This article outlines procedures for the feedback of individual research data to participants. This feedback framework was developed in the context of a personalized medicine research project in Canada. Researchers in this domain have an ethical obligation to return individual research results and/or material incidental findings that are clinically significant, valid and actionable to participants. Communication of individual research data must proceed in an ethical and efficient manner. Feedback involves three procedural steps: assessing the health relevance of a finding, re-identifying (...) the affected participant, and communicating the finding. Re-identification requires researchers to break the code in place to protect participant identities. Coding systems replace personal identifiers with a numerical code. Double coding systems provide added privacy protection by separating research data from personal identifying data with a third "linkage" database. A trusted and independent intermediary, the "keyholder", controls access to this linkage database. (shrink)

Evolutionary accounts of the origins of human morality may lead us to doubt the truth of our moral judgments. Sidgwick tried to vindicate ethics from this kind of external attack. However, he ended The Methods in despair over another problem—an apparent conflict between rational egoism and universal benevolence, which he called the “dualism of practical reason.” Drawing on Sidgwick, we show that one way of defending objectivity in ethics against Sharon Street’s recent evolutionary critique also puts us in a position (...) to support a bold claim: the dualism of practical reason can be resolved in favor of impartiality. (shrink)

This volume is primarily concerned with equality as a basic component of the democratic character of representation. In other words, of the many types of equality that have attracted the attention of theorists since democracy's beginnings - arithmetic equality, equality before the law, equality of opportunity- we would like to draw attention to representational equality, that is, the role of equality in systems of democratic representation. In what form is equality present in traditional forms of electoral representation? How can it (...) be secured in new forms of representation, such as claims-making, deliberative, klerotarian and epistemic representation? And to what extent are electoral or non-electoral models of representation able to accommodate increasing social inequalities? The articles in this volume discuss these issues from a normative and conceptual point of view, seeking to shed new light on the important but under-explored relationship between equality and representation. This book was originally published as a special issue of Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. (shrink)

Most students of politics are familiar with Carl Schmitt’s definition of politics as a friend–enemy distinction. Yet, only few know of alternative conceptions of politics in interwar Germany that emphasize cooperation and legality over confrontation and decisionism. To unlock such views, this article examines the work of Hermann Heller, a social-democratic constitutional theorist, and takes a close look at his conceptualization of politics as a sphere, activity and discipline. For Heller, ‘the political’ consists in turning human conflict into social cooperation. (...) For him, the political may be conflictual, but is also conditioned by shared norms and agreed rules. By consequence, to act politically means to order the antagonistic social relations that are typical of every human society. In this sense, politics is a purposeful activity, but one which leaves the content of every decision unconfined and the potentialities that follow endless. Like politicians, politics scholars must reflect on ethical and legal principles, while remaining focused on context-specific political problems. The study of politics cannot be disconnected from the study of law, ethics and social reality. Heller’s work showed that the way we conceive of politics is directly related to the way we study politics and vice-versa. (shrink)

In their efforts to prevent democratic backsliding, militant democrats have traditionally been sympathetic to technocratic arrangements. Does this sympathy imply a logical congruence? Comparing theories of militant democracy and epistemic technocracy (aka epistocracy), I discover a common approach to basic aspects of representative democracy. Both theories see voters as fallible or ignorant instead of capable political agents; and they both understand political parties to be channels of state rule rather than democratic expression. This shared suspicion of grassroots political agency explains (...) why they employ non-democratic means to pursue their goals. But the two theories appear to be also analytically co-extensive. Like militant democrats, epistemic technocrats polemicize antidemocrats inasmuch as the latter are proxies for epistemically foul decision-making. Conversely, militant democrats try to block ‘incorrect’ decisions as long as these lead to democratic subversion, thereby producing a distinct type of militant technocracy. The article ends by drawing the implications of this symbiosis of epistemic and militant democratic ideas for contemporary democratic theory. (shrink)

What does the idea of taking 'the point of view of the universe' tell us about ethics? Lazari-Radek and Singer defend objectivism in ethics, and hedonistic utilitarianism, following Henry Sidgwick's lead. They explore how to justify an ethical theory; conflicts of self-interest and universal benevolence; and whether we should discount the future.

Utilitarianism may well be the most influential secular ethical theory in the world today. It is also one of the most controversial. It clashes, or is widely thought to clash, with many conventional moral views, and with human rights when they are seen as inviolable. Would it, for example, be right to torture a suspected terrorist in order to prevent an attack that could kill and injure a large number of innocent people? In this Very Short Introduction Peter Singer and (...) Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek provide an authoritative account of the nature of utilitarianism, from its nineteenth-century origins, to its justification and its varieties. Considering how utilitarians can respond to objections that are often regarded as devastating, they explore the utilitarian answer to the question of whether torture can ever be justified. They also discuss what it is that utilitarians should seek to maximize, paying special attention to the classical utilitarian view that only pleasure or happiness is of intrinsic value. Singer and de Lazari-Radek conclude by analysing the continuing importance of utilitarianism in the world, indicating how it is a force for new thinking on contemporary moral challenges like global poverty, the treatment of animals, climate change, reducing the risk of human extinction, end-of-life decisions for terminally-ill patients, and the shift towards assessing the success of government policies in terms of their impact on happiness. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

Sidgwick's defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized, for example in Bernard Williams's condemnation of it as 'Government House utilitarianism.' It is also at odds with the idea of morality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M. Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialism that it is sometimes right to do in secret what it would not be right to do openly, or to advocate publicly. We defend Sidgwick on this issue, and (...) show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makes it possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications. (shrink)

Due to the persistent rise of extremism, democrats in recent years have been exploring old and new possibilities of democratic self-defence. This article explores an unconventional and little known alternative to militant democracy that places the demos at the centre stage of the struggle against extremism. Through a neo-procedural reinterpretation of ancient ostracism and modern-day recall, I suggest that citizens should have rights of democratic de-selection of elected parties and candidates. I argue that, if properly designed, such a mechanism of (...) de-presentation distributes the burden of democratic self-defence among citizens and creates a bottom-up majoritarian resistance to anti-democratic threats, without compromising free parliamentary mandate or minority rights. (shrink)

In the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories – Kantianism, Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism – are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled in what he calls ‘Triple Theory’. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on correspondence with Parfit to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider Parfit's efforts, in the (...) third volume of On What Matters, to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the triple theory, in part by treating impartial rationality as an external rival to morality, in much the same way that egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that Parfit's attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success. (shrink)

In this article we argue that it is reasonable to believe that normal vertebrate animals can feel pleasure, and that there is sufficient evidence for a capacity for pleasure in some invertebrates. It follows that the pleasures of animals are morally significant. We argue for that in a few steps. First, we explain why philosophers used to concentrate more on pain rather than pleasure in regard to animals. Second, we define the notion of pleasure and show how it implies to (...) non-human animals. Third we discuss whether animals are conscious beings and how they may feel pleasure. It is true that we do not know exactly how pain and pleasure feel to nonhumans, but this is also true for other humans. Even though we can give a detailed verbal description of what we feel, pains and pleasures are subjective and we do not have any certain insight into what another human is feeling. This limitation should not stop us from behaving in a way that takes into account the fact that both we and many nonhuman animals are beings who can suffer and enjoy. (shrink)

Constellations, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 296-309, September 2022.

Située dans une vallée fertile, au débouché de la passe de Gravia, entre les pentes extrêmes du Ghiona et du Parnasse, la ville d’Amphissa a occupé depuis l’Antiquité une place stratégique dans l’histoire diplomatico-militaire, place dont témoigne l’ampleur des fortifications de toutes époques conservées aujourd’hui. Face au défi que représente la compréhension de ces vestiges relativement peu étudiés jusqu'à présent, une équipe internationale et transdisciplinaire s’est constituée depuis 2017 avec pour but l'étude des systèmes défensifs d’Amphissa dans la longue durée. (...) La présente communication expose les premiers résultats de cette enquête. (shrink)

The first part of the article presents Petrażycki’s theory of moral and legal phenomena, which he called collectively ethical phenomena. The second part is devoted to normative issues. Petrażycki appreciated a specific moral ideal of personality; he wished that men should refute blameworthy acts instinctively and impulsively. Moral rules, according to him, are to be observed not because of the possible consequences of the acts but because of a positive or negative emotional attitude towards the acts as such. He believed (...) that moral rules are always obligatory, independently of the circumstances. (shrink)

Moralists and philosophers of law often demand that the axiological systems be in conformity with “human nature”, or with “nature”. Among conceptions which look for footing in human nature two main trends may be distinguished.

W artykule przedstawiono postać Henry Sidgwicka oraz główne założenia i recepcję jego najważniejszego dzieła The Methods of Ethics. Myśl Sidgwicka, w Polsce znana marginalnie, wpłynęła na współczesną dyskusję filozoficzną w większym stopniu niż teorie Benthama czy Milla i to nie tylko w obrębie utylitaryzmu i konsekwencjalizmu, ale również teorii umowy społecznej czy etyki cnoty. Kwestie moralne, które Sidgwick omawiał w The Methods, w dużym stopniu wynikły z obecnego w historycznych i społecznych realiach wiktoriańskich kryzysu powstałego na tle konfliktu wiary i (...) rozumu. Myśl Sidgwicka zrodziła się z dwu bodaj najbardziej charakterystycznych symptomów owego okresu: zainteresowania nauką i wiary w postęp oraz sceptycyzmu w stosunku do religii. Zarówno w swym wielkim dziele jak i w życiu osobistym Sidgwick dowiódł, iż rzeczą podstawowej wagi było dla niego poszukiwanie prawdy. Świadectwem jego oddania prawdzie było to, że po racjonalnym dojściu do konkluzji sprzecznych z jego utylitarystycznymi „preferencjami”, uznał, iż istnieją dwie ostateczne, nie dające się ze sobą pogodzić zasady moralne — utylitarystyczna zasada życzliwości oraz egoistyczna zasada roztropności. (shrink)

A common expectation of moralists is that man will develop some positive characteristics in himself. However, they disagree as regards the solution of two problems.

Searching for a rational method of moral reasoning, Henry Sidgwick concludes that practical reason is inconsistent and sometimes directs us to actions that are contradictory. Our ultimate duty is in fact to achieve both our own, particular happiness and the happiness at all. We have duties both of a selfish and of a utilitarian nature. In a situation of conflict, when for the public good we must sacrifice our own interests, reason is not able to indicate to us what course (...) of action should be followed. Finally, we must admit that we cannot entirely rationalize our moral choices. The so-called problem of the dualism of practical reason has been and is discussed by many eminent philosophers, including Roger Crisp, John Skorupskiego and Derek Parfit. This paper is an attempt to highlight the considerations of Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason, the sources of dualism and the contemporary reception of this extremely serious problem for ethics. (shrink)

Pandemia Covid-19 poddała próbie poglądy bioetyków na temat alokacji ograniczonych zasobów opieki zdrowotnej. Rozważamy stanowiska zajmowane przez organizacje medyczne i krajowe rady etyki we Włoszech, Hiszpanii, Wielkiej Brytanii, Niemczech i Szwecji. W kilku wypowiedziach tych organów pojęcie godności ludzkiej odgrywa kluczową rolę. Twierdzimy, że użycie tego pojęcia nie pomaga w debacie etycznej. Bronimy poglądu, że decyzje dotyczące alokacji ograniczonych zasobów powinny być podejmowane na podstawie zasady maksymalizacji korzyści netto dla dotkniętych nimi osób. Kończymy pytaniem, czy fakt, że w niektórych regionach, (...) po szczepieniu, które stały się powszechnie dostępne, niedobór łóżek szpitalnych był w dużej mierze spowodowany przez członków społeczności, którzy zdecydowali się nie szczepić przeciwko wirusowi wywołującemu Covid-19, powinien odgrywać rolę w przydzielanie zasobów niezaszczepionym osobom, które później zachorowały na ten wirus. (shrink)