El objetivo del artículo es reflexionar sobre el concepto de revuelta popular para precisar su valor heurístico en relación con la comunidad política. Para ello se realiza un recorrido teórico de la idea de revuelta popular en algunos textos de Arendt, Rancière, Blanchot, Nancy, Agamben y Esposito. Propongo que la revuelta debe ser entendida en el marco de una ontología de la comunidad. Se concluye que la revuelta popular supone el rechazo de un orden de desigualdad sostenido en un desacuerdo (...) y la exigencia de no perder la comunidad entendida como el lugar mismo de nuestra existencia. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the concept of popular revolt in order to clarify its heuristic value in relation to political community. The essay traces a theoretical trajectory of the idea of popular revolt in some texts of Arendt, Rancière, Blanchot, Nancy, Agamben and Esposito. I propose that popular revolt must be understood in the context of an ontology of the community. I conclude that popular revolt presumes the rejection of an order on inequality sustained by a disagreement and the requirement of not to lose the community understood as the very place of our existence. (shrink)

Description from a book review by J. G. Beebe-Center: "Mr. Allen's book develops in detail the view that pleasure and unpleasure are essentially manifestations of the progression and thwarting of impulses. Part one is a brief summary of the principal theories of feeling. Part two is devoted to "sensory" or "bodily" pleasure and unpleasure. These forms of feeling, it is argued, 'depend on an analogue of conation existing in the organism, a nisus to maintain, or to carry out to the (...) full extent, the functioning proper to the bodily system.' Part three -- the piece de resistance (about half the book) -- deals with the relation of pleasure and unpleasure to the main instincts. Parts four, five and six take up a number of classical problems: the relation of pleasure and unpleasure to sensation, their relation to desire, the relativity of feelings, the qualitative variety of feelings, and the psychology of values. The author shows throughout a rare combination of historicophilosophical sophistication and of first-hand familiarity with the modern experimental literature.". (shrink)

David Chalmers appears to assume that we can meaningfully discuss what goes on in human heads without paying any attention to the words in which we couch our statements. This paper challenges this assumption and argues that the initial problem is that of metalanguage: if we want to say something clear and valid about us humans, we must think about ourselves outside conceptual English created by one particular history and culture and try to think from a global, panhuman point of (...) view. This means that instead of relying on untranslatable English words such as 'consciousness' and 'experience' we must try to rely on panhuman concepts expressed in cross-translatable words such as THINK, KNOW, and FEEL (Wierzbicka, 2018). The paper argues that after 'a hundred years of consciousness studies' it is time to try to say something about us (humans), about how we think and how we differ from cats and bats, in words that are clear, stable, and human rather than parochially English. (shrink)

This volume brings together the religious and philosophical writings of the founders of Russian religious philosophy, Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky. Both began their intellectual careers in the literary world of the 1820s. The texts collected here make the philosophical concepts of Sobornost (community, universality, wholeness, ecumenicity) and integral knowledge, available to western readers. Based on the primacy of the heart, the spiritual wholeness of the human being and the cognitive will, integral knowing moves beyond rationality to union with the (...) object of knowledge in knowing. This book provides an introduction to Russian religious philosophy, and a profound, meditative text for anyone concerned with human and spiritual unity. Also included are two responses to Slavophile ideas by the prominent Russian philosophers Pavel Florensky and Nikolai Berdiaev. (shrink)

A pIausibicRi2;if not self-cvidcntRi2;Ri2;hypoth@sis readily comes to mind: when 0nc tries t0 understand oncsclf, that is, when 0nc works at building a self-image, cme talkx t0 07i656% A stronger formulation of this hypothesis could bc that the more one talks to oneself to construct a self-image, the more this image will gain coherence and sophistication. A corrclational study is presented in which the existence of a relation between thc complexity (or richness) of thc seIfRi2;concept and a more or less frequent (...) use of seifRi2;taik is examined. The results are preliminary because scifRi2;taIk was measured with 21 pilotdnvcntory and the complexity of thc self-concept was scored using a new system. For a detailed discussion of thc role played by self-talk in the acquisition 0f sclfdnformation and its organisation into a seIfRi2;conccpt, scc.. (shrink)

Книга рассчитана на тех, кто по своей специальности занимается философией, литературоведением и в дальнейшем углубят свои знания в этом вопросе, а также для широкого круга читателей.

I suppose the most obvious difference in fact between dreams and waking life is the chaotic nature of the former. But this somehow seems to be a mere contingency. Some of our dreams are more contingent than others, and it seems hard to impose any upper limit of coherence on them. Also it is usually after we wake up that they seem incoherent. Similarly many dreams are largely matters of sensation and emotion, mood and atmosphere, with little or no reasoning (...) in them; but this again is contingent, and dreams vary; Professor Broad, 56-57) relates a quite detailed scientific experiment which he carried out in a dream. (shrink)