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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Sons of the earth: Are the stoics metaphysical brutes?
Phronesis 54 (2):136-154 (2009)
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The Stoics are famously committed to the thesis that only bodies are, and for this reason they are rightly called “corporealists.” They are also famously compared to Plato’s earthborn Giants in the Sophist, and rightly so given their steadfast commitment to body as being. But the Stoics also notoriously turn the tables on Plato and coopt his “dunamis proposal” that being is whatever can act or be acted upon to underwrite their commitment to body rather than shrink from it as (...) |
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The Stoics offer us a very puzzling conception of causation and an equally puzzling ontology. The aim of the present paper is to show that these two elements of their system elucidate each other. The Stoic conception of causation, I contend, holds the key to understanding the ontological category of incorporeals and thus Stoic ontology as a whole, and it can in turn only be understood in the light of this connection to ontology. The thesis I defend is that the (...) |
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Here I propose an interpretation of the ancient Stoic psychological theory on which (i) the concepts that an adult human possesses affect the content of the perceptual impressions (φαντασίαι αἰσθητικαί) she forms, and (ii) the content of such impressions is exhausted by an ‘assertible’ (ἀξίωμα) of suitable complexity. What leads the Stoics to accept (i) and (ii), I argue, is their theory of assent and belief formation, which requires that the perceptual impression communicate information suitable to serve as the content (...) |
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There is a long history of philosophers granting a privileged epistemic status to cognition of directly present objects. In this paper, I examine three important historic accounts which provide different models of this cognitive state and its connection with its objects: that of the Stoics, who are corporealists and think that ordinary perception may have an epistemically privileged status, but who seem to struggle to accommodate non-perceptual cognizance; that of Augustine, who thinks that incorporeal objects are directly present to us (...) |
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Often, when Seneca wants to defend a thesis that seems original to him in relation to the Stoic school, he claims to enjoy distracting himself with subtle games that quickly become boring puzzles.... No categories |
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Sources for Stoicism present conflicting accounts of the Stoic principles. Some suggest that the principles are inseparable from each other. Others suggest that they are separable. To resolve this apparent interpretive dilemma, I distinguish between the functions of the principles and the bodies that realize those functions. Although the principles cannot separate when realizing their roles, the Stoic theory of blending entails that the bodies that realize those roles are physically separable. I present a strategy for further work on the (...) |
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This paper considers what function—if any—colocation of bodies may have in the Stoic theory of blending (κρᾶσις), by examining (1) whether colocation is part of the definition of what blending is; and (2) whether colocation is posited by the Stoics as a requirement necessary for the definition to be satisfied. I reconstruct the standard, Chrysippean definition of blending, and I show that the answer to (1) is ‘no’; further, I argue that the evidence gives no reason to affirm (2). Thus, (...) |
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At the beginning of his Isagoge, Porphyry establishes a famous set of questions concerning genera and species, which is the origin of the medieval “Quarrel of universals”. But this text gave rise to difficulty for interpreters: does Porphyry, when elaborating this set of questions, refer to historical positions or does he offer these alternatives in a lingua franca, which would be neutral from a doctrinal point of view? This article focusing on the first of the three alternatives raised by Porphyry (...) |
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Le début de l'Isagogè de Porphyre énonce une série de trois questions à propos des genres et des espèces, que l'on tient pour l'origine de la médiévale « Querelle des universaux ». Mais la question s'est posée aux interprètes de savoir si, dans ce texte, Porphyre se référait à certaines thèses historiquement déterminées ou bien s'il construisait ces alternatives de façon théorique, dans une lingua franca non connotée d'un point de vue doctrinal. Cet article, en se concentrant sur la première (...) No categories |
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Void is at the heart of Stoic metaphysics. As the incorporeal par excellence, being defined purely in terms of lacking body, it brings into sharp focus the Stoic commitment to non-existent Somethings. This article argues that Stoic void, far from rendering the Stoic system incoherent or merely ad hoc, in fact reflects a principled and coherent physicalism that sets the Stoics apart from their materialist predecessors and atomist neighbors. |
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Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print. This paper is dedicated to exploring the alleged difference between Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ accounts of the post-mortal survival of the souls and the conceptions of personal identity that these accounts underpin. I argue that while Cleanthes conceptualised the personal identity as grounded in the rational soul, Chrysippus conceptualised it as an embodied rational soul. I also suggest that this difference between the two early Stoics might have been due to Chrysippus' metaphysical commitments arising from his (...) |
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The Stoics have often been compared to the earthborn Giants in the Battle of Gods and Giants in Plato’s Sophist, but with diverging opinions about the lessons they drew in reaction to Plato. At issue are questions about what in the Sophist the Stoics were reacting to, how the Stoics are like and unlike the Giants, the status of being for the Stoics, and the extent to which they were Platonizing with their incorporeals. With these open questions in mind, I (...) |
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In this paper I offer a new interpretation of Stoic ontology. I aim to explain the nature of, and relations between, (i) the fundamental items of their physics, bodies; (ii) the incorporeal items about which they theorized no less; and (iii) universals, towards which the Stoic attitude seems to be a bizarre mixture of realism and anti-realism. In the first half of the paper I provide a new model to explain the relationship between those items in (i) and (ii). This (...) |
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