In this paper, we first define the vector product in Minkowski space $\mathbb{R}_{4}^{7}$, which is identified with the space of spatial split-octonions. Next, we derive the $G_{2}-$ frame formulae for a seven dimensional Minkowski curve by using the spatial split-octonions and the vector product. We show that Frenet–Serret formulas are satisfied for a spatial split octonionic curve. We obtain the congruence of two spatial split octonionic curves and give relationship between the $G_{2}-$ frame and Frenet–Serret frame. Furthermore, we present the (...) Frenet–Serret frame with split octonions in $\mathbb{R}_{4}^{8}$. Finally, we give illustrative examples with Matlab codes. (shrink)

La contemporaneidad es facticidad sin sentido, un “espacio de crisis” donde al “ocultamiento de Dios” (teología) le corresponde “la imposibilidad del Absoluto” (filosofía), y a ambos les son correlativas la imposición de un “universo infinito e inestable” (ciencia) y la consecuente pérdida de significancia (semiótica) que implican el vacío y las ausencias. Esa contemporaneidad es asimismo preludio que inaugura la emergencia hegemónica de la efectividad (tecnología), al costo de una debacle espiritual que tiene consecuencias trágicas para la vida y la (...) convivencia humanas. El agotamiento de las dimensiones imaginarias o no de ese universo, determinadas por las repeticiones inexorables de su geografía máxima y mínima, o la imposibilidad de progresar “más allá de la inmanencia” que reitera los recorridos reales y virtuales por la materia, proyecta nefastos efectos desexistenciarios sobre una humanidad que se hunde en la facticidad sin sentido y pervierte cualquier posibilidad de conocimiento, valor y virtud. La emergencia de novedosas modalidades de subjetividad, que atentan contra la existencia colectiva de comunidades, culturas y modos de vida, tienen directa relación con originales formas de reproducción del capital (economía) y modos traumáticos para realizar el prometeico sueño de producción de poder privado (política). También influye de manera decisiva la vigencia de un sistema de poder tecnocrático que sustituye “lo real” por virtualidades e impone una “convivencia” determinada por flujos digitales efímeros e inconsistentes. Esta obra demuestra que tales cuestiones económicas o políticas, científicas o técnicas, lejos de ser contradictorias con un tratamiento teológico o filosófico de la realidad, dependen de la previa respuesta de éste a los problemas elementales que la ciencia y la tecnología deben tener por resueltos antes de aplicar sus progresos por más elocuentes que estos pudieran parecer. Y tal demostración, en el presente texto, no gira en el vacío sino que perdura fundamentada en un recorrido ejemplificador a través de las diversas culturas “occidentales” que han predominado, primero en la misión de “ordenar a la Humanidad” en el tiempo y el espacio, para luego desatar la tragedia que signa un porvenir de convulsiones y pérdidas. Un “mundo” llega a su fin y las formas y elementos que lo sostenían se degradan fungiendo una transición hacia nuevas dimensiones de un “futuro” donde el hombre será un mendigo de lo inexorable. Sólo la conciencia plena del colapso y las causas que lo generan puede abrir una herida en ese futuro a favor del ser humano, evitando la pérdida de su condición de persona y de las virtudes propias que pueden salvarlo. (shrink)

This article critiques Sara Ahmed’s queer phenomenology in light of psychoanalytic theory of sexuality. I argue that there is a conspicuous absence of the unconscious, sexuality, and fantasy in Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. I turn to the work of Jean Laplanche both to address this absence and to argue for a theory of the formation of sexuality and gender that is not exhausted by the phenomenal world.

Compounding is one of the most productive word-formation processes in contemporary Standard English. Hence, new patterns occur regularly. Productivity is one of the characteristic features of human language which implies the ability to create and understand new word forms by the speaker of a language. This was the starting point and motivation of this paper. The main aim of this paper was to investigate the morphological productivity of nominal and verb compounds in English as a foreign language in terms of (...) the most productive and the least productive patterns of compounds in a written English corpus (consisted of 60073 words) by 75 students enrolled in undergraduate studies at the Law Faculty at SEEU. The quantitative measure used for the evaluation of the productivity of compounding patterns was according to hapax legomenon [P = n1 / N]. Findings from the empirical approach show that the most productive compounds in the analyzed corpus (professional /legal English context) are verb compounds, followed by special noun compounds, whereas the least productive were noun compounds. The analysis of the corpus showed that morphological productivity in compounding increased in the writing of students with higher degree of competence and proficiency of English. (shrink)

Due to new innovations and changes, every language needs new words simply because there is a need for new words to name new things. It is a common occurrence for a speaker to use some words in a way that has never been used before in order to communicate directly about certain facts or ideas. When new inventions and changes come into people’s lives, there is a need to name them and talk about them. If a new word is used (...) by many speakers of the language, it will probably survive, and the same word will one day become an everyday word and enter the vocabulary of a language. This paper looks at compounding as one of the most productive word formation process in English. The term compounding refers to a process in which two or more lexemes are combined into one new word. When a word is formed by merging two or more words, each of which can be used separately, it is called a compound word. The term “word formation” has no universally accepted use. Word formation is sometimes defined as a process associated with changing the form of a word, for example, affixation, which is, in fact, the subject of morphology. In a broader sense, word formation covers the processes of creating new lexical items. In English, word formation is of great importance because this phenomenon affects the English dictionary, which in addition to borrowing from various other languages is enriched in this way. The aim of this paper was to investigate the context based vs. non-context interpretation of English compounds by EFL students in legal discourse. The findings from the test run-questionnaire showed that students of English as a foreign language found it more difficult to apply compound words in context rather than choosing an appropriate definition for them, with or without a given context. Furthermore, students scored lower when 50% of the compounds were given in context. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to explore teachers’ beliefs about multilingualism at universities in North Macedonia. Multilingualism as a concept is related to an individual’s ability to speak three or more languages. Given the educational and cultural globalization, multilingualism is crucial in many countries in the world. North Macedonia is an excellent example of multilingualism where different cultures live together and learn the languages of each other. At Universities across the country, teachers face different challenges while teaching multilingual classes. (...) Linguistic competence in many local languages allows students to learn foreign languages easily and thus raises students’ global awareness and deepens knowledge about their future teaching career. The study analysed data collected from thirty EFL teachers from four different universities, Southeast European University, University of Tetova, Mother Teresa University and International Balkan University in North Macedonia. The research instrument used was the teacher survey which contained five domains: Teachers’ perspective on multilingualism; Students’ language learning knowledge; Language teacher collaboration; Learning materials, and other topics related to L2 learning and teaching. The study results revealed that teachers view multilingualism as a positive asset for the students, and they expressed that they have developed an approach which helps multilinguals to achieve their learning goals. One area which needs improvement is teacher collaboration, as they tend to collaborate regarding materials and textbooks, however, not willing to share their experience on teaching methods/strategies and challenges faced. (shrink)

The 27th February, 2010 an 8.8 Mw earthquake upset Chile. A year after, the writer Juan Villoro published 8.8: El miedo en el espejo, a story by means of a catharsis telling his own experience throughout the earthquake. Villoro’s aim is to demonstrate that people’s psychological guaranties have fallen down together with the buildings’ walls. The Mexican writer describes his staying at the Hotel San Francisco in Santiago de Chile, which held out against the earthquake shocks but entrapped several Latin-American (...) writers as well as Villoro. All the writers were guests at the Congreso Iberoamericano de Literatura Infantil y Juvenil. Villoro book’s purpose is to reflect upon how fear impacts the human beings. (shrink)

IntroductionIndividuals with high scores of perceived stress are more likely to develop arterial hypertension than those with low levels of stress. In addition to this, AH and stress are both independent risk factors for executive function impairment and worse quality of life. Therefore, strategies to control and cope with emotional stress are of paramount importance. However, less is known about the association of PS with EF, QoL, and coping in individuals with hypertension. This study aimed to evaluate the association of (...) PS with EF performance, coping strategies use, and QoL in a sample of hypertensive patients.MethodsWe assessed a group of 45 hypertensive individuals. The EF evaluation was: Frontal Assessment Battery; Controlled Oral Word Association Test—FAS; Letter-Number Sequencing subtest from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Third Edition ; Digit Span subtest from the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised and Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. The type and frequency of coping strategies used were measured by the Brief Coping with Experienced Problems Scale. The World Health Organization Quality of Life Questionnaire Bref was applied to measure QoL. The associations of the PS with EF performance, coping strategies, and QoL were investigated using univariate and multiple linear regression models adjusted for age, sex, education, systolic pressure, and depression symptoms.ResultsIn the multivariate analyses, higher PS was an independent predictor for a lower frequency of emotion-focused strategy use. However, PS was not significantly related to EF and Qol in this sample. The lower the PS, the greater the use of emotion-focused coping.ConclusionHypertensive individuals with high PS use less frequently positive emotion-focused coping strategies. (shrink)

This book is a large-scale historical reconstruction of liberal legalism, from its inception in the mid-nineteenth century, the moment in which the jurists forged the alliance between political liberalism and legal expertise embodied in classical private law doctrine, to the contemporary anxiety about the possibility of both a liberal solution to the problem of political justification and of law as a respectable form of expert knowledge. Each stage in the history is a moment of synthesis between a substantive and a (...) methodological idea. The former is the liberal political theory of the period, purporting to provide a solution to the problem of political justification. The latter is a conception of legal method or science, supposedly vindicating the access of the expert to the political choices embodied in the law. Thus, each moment in the history of liberal legalism integrates a political theory with a jurisprudential conception. Although it reaches the unsettling conclusion that liberal legalism has largely failed by its own standards, the book urges us to avoid quietism, skepticism or cynicism, in the hope that a deeper understanding of the fragility of our values and institutions inspires a more thoughtful, broadminded and nurtured citizenship. (shrink)

Peer-review has become increasingly important to the way scholarly journals assess whether a manuscript is suitable for publication [...].

This paper focuses on the ways in which national identities are staged in recent film and theatre productions in Estonia. We want to complement the prevalent approaches to nationality (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Bhabha 1990), where the role of theatre and film as modellers of national identity are undervalued. National identity is a complex term that presupposes some clarification, which we gave by describing its dynamics today; its relation to ethnic identity, a thread between the lived and declared national identities, (...) and the relevance of culture-based national identity. Herein we consider the concept of staging to have two implications: (1) as an aesthetic term it incorporates an artistic process, comprising several devices and levels; (2) as a concept in cultural theory it describes cultural processes in which something is set on stage for public reflection. Accordingly, in our analysis we considered national identities in theatre and film stagings in both senses. The results of our analyses demonstrated that our hypothesis about emerging new national identities in Estonia was valid, though deconstructed and hybrid national identities are not exactly and absolutely new types of identities but rather strategies of creating space for new identities to develop. A deconstructed national identity refers to the state of high self-reflexivity in which the existing elements of national identity are re-examined, recontextualised and re-evaluated. Further, a hybrid national identity demonstrates the diversity and coexistence of the components of national identity. Both strategies of staging are characteristic of the transformation of national identities, confirming that a single homogenous staging of national identity seems to be replaced by bringing multiple new self-models on stage. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the ways in which national identities are staged in recent film and theatre productions in Estonia. We want to complement the prevalent approaches to nationality (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Bhabha 1990), where the role of theatre and film as modellers of national identity are undervalued. National identity is a complex term that presupposes some clarification, which we gave by describing its dynamics today; its relation to ethnic identity, a thread between the lived and declared national identities, (...) and the relevance of culture-based national identity. Herein we consider the concept of staging to have two implications: (1) as an aesthetic term it incorporates an artistic process, comprising several devices and levels; (2) as a concept in cultural theory it describes cultural processes in which something is set on stage for public reflection. Accordingly, in our analysis we considered national identities in theatre and film stagings in both senses. The results of our analyses demonstrated that our hypothesis about emerging new national identities in Estonia was valid, though deconstructed and hybrid national identities are not exactly and absolutely new types of identities but rather strategies of creating space for new identities to develop. A deconstructed national identity refers to the state of high self-reflexivity in which the existing elements of national identity are re-examined, recontextualised and re-evaluated. Further, a hybrid national identity demonstrates the diversity and coexistence of the components of national identity. Both strategies of staging are characteristic of the transformation of national identities, confirming that a single homogenous staging of national identity seems to be replaced by bringing multiple new self-models on stage. (shrink)

This paper examines language practices in two services offered in the main Catholic Church in the town of Sangmelima in the South region of Cameroon. The research is motivated by the need to find out what languages are used in this church and what the terms “French service” and “Bulu service” imply in the multilingual city of Sangmelima. The informants were the priests, catechists, choir leaders, and some parishioners of this church. Three main instruments were used to collect data in (...) these two church services, i.e., interview, questionnaire and participant observation. The frame adopted for the analysis was Kouega’s structural-functional approach (2008). The findings revealed that the services in this church include 28 parts. In the French service, the languages used to realise these parts were found to be French, Bulu (Sangmelima), Ewondo (Yaounde), Fang (south of Cameroon and north of Equatorial Guinea), Fe’efe’e (Bafang), Ghomala’ (Bafoussam), and Medumba (Bangangte). In the Bulu service, on the other hand, the languages used were: Bulu (Sangmelima), Ewondo (Yaounde), and French. These languages were chosen for a variety of reasons. First, a language like Bulu was chosen because it is understood by the parishioners as it is the main language of the locality. Second, French is the official language of the territory; third, some languages like Fe’efe’e, Ghomala, and Medumba were chosen on the basis of the involvement of the speakers of these ethnic languages in the activities of the church. Fourth, the availability of printed religious materials in a language was an important factor. (shrink)

O artigo articulará a temática do dossiê _Religião e Cinema_ no gênero da ficção científica. Para isso, propõe-se uma reflexão acerca de um conceito de Deus em _2001 Uma Odisseia no Espaço_ a partir de uma declaração do diretor Stanley Kubrick. O trabalho mostrará, inicialmente, um fundo de reflexão comum tanto para a religião quanto para a ficção científica. Uma narrativa cuja realização se dá num evento maior distingue-se, no filme, da confessionalidade religiosa, encontrando, a despeito da tecnologia e da (...) ciência, na própria ficção a emancipação da finitude e das determinações por meio de símbolos infinitos. O símbolo maior, manifestado como protagonista, é o Monolito: fonte de reflexão sobre um outro conceito de Deus distinto de tradições religiosas monoteístas. Como uma metáfora da jornada da humanidade, o neologismo _monoliteísmo_ sugere a busca da compreensão de si mesmo por meio de significações últimas na expressão artística de Kubrick da circularidade, da linearidade e, sobretudo, do silêncio. Apesar de contar com uma análise crítica da linguagem cinematográfica, sobretudo a partir de Deleuze, o método de pesquisa é o hermenêutico e o referencial bibliográfico selecionado contempla obras de crítica tanto filosófica quanto cinematográfica. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to assess the predictive capacity of some of the most relevant cognitive skills pertaining to the academic field as measured by the Spanish Primary School Aptitude Test Battery. This psychometric tool was applied to all students who were enrolled in the final year of Early Childhood Education in the public schools of the province of Alicante and a follow-up of their academic progress was carried out when they completed Primary Education. The results obtained show (...) that medium-high and high scores in Verbal Aptitude and Numerical Aptitude tests in Early Childhood Education, can predict academic success at the end of Primary Education in instrumental subjects such as: Language and Mathematics. We have determined the importance of developing pedagogical programs that stimulate the development of these skills during Early Childhood Education, while implementing support strategies during Primary Education, for those students who present underdeveloped aptitudes in these areas. In this way, school difficulties would be prevented in the instrumental subjects that provide access to other academic areas. (shrink)

_El intelectual plebeyo. Vocación y resistencia del pensar alegre _es la continuación del trabajo que Javier López Alós sintetizó en _Crítica de la razón precaria. La vida intelectual ante la obligación de lo extraordinario_. En esta nueva obra el autor focaliza en la reflexión sobre la figura del intelectual en nuestros días, destacando la perplejidad y el malestar como dos bases presentes en las trayectorias tanto de los investigadores consagrados, como de los más jóvenes. A través del concepto del “intelectual (...) plebeyo” proyecta una reivindicación, una articulación del malestar que explora el potencial movilizador de la conciencia de desigualdad e injusticia del intelectual. El concepto de vocación, apunta López Alós, ha sido modulado para convertirse en una herramienta para la explotación y la servidumbre voluntaria. Frente a esto, su propuesta trata de centrarse en una práctica intelectual alternativa que supere la ideología neoliberal, por lo que el concepto “intelectual plebeyo” pretende politizar la posición precaria de gran parte de las personas que se dedican al trabajo intelectual. Así, “plebeyo” contiene un gran potencial movilizador, una conciencia de la desigualdad y la injusticia, así como una toma de postura ante estas. (shrink)

El artículo presenta fundamentalmente un análisis sobre el concepto de la sabiduría y la belleza, desde la experiencia teológica del pueblo de Israel plasmada en un antiguo proverbio. La belleza y la sabiduría se encuentran unidas por una experiencia teológica y no únicamente estética; y en tal experiencia se puede reconocer al hombre sabio y bello que actúa con sensatez y eticidad con los demás.

Se trata de pensar y abrir el horizonte del ser-con desde los análisis fenomenológicos vertidospor Heidegger en la I Sección de su libro Ser y Tiempo, respetando y aceptando sus propiaslimitaciones intrínsecas y a pesar del carácter aparentemente negativo que rodea a este existenciario,a fin de radicalizarlo, extenderlo y ubicarlo en su posibilidad más genuina. Por esta razón, a través deuna interpretación de corte fenomenológico, se ha querido potenciar los posibles rendimientos de unser-con en propiedad, enfatizando la necesidad de interpretar (...) el opus magnum heideggeriano desdeel horizonte de la mismidad del Dasein. La conclusión apunta sobre dos vías temáticas, a saber: a) atomar la mismidad del Dasein, por cuanto constituye una posibilidad ejecutiva de existir conforme alo que este ente es, en tanto condición necesaria y suficiente para pensar un ser-con en propiedad; b) aestablecer, casi a modo de esbozo, una relación entre ser-con, libertad y mismidad, la cual tiene su basetemática en una presumible igualdad de orden pre-ontológico. (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...) , or freedom from the causal determinism of nature, became prominent in justifying the human use of animals.”3 One of the oldest uses of autonomy in English is a description of the French civil war from the late sixteenth century: “Others of the…rebellion entred in counsell, whether they ought to admit the King vpon reasonable conditions, specially hauing their autonomy.”4 Life, and in particular human life, and in particular human politics, is well served by the usages of autonomy . What about the rest of reality, however? Should it be thought of, if it's even considered real and mind-independent, as pure stuff for the manipulation or decorative tastes of truly autonomous beings? We tend to think of things such as paperweights and iPhones as mere tools of human design and human use. To use them is to cause them to exist as fully and properly as they can. But according to Martin Heidegger, when a tool such as a paperweight is used, it disappears, or withdraws ( Entzug ). We are preoccupied with copying the page that the paperweight is holding down. We are concerned with an essay deadline, and the paperweight simply disappears into this general project. If the paperweight slips, or if the iPhone freezes, we might notice it. All of a sudden it becomes vorhanden (present-at-hand) rather than zuhanden (ready-to-hand).5 Yet Heidegger is unable to draw a meaningful distinction between what happens to a paperweight when it slips from the book I'm copying from and what happens to the paperweight when it presses on the still resilient pages of the thick paperback itself. Further still and related to this point, even when I am using the paperweight as part of some general task, I am not using the entirety of the paperweight as such. My project itself selects a thin slice of paperweight-being for the purposes of holding down a book. Even when it is zuhanden the paperweight is withdrawn. Graham Harman is the architect of this way of thinking.6 Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and most of the other isms that have defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. At a moment when the term ontology was left alone like a piece of well chewed old chewing gum that no one wants to have anything to do with, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has put it back on the table. The coral reef isn't going anywhere and once you have discovered it, you can't un-discover it. And it seems to be teeming with strange facts. The first fact is that the entities in the reef—we call them “objects” somewhat provocatively—constitute all there is: from doughnuts to dogfish to the Dog Star to Dobermans to Snoop Dogg. People, plastic clothes pegs, piranhas and particles are all objects. And they are all pretty much the same, at this depth. There is not much of a distinction between life and non-life (as there isn't in contemporary life science). And there is not much of a distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence (as there is in contemporary artificial intelligence theory). A lot of these distinctions are made by humans, for humans (anthropocentrism). And the concept autonomy has come into play in policing such distinctions. In this essay I shall to try to liberate autonomy for the sake of nonhumans. I shall do so by parsing carefully the title, which is taken from Hakim Bey's work The Temporary Autonomous Zone .8 First we shall explore the term autonomous . Then we shall explore what the full meaning of zone is. Finally, we shall investigate what temporary means. Each of these terms is of great value. An object withdraws from access. This means that its very own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole. A coral reef is made of coral, fish, seaweed, plankton and so on. But one of these things on its own doesn't embody part of a reef. Yet the reef just is an assemblage of these particular parts. You can't find a coral reef in a parking lot. In this way, the vibrant realness of a reef is kept safe both from its parts and from its whole. Moreover, the reef is safe from being mistaken for a parking lot. Objects can't be reduced to tiny Lego bricks such as atoms that can be reused in other things. Nor can be reduced upwards into instantiations of a global process. A coral reef is an expression of the biosphere or of evolution, yes; but so is this sentence, and we ought to be able to distinguish between coral reefs and sentences in English. The preceding facts go under the heading of undermining . Any attempt to undermine an object—in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with the ravages of time or global warming—will not get at the withdrawn essence of the object. By essence is meant something very different from essentialism . This is because essentialism depends upon some aspect of an object that OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the object itself! Even a coral reef can't grasp its essential coral reefness. In essentialism, a superficial appearance is taken for the essence of a thing, or of things in general. In thinking essentialism we may be able to discern another way of avoiding OOO. This is what Harman has christened overmining .? The overminer decides that some things are more real than others: say for example human perception. Then the overminer decides that other things are only granted realness status by somehow coming into the purview of the more real entity. When I measure a photon, when I see a coral reef, it becomes what it is. But when I measure a photon, I never measure the actual photon. Indeed, since at the quantum scale to measure means “to hit with a photon or an electron beam” (or whatever), measurement, perception ( aisthesis ), and doing become the same. What I “see” are deflections, tracks in a diffusion cloud chamber or interference patterns. Far from underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full comprehension, by anything.9 So far we have made objects safe from being swallowed up by larger objects and broken down into smaller objects—undermining. And so far we have made objects safe from being mere projections or reflections of some supervenient entity—overmining. That's quite a degree of autonomy. Everything in the coral reef, from the fish to a single coral lifeform to a tiny plankton, is autonomous. But so is the coral reef itself. So are the heads of the coral, a community of tiny polyps. So is each individual head. Each object is like one of Leibniz's monads, in that each one contains a potentially infinite regress of other objects; and around each object, there is a potentially infinite progress of objects, as numerous multiverse theories are now also arguing. But the infinity, the uncountability, is more radical than Leibniz, since there is nothing stopping a group of objects from being an object, just as a coral reef is something like a society of corals. Each object is “a little world made cunningly” (John Donne).10 We are indeed approaching something like the political valance of autonomy . The existence of an object is irreducibly a matter of coexistence. Objects contain other objects, and are contained “in” other objects. Let us, however, explore further the ramifications of the autonomy of objects. We will see that this mereological approach (based on the study of parts) only gets at part of the astonishing autonomy of things. Yet there are some more things to be said about mereology before we move on. Consider the fact that since objects can't be undermined or overmined, it means that there is strictly no bottom object . There is no object to which all other objects can be reduced, so that we can say everything we want to say about them, hypothetically at least, based on the behavior of the bottom object. The idea that we could is roughly E.O Wilson's theory of consilience .11 Likewise, there is no object from which all things can be produced, no top object . Objects are not emanations from some primordial One or from a prime mover. There might be a god, or gods. Suppose there were. In an OOO universe even a god would not know the essential ins and outs of a piece of coral. Unlike even some forms of atheism, the existence of god (or nonexistence) doesn't matter very much for OOO. If you really want to be an atheist, you might consider giving OOO a spin. If there is no top object and no bottom object, neither is there a middle object . That is, there is no such thing as a space, or time, “in” which objects float. There is no environment distinct from objects. There is no Nature (I capitalize the word to reinforce a sense of its deceptive artificiality). There is no world, if by world we mean a kind of “rope” that connects things together.12 All such connections must be emergent properties of objects themselves. And this of course is well in line with post-Einsteinian physics, in which spacetime just is the product of objects, and which may even be an emergent property of a certain scale of object larger than 10?¹?cm).13 Objects don't sit in a box of space or time. It's the other way around: space and time emanate from objects. How does this happen? OOO tries to produce an explanation from objects themselves. Indeed, the ideal situation would be to rely on just one single object. Otherwise we are stuck with a reality in which objects require other entities to function, which would result in some kind of undermining or overmining. We shall see that we have all the fuel we need “inside” one object to have time and space, and even causality. We shall discover that rather than being some kind of machinery or operating system that underlies objects, causality itself is a phenomenon that floats ontologically “in front of” them. In so doing, we will move from the notion of autonomy and begin approaching a full exploration of the notion of zone , which was promised at the outset of this essay. Since an object is withdrawn, even “from itself,” it is a self-contradictory being. It is itself and not-itself, or in a slightly more expanded version, there is a rift between essence and appearance within an object (as well as “between” them). This rift can't be the same as the clichéd split between substance and accidents , which is the default ontology. On this view, things are like somewhat boring cupcakes with somewhat less boring sugar sprinkles on them of different colors and shapes. But on the OOO view, what is called substance is just another limited slice of an object, a way of apprehending something that is ontologically fathoms deeper. What is called substance and what is called accidence are just on the side of what this essay calls appearance. The rift (Greek, chorismos ) between essence and appearance means that an object presents us with something like what in logic is known as the Liar: some version of the sentence “This sentence is false.” The sentence is true, which means that it is a lie, which means that it is false. Or the sentence is false, which means that it is telling the truth, which means that it is true. Now logic since Aristotle has tried desperately to quarantine such beasts in small backwaters and side streets so that they don't act too provocatively.14 But if OOO holds, then at least one very significant thing in the universe is both itself and not-itself: the object. An object is p ? ¬p. To cope with this fact, we shall need some kind of paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic logic, one that is not allergic to dialetheias (double-truthed things). Yet if we accept that objects are dialetheic, p ? ¬p, we can derive all kinds of things easily from objects. Consider the fact of motion. If objects only occupy one location “in” space at any “one” time, then Zeno's paradoxes will apply to trying to think how an object moves. Yet motion seems like a basic, simple fact of our world. Either everything is just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and not-here “at the same time.”15 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of dance or revolt . They emanate from objects, yet they are not the object. “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (Yeats).16 The point being, that for there to be a question, there must be a distinction—or there must not be (p ? ¬p).17 It becomes impossible to tell: “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don't know whether it's pretense or not.”18 In this notion of the emergence of time and space from an object we can begin to understand the term zone . Zone can mean belt , something that winds around something else. We talk of temperate zones and war zones. A zone is a place where a certain action is taking place: the zone winds around, it radiates heat, bullets fly, armies are defeated. To speak of an autonomous zone is to speak of a place that a certain political act has carved out of some other entity. Cynically, Tibet is called TAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for this very reason. In this phrase, Region tries to emulate zone : it sounds as if the place has its own rules, but of course, it is very much under the control of China. What action is taking place? “[N]ot something that just is what it is, here and now, without mystery, but something like a quest…a tone on its way calling forth echoes and responses…water seeking its liquidity in the sunlight rippling across the cypresses in the back of the garden.”19 If as suggested earlier there is no functional difference between substance and accidence; if there is no difference between perceiving and doing; if there is no real difference between sentience and non-sentience—then causality itself is a strange, ultimately nonlocal aesthetic phenomenon. A phenomenon, moreover, that emanates from objects themselves, wavering in front of them like the astonishingly beautiful real illusion conjured in this quotation of Alphonso Lingis. Lingis's sentence does what it says, casting a compelling, mysterious spell, the spell of causality, like a demonic force field. A real illusion: if we knew it was an illusion, if it were just an illusion, it would cease to waver. It would not be an illusion at all. We would be in the real of noncontradiction. Since it is like an illusion, we can never be sure: “What constitutes pretense…” A zone is what Lingis calls a level . A zone is not entirely a matter of “free will”: this concept has already beaten down most objects into abject submission. Objects are far more threateningly autonomous, and sensually autonomous, than the Kantian version of autonomy cited in the first paragraph of this essay. A zone is not studiously decided upon by an earnest committee before it goes into action. One of its predominant features is that it is already happening . We find ourselves in it, all of a sudden, in the late afternoon as the shadows lengthen around a city square, giving rise to an uncanny sensation of having been here before. Objects emit zones. Wherever I find myself a zone is already happening, an autonomous zone. It is the nonautonomous zones that are impositions on what is already the case. Or rather, these zones are autonomous zones that exclude and police. They are brittle. Every object is autonomous, but some objects try to maintain themselves through rigidity and brittleness, like (and such as) a police state. Paradoxically, the more rigidly one tries to exclude contradiction, the more virulent become the dialetheias that are possible. I can get around “This sentence is false” by imagining that there are metalanguages that explain what counts as a sentence. Then I can decide that this isn't a real sentence. This is basically Alfred Tarski's strategy, since he invented the notion of metalanguage specifically to cope with dialetheias.20 For example we might claim that sentences such as “This sentence is false” are neither true nor false. But then you can imagine a strengthened version of the Liar such as: “This sentence is not true”; or “This sentence is neither true nor false.” And we can go on adding to the strengthened Liar if the counter-attack tries to build immunity by specifying some fourth thing that a sentence can be besides true, false, and neither true nor false: “This sentence is false, or neither true nor false, or the fourth thing.” And so on.21 It seems as if language becomes more brittle the more it tries to police the Liars of this world. Why? I believe that this increasing brittleness is a symptom of a deep fact about reality. What is this deep fact? Simply that there are objects, that these objects are withdrawn, and that they are walking contradictions. This means indeed that (as Lacan put it) “there is no metalanguage,” since a metalanguage would function as a “middle object” that gave coherency and evenness to the others.22 Since there is no metalanguage, there is no rising above the disturbing illusory play of causality. This may even have political implications: no global critique is therefore possible, and attempts to smooth out or totalize are doomed to fail. To think the zone is to think the notion of temporary , which we shall now begin to discuss in greater detail. The zone is not in time: rather it “times.” But because a zone is an emanation of an object, it is based on a wavering fragility, since objects are p ? ¬p. When an object is born, that means that it has broken free of some other object. An object can be born because it and other objects are fragile. If not, no movement would be possible. Objects contain the seeds of their own destruction, a dialetheic sentence that says something like “This sentence cannot be proved.” Kurt Gödel argues that every true system of propositions contains at least one sentence that the system cannot prove. In order to be true, the system must have a minimum incoherence. To be real, it has to be fragile. Imagine a record player. Now imagine a record called I Cannot Be Played on This Record Player . When you play it on this record player, it produces sympathetic vibrations that cause the record player to shudder apart. No matter how many defense mechanisms you build in, there will always be the possibility of at least one record that destroys the record player.23 That is what being physical is. An object is inherently fragile because it is both itself and not-itself. When the rift between appearance and essence collapses, that is called destruction, ending, death. When an object breaks, several new objects are born. An opera singer sings a loud note in tune with the resonant frequency of a wine glass. (See the movie included below.) The singing is a zone, an autonomous level of intensity, opening a rift between appearance and essence. The glass ripples—for a moment it is nakedly a glass and a not-glass—almost as if it were having an orgasm, a little death. It is caught in the rift of the singing. Then its structure can't handle the coherence of the sound waves, and it breaks. It is incoherence and inconsistency that is the mark of existence, not consistency and noncontradiction. When things break or die, they become coherent. Essence disappears into appearance. I become the memories of friends. A glass becomes a dancing wave. Instantly, there are glass fragments, new temporary autonomous zones. The fragments have broken free from the glass. They are no longer its parts, but emanate their own time and space, becoming perhaps accidental weapons as they bury themselves in my flesh. Thus Hakim Bey's instructions on creating temporary autonomous zones oscillate disturbingly between performance art and politics, circus clowning and revolution. To play with the aesthetic is to play with causality, to rip from the sensual ether emanating from things new regions, new zones. Anarchist politics is the creation of fresh objects in a reality without a top or a bottom object, or for that matter a middle object: Everything in nature is perfectly real including consciousness, there's absolutely nothing to worry about. Not only have the chains of the Law been broken, they never existed; demons never guarded the stars, the Empire never got started, Eros never grew a beard. … There is no becoming, no revolution, no struggle, no path; already you're the monarch of your own skin—your inviolable freedom waits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky.24 Bey imagines that this is because chaos is a primordial “undifferentiated oneness-of-being.” A Parmenides or a Spinoza or a Laruelle would read this a certain way. Individual objects, or decisions to talk about this rather than that, are just maggot-like things crawling around on the surface of the giant cheese of oneness.25 Yet he also describes chaos as “Primordial uncarved block, sole worshipful monster, inert & spontaneous, more ultraviolet than any mythology.” This image is of an inconsistent object, not of an undifferentiated field. An object, indeed, that can be distinguished from other things. If not, then the first part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , subtitled “The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism,” is a kind of onto-theology. Onto-theology proclaims that some things are more real than others. Bey, however, is writing poetically, and thus ambiguously. We are at liberty to read “undifferentiated oneness-of-being” as something like the irreducibility of a thing to its parts and so forth (undermining and overmining). This certainly seems closer to the language in the following paragraph: “There is no becoming … already you're the monarch of your own skin.”26 On this view, there is no difference between art and politics: “When ugliness, poor design & stupid waste are forced upon you, turn Luddite, throw your shoe in the works, retaliate.” Since Romanticism this has been the war cry of the vanguard artist.27 To say to is to fall prey to the tired axioms of the avant-garde, and we think we know how the game goes. But OOO is not simply a way to advocate “new and improved” versions of this shock-the-bourgeoisie boredom. Bey's text is certainly full enough of that. Rather, since causality as such is aesthetic, and since nonhumans are not that different from humans, the new approach would be to form aesthetic–causal alliances with nonhumans. These alliances would have to resist becoming brittle, whether that brittleness is right wing (authoritarianism) or left wing (the endless maze of critique). No “ism,” especially not the ultimate forms, nihilism and cynicism, is in any sense effective at this point. All forms of brittleness are based on the mistaken assumption that there is a metalanguage and that therefore “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” I will not be listing any approaches here, as Bey does. Such lists and manifestos belong to the vanguardism that no longer works. Why? Not because of some marvelous revolution in human consciousness, but because nonhumans have so successfully impinged upon human social, psychic and aesthetic space. It is the time after the end of the world. That happened in 1945, when a thin layer of radioactive materials was deposited in Earth's crust. Geology now calls it this era the Anthropocene . Ironically, this period, named after humans, is the moment at which even the most thick headed of us make decisive contact with nonhumans, from mercury in our blood to manta rays to magnesium. Richard Dawkins, Pat Robertson and Lady Gaga all have to deal with global warming and mass extinction, somehow. We now live in an Age of Asymmetry marked by a skewed, spiraling relationship between vast knowledge and vast nonhuman things—both become vaster and vaster because of one another and for the same reasons.28 This means that coming up with the perfect attitude or the perfect aesthetic prescription just won't work any more. Even the most hardened anthropocentrist now has to pay through the nose for basic food supplies, and has to use more sunscreen. Whether he knows it or acknowledges it, he is already acting with regard towards nonhumans. There is nothing special to think, no special critique that will get rid of the stains of coexistence. The problem won't fit into the well-established modern boxes, which is why the “mystical,” “spiritual” quality of Bey's prose is welcome. Of course, when I put it this way, you may immediately close off and decide that I am talking about perfect attitudes after all, or something outside of politics, or other ways that the radical left marshals to police its thinking of the nonhuman. Because that is what is really at stake in all this: the nonhuman in its coexistence with the human—bosons, gods, clouds, spirits, lifeforms, experiences, the sunlight rippling across the cypresses. Bey begins to get at this in a Latour litany in the second part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , “The Assassins”: Pomegranate, mulberry, persimmon, the erotic melancholy of cypresses, membrane-pink shirazi roses, braziers of meccan aloes & benzoin, stiff shafts of ottoman tulips, carpets spread like make-believe gardens on actual lawns—a pavilion set with a mosaic of calligrammes—a willow, a stream with watercress—a fountain crystalled underneath with geometry— the metaphysical scandal of bathing odalisques, of wet brown cupbearers hide-&-seeking in the foliage—“water, greenery, beautiful faces.”29 This will be conveniently dismissed as orientalism. If we're never allowed to escape the crumbling prison of modernity for fear of imperialism there is truly no hope. In a similar way, the fear of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is very often staged from a place that just is anthropocentrism .30 Critique turns into ressentiment . An object radiates a zone that is aesthetic and therefore causal. Because objects “time” they are temporary. Not because they exist “in” time that eventually gets the better of them. Their very existence implies the possibility of their non-existence. Since objects are not consistent, they can cease to exist. But nothing, no one, will ever be able to insert a blade between appearance and existence, even thought there is a rift there. Now that's what I call autonomy. NOTES 1. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 96. 2. P. B. Medawar and J. S. Medawar, The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology (London: Wildwood House, 1977), 8. 3. David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 4. Antony Colynet, A True History of the Civil Warres in France (London, 1591), 480. 5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996) 62–71. 6. Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 7. Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991). 8. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Ripley: Zero Books, 2011), 7–18. 9. This is not the place to get into an argument about quantum theory, but I have argued that quanta also do not endorse a world that I can't speak about because it is only real when measured. This world is that of the reigning Standard Model proposed by Niels Bohr and challenged by De Broglie and Bohm (and now the cosmologist Valentini, among others). See Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui Parle 19.2 (Spring–Summer, 2011), 163–190. 10. John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons , ed. John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 11. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998). 12. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Washington: Regnery, 1968), 243. 13. Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (London: Penguin, 2006); Petr Horava, “Quantum Gravity at a Lifshitz Point,” arXiv:0901.3775v2 [hep-th]. 14. Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), passim: the most notable recent quarantine officers have been Tarski, Russell, and Frege. 15. Priest, In Contradiction , 172–181. 16. William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems , ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996). 17. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (Autumn, 1973), 27–33 (30). 18. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, Livre III: Les psychoses (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981), 48. See Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 206. 19. Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 29. 20. Priest, In Contradiction , 9–27. 21. See Graham Priest and Francesco Berto, “ Dialetheism ,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 22. Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 311. 23. The analogy can be found at length in Douglas Hofstadter, “Contracrostipunctus,” Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 75–81. 24. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 25. This is closest to the language of François Laruelle in Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2011) 179. 26. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 27. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 28. For further discussion see Timothy Morton, “From Modernity to the Anthropocene: Ecology and Art in the Age of Asymmetry,” The International Social Science Journal 209 (forthcoming). 29. Bey, “ The Assassins ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 30. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 75–76. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:No-Self, Dōgen, the Senika Doctrine, and Western Views of SoulGerhard FadenNo-Self Versus SoulFrom the very beginning of Buddhism, the concept of no-self (P. anattā, J. muga) has been at the heart of Buddhist thought. Based on this concept, Buddhist apologetics rejected the concept of Atman in the Upanishads as well as Western concepts of soul. Christian authors, on the other hand, see an unbridgeable abyss between what they call (...) "Christian personalism" and Buddhist "rejection of souls."1 However, is there really such a clear-cut distinction? Posing this question means denying it. The no-self doctrine is one of the most intricate concepts within philosophy, and words like "self" and "soul" have countless interpretations. It seems to me that the Buddhist tradition itself has not always realized the crucial point of its fundamental doctrine, just as the Western concepts of "person" and "soul" more often than not fell behind the achievements of Plato and the New Testament. Especially the Theravāda line of Buddhism has developed a very counterintuitive picture of what it is to be a human person. "There is suffering, but there is no self who suffers." The most outstanding philosopher of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-250), introduced a more convincing interpretation when he said that according to Buddha the self or soul does neither exist nor not exist. This interpretation too, no less than the Theravāda doctrine, can refer to the early epoch of Buddhism. In the Pāli suttas a monk named Vacchagotta asked the Buddha, "Is there a self?" The Buddha gave no response. Then Vacchagotta asked, "Is there no self?" Again the Buddha was silent.2 In any case, the teaching of no-self leaves room for many divergent interpretations. In this paper, I shall propose to understand it as an original view of what is my true being, a view that has analogues in traditional Western philosophy. The truth is one; philosophy has to demonstrate that the different doctrines are nothing but aspects of a single universe. As for the dogmatic tenets of each religion, I would propose to see them like educators of the individual's thought: they set limits, develop abilities, suggest lines of sight, and the like. [End Page 41]The Concept of No-self in Pāli BuddhismIn the limited space of this essay, I can only give some marginal remarks. For a first approach, let us look at the origins of the no-self concept in the scriptures of Pāli Buddhism. They show clearly the aim of that doctrine: it consists in the liberation from objectifying theories of the soul. In the canonical texts, we find repeatedly the formula of rejecting the five aggregates, the so-called "heaps" (Skt. skhandha, P. khandha) that form the phantom of a persistent ego: body, sensation, conceptualization, volitions, and consciousness. None of these things is really mine. The Buddha tells to his disciples as follows: "Suppose, bhikkhus, people were to carry off the grass, sticks, branches, and foliage in this Jeta's Grove, or to burn them, or to do with them as they wish. Would you think: 'People are carrying us off, or burning us, or doing with us as they wish'?" Of course, the disciples do not think so. It is neither their self nor what belongs to their self. In the same way, the Buddha instructs them to think, the ear is not yours, and the mind is not yours, and so on, and to abandon it all.3In other words, by the teaching of anattā the Buddha invites his disciples to cease identifying their true being with things like body or consciousness. Only what really is mine can be my self. The khandhas seem to be mine. To a certain degree, I can dispose of them. However, really they are not mine; on the contrary, they are my master. The teaching of no-self does not originally mean there is no self, but nothing in this world can be my self. What is my self can never be taken from me. I cannot dispose of it, and on the other... (shrink)

Determination of cell fate in the developing eye of Drosophila depends on a precise sequence of cellular interactions which generate the stereotypic array of ommatidia. In the eye imaginal disc, an initially unpatterned epithelial sheath of cells, the first step in this process may be the specification of R8 photoreceptor cells at regular intervals. Genes such as Notch and scabrous, known to be involved in bristle development, alos participate in this process, suggesting that the specification of ommatidial founder cells and (...) the formation of sensory organs in the adult epidermis may involve a similar mechanism, that of lateral inhibition. The subsequent steps of ommatidial assembly, following R8 assignment, involve a different mechanism: Undetermined cells read their position based on the contacts they make with neighbors that have already begun to differentiate. The development of the R7 photoreceptor cell, one of the eight photoreceptor cells in the ommatidium, is best understood. An important role seems to be played by sevenless, a receptor tyrosine kinase on the surface of the R7 precursor. It transmits the positional information– most likely encoded by the boss protein on the neighboring R8 cell membrane – into the cell via its tyrosine kinase, which activates a signal transduction cascade. Constitutive activation of the sevenless kinase by overexpression of an N‐terminally truncated form results in the diversion of other ommatidial cells into the R7 pathway suggesting that activation of the sevenless signalling pathway is sufficient to specify R7 development. Genetic dissection of this pathway should therefore identify components of a signalling cascade activated by a tyrosine kinase. (shrink)

Istraživanje je provedeno na uzorku učenika trećih razreda strukovnih škola i gimnazija. Od uključenih učenika, gimnaziju je pohađalo njih 253, a srednje strukovne škole 352 učenika. Cilj istraživanja bio je ispitati neke specifičnosti u percepciji učenika srednjih škola o važnosti nastavnih predmeta iz područja likovnih umjetnosti. Napravljena je posebna analiza samo za dvije odabrane zavisne varijable: važnost nastavnih predmeta iz područja likovnih umjetnosti za razvoj pamćenja i sposobnosti za učenje ostalih nastavnih predmeta te interes i zadovoljstvo sudjelovanjem u likovnim aktivnostima. (...) Rezultati pokazuju da ne postoji statistički značajna razlika između učenika gimnazija i strukovnih škola u procjeni sudjelovanja u aktivnostima nastave likovne umjetnosti te u procjeni važnosti likovnih aktivnosti za razvoj pamćenja i sposobnosti za učenje ostalih predmeta. Postoji statistički značajna spolna razlika u procjeni sudjelovanja u aktivnostima nastave likovne umjetnosti te u procjeni važnosti likovnih aktivnosti za razvoj pamćenja i sposobnosti za učenje ostalih predmeta. Može se zaključiti da ispitanici nisu bili u mogućnosti procijeniti koliko i u koju svrhu će im u daljnjem školovanju i budućem zanimanju koristiti kompetencije stečene u nastavi likovne umjetnosti. This research was carried out on a sample of third year pupils of vocational schools and gymnasiums. Of the surveyed pupils, 253 of them attended gymnasiums, while 352 attended vocational secondary schools. The goal of this research was to examine specificities in secondary school pupils’ perceptions of the importance of subjects in the field of the fine arts. A separate analysis was undertaken for only two selected dependent variables: the importance of subjects in the field of the fine arts for developing memory and the ability to learn other subjects, and interest in and satisfaction with participation in fine arts activities. The results show that there is no statistically significant difference between the estimation of gymnasium and vocational school pupils regarding participation in fine arts activities or in their estimation of the importance of fine arts activities in developing memory and the ability to learn other subjects. There is a statistically significant gender difference in the estimation of participation in fine arts activities, as well as in the estimation of the importance of fine arts activities in developing memory and the ability to learn other subjects. It can be concluded that respondents were unable to estimate how much or why they would use competencies gained in fine arts teaching in their continued education or their future careers. (shrink)

Desde la antigüedad greco-latina viene planteado un problema que aún persiste en nuestrosdías ¿cuál es el estatuto que nos permite distinguir claramente la especificidad de un textoescrito? La necesidad de presentar a uno de los filósofos más emblemáticos, Sócrates, a lasnuevas generaciones creó un reto difícil de superar. El hecho de que este pensador nodejara obra escrita ni planteara una teoría específica, pero al tiempo fuese un ejemplo depensador y de vida, hizo a los que le conocieron, se propusieran reconstruir (...) esta difícilfaceta de una forma vívida. Tanto Platón, Jenofonte, Antístenes y Esquines, los másconocidos biógrafos de Sócrates, tuvieron que ingeniárselas para hacer pasar a la historia aeste genial filósofo. Según noticias de Werner Jeager en la época de estos filósofos seusaba una forma estilística denominada Enkonion o Elkonion, para hacer un retrato escritode una persona importante, una especie de panegírico que Aristóteles en su Retóricaclasifica como perteneciente uno de los géneros de la argumentación: el género epidíctico.En el análisis de este género discursivo se puede observar tal problemática. Por ejemplo losDiálogos de Platón, cuyo personaje central es Sócrates, están a medio camino entre lo quehoy conocemos como filosofía, retórica y literatura, y que en aquella época no se hacía taldistinción tajante como se hace hoy en día. Analizando la estructura de las diferentespresentaciones del filósofo podemos ver claramente que el problema que se les presentó alos biógrafos fue de retórica que es la base que fundamenta los discursos filosóficos yliterarios. (shrink)

Early period (h. I-III) works are the most basic data sources in tafsīr studies. However, the related works were shaped within the conditions of the period. In this process, the literacy and schooling rate is low. It is not easy to obtain sufficient writing materials. For this reason, the information was initially transferred as a verbal, some of the original material that has been written has not survived. The information, which is usually narrated and sometimes written, can be learned through (...) the written copies of the next dates. However, there are serious time intervals between the author and the manuscript copies. This time period has led to some problems. There are such works that the author is controversial. There is such information that it is obvious that it was added later. Although some works belonging to the period were compiled from the sources of the following centuries, they were printed under the name of some people who lived in the early period, as if they gave the impression of author copy. Each of these matters has the quality to affect the nature of the information to be used as reference and the perception to be created on it. The relation of the subject with the interpretation of the Qur'ān and the fact that it is binding has a special importance, therefore, it requires knowing the formation stages of the reference source, especially in the commentary of tafsīr. In the article, the author-work relation in early tafsīr works has been tried to be processed on a sufficient number of examples with their respective dimensions.Summary: Early works in tafsīr studies are the most basic data sources. However, the related works were shaped within the conditions of the period. The data at the beginning were verbally transmitted, but some original material that has been written has not survived until nowadays. Therefore, the information about tafsīr are derived from the mainly Buhkārī (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875), Tirmidhī (d. 279/892), Nasā’ī (d. 303/915) which have tafsīr contents, and encyclopedic sources which have been contended narrations suhc as Țabarī (d. 310/923) and Ibn Abī Ḥātim (d. 327/938).Some later dated work/s belonged to people who lived in the early period alo contribute to this accumulation. However, in scientific studies it is necessary to pay attention to the harmony or difference between the author manuscripts and copies which have been survived. Because the limited possibilities of the period, the time interval between the author and the writing copy, the corrosion that occurred in the texts over time, the capacity or thought the scribe has caused the addition and reduction of the original copy of the text. Although it is rare, it is also possible to attribute the work to a well-known person of the period in order to gain the reputation of the views in the work.In this regard, the article first draws attention to the time difference between the author and the copies that have survived to the present day. Accordingly, it was emphasized that there may be works with controversial belonging to the author. Because, it may be that the names of those who expand, explain or shorten the work with additions are given as the author's name.It is shown with examples that additions to the work could be made in the time interval between the author and the manuscript that has survived to the present day. However, sometimes the difference between copies can be based on many reasons, from the ignorance of the obscene to its forgetfulness and even deliberate replacement. Even in the hadith narrations that attribute special importance to its narration, it is quite possible that the additions were made intentionally or unknowingly, even after the transition to the written period.However, this study was carried out only on tafsīr works. Because even the sampling on a limited number of tafsīr works pushes the limits of the article.In the study, the original texts of the selected works as samples such as Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Farrāʾ, Abū ʿUbayda, etc. were reviewed, and the master's and doctorate studies on the relevant works and the period, especially their editorial evaluations, were tried to be examined as much as possible. In the evaluations, the classical period sources such as Ibnu-Nadīm, Thaʻlabī and Ibn Khallikān, where tafsīr works were subject, as well as the Ottoman period like Edirnevī; Modern era works such as Brockelman and Sezgin were used. Books, articles and encyclopedia articles evaluating the manuscripts were also used.The study revealed that when the early tafsīr references were given, the author-copy relationship should be taken into consideration. Because, although some names are mentioned as mufassīr in the sources, it is controversial whether some of them convert the relevant information into written form. Because the period of the compilation is started in the period of tâbiûn in its earliest form. It is understood that even though the writing is partially activated, the tendency to convey information by narration continues from the examples given.The fact that no original work of the period reaches the present day, there is a serious time gap between the oldest manuscripts carrying the relevant information to the present day and its authors raises the issue of the reliability of the information. This is an issue to be considered in research and updating of information. Because it was seen that some information was difficult to determine the author. In addition, it has been understood that there may be additions afterwards besides the possibility of missing or misreported information due to various factors during the transfer. The fact that narration analysis has not been done properly in the context of the tafsīr science can lead to wrong conclusions in some works, if the possibility of reaching the information added later has not been taken into consideration.In addition, creating author copies from manuscripts is a challenging process with some difficulties in itself. No matter how fastidious it is shown, it should not be forgotten that the work is compiled from manuscripts, it should be known that errors may occur despite the maximum sensitivity.It is another point to consider that some information should be associated with the author and turned into a book based on the narrations in the sources of the next period. It should not be forgotten that some works were created by collecting the narrations of the next period. When the process in its formation is not taken into account, there is a possibility that the relevant information creates an early perception of false perception, as well as the belief that it expresses correct and precise information in all aspects due to its connection with the sacred. It is obvious that there is a difference between the original information from the author's pen and the quality and knowledge value of the information collected by claiming belonging to the author from later works. It is necessary to pay attention to this difference in information transfer.Therefore, during the investigation of the envoy, whose main task is to determine the will of Allah, he has to take into account the mentioned features of the early works. Reliable knowledge transfer and correct religion perception can only be achieved with this care. (shrink)