Im vorliegenden Beitrag geht es – angesichts der enormen gesellschaftlichen Verbreitung von Quantifizierungstechniken und -imperativen im digitalen Zeitalter – um psychische Bedeutungen des digitalen Messens, Zählens und Vergleichens und um die Faszination für diese Operationen. Mit Blick auf eine sozio- und psychoanalytisch ausgerichtete Hermeneutik der Zahl werden erste Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts »Das vermessene Leben« erörtert. Eine der zentralen Fragen ist dabei, wie sich Merkmale digitaler Quantifizierung mit psychischen Dispositionen verbinden, spezifische Bewältigungs- und Abwehrmuster auslösen oder welche Rolle etwa die Externalisierung (...) von Affekt- oder Norm-Regulationen spielt. Schließlich wird nachgezeichnet, wie daraus neue Konstellationen und kulturelle Vorstellungen von Normalität und Pathologie hervorgehen können. (shrink)

Abstract The debate on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been going on for decades, without leading to a clearer understanding of the term. Furthermore, the current literature on the topic remains relatively silent on the actual impact of CSR, especially the impact on issues of international development, for example poverty reduction in the Global South. By developing a conceptual assessment framework with a bipolar differentiated definition of CSR and a Sen-based notion of poverty, the article analyses the effects and impact (...) of two different types of CSR-strategies on the reduction of poverty. For this, two case studies have been conducted in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The results imply that CSR measures which are built into the core business of a company (both transnational companies and small/medium sized companies) have larger effects on poverty than CSR measures which are located outside of the core business activities. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-33 DOI 10.1007/s13520-012-0016-6 Authors Maike J. Schölmerich, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany Journal Asian Journal of Business Ethics Online ISSN 2210-6731 Print ISSN 2210-6723. (shrink)

Concerned with the interplay between science, society, and power, Isabelle Stengers offers a unique perspective on the power of scientific theories to modify society, and vice versa. 9 diagrams.

It is widely acknowledged that moral principles are not sufficient to guide moral thought and action: they need to be supplemented by a capacity for judgement. However, why can we not rely on this capacity for moral judgement alone? Why do moral principles need to be supplemented, but are not supplanted, by judgement? So-called moral particularists argue that we can, and should, make moral decisions on a case-by-case basis without any principles. According to particularists, the person of moral judgement is (...) a person of empathy, sensibility and virtue, rather than a person of principle. In this paper I argue that this is a false dichotomy. The person of good moral judgement is a person of principle. I propose that we think of moral principles as internalised long-term commitments that form our moral character and sensitivity, and, as such, are constitutive of moral judgement. (shrink)

The continuous revaluation of rewards lies at the core of Ainslie's account of willpower. Yet, he does not explicate the underlying experiential mechanisms. We draw upon theoretical, neuroscientific, and computational evidence to demonstrate that boredom evokes revaluation. By biasing behavior toward exploration, boredom necessitates effortful willpower to balance it against exploitation, thereby rendering suppression a highly adaptive function of willpower.

The compound eyes of insects exhibit stunning variation in size, structure, and function, which has allowed these animals to use their vision to adapt to a huge range of different environments and lifestyles, and evolve complex behaviors. Much of our knowledge of eye development has been learned from Drosophila, while visual adaptations and behaviors are often more striking and better understood from studies of other insects. However, recent studies in Drosophila and other insects, including bees, beetles, and butterflies, have begun (...) to address this gap by revealing the genetic and developmental bases of differences in eye morphology and key new aspects of compound eye structure and function. Furthermore, technical advances have facilitated the generation of high‐resolution connectomic data from different insect species that enhances our understanding of visual information processing, and the impact of changes in these processes on the evolution of vision and behavior. Here, we review these recent breakthroughs and propose that future integrated research from the development to function of visual systems within and among insect species represents a great opportunity to understand the remarkable diversification of insect eyes and vision. (shrink)

There are cases such as climate change where the cumulative effects of the actions of several agents lead to grave harm but where no individual agent can make a perceptible difference for the better or worse. According to Derek Parfit, dealing with such imperceptible difference cases requires substantial changes to the way we think about morality. In On What Matters, Parfit builds on Kantian Ethics to address the problem of imperceptible differences, but the transformation that Kant's theory undergoes in his (...) hands is radical. I argue that Parfit's changes to Kant's theory are not only unnecessary but also detrimental to making sense of the ethical dimensions of action in collective contexts. Building on the notion of imperfect duties, I offer an alternative solution to the problem of imperceptible difference cases that remains closer to Kant's original theory and avoids the difficulties of Parfit's approach. (shrink)

"Isabelle Stengers presents us with a new way of understanding a remarkably diverse range of sciences and their relation to a material and living world. Playing with a position both inside the practices that constitute and transform science and outside the sciences as their mode of conceptualization, Stengers explores the limits, constraints, and inventions that fuse modern science and contemporary society." Elizabeth Grosz --.

Prepared for an ANU Humanities Research Centre Symposium in early August 2003, these notes may be considered as a comment on Brian Massumi’s proposition that ‘a political ecology would be a social technology of belonging, assuming coexistence and co-becoming as the habitat of practices’.

The history of moral philosophy has been dominated by attempts to find and defend the correct moral principle or set of principles. However, over the last two decades the assumption that morality can and should be understood in terms of principles has come under attack from several quarters. The most radical attack has come from so-called moral particularists according to whom principles are at best useless and at worst a hindrance to successful moral reasoning and action.Why should - and how (...) can - morality be based on principles? These are the leading questions of this book. Moral Principles offers a historically informed, in-depth examination of the current particularist/generalist debate and presents a novel account of the place of principles in our moral thought and action. (shrink)

Depuis qu'elles existent, les sciences dites exactes se prétendent différentes des autres savoirs. Comment comprendre cette prétention? Faut-il, à la manière des épistémologues anglo-saxons ou de Karl Popper, tenter d'identifier les critères qui la justifient? Peut-on, suivant le modèle nouveau des études sociales des sciences, y voir une simple croyance? Ce livre propose un dépassement fructueux de l'opposition, apparemment irréconciliable, entre ces deux approches des sciences. Et si la tension entre objectivité scientifique et croyance était justement constitutive des sciences, enjeu (...) des pratiques inventées et réinventées par les scientifiques? Réussir à parler des sciences avec humour, sans en faire un objet de vénération, ni de dénonciation, en restant au plus proche de la passion des scientifiques, tel est ici le pari d'Isabelle Stengers. Mais ce livre ne se limite pas à un discours sur les sciences. Il s'agit bien plutôt de prolonger l'histoire de leur invention. Comment comprendre les liens multiples entre la science et les pouvoirs qui la mobilisent aujourd'hui? Comment concevoir les rapports entre science, expertise et démocratie? La nouveauté de L'invention des sciences modernes est de faire de ces différents problèmes intellectuels, pratiques et politiques les enjeux du processus par où pourrait s'inventer et se renouveler l'identité même des sciences. (shrink)

Originally published in French in seven volumes, Cosmopolitics investigates the role and authority of the sciences in modern societies and challenges their claims to objectivity, rationality, and truth. Cosmopolitics II includes the first English-language translations of the last four books: Quantum Mechanics: The End of the Dream, In the Name of the Arrow of Time: Prigogine’s Challenge, Life and Artifice: The Faces of Emergence, and The Curse of Tolerance. Arguing for an “ecology of practices” in the sciences, Isabelle Stengers explores (...) the discordant landscape of knowledge derived from modern science, seeking intellectual consistency among contradictory, confrontational, and mutually exclusive philosophical ambitions and approaches. For Stengers, science is a constructive enterprise, a diverse, interdependent, and highly contingent system that does not simply discover preexisting truths but, through specific practices and processes, helps shape them.Stengers concludes this philosophical inquiry with a forceful critique of tolerance; it is a fundamentally condescending attitude, she contends, that prevents those worldviews that challenge dominant explanatory systems from being taken seriously. Instead of tolerance, she proposes a “cosmopolitics” that rejects politics as a universal category and allows modern scientific practices to peacefully coexist with other forms of knowledge. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAuf dem Wiesbadener Internistenkongress von 1949 forderten Alexander Mitscherlich und Viktor von Weizsäcker eine Erweiterung des naturwissenschaftlichen Kausalitätsbegriffs um die Suche nach dem Sinn von Krankheit in der Lebensgeschichte. Hiermit wurde ein traditionelles psychiatrisches Paradigma infrage gestellt: die vermutete somatische Ursache psychischer Erkrankungen. Damit standen auch psychiatrische Evidenzpraktiken auf dem Prüfstand. Im ersten Teil dieses Beitrags werden im Sinne eines Querschnitts drei psychiatrische Positionen rekonstruiert, die auf dem Kongress zur Darstellung kamen. Im zweiten Teil wird die Entwicklung eines der beteiligten (...) Psychiater, Jürg Zutt, im Längsschnitt untersucht, wobei der Fokus auf der Frage nach möglichen Auswirkungen der Wiesbadener Debatte auf seine wissenschaftliche Neuausrichtung sowie den Konsequenzen für seine Auffassung von psychiatrischer Evidenz liegt. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAuf dem Wiesbadener Internistenkongress von 1949 forderten Alexander Mitscherlich und Viktor von Weizsäcker eine Erweiterung des naturwissenschaftlichen Kausalitätsbegriffs um die Suche nach dem Sinn von Krankheit in der Lebensgeschichte. Hiermit wurde ein traditionelles psychiatrisches Paradigma infrage gestellt: die vermutete somatische Ursache psychischer Erkrankungen. Damit standen auch psychiatrische Evidenzpraktiken auf dem Prüfstand. Im ersten Teil dieses Beitrags werden im Sinne eines Querschnitts drei psychiatrische Positionen rekonstruiert, die auf dem Kongress zur Darstellung kamen. Im zweiten Teil wird die Entwicklung eines der beteiligten (...) Psychiater, Jürg Zutt, im Längsschnitt untersucht, wobei der Fokus auf der Frage nach möglichen Auswirkungen der Wiesbadener Debatte auf seine wissenschaftliche Neuausrichtung sowie den Konsequenzen für seine Auffassung von psychiatrischer Evidenz liegt. (shrink)

It may be that denouncing the ideals of objectivity or neutrality associated with the sciences leads us into a trap: that of accepting, in order to criticize it, that there would be a common identity for the many ways to produce science. Learning to laugh, we choose to laugh with and laugh at. But we accept the risk of being interested, that is, of giving up the position of a judge.

A widely shared view in the literature on first-person thought is that the ability to entertain first-person thoughts requires prior non-conceptual forms of self-consciousness. Many philosophers maintain that the distinctive awareness which accompanies the use of the first person already presupposes a non-conceptual consciousness of the fact that oneself is the owner of a first-person thought. I call this argument The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness based on the Meaning of “I” and will demonstrate that most proponents of the presented argument (...) fail to establish their conclusion, even though I believe that the conclusion is actually true. The argument only justifies the claim that contextual information is needed in order to recognize oneself as the referent of an occurrence of the first person. However, it does not justify the thesis that this information needs to be given consciously and thus the existence of any non-conceptual self-consciousness. Finally, I shall present an argument for the assumption that some form of self-consciousness is needed to reflexively think about oneself via the first-person concept. In order to do so, I will draw on the general discussion about the functional role of consciousness. In particular, I will rely on results recently proposed by Frith and Metzinger (2016), Frith (Pragmatics & Cognition 18:497–551, 2010, Cognitive Neuroscience 2:117–118, 2011), Graziano (2013, Frontiers in Robotics and AI 4:article 60, 2017), and Graziano and Kastner (Cognitive Neuroscience 2:98–113, 2011), which suggest that one of the central functions of consciousness is to provide information about mental states for communication. (shrink)

Despite its age, quantum theory still suffers from serious conceptual difficulties. To create clarity, mathematical physicists have been attempting to formulate quantum theory geometrically and to find a rigorous method of quantization, but this has not resolved the problem. In this article we argue that a quantum theory recursing to quantization algorithms is necessarily incomplete. To provide an alternative approach, we show that the Schrödinger equation is a consequence of three partial differential equations governing the time evolution of a given (...) probability density. These equations, discovered by Madelung, naturally ground the Schrödinger theory in Newtonian mechanics and Kolmogorovian probability theory. A variety of far-reaching consequences for the projection postulate, the correspondence principle, the measurement problem, the uncertainty principle, and the modeling of particle creation and annihilation are immediate. We also give a speculative interpretation of the equations following Bohm, Vigier and Tsekov, by claiming that quantum mechanical behavior is possibly caused by gravitational background noise. (shrink)

At the end of his life, Michel Foucault wrote of ‘problematization’ as what he had done all along. Yet some commentators see a ‘new’ Foucault emerging together with this term. This essay accepts the last hypothesis and connects it with the French scene, where problematization was already familiar, and its use under tension. Starting with Bachelard, problematization was related with a polemic epistemological stance, but its reprise by Gilles Deleuze turned it into an affirmative theme dramatizing the creation of problems. (...) Situating Foucault’s problematization in this philosophical line permits us to develop the relation he proposed between problematization and the test of contemporary reality on the thinker. This paper will put problematization itself to the test of our present, that is, to the prospect of the social-ecological devastation associated with climate disorder. Both following and betraying Foucault with the help of Whitehead and Haraway, problematization will then be related to the power of sensible events, a power which requires allowing oneself to be touched, and allowing what touches us the power to modify the relation we entertain to our own reasons. (shrink)

Collective migration is a key process that is critical during development, as well as in physiological and pathophysiological processes including tissue repair, wound healing and cancer. Studies in genetic model organisms have made important contributions to our current understanding of the mechanisms that shape cells into different tissues during morphogenesis. Recent advances in high‐resolution and live‐cell‐imaging techniques provided new insights into the social behavior of cells based on careful visual observations within the context of a living tissue. In this review, (...) we will compare Drosophila testis nascent myotube migration with established in vivo model systems, elucidate similarities, new features and principles in collective cell migration. (shrink)

L'ambition de ce livre, et elle est grande, est de faire vivre à son lecteur, qu'il soit ou non philosophe, le trajet fulgurant qui, en quelques années, a transformé le mathématicien Alfred North Whitehead en philosophe spéculatif. De la pierre grise que je vois là jusqu'à la création du Dieu qu'exige la cohérence spéculative, il s'agit bel et bien de cette " libre et sauvage création de concepts " associée à la philosophie anglaise par Deleuze et Guattari dans Qu'est-ce que (...) la philosophie? Mais " sauvage " signifie d'abord ici l'humour d'une mise à l'aventure de tous les " nous savons bien " qui rassurent, et l'expérimentation tranquille des concepts qui portent à leur plus haut degré, pour les faire converger, liberté et contrainte, audace et obligation. De l'aventure, nul ne devrait ramener une doctrine ou un mode de pensée unanime ; plutôt, différent pour chacun, un certain goût pour les questions qui mettent en risque, et une grande indifférence aux mots d'ordre qui prétendent nous dire comment penser. (shrink)

Prepared for an ANU Humanities Research Centre Symposium in early August 2003, these notes may be considered as a comment on Brian Massumi’s proposition that ‘a political ecology would be a social technology of belonging, assuming coexistence and co-becoming as the habitat of practices’.

This article investigates the constructions of Hebrew, classical, and “Northern” antiquities put forward by an eighteenth-century network of Anglo-German scholars. It asks to what extent these constructions propose a cultural equality between these competing “antiquities”, how such equality relates to the contemporaneous conception of universal history, and to what extent this development is driven by emancipatory tendencies within Enlightenment thinking. By discussing the changing approaches to Homer, Old Testament texts, and “early” European literature, the article relates the emergence of primitivism (...) and orientalism to Enlightenment historicism and an interest in the sublime, which produces a growing focus on the importance of authentic culture and the role of the bard-poet. By discussing the connections between the work of Joseph Trapp, Thomas Blackwell, Robert Lowth, and Thomas Percy on the one hand, and Johann David Michaelis, Christian Gottlob Heyne, Johann Jakob Bodmer, and Johann Gottfried Herder on the other, the article illustrates the significance in this context of newly emerging Anglo-German scholarly networks and illuminates lesser-known aspects of Anglo-German relations in the second half of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

Nature always refers to something inasmuch as it relates to something else. This « something else » is highly variable. The role of Nature as the respondent of judgements which are both hierarchical and moral is always present in modern science, without thereby being deducible from modern science. Today it presents new contrasts, new oppositions which involve multiple natures, interlinked and historical, which does not result in anything like a neutral Nature. The best example, linked to the idea of Gaia, (...) is the greenhouse effect. Our interventions, even if they take place over a very short period of time, might disturb situations which arose over very long periods. Gaia is a new figure of Nature which must be respected because we are dependent on her, not in the sense that she must be respected as a goddess, but in the sense of her sensitivity. Now, a Nature that could thus be defined once and for all, with an identity that could be opposed to humanity’s, does not exist. Nature in the other sense does not exist objectively either, but is more interesting because it participates in human historicity. It exists in the sense in which it forces us to think, negotiate, take into account, imagine, take note without saying that Nature, too, thinks, negotiates, takes into account, imagines, and takes note. We must think and imagine with something that does not do so. This is the beginning of a culture of non-symmetry. If Nature as Gaia teaches us something, it is that we must take care : the fact the current regimen of interdependence suits us is in no way a privilege of this regiment. Gaia has no innate reason to care about us ; rather, we must care about her. Non-symmetry, then, is this interesting situation in which Nature interests us while we do not interest her. (shrink)

The question of universalism versus relativism is often taken to be a matter of critical reflexivity. This article attempts to present the question instead as a matter of practical, political, and always situated concern. The attempt starts from consideration of modern experimental sciences. These sciences usually serve as the stronghold for universalist claims and as such are a target of relativism. It is argued here that the specificity of these sciences is not a method but a concern. To be able (...) to claim that they have not unilaterally imposed their definitions on the phenomena they study is the leading concern of experimenters and should be understood in terms of the following achievement: the creation of a very particular “rapport” that authorizes claiming that what is operationally defined “lends itself” to this correlation. Linking knowledge production with a creation of rapports entails a pluralization of sciences along with the pluralization of modes of concern associated with the rapport. However, resisting unilaterally imposed definitions is not enough because with the coming “knowledge economy,” the questions that this essay raises will soon be part of a romantic past. Thus it concludes with a speculative touch, or perhaps it is a requiem, relating the creation of rapports to an ecology of practices akin to William James’s always-under-construction pluriverse. (shrink)

Informer days to resist power was just to live in spite of differences in thought, religion, etc... Today the State is ready to compromise on anything, arguing it protects life. What can resistance become then?

The “self” shapes the way in which we process the world around us. It makes sense then, that self-related information is reliably prioritised over non self-related information in cognition. How mig...

This memorial to Latour is not an appraisal of his fifty-year research career but the report of a traveling companion with a story to share about the apparent lack of continuity, the sudden, unapologetic, unprincipled changes of position, with which he surprised or scandalized his colleagues and readers. In the first place, was he a sociologist, an anthropologist, a philosopher? Though he did not make lasting commitments of that kind, he did make deeper ones that did not change—above all, never (...) to explain anything in terms of something more general and, thus, never to accept the position of judge. To follow Latour's problematic changes—sometimes referred to as his “versatility”—demands that we follow the changes of the very terms of the problems that his basic commitment bound him to confront. From the 1980s, when his work dealt with technoscientific progress, to the years of his growing concern with political ecology, and finally to his recognition of the oncoming climate chaos, dizzying leaps were entailed by his resistance to the temptation of judging. Involved in, but never the cause of, various of his leaps, Stengers describes her friend as responding, perforce, to changing times, rather than as behaving like a theorist thinking mainly of his image, reputation, and career. (shrink)

Dans cet essai qui privilégie la joie d'une pensée insoumise plutôt que la dénonciation, Isabelle Stengers prend le relais d'Alfred North Whitehead lorsque, diagnostiquant le "déclin de la civilisation moderne", celui-ci assigna à la philosophie la tâche de "souder le sens commun avec l'imagination". Face aux prétentions à déterminer ce que nous avons le droit de savoir, elle cherche à donner force à ce que nous savons. Face aux oppositions doctrinales prédatrices qui démembrent le sens commun, elle affirme la philosophie (...) comme puissance de problématisation. Prolongeant et renouvelant les ressources proposées par Whitehead, elle fait exister tant la possibilité d'une science "civilisée" que celle, politique, de dispositifs susceptibles d'habiliter les "gens du commun" à faire valoir les questions qui les concernent. Au déclin de la civilisation a aujourd'hui succédé la débâcle : "Nous entendons déjà les grincements et les craquements sourds marquant la rupture des plaques de glace, démantibulant le sol que nous avions défini comme assuré." II s'agit désormais d'apprendre à vivre dans un monde devenu lui-même intrinsèquement problématique. D'autres voix, et notamment celles, contemporaines, de Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, David Abram ou Anna Tsing, viendront dès lors s'associer à celle de Whitehead dans l'exploration des manières de "faire commun" que demande notre époque. (shrink)

Recent evidence indicates that transcriptional bursts are intrinsically amplified by messenger RNA cytoplasmic processing to generate large stochastic fluctuations in protein levels. These fluctuations can be exploited by cells to enable probabilistic bet‐hedging decisions. But large fluctuations in gene expression can also destabilize cell‐fate commitment. Thus, it is unclear if cells temporally switch from high to low noise, and what mechanisms enable this switch. Here, the discovery of a post‐transcriptional mechanism that attenuates noise in HIV is reviewed. Early in its (...) life cycle, HIV amplifies transcriptional fluctuations to probabilistically select alternate fates, whereas at late times, HIV utilizes a post‐transcriptional feedback mechanism to commit to a specific fate. Reanalyzing various reported post‐transcriptional negative feedback architectures reveals that they attenuate noise more efficiently than classic transcriptional autorepression, leading to the derivation of an assay to detect post‐transcriptional motifs. It is hypothesized that coupling transcriptional and post‐transcriptional autoregulation enables efficient temporal noise control to benefit developmental bet‐hedging decisions. (shrink)