discussing his relationship to the pragmatist movement, four formulations of the "unknowable" objection are presented: (1) Matter is unknowable because it is not given in experience, (2) Matter is unknowable because its true nature cannot be revealed in perception, (3) Matter is (...) unknowable because it has no properties, (4) Matter is unknowable because existence is a surd. It is argued that these objections are based in part on persistent misunderstandings of Santayana's materialism and that some of the more controversial aspects of his ontology are similar to ideas found in the writings of James and Peirce. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Expressivism, Projectivism and SantayanaGlenn Tiller1. Santayana and Non-CognitivismThere is a general consensus that Santayana's metaethical analysis of moral judgments falls under the category of non-cognitivism. For instance, Timothy Sprigge writes that "Santayana's position shares some features with those attitudinist theories of ethics or values for which value judgments express attitudes rather than beliefs."1 In another example, John Lachs states that "Santayana agrees with the emotivists that moral terms have (...) no descriptive significance.2 And, in a similar vein, Thomas Munson writes that, for Santayana, "Ultimate Good is not an opinion hazarded."3 Each of these writers classifies Santayana as one who expounds the basic thesis of non-cognitivism that moral judgments are not descriptive, and hence neither true nor false.Certainly there is a wealth of textual evidence which suggests this interpretation. While it is true, as Sprigge comments, that Santayana offers only a collection of "scattered observations" on metaethical questions such as the nature of moral judgments, those observations amount to a clear affirmation of non-cognitivism.4 Below is a small but representative sample of Santayana's statements on this metaethical issue:Moral terms are caresses or insults and describe nothing.5In order to understand why Santayana thinks that moral terms "describe nothing" and that to "esteem a thing good" is never to assert a truth, we must turn to Santayana's account of valuation. Santayana's account of valuation turns on two principle ideas which lie at the heart of his moral theory. These two ideas can be set out as follows. First, there is the origin of morality, which takes us into Santayana's notion of the psyche. Second, there is the phenomenology of moral experience, which centers on Santayana's epiphenomenalist theory of consciousness. We turn first to Santayana's analysis of the origins of morality.2. The Psyche And The Origin Of MoralitySantayana vigorously rejects any Humean empiricist notion of the self as "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions."8 Santayana objects that this phenomenalistic conception of the self leaves "no room for anything latent," and "in a living being, especially in a nice Englishman, what is latent is the chief thing."9 In Santayana's opinion, the assumptions of materialism must underlie any understanding we have of human nature. Thus, for Santayana the psyche is not some evanescent phenomenal self or passing datum, but rather "that habit in matter which forms the human body and the human mind."10 It is the principle of the long-term development of the individual, for contained within our psyche:There is our whole past, as it were, knocking at the door; there are our silent hopes; there are our future discourses and decisions working away, like actors rehearsing their parts, at their several fantastic arguments. All this is the psyche's work.11In sum, we can say that the psyche accounts for everything that is latent in the self; it embodies the potentiality of a human life from its beginning to its final development.To say that the psyche embodies all that is potential within us and accounts for our material development is to view the psyche as the ultimate origin of animal interests. In other words, we can say that the psyche accounts for all the physical predispositions of an animal life. These predispositions, such as the [End Page 240] habit of the body to repair itself after being injured, may be considered "animal interests" insofar as they represent the (innate) physical course of development of some animal life. Of course, here we are taking the terms "animal interests" and "predispositions" in a purely materialistic way; we are noting, to repeat Santayana's phrase, the "habit of matter."Accepting that the psyche accounts for all predispositions in animal life and that it is the source of animal interests has important implications. According to Santayana, this fact alone accounts for the origin of morality:This predetermined, specific direction of animal life is the key to everything moral; without it no external circumstance could be favourable or unfavourable to us; and spirit within us would have no reason to welcome, to deplore, or... (shrink)

Tiller enquires into Santayana’s notion of a realm of truth. He considers how the realm of truth is situated in Santayana’s ontology. He notes some of the defining features of the realm of truth and differentiates it from Santayana’s account of true judgment.

In her introduction to Life as Insinuation: George Santayana’s Hermeneutics of Finite Life and Human Self, Katarzyna Kremplewska states that the general aim of her book is “reconstructing George Santayana’s conception of human self as embedded in a larger project of philosophy of life” (xi). More specifically, she explains that she is undertaking an inquiry “into the latter in the context of the former” (xvi). Her aim is not only to reconstruct Santayana’s conception of the self, but also sho...

Few if any contemporary philosophers have done more to promote American philosophy and philosophy in America than John Lachs. The creativity and sheer industriousness that characterize his sixty-year career as a producer and advocate of both professional and public philosophy are extraordinary, while his reputation as a teacher of philosophy, especially his work with undergraduate students, is described as “legendary” (p. 21). In the appreciative, probing introductory essay to John Lachs’s Pr...

George Santayana (1863–1952) believed that a philosophy of orthodox common sense exists beneath all major systems of philosophy and religion. This philosophy is a form of naturalism. It begins with the assumption that we are animals generated by and sustained for a time within a vast impersonal physical cosmos that is the sole source of power. Although rational argumentation cannot justify this assumption, our actions repeatedly confirm it, and we could not live without it. Another central feature of Santayana’s philosophy (...) of naturalism is that we are conscious as well as active animals. The inner light of awareness, or what he calls “spirit,” arises by the activities of the physical body but is itself powerless. Our experience of the world is rendered in the morally charged signs of human cognition, and these may be aesthetically appreciated for their own sake in imagination, granting us the possibility of contemplative respite from the exigencies of life. Santayana’s philosophy is atheistic and holds out no religious hope of redemption. Still, it is celebratory of the life of consciousness and offers a path toward naturalistic spirituality. (shrink)

The first of its kind, this project is a collection of critical and interpretive essays on George Santayana’s seminal work in American philosophy, Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923), 100 years after its first edition. The reader will be guided through the intricacies of Scepticism and Animal Faith by expert scholars. This book is a companion to Scepticism and Animal Faith for both first-time readers and readers intimately familiar with this work.

Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce is Christopher Hookway’s second book on Peirce’s philosophy. The first was Peirce, in the Arguments of the Philosophers series published by Routledge in 1985. That book was intended to be a general introduction to Peirce’s philosophy. In contrast, the present volume investigates in greater detail, and in some measure defends, Peirce’s views on the nature of inquiry, truth, reference, vagueness, metaphysics, common sense, the connections between reason and sentiment, the existence of God, and (...) the pragmatist principle. There are twelve essays in total, five of which were written especially for this volume. The remaining seven essays, published over a period of twelve years, are revised and cross-referenced with the new material. (shrink)

Expounds on the relationship between theory and practice as applied, adjusted, and inaugurated in health care.

What are we to make of Western Buddhism? Glenn Wallis argues that in aligning their tradition with the contemporary self-help industry, Western Buddhists evade the consequences of Buddhist thought. This book shows that with concepts such as vanishing, nihility, extinction, contingency, and no-self, Buddhism, like all potent systems of thought, articulates a notion of the "real." Raw, unflinching acceptance of this real is held by Buddhism to be at the very core of human "awakening." Yet these preeminent human truths (...) are universally shored up against in contemporary Buddhist practice, which contradicts the very heart of Buddhism. The author's critique of Western Buddhism is threefold. It is immanent, in emerging out of Buddhist thought but taking it beyond what it itself publicly concedes; negative, in employing the "democratizing" deconstructive methods of François Laruelle's non-philosophy; and re-descriptive, in applying Laruelle's concept of philofiction. Through applying resources of Continental philosophy to Western Buddhism, A Critique of Western Buddhism suggests a possible practice for our time, an "anthropotechnic", or religion transposed from its seductive, but misguiding, idealist haven. (shrink)

Degrees of belief; Dempster's rule of combination; Simple and separable support functions; The weights of evidence; Compatible frames of discernment; Support functions; The discernment of evidence; Quasi support functions; Consonance; Statistical evidence; The dual nature of probable reasoning.

Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic prompted people and institutions to turn to online virtual environments for a wide variety of social gatherings. In this perspectives article, we draw upon our previous work and interviews with Ghanaian Christian leaders to consider implications of this shift. Specifically, we propose that the shift from physical to virtual interactions mimics and amplifies the neoliberal individualist experience of abstraction from place associated with Eurocentric modernity. On the positive side, the shift from physical to virtual environments (...) liberates people to selectively pursue the most fulfilling interactions, free from constraints of physical distance. On the negative side, the move from physical to virtual space necessitates a shift from material care and tangible engagement with the local community to the psychologization of care and pursuit of emotional intimacy in relations of one’s choosing—a dynamic that further marginalizes people who are already on the margins. The disruptions of the pandemic provide an opportunity to re-set social relations, to design ways of being that better promote sustainable collective well-being rather than fleeting personal fulfillment. (shrink)

In this issue of Journal of Medical Ethics, Pugh1 offers a pluralist justice-based argument in support of the spirit, if not the precise letter, of the UK approach to the use of genetic test results to underwrite life insurance. We agree with Dr Pugh’s general contention that there is ethical and philosophical support for curtailment of insurers’ access to, and use of, applicants’ GTR in underwriting. However, we disagree with the contention that broad revisionary implications of certain theories of justice (...) render them unpersuasive. In fact, despite the competing theories, the United Nations Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights has already made a clear statement on this issue. Article 6 of the Declaration,2 unanimously adopted in 1997 by 77 countries, along with a resolution for its implementation,3 states, ‘No one shall be subjected to discrimination based on genetic characteristics that is intended to infringe or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity.’ Further, Article 25 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of life insurance. These statements are not contingent on the acceptability of the degree of revisionary implications. They are clear, unambiguous statements about the obligations of signatory countries. Despite this, few countries have taken steps commensurate with this expectation, possibly due to the scale of changes required for proper ratification. However, genetic discrimination is recognised as one …. (shrink)

An account of the conflict between our positive and negative emotional relationships to the Earth and how they will be resolved for the Symbiocene, the next period in the history of the Earth.

Conceived as a solution to clinical dilemmas, and now required by organizations for hospital accreditation, ethics committees have been subject only to small-scale studies. The wide use of ethics committees and the diverse roles they play compel study. In 1999 the University of Pennsylvania Ethics Committee Research Group (ECRG) completed the first national survey of the presence, composition, and activities of U.S. healthcare ethics committees (HECs). Ethics committees are relatively young, on average seven years in operation. Eighty-six percent of ethics (...) committees report that they play a role in ongoing clinical decision making through clinical ethics consultation. All are engaged in developing institutional clinical policy. Although 4.5% of HECs write policy on managed care, 50% of HEC chairs feel inadequately prepared to address managed care. The power and activity of ethics committees parallels the composition of those committees and the relationship of members to their institutions. The role of ethics committees across the nation in making policies about clinical care is greater than was known, and ethics committees will likely continue to play an important role in the debate and resolution of clinical cases and clinical policies. (shrink)

In most forms of evaluation the benefits of preventive health care are narrowly defined in terms of reductions in future morbidity and mortality. Thus it is normally assumed that it is the final health gains alone which bear utility. This discounts the possibility that individuals may derive utility from the process of health care and other outcomes as well as the end health states. Attributes such as anxiety, reassurance, autonomy, regret and hope provide potential benefits or disbenefits in addition to (...) health gains. This paper explores the concept of process utility in the specific context of preventive goods. Characteristics such as information, awareness and autonomy are examined for two preventive goods—hip protectors and mammographic screening. If individuals trade off process attributes for final health outcomes, then to ignore process utility may lead to a sub-optimal allocation of resources. (shrink)

Are there no new ideas to be invented? Are today's ideas really just borrowed from previous times? Postmodernism says this is so, and it's one of the hottest philosophies of today. The book provides an indispensable guide to this often-demanding terrain for readers encountering theories of postmodernism for the first time and places the subject in a broad context. It introduces a wide range of ideas, thinkers, and views yet maintains the readers' focus by linking theory with concrete examples from (...) both "high" and "popular" culture. After completing Teach Yourself Postmodernism , readers will never look at their world the same way again. (shrink)