In ancient Rome, there was no need for people to have distinct names, they followed that of their tribe. For instance, a family of four children would classify their kids as young, middle, old, and first-born. There was no need for them to have their own identity because this identity was no expected to serve any purpose. Although two thousand years have gone by, this ideological reproduction of the self into a miniature replica is still present within contemporary Levantine societies. (...) This paper will particularly shed light on 21 st century Lebanon and its system of ideological stratification and inheritance; this structure functions on the basis of an advanced rendition of primitive tribalism, known as sectarianism. Consequently, this sectarian identity enables the othering of the self from its own surrounding as well as any “outsider”. This constant and inter-generational practice is classified as a manifestation of persistence. (shrink)

In his formidable Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, Kojin Karatani endeavors to assert the critical potential of an in-between stance which he calls the “parallaxview”: when confronted with an antinomic stance, in the precise Kantian sense of the term, one should renounce all attempts to reduce one aspect to the other. One should, on the contrary, assert antinomy as irreducible, and conceive the point of radical critique not as a certain determinate position as opposed to another position, but as the (...) irreducible gap between the positions themselves, the purely structural interstice between them. Kant’s stance is thus “to see things neither from his own viewpoint, nor from the viewpoint of others, but to face the reality that is exposed through difference (parallax).” What Kant does is to change the very terms of the debate; his solution—the transcendental turn—is unique in that it first rejects any ontological closure: it recognizes a certain fundamental and irreducible limitation (“finitude”) of the human condition, which is why the two poles, rational and sensual, active and passive, cannot ever be fully mediated—reconciled. And, according to Karatani, Marx, in his “critique of political economy,” when faced with the opposition of the “classical” political economy and the neo-classic reduction of value to a purely relational entity without substance, accomplished exactly the same breakthrough toward the “parallax” view: he treatedthis opposition as a Kantian antinomy, i.e., value has to originate outside circulation, in production, and in circulation. (shrink)

In his formidable Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, Kojin Karatani endeavors to assert the critical potential of an in-between stance which he calls the “parallaxview”: when confronted with an antinomic stance, in the precise Kantian sense of the term, one should renounce all attempts to reduce one aspect to the other. One should, on the contrary, assert antinomy as irreducible, and conceive the point of radical critique not as a certain determinate position as opposed to another position, but as the (...) irreducible gap between the positions themselves, the purely structural interstice between them. Kant’s stance is thus “to see things neither from his own viewpoint, nor from the viewpoint of others, but to face the reality that is exposed through difference .” What Kant does is to change the very terms of the debate; his solution—the transcendental turn—is unique in that it first rejects any ontological closure: it recognizes a certain fundamental and irreducible limitation of the human condition, which is why the two poles, rational and sensual, active and passive, cannot ever be fully mediated—reconciled. And, according to Karatani, Marx, in his “critique of political economy,” when faced with the opposition of the “classical” political economy and the neo-classic reduction of value to a purely relational entity without substance, accomplished exactly the same breakthrough toward the “parallax” view: he treatedthis opposition as a Kantian antinomy, i.e., value has to originate outside circulation, in production, and in circulation. (shrink)

Book synopsis: Philosopher, cultural critic, and agent provocateur Slavoj Žižek constructs a fascinating new framework to look at the forces of violence in our world. Using history, philosophy, books, movies, Lacanian psychiatry, and jokes, Slavoj Žižek examines the ways we perceive and misperceive violence. Drawing from his unique cultural vision, Žižek brings new light to the Paris riots of 2005; he questions the permissiveness of violence in philanthropy; in daring terms, he reflects on the powerful image and (...) determination of contemporary terrorists. Violence, Žižek states, takes three forms--subjective, objective, and systemic --and often one form of violence blunts our ability to see the others, raising complicated questions. Does the advent of capitalism and, indeed, civilization cause more violence than it prevents? Is there violence in the simple idea of "the neighbour"? And could the appropriate form of action against violence today simply be to contemplate, to think? Beginning with these and other equally contemplative questions, Žižek discusses the inherent violence of globalization, capitalism, fundamentalism, and language, in a work that will confirm his standing as one of our most erudite and incendiary modern thinkers. (shrink)

In his formidable Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, Kojin Karatani endeavors to assert the critical potential of an in-between stance which he calls the “parallaxview”: when confronted with an antinomic stance, in the precise Kantian sense of the term, one should renounce all attempts to reduce one aspect to the other. One should, on the contrary, assert antinomy as irreducible, and conceive the point of radical critique not as a certain determinate position as opposed to another position, but as the (...) irreducible gap between the positions themselves, the purely structural interstice between them. Kant’s stance is thus “to see things neither from his own viewpoint, nor from the viewpoint of others, but to face the reality that is exposed through difference (parallax).” What Kant does is to change the very terms of the debate; his solution—the transcendental turn—is unique in that it first rejects any ontological closure: it recognizes a certain fundamental and irreducible limitation (“finitude”) of the human condition, which is why the two poles, rational and sensual, active and passive, cannot ever be fully mediated—reconciled. And, according to Karatani, Marx, in his “critique of political economy,” when faced with the opposition of the “classical” political economy and the neo-classic reduction of value to a purely relational entity without substance, accomplished exactly the same breakthrough toward the “parallax” view: he treatedthis opposition as a Kantian antinomy, i.e., value has to originate outside circulation, in production, and in circulation. (shrink)

My knowledge of architecture is constrained to a coupler of idiosyncratic data: my love for Ayn Rand and her architecture-novel The Fountainhead; my admiration of the Stalinist “wedding-cake” baroque kitsch; my dream of a house composed only of secondary spaces and places of passage – stairs, corridors, toilets, store-rooms, kitchen – with no living room or bedroom. The danger that I am courting is thus that what I will say will oscillate between the two extremes of unfounded speculations and what (...) most is already known for a long time. I would like to begin with the notion of parallax which I took from Kojin Karatani. The common definition of parallax is: the apparent displacement of an object, caused by a change in observational position that provides a new line of sight. The philosophical twist to be added, of course, is that the observed difference is not simply “subjective,” due to the fact that the same object which exists “out there” is seen from two different stations, or points of view. It is rather that, as Hegel would have put it, subject and object are inherently “mediated,” so that an “epistemological” shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an “ontological” shift in the object itself. When confronted with such a parallax gap, one should renounce all attempts to reduce one aspect to the other ; the task is, on the contrary, to conceive all possible positions as responses to a certain underlying deadlock or antagonism, as so many attempts to resolve this deadlock… and this already brings us to so-called postmodern architecture which, sometimes, seems to enact the notion of parallax in a directly-palpable way. Think about Liebeskind or Gehry: their work often appears as a desperate attempt to combine two incompatible structuring principles within the same building, as if two principles are locked in a struggle for hegemony. (shrink)

In _Civilization and Its Discontents_, Freud made abundantly clear what he thought about the biblical injunction, first articulated in Leviticus 19:18 and then elaborated in Christian teachings, to love one's neighbor as oneself. "Let us adopt a naive attitude towards it," he proposed, "as though we were hearing it for the first time; we shall be unable then to suppress a feeling of surprise and bewilderment." After the horrors of World War II, the Holocaust, Stalinism, and Yugoslavia, Leviticus 19:18 seems (...) even less conceivable—but all the more urgent now—than Freud imagined. In _The Neighbor_, three of the most significant intellectuals working in psychoanalysis and critical theory collaborate to show how this problem of neighbor-love opens questions that are fundamental to ethical inquiry and that suggest a new theological configuration of political theory. Their three extended essays explore today's central historical problem: the persistence of the theological in the political. In "Towards a Political Theology of the Neighbor," Kenneth Reinhard supplements Carl Schmitt's political theology of the enemy and friend with a political theology of the neighbor based in psychoanalysis. In "Miracles Happen," Eric L. Santner extends the book's exploration of neighbor-love through a bracing reassessment of Benjamin and Rosenzweig. And in an impassioned plea for ethical violence, Slavoj Žižek's "Neighbors and Other Monsters" reconsiders the idea of excess to rehabilitate a positive sense of the inhuman and challenge the influence of Levinas on contemporary ethical thought. A rich and suggestive account of the interplay between love and hate, self and other, personal and political, _The Neighbor_ will prove to be a touchstone across the humanities and a crucial text for understanding the persistence of political theology in secular modernity. (shrink)

The ‘inherent transgression’ refers to the notion that the very emergence of a certain ‘value’ which serves as a point of ideological identification relies on its transgression, on some mode of taking a distance from it. Ideology depends upon the ‘gap’ that the symbolic order produces between itself and the subject as an effect of bringing the latter into being as a subject of language. Since there is no direct, unmediated relationship between the subject and the authentic, true value, the (...) problem of ‘belief takes on vital importance. But the very separation between belief and knowledge requires that the’ true believer’ must always be someone else. The ‘Lacanian’ decentred subject has to live out the authenticity of his being or her jouissance through the Other. The problem, then, is how to sustain the fiction of the Other, the Other who believes and is worthy of belief. Belief in the Other never goes away but returns in the more excessive, threatening form of nameless powers ‘pulling the strings’, leaving the subject vulnerable to another paranoiac impostor looking to confirm the truth of the conspiracy in his or her own ‘transgressive’ image. (shrink)

In his wonderful short text ‘Notes of a Publicist’—written in February 1922 when the Bolsheviks, after winning the Civil War against all odds, had to retreat into the New Economic Policy of allowing a much wider scope to the market economy and private property—Lenin uses the analogy of a climber who must backtrack from his first attempt to reach a new mountain peak to describe what retreat means in a revolutionary process, and how it can be done without opportunistically betraying (...) the cause: Let us picture to ourselves a man ascending a very high, steep and hitherto unexplored mountain. Let us assume that he has overcome unprecedented difficulties and dangers and has succeeded in reaching a much higher point than any of his predecessors, but still has not reached the summit. He finds himself in a position where it is not only difficult and dangerous to proceed in the direction and along the path he has chosen, but positively impossible. In these circumstances, Lenin writes: He is forced to turn back, descend, seek another path, longer, perhaps, but one that will enable him to reach the summit. The descent from the height that no one before him has reached proves, perhaps, to be more dangerous and difficult for our imaginary traveller than the ascent—it is easier to slip; it is not so easy to choose a foothold; there is not that exhilaration that one feels in going upwards, straight to the goal, etc. One has to tie a rope round oneself, spend hours with an alpenstock to cut footholds or a projection to which the rope could be tied firmly; one has to move at a snail’s pace, and move downwards, descend, away from the goal; and one does not know where this extremely dangerous and painful descent will end, or whether there is a fairly safe detour by which one can ascend more boldly, more quickly and more directly to the summit. It would only be natural for a climber who found himself in such a position to have ‘moments of despondency’. In all probability these moments would be more numerous and harder to bear if he could hear the voices of those below, who ‘through a telescope and from a safe distance, are watching his dangerous descent’: ‘The voices from below ring with malicious joy. They do not conceal it; they chuckle gleefully and shout: “He’ll fall in a minute! Serve him right, the lunatic!”.’ Others try to conceal their malicious glee, behaving ‘more like Judas Golovlyov’, the notoriously hypocritical landowner in Saltykov-Shchedrin’s novel, The Golovlyov Family: They moan and raise their eyes to heaven in sorrow, as if to say: ‘It grieves us sorely to see our fears justified! But did not we, who have spent all our lives working out a judicious plan for scaling this mountain, demand that the ascent be postponed until our plan was complete? And if we so vehemently protested against taking this path, which this lunatic is now abandoning, if we so fervently censured this lunatic and warned everybody against imitating and helping him, we did so entirely because of our devotion to the great plan to scale this mountain, and in order to prevent this great plan from being generally discredited!’ Happily, Lenin continues, our imaginary traveller cannot hear the voices of these people who are ‘true friends’ of the idea of ascent; if he did, ‘they would probably nauseate him’—‘And nausea, it is said, does not help one to keep a clear head and a firm step, particularly at high altitudes.’ Of course, a metaphor does not amount to proof: ‘every analogy is lame’. (shrink)

Two topics determine today's liberal tolerant attitude towards Others: the respect of Otherness and the obsessive fear of harassment: the Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as the Other is not really Other. The central human right in late-capitalist society, namely the right to be free from all harassment by the Other including the violent imposition of ethical norms, contrasts sharply with the violent imposition of divine Mosaic law – the Decalogue – from which the (...) idea of human rights ultimately derives. The underlying discursive shift can be analyzed with the help of Lacan: the discourse of the Master had been replaced by university discourse. While the Master's decision is per se violent, university discourse is enunciated from the position of neutral Knowledge. The truth of the university discourse is power: the constitutive lie of the university discourse is that it disavows its performative dimension, presenting what effectively amounts to a political decision based on power as a simple insight into the factual state of things. (shrink)

Jacques Lacan coined the term “subjective destitution” to describe the concluding moment of a psychoanalytic treatment. This concept can also usefully be applied to art and to politics. In art, subjective destitution can be defined as a passage from being-towardsdeath to undeadness, in other words to the position of the living dead – this passage takes place between Shostakovich’s 14th symphony and his final symphony, the 15th. In politics, subjective destitution designates the passage of a political subject to a radical (...) de-subjectivization, to becoming an object of a political cause. (shrink)

In a critical reading of my plenary talk at the Law and Critique Conference in 2007, Sara Ahmed challenges my claim that it is an “empirical fact” that liberal multiculturalism is hegemonic. Her first step is to emphasize the distinction between the semblance of hegemony and actual hegemony: Hegemony is not really reducible to facts as it involves semblance, fantasy and illusion, being a question of how things appear and the gap between appearance and how bodies are distributed. To read (...) hegemony we have to distrust how things appear. Indeed, what is striking about Zizek’s retort is how much his reading of ‘political correctness’ and ‘liberal multiculturalism’ involved a certain literalism, as if the prohibition of speech acts that are not based on respecting the other’s difference are ‘really’ what is prohibited, or as if the prohibition is simply real by virtue of being articulated within public culture. So the speech act, ‘we must support the other’s difference’ is read as hegemonic, is taken literally as a sign not only that it is compulsory to support the other’s difference, but we are not allowed to refuse this support. The speech act is read as doing what it says. In order to re-consider the effects of such injunctions and prohibitions, I have introduced a new class of what I call non-performatives: speech acts that do not do what they say, that do not bring into effect that which they name. Could the speech work to create an illusion that we do support the other’s difference, which might work by not bringing such support into existence? (shrink)

The concept of disparity has long been a topic of obsession and argument for philosophers but Slavoj Žižek would argue that what disparity and negativity could mean, might mean and should mean for us and our lives has never been more hotly debated. Disparities explores contemporary 'negative' philosophies from Catherine Malabou's plasticity, Julia Kristeva's abjection and Robert Pippin's self-consciousness to the God of negative theology, new realisms and post-humanism and draws a radical line under them. Instead of establishing a (...) dialogue with these other ideas of disparity, Slavoj Žižek wants to establish a definite departure, a totally different idea of disparity based on an imaginative dialectical materialism. This notion of rupturing what has gone before is based on a provocative reading of how philosophers can, if they're honest, engage with each other. Slavoj Žižek borrows Alain Badiou's notion that a true idea is the one that divides. Radically departing from previous formulations of negativity and disparity, Žižek employs a new kind of negativity: namely positing that when a philosopher deals with another philosopher, his or her stance is never one of dialogue, but one of division, of drawing a line that separates truth from falsity. (shrink)

In _Civilization and Its Discontents_, Freud made abundantly clear what he thought about the biblical injunction, first articulated in Leviticus 19:18 and then elaborated in Christian teachings, to love one's neighbor as oneself. “Let us adopt a naive attitude towards it,” he proposed, “as though we were hearing it for the first time; we shall be unable then to suppress a feeling of surprise and bewilderment.” After the horrors of World War II, the Holocaust, and Stalinism, Leviticus 19:18 seems even (...) less conceivable—but all the more urgent now—than Freud imagined. In _The Neighbor_, three of the most significant intellectuals working in psychoanalysis and critical theory collaborate to show how this problem of neighbor-love opens questions that are fundamental to ethical inquiry and that suggest a new theological configuration of political theory. Their three extended essays explore today's central historical problem: the persistence of the theological in the political. In “Toward a Political Theology of the Neighbor,” Kenneth Reinhard supplements Carl Schmitt’s political theology of the enemy and friend with a political theology of the neighbor based in psychoanalysis. In “Miracles Happen,” Eric L. Santner extends the book's exploration of neighbor-love through a bracing reassessment of Benjamin and Rosenzweig. And in an impassioned plea for ethical violence, Slavoj Žižek’s “Neighbors and Other Monsters” reconsiders the idea of excess to rehabilitate a positive sense of the inhuman and challenge the influence of Levinas on contemporary ethical thought. A rich and suggestive account of the interplay between love and hate, self and other, personal and political, _The Neighbor_ has proven to be a touchstone across the humanities and a crucial text for understanding the persistence of political theology in secular modernity. This new edition contains a new preface by the authors. (shrink)

Contribution to a collective work called “Manifesto: A Struggle for Universalities” to be published soon and edited by Nicol A, Barría Asensio & Slavoj Zizek: _Foreword:_ Yanis Varaoufakis: _Epilogue:_ David Pavón-Cuellar and over 40 other contributors. In the words of Nicol A, Barría Asenjo: “The present Manifesto arises as an attempt to respond to the current political, historical, social and economic situation. The 21st century prevails, containing within itself the antagonisms, challenges and debates that the history of humanity has tried (...) to overcome. The 21st century is a repetition of systematic failure, a living symptom of past epochs that have not learned to re-elaborate and re-signify their own symptom. We are and live in a repetition that must be stopped, if our goal is that the signifier "humanity" remains in the following centuries, the time has come to work in the present.”. (shrink)

Today’s predominant mode of politics is the post-political biopolitics an expression which is effectively tautological: “post-politics” designates the reduction of politics to the expert administration of social life. Such a politics is ultimately a politics of fear, a politics focused on the defense against a potential victimization or harassment. Therein resides the true line of separation between radical emancipatory politics and the predominant status quo politics: it is not the difference of two different positive visions, sets of axioms, but, rather, (...) the difference between the politics based on a set of universal axioms and the politics which renounces the very constitutive dimension of the political, since it resorts to fear as its ultimate mobilizing principle: fear of immigrants, fear of crime, fear of godless sexual depravity, fear of the excessive State itself, fear of ecological catastrophes, fear of harassment – such a politics always relies on the manipulation of a paranoid ochlos – the frightening rallying of frightened men. The zero-level of politics today is the depoliticized expert administration and coordination of interests; the only way to introduce passion into this field, to actively mobilize people, is through fear. At the level of social objectivity, we have mechanisms and processes to be regulated by expert administrators; the subjective counterpart of it is fear, the basic constituent of today’s subjectivity. This is why the big event not only in Europe in the early 2006 was that the anti-immigration politics “went mainstream”: they finally cut the umbilical link that connected them to the far Right fringe parties. From France to Germany, from Austria to Holland, in the new spirit of pride at one’s cultural and historical identity, the main parties now find it acceptable to stress that the immigrants “are guests who have to accommodate themselves to the cultural values that define the host society – it is “our country, love it or leave it.” This fear is, at its most basic, the fear of the Neighbor. There are two topics which determine today’s liberal tolerant attitude towards Others: the respect of Otherness, openness towards it, and the obsessive fear of harassment – in short, the Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as the Other is not really Other… In the strict homology with the paradoxical structure of chocolate laxative, tolerance this coincides with its opposite: my duty to be tolerant towards the other effectively means that I should not get too close to him, not to intrude into his/her space – in short, that I should respect his/her intolerance towards my over-proximity. This is what is more and more emerging as the central “human right” in late-capitalist society: the right not to be “harassed,” i.e., to be kept at a safe distance from the others. (shrink)

Lacan: Television – let’s proceed like idiots; let’s take this title literally and ask ourselves a question, not the question, “what can we learn about TV from Lacan’s teaching?” which would get us on the wrong path of so-called applied psychoanalysis, but the inverse question, “what can we learn about Lacan’s teaching from the TV phenomenon?” At first sight, this seems as absurd as the well-known Hegelian proposition defining phrenology, “the spirit is the bone”: the equalization of the most sublime, (...) elusive theory with the vulgar mass-cultural phenomenon. But perhaps, as in the Hegelian proposition, there is a “speculative truth” beneath the obvious banality – perhaps certain peculiarities of the American TV program allow us to grasp the fundamental Lacanian proposition that psychoanalysis is not a psychology: the most intimate beliefs – even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter – can be transferred, delegated to others without losing their sincerity. (shrink)

The opposition between Kant and Rorty with regard to the distinction of public and private is rarely noted, but nonetheless crucial: they both sharply distinguish between the two domains, but in the opposite sense. For Rorty, the great contemporary liberal if there ever was one, private is the space of our idiosyncrasies where creativity and wild imagination rule, and moral considerations are suspended, while public is the space of social interaction where we should obey the rules so that we do (...) not hurt others; in other words, the private is the space of irony, while the public is the space of solidarity. For Kant, however, the public space of the “world-civil-society” designates the paradox of the universal singularity, of a singular subject who, in a kind of short-circuit, by-passing the mediation of the particular, directly participates in the Universal. This is what Kant, in the famous passage of his “What is Enlightenment?”, means by “public” as opposed to “private”: “private” is not individual as opposed to one’s communal ties, but the very communal-institutional order of one’s particular identification, while “public” is the trans-national universality of the exercise of one’s Reason. The paradox of the underlying formula “Think freely, but obey!” is thus that one participates in the universal dimension of the “public” sphere precisely as singular individual extracted from or even opposed to one’s substantial communal identification—one is truly universal only as radically singular, in the interstices of communal identities. It is Kant who should be read here as the critic of Rorty: in his vision of the public space of the unconstrained free exercise of Reason, he asserts the dimension of emancipatory universality OUTSIDE the confines of one’s social identity, of one’s position within the order of being—the dimension missing in Rorty. (shrink)

The predominance of religiously justified violence can be accounted for by the very fact that we live in an era that perceives itself as post-ideological. Since great public causes can no longer be used to incite mass violence, that is, since our hegemonic ideology calls on us to enjoy life and to realise our Selves, it is difficult for the majority to overcome their revulsion at torturing and killing another human being. The majority would need to be 'anaesthetised' against their (...) elementary sensitivity to the suffering of others in order to do this. Religious ideologists usually claim that religion makes some otherwise bad people do some good things; from today's experience, one should give more weight to Steven Weinreich's claim that, while without religion good people would do good things and bad people bad things, only religion can make good people do bad things. (shrink)

In his review of Badiou's Ethics, Terry Eagleton wrote: There is a paradox in the idea of transformation. If a transformation is deep-seated enough, it might also transform the very criteria by which we could identify it, thus making it unintelligible to us. But if it is intelligible, it might be because the transformation was not radical enough. If we can talk about the change then it is not full-blooded enough; but if it is full-blooded enough, it threatens to fall (...) outside our comprehension. Change must presuppose continuity - a subject to whom the alteration occurs - if we are not to be left merely with two incommensurable states; but how can such continuity be compatible with revolutionary upheaval? [1] The properly Hegelian solution to this dilemma is that a truly radical change is self-relating: it changes the very coordinates by means of which we measure change. In other words, a true change sets its own standards: it can only be measured by criteria that result from it. (shrink)

need to confront Taylor’s theory of secularism as fending off Marcel Gauchet’sincisive post-Weberinan reading of Christianity as producing an “exit fromreligion”. Finally, I examine Taylor’s perspectivist history and theory ofsecularism. Ultimately, I argue that Taylor’s perspectivism forsakes aconception of religion as subjective reason for a subjectivism that embracesorder and institutional power in the name of benevolence. By reinforcing hispersonal faith in Catholicism, Taylor inevitably weakens his otherwise solidand important claim to participate in the transformational unfolding ofChristian moral philosophy into a (...) bona fide public philosophy withuniversalist ambitions.O artigo explora dois sentidos diferentes da formulação “o grande outro nãoexiste”: o primeiro, formulado por Lacan, atesta a inexistência real do grandeOutro e seu caráter estritamente simbólico; o segundo, característico dapostura cínica, resulta do descrédito diante da ordem simbólica e apontapara o ressurgimento da figura do grande Outro no Real. A crença no grandeOutro que existe no Real é a mais sucinta definição de paranóia: o sujeitocontemporâneo, ao mesmo tempo em que demonstra um descrédito cínicodiante de toda ideologia pública, entrega-se a fantasias paranóicas sobreconspirações, ameaças e formas excessivas de gozo do Outro. A descrençano grande Outro , a recusa do sujeito de“levar a sério”, repousa sobre a crença de um “Outro do Outro,” um agenteinvisível, secreto, onipotente, que efetivamente “puxa os cordões” por trásdo poder público visível.The aim of this article is to explore two different senses of the statement:“The big Other doesn’t exist”. The first sense, formulated by Lacan, showsthe real inexistence of the big Other and its strictly symbolic character. Thesecond sense, characteristic of a cynical stance, is the outcome of discrediting the symbolic order. It points to the resurgence of the figure of the big Otherin the Real. Now, belief in a big Other that exists, as it were, in the Real, isone of the most succinct definitions of paranoia. The contemporary subjectsurrenders to paranoid fantasies about conspiracies, threats and excessiveforms of the Other’s jouissance precisely when it cynically discredits allpublic ideologies. Disbelief in the big Other ,that is, the subject’s refusal to “take things seriously”, rests on the belief ofan “Other of the Other”: an invisible, secret and omnipotent agent “pullingthe strings” behind the visible side of public power. (shrink)

What ethical stance would be appropriate in today’s messy situation of health crisis, global warming, social and economic antagonisms, etc.? The first one is that of an expert who deals with the specific task imposed on him by those in power, blissfully ignoring the wider social context of his activity. The second one is that of pseudo-radical intellectuals who criticize the existing order from a comfortable morally superior position, well aware that their criticism will have no actual effects. How, then, (...) are we to go on living after we get rid of the illusions of a false critical stance? Not just by accepting our reality: the fascination with the end of our civilization make us spectators who morbidly enjoy the disintegration of normality. A way out of this deadlock is signalled by a line from a song by the German rock band Rammstein: “we have to live till we die”. We have to fight against the pandemic and other crises not by way of withdrawing from life but as a way to live with utmost intensity. Is there anyone more ALIVE today than millions of healthcare workers who with full awareness risk their lives on a daily base? Many of them died, but till they died they were alive. (shrink)

Fascinated by the recent scientific progress, even some philosophers today claim that philosophy is dead and that natural sciences (quantum cosmology, cognitive sciences) can answer questions which were once considered a domain of metaphysics: is our universe finite? Do we have free will? etc. The essay tries to problematize this claims by raising a series of questions. First, it is easy to show that modern science itself relies on a series of philosophical propositions. Second, what accounts for the role of (...) science in our world is its link with capitalism. Third, we should distinguish between knowledge and truth: not only philosophy, other discourses (like Marxism or psychoanalysis) also practice a notion of truth which cannot be reduced to knowledge. (shrink)

In Ireland, HSE issued guidelines about practicing sex in the time of coronavirus, and the two key recommendations are: “Taking a break from physical and face-to face interactions is worth considering, especially if you usually meet your sex partners online or make a living by having sex. Consider using video dates, sexting or chat rooms. Make sure to disinfect keyboards and touch screens that you share with others. / Masturbation will not spread coronavirus, especially if you wash your hands with (...) soap and water for at least 20 seconds before and after. (shrink)

This article presents a conceptual and methodological framework to study heritage-based tribalism in Big Data ecologies by combining approaches from the humanities, social and computing sciences. We use such a framework to examine how ideas of human origin and ancestry are deployed on Twitter for purposes of antagonistic ‘othering’. Our goal is to equip researchers with theory and analytical tools for investigating divisive online uses of the past in today’s networked societies. In particular, we apply notions of heritage, othering and (...) neo-tribalism, and both data-intensive and qualitative methods to the case of people’s engagements with the news of Cheddar Man’s DNA on Twitter. We show that heritage-based tribalism in Big Data ecologies is uniquely shaped as an assemblage by the coalescing of different forms of antagonistic othering. Those that co-occur most frequently are the ones that draw on ‘Views on Race’, ‘Trust in Experts’ and ‘Political Leaning’. The framings of the news that were most influential in triggering heritage-based tribalism were introduced by both right- and left-leaning newspaper outlets and by activist websites. We conclude that heritage-themed communications that rely on provocative narratives on social media tend to be labelled as political and not to be conducive to positive change in people’s attitudes towards issues such as racism. (shrink)

The primary objective of this essay is to illuminate why the work of French philosopher Alain Badiou has become so important to the work of Slavoj Žižek. The primary audiences include new or relatively new readers of Žižek , the merely curious, and those, like myself, whose various disciplinary specific pursuits engage with the work of Žižek and Badiou, but only indirectly and very often in a haphazard fashion. I am particularly interested in addressing those that “borrow” (...) from or “use” Žižek and Badiou to inform their own work in various fields but who do not, as a general rule, consider themselves philosophers or theorists or, at least, do not write as philosophers or theorists but as “theoretically informed” or “philosophically minded” literary critics, political scientists, anthropologists, etc. In particular, I contend that Badiou is so important to Žižek because in the course of the 1990s and the early twenty-first century Badiou’s work helped Žižek, both philosophically and rhetorically/strategically, confront and avoid the “religious” or “ethical” temptation ever present in philosophy. In so doing I trace Žižek’s struggle with “the usual gang of democracy-to-come-deconstructionist-postsecular-Levinasian-respect-for-Otherness suspects.”. (shrink)

Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. The primary source of evidence for this position is our intuition that humans’ interests matter more than the similar interests of other animals. And it must be acknowledged that this intuition is both powerful and widespread. But should we trust it for all that? The present (...) paper defends a negative answer to that question, based on a debunking argument. The intuitive belief that humans matter more than other animals is unjustified because it results from an epistemically defective process. It is largely shaped by tribalism, our tendency to favor ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. And this influence is distortive for two reasons. First, tribalism evolved for reasons unrelated to moral truths; hence, it would at best produce true moral beliefs accidentally. Second, tribalism generates a vast quantity of false moral beliefs, starting with racist beliefs. Once this intuition is discarded, little evidence remains that speciesism is morally acceptable. (shrink)

In 1976, Jo Freeman wrote an article for Ms. Magazine, entitled ‘Trashing: The Dark Side of Sisterhood’. It provoked an outpouring of letters from women relating their own experiences of trashing during the course of the second wave feminist movement—more letters than Ms. had received about any previous article. Since then, the technology has improved but the climate among feminists has not; trashing is now conducted on social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook, in front of ever-larger audiences and with (...) the magnified opportunities for destruction that these new platforms bring with them. Women already experience disproportionate harassment on social media; many feel trashing by other feminists to be much harder to accept. It’s one thing for people to hate feminists; resistance from those for whom a social justice movement represents a threat is par for the course. But it’s something else for feminists to hate each other. These are people with shared goals and a common enemy. What are the psychological mechanisms underlying this fact of life for feminist activists? Various explanations might be offered, from internalised misogyny, through volatility caused by histories of oppression, through envy and competitiveness, through ideological purity policing. Which are correct? Is the hatred that motivates trashing within feminism the same in quality and quantity, or different, from the affective dynamics inside other social movements? How does tribalism between warring feminist factions contribute to these dynamics, and to what extent is trashing underwritten by laudable moral goals (such as anti-elitism and anti-hierarchy) even when it goes too far or misfires? Can a liberation movement be successful without ideological purity policing, or is there a tension between achieving social justice outcomes and facilitating a healthy amount of disagreement and constructive criticism within a group? In this paper I’ll focus on potential explanations of the phenomena of trashing, including tribalism, power grabs, and purity policing; and the moral commitments that might lead feminists to trash each other. (shrink)

Despite Žižek’s privileging of politics over ethics, it is possible to reconstruct from his work a very significant, thoroughgoing reconception of ethics and metaethics. He sets forth accounts of the nature of ethics, action, freedom, the supreme moral principle, the fact-value split, the relation of the self to others, and the values that should determine our actions. He expresses a Kantian/Lacanian notion of law and freedom, an Hegelian critique of the subject-object distinction, a Lacanian subversion of the fact-value split, (...) and an Adornian quasi-formalist treatment of ethical imperatives. The most radical element within his ethics is arguably his notion of the passage à l’acte, according to which certain types of actions not only transgress extant norms, but challenge the very nature of the norms, transform the coordinates of the reality principle, and bring into being its conditions of value. (shrink)

Preface: The dog's bollocks-- at the media dinner party -- Introduction: "The Marx brothers", "The Elvis of cultural theory", and other media clichés -- The mediated imp of the perverse -- Žižek's tickling shtick -- Big (Br)other : psychoanalysing the media -- Understanding the media : the sublime objectification of ideology -- The media's violence -- The joker's little shop of ideological horrors -- Conclusion: Don't just do it : negative dialectics in the age of Nike.

This paper uses evidence from laboratory experiments to identify a variety of tribalisms. This is important because some tribalisms encourage zerosum thinking and others do not; and some are not developed by Buchanan. This, in turn, supplies new insights into Buchanan’s project of identifying the kinds of environment that encourage his sense of moral progress. In particular, current levels of inequality become a significant barrier to moral progress not only because they create an economic form of tribalist zero-sum thinking but (...) they also undermine the scope for positive-sum. (shrink)

Slavoj Žižek is the most popular and discussed philosopher in the world today. His prolific writings – across philosophy, psychoanalysis, political and social theory, film, music and religion – always engage and provoke. The power of his ideas, the breadth of his references, his capacity for playfulness and confrontation, his willingness to change his mind and his refusal fundamentally to alter his argument – all have worked to build an extraordinary international readership as well as to elicit much critical (...) reaction. _The Žižek Dictionary _brings together leading Žižek commentators from across the world to present a companion and guide to Žižekian thought. Each of the 60 short essays examines a key term and, crucially, explores its development across Žižek’s work and how it fits in with other concepts and concerns. The dictionary will prove invaluable both to readers coming to Žižek for the first time and to those already embarked on the Žižekian journey. (shrink)

Slavoj Žižek is the most popular and discussed philosopher in the world today. His prolific writings – across philosophy, psychoanalysis, political and social theory, film, music and religion – always engage and provoke. The power of his ideas, the breadth of his references, his capacity for playfulness and confrontation, his willingness to change his mind and his refusal fundamentally to alter his argument – all have worked to build an extraordinary international readership as well as to elicit much critical (...) reaction. _The Žižek Dictionary _brings together leading Žižek commentators from across the world to present a companion and guide to Žižekian thought. Each of the 60 short essays examines a key term and, crucially, explores its development across Žižek’s work and how it fits in with other concepts and concerns. The dictionary will prove invaluable both to readers coming to Žižek for the first time and to those already embarked on the Žižekian journey. (shrink)

This essay is a cut-up / remix / montage of the work of Slavoj Žižek. It is a recombination of materials from his critical publications, including The Sublime Object of Ideology, For They Know Not What They Do, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, The Parallax View, In Defense of Lost Causes, First As Tragedy, Then As Farce, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism, (...) and Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism. The section headers are all direct quotations from Žižek’s texts, as are the individual sentences in the essay’s first section. All other sentences are splicings-together of syntactic fragments from his texts. This essay is part of A Recombinant Theory Project. Micro-reports from this project are regularly published on Twitter: @remixtheory. (shrink)

Roche, Marcia Sectarianism has been defined as 'adherence or excessive devotion to a particular religious denomination or sect'.1 However, as Kildea notes, dictionary definitions of the term fail to square with its 'distinctive' meaning in the Australian context.2A more accurate representation of the Australian connotation is conveyed by Hogan, who says that it refers to 'the hostility between different churches or "sects" which has manifested itself in the wider arena of social and political conflict'.3 The social, political and economic discrimination (...) and exclusion that has existed in Australia between Catholics and Protestants was most intense from the beginning of European settlement until the 1960s, when the Catholic Church's endorsement of ecumenism offered a means of positive engagement with members of other Christian denominations. (shrink)

Slavoj Zizek is the most popular and discussed philosopher in the world today. His prolific writings - across philosophy, psychoanalysis, political and social theory, film, music and religion - always engage and provoke. The power of his ideas, the breadth of his references, his capacity for playfulness and confrontation, his willingness to change his mind and his refusal fundamentally to alter his argument - all have worked to build an extraordinary international readership as well as to elicit much critical reaction. (...) The Zizek Dictionary brings together leading Zizek commentators from across the world to present a companion and guide to Zizekian thought. Each of the 60 short essays examines a key term and, crucially, explores its development across Zizek's work and how it fits in with other concepts and concerns. The dictionary will prove invaluable both to readers coming to Zizek for the first time and to those already embarked on the Äi§ekian journey. (shrink)

True to his early Schellingian roots, Slavoj Zizek, in his recent book, Pandemic! Covid-19 Shakes the World describes a virus as “a kind of zero-level life,” invoking Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. Perhaps the closest reference, though Zizek did not mention it, is his second major work on the subject, namely, First Outline of A System of the Philosophy of Nature where Schelling originally propounded the theory of nature’s ‘duplicity’. In the following discussions, we will situate Zizek’s timely intervention within the context of (...) his naturalism that politically mediates the differential flows of the present world and the subject itself, against the background of a space of difference between the two, whereby the virus acts as a kind of deferral mechanism in which something like the future is suspended, finally rendering the relation motionless. The discussions will also briefly situate Zizek’s political naturalism within contemporary political discourse involving some of his direct and indirect engagements with Agamben, Latour, Badiou, Berardi, Deleuze, and others. This critical review stakes out a view of Zizek’s recent intervention as a timely polemics, consistent with his global image as one of the most dependable public intellectuals of our troubled time. (shrink)

Regarding scientific development, psychoanalysis has been compared to the Copernican and Darwinian revolution. Freud has added his name to the well-established comparison of Copernicus and Darwin by introducing his notion of three blows to man’s narcissism, defining his discovery of psychoanalysis as the most dangerous last blow. The presentation examines the possible continuation of the series of the biggest scientific revolution in Jacques Derrida and Slavoj Žižek. Derrida has added to Copernicus, Darwin and Freud the name of Karl Marx (...) as the fourth, disrupting one, defining his blow ‘in the name of the revolution’ as a much worse one, putting us today as Marx’s heirs in the position of debt and mourning. Derrida used the Freudian reading of Marx’s blow concerning the horrors of the October revolution, Stalinism, holocaust etc., while Slavoj Žižek – also relating Freud to Marx – examined the succession of Copernicus, Darwin and Freud by ‘many others’. The presentation focuses on Žižek’s idea of these ‘many others’, putting it in the context of Lacan’s return to Freud and prolonging it regarding the feminist revolution. The conclusion is made that Žižek’s elaboration of Lacan’s return of Freud, without and beyond the Lacanian feminist-psychoanalytic insistence on the centrality of sexual difference, can be understood as Žižek’s unfinished Copernican revolution. (shrink)

Resumen A diferencia de trabajos anteriores sobre el universalismo y el colonialismo en el pensamiento filosófico y político de Žižek, el presente artículo se basa en profundas coincidencias con este pensamiento, así como en irreductibles discrepancias con respecto a muchos de sus detractores. Todo esto no impide que se disienta con respecto a dos puntos fundamentales del filósofo esloveno: su posición universalista abiertamente eurocéntrica y su concepción positiva del colonialismo. La doble divergencia es resumida y justificada en las siguientes (...) doce tesis y en las objeciones que plantean a lo que se juzga inaceptable en el pensamiento žižekiano: 1) la conciencia y la crítica del horror colonial no son legados europeos; 2) el colonialismo es él mismo opresión; 3) hay otros orígenes fuera de Europa; 4) nunca se pierden todas las raíces; 5) lo aparente puede ser lo universal; 6) el capitalismo nunca supera su particularidad; 7) el capitalismo sigue comportando la colonialidad; 8) la modernidad capitalista incluye una otredad que no es ni anterior ni posterior; 9) la otredad sabe cómo explotar lo europeo que la explota; 10) un sujeto puede encontrarse en más de un universo; 11) no todo es comparable al ello fuera de Europa y Estados Unidos; y 12) es Europa la que se distorsiona al reflejarse en Estados Unidos.Unlike earlier work on universalism and colonialism in Žižek’s philosophical and political thought, this article draws on deep coincidences with this thought, as well as irreducible disagreements with many of its detractors. All this does not prevent that there are also divergences with respect to the two fundamental points of the Slovenian philosopher: his universalist openly Eurocentric position and his positive conception of colonialism. The double divergence is summarized and justified in the following twelve theses and in the objections they raise to what is deemed unacceptable in Žižekian thought: 1) the consciousness and critique of colonial horror are not European legacies; 2) colonialism is itself oppression; 3) there are other origins outside of Europe; 4) all roots are never lost; 5) the apparent can be the universal; 6) capitalism never overcomes its particularity; 7) capitalism continues to involve coloniality; 8) capitalist modernity includes an otherness that is neither anterior nor posterior; 9) otherness knows how to exploit the European that exploits it; 10) a subject can be found in more than one universe; 11) not everything is comparable to the id outside of Europe and the United States; and 12) it is Europe that is distorted when reflected in the United States. (shrink)

In the updated preface to the 2008 edition of his seminal work The Sublime Object of Ideology, Slavoj Žižek writes that “when a discipline is in crisis, attempts are made to change or supplement its theses within the terms of its basic framework – a procedure one might call ‘Ptolemization’”. The alternative, he claims, is a “true ‘Copernican’ revolution” which takes place “when, instead of just adding complications and changing minor premises, the basic framework itself undergoes a transformation”. In (...) light of these remarks, the central question posed in this paper is as follows: how might Žižek’s distinction between a Ptomelization and Copernican revolution be applied to the field of Žižek Studies today? How, in other words, might we seek to re-evaluate Žižek’s work in a way that includes the mechanisms of evaluation as part of the observed phenomena? The working hypothesis is that, as Žižekians, we must reassert the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis as articulated by Žižek himself: one must remember to include as part of the content of the message communicated, the act of communication itself. In short, when it comes to the reception of Žižek’s thought we should remember Žižek’s basic point that “the question to ask is always: is this truly a Copernician revolution, or merely a Ptolemization of the old paradigm?”. (shrink)

Walt Disney’s animation film Bambi is transparently liberal, and in the post-1968 era could even be seen as post-modern and deep-ecological. The reading offered here, however, makes three counter-moves to this prevailing interpretation: First it follows in both broad technique and ultimate conclusion Žižek’s critique of The Sound of Music wherein he unmasks a fascist ideology encoded in this ostensibly liberal musical. Second, it introduces a gender lens via Silvia Plath’s autobiographical poem, “Daddy,” and third, it employs Lacan's Mirror (...) Stage as key to this construction of a gendered identity and hierarchy. These three moves combine to show that, far from a simple coming-of-age cartoon about a cute little deer, the perennial classic Bambi can be read decidedly other-wise. (shrink)

We are used to hearing Žižek respond to a proposed choice between two options with the replies “yes please!” or “no thanks!” – this answer amounting to a refusal of choice that maintains the productive antagonism between the presented options or a refutation that one offers a better solution than the other. However, when it comes to the question “Joyce or Beckett?” Žižek unequivocally responds “Beckett, please!” Through a close reading of Žižek’s scattered references to and reflections (...) on both writers, this paper sets out the theoretical stakes of such a response whilst also addressing other matters such as Žižek’s remarks on the “Joycean” Lacan. (shrink)

In a well-known way, Husserl's foundation of phenomenology as a transcendental discipline aspires to universal essences, but collapses back to a form of Euro-centrism. While Žižek's description of the phenomenology of the subject follows the Husserlian line in that the subject is a transcendental structure of experience, it is intended to be interpreted in a materialist sense: there is no Big Other. This materialist twist to the philosophy of the subject is supposed to eliminate two traditional phenomenological dead-ends: the (...) Husserlian mistake of colonialism masquerading as universalism and the post-phenomenological mistake of not being able to take an existential and political stand seriously enough. These mistakes are overcome through the notion of a materialist act that is able to reorganize the given boundaries of a situation. However, as Žižek limits his phenomenology of the act to a communicative transaction between subjects, he is quite close to the Husserlian mistake of promoting European values as universal. This can be seen in a number of conceptual knots that figure in Žižek's work. First, like Husserl, Žižek is unable to satisfactorily bridge the divide between transcendental knowledge and positive science. Second, the Žižekian analysis of the necessary political action against multiculturalist capitalism emphatically belittles the role of local and ethnic identities as revolutionary forces. Correspondingly, the belief in the revolutionary potential of the psychoanalytically and philosophically enlightened subject is over-optimistic. Third, the phenomenology of the act in an unfortunate way describes the transcendental aspect of an authentic act, thus unnecessarily mystifying the essentially mundane and subject-less nature of revolutionary acts. (shrink)

The book uses evolutionary principles to explain tribalism, a way of thinking and acting that divides the world into Us versus Them and achieves cooperation within a group at the expense of erecting insuperable obstacles to cooperation among groups. Tribalism represents political controversies as supreme emergencies in which ordinary moral constraints do not apply and as zero-sum, winner take all contests. Tribalism not only undermines democracy by ruling out compromise, bargaining, and respect for the Other; it also reverses one of (...) the most important milestones of progress in how we understand morality: the insight that morality is not a list of commands to be unthinkingly followed, but rather that morality centrally involves the giving and taking of reasons among equals. Tribalism rejects this insight by branding the Other as a being who is incapable of reasoning. (shrink)

In The Ticklish Subject, Žižek argues that the Hegelian concrete universal is not the organic comprehensive totality that it is often assumed to be. Rather, he argues that Hegel's concrete universality is defined in its very concretion by an irreducible rupture, gap, or trauma that not only neither closes it off from otherness nor assimilates otherness within the same, but forever opens it to otherness, constituting it as such exposure. However, by understanding the function of negativity in Hegel's argument (...) in a foundational way, Žižek posits as final what is merely a transitional stage. As a result, he not only misconstrues concrete universality and substitutes for it a particularized universal which, as such, remains abstract, but in doing so he passes by the implications in his own account that could lead to a positive conception of concrete universality above and beyond the strictly negative and empty formality he takes it to be. By avoiding Žižek's foundationalist way of framing the category of universality we can thereby articulate a logic of implications in it that leads us out of the still abstract shape, to which Žižek limits it, to its truly concrete form. Furthermore, the latter contains political implications that are lost in Žižek's version. (shrink)

This essay review discusses criticall the book the universal excemption of Slavoj Zizek. Just after finishing my two recent books: Tracing Spikes in Fear and Narcissism in Western Democracies Since 9/11 and The Challenges of Democracy in the War on Terror. While in the first work I traced back the limitations of Psychoanalysis as well as its complicities to legitimate the advance and expansion of capitalism, the latter focused on the role of torture –as a lesser evil- of contemporary government (...) in their war on terror. One of my arguments sounded polemically as though not only terrorism is the organization of labor by other means but psychoanalysis organized a specific ethics, which extracting its nature from ancient Greek philosophy, ascribed to the theory of scarcity which is the touchstone of capitalism. Secondly but most important, Occident carefully developed a doctrine of security, which the part may be sacrificed at the moment the body is in danger. Let me put the medical metaphor of cancer. While the medical gaze is programmed to look and eradicate the pathology, the illness, cancer derives from an anomaly of cell growth. Once some organs are affected, the medical gaze does not hesitate in extirpating the affected organ. The same allegory can be applied to the war on terror and the serious risks of ghettoization the Muslim community daily faces. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian ReformationGiving a Hearing to The Parallax ViewAdrian Johnston (bio)Slavoj Žižek. THE PARALLAX VIEW. Cambridge: MIT P, 2006. [PV]Near the end of a two-hour presentation at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on November 10, 2006, Slavoj Žižek confesses that, in terms of the intellectual ambitions nearest to his heart, “my secret dream is to be Hegel’s Luther” [“Why Only an Atheist Can Believe”]. (...) This confession comes just months after the publication of his latest major work, The Parallax View, a book described as a new magnum opus. There are ample justifications within this text to license retroactively rereading it through the lens of Žižek’s subsequent public admission that he is now preoccupied with rescuing Hegel from the numerous misinterpretations to which this giant of German idealism (who casts such a long shadow over the Continental European philosophical tradition) has been repeatedly subjected over the past two hundred years. The Parallax View, at certain points explicitly and in other places implicitly, can be seen as centered on an effort to confront aggressively the various received versions of Hegel widely accepted as official and orthodox exegetical renditions. The motif of the “parallax gap,” elaborated in a plethora of guises throughout this 2006 tome, condenses and reflects the axiomatic theses of what could be called Žižek’s Hegelian reformation.The critical assessment of The Parallax View offered here seeks to go straight to its theoretical heart by highlighting a single line of argumentation running through the full span of this text’s different moments and phases. Žižek’s own Hegelian-style conceptions of truth (as fiercely partisan rather than calmly neutral) and universality (as immanently concrete rather than transcendently abstract) validate such an interpretive approach—“universal Truth is accessible only from a partial engaged subjective position” [PV 35]. Deliberately extracting particular conceptual constellations and forcing them to link up with each other according to the plan of a certain directed philosophical agenda promises to be much more revealing of the essential features of Žižekian thought than a comprehensive survey of this latest of his major works.The specific argumentative thread to be isolated here is the new extended engagement with the terrain covered by cognitive science and the neurosciences. Apart from the task of denouncing falsifying popular pictures of Hegel, one of Žižek’s other driving ambitions in this book is the desire to formulate a fundamental ontology appropriate to the theory of subjectivity mapped out over the course of his entire intellectual itinerary (a theory informed by Kant and post-Kantian German idealism combined with Lacanian psychoanalytic metapsychology). And, herein, the articulation of such an ontology appropriately gets entangled, via reflections on the nature of the brain, with the latest instantiations of the perennial philosophical problem of the relationship between mind and [End Page 3] body. Žižek grants that the central nervous system is, in at least several undeniable and important senses, the material, corporeal ground of the subject, the bodily being without which there cannot be the parlêtre (speaking being). But, in the spirit of Schelling and Hegel (especially their philosophies of “productive” nature), the fashions in which Žižek attempts to tie together systematically a materialist ontology with an account of more-than-material, transontological subjectivity illuminate a normally obscured and ignored set of implied consequences flowing from the gesture of dissolving hard-and-fast dualist distinctions between body and mind, nature and spirit.The past few decades of philosophical engagement with the neurosciences, an engagement almost completely monopolized by the Anglo-American Analytic philosophical tradition and neglected by the Continental European philosophical tradition to an equal degree, has emphasized (to put this in the vernacular of German idealism) the naturalization of spirit resulting from the collapse of any strict nature-spirit dichotomy. The materialisms promoted by those Analytic philosophers amenable to grounding the mental on the neuronal simply assume that the outcome of folding mind and matter into each other is a becoming-material of the mind, namely, a naturalization of the spirit (that is, the mind comes to resemble the brain conceived of as just another part... (shrink)