Thomas A. Fay Heidegger and the Formalization of Thought 1 Dagfinn F011esdal The Justification of Logic and Mathematics in Husserl's Phenomenology 25 Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock On Husserl's Distinction between State of Affairs and Situation of Affairs.... 35 David Woodruff Smith On Situations and States of Affairs 49 Charles W. Harvey, Jaakko Hintikka Modalization and Modalities................... 59 Gilbert T. Null Remarks on Modalization and Modalities 79 J. N. Mohanty Husserl's Formalism 93 Carl J. Posy Mathematics as a Transcendental Science (...) 107 vi Gian-carlo Rota Mathematics and the Task of Phenomenology 133 John Scalon "Tertium Non Datur: " Husserl's Conception of a Definite Multiplicity..... 139 Thomas M. Seebohm Psychologism Revisited 149 Gerald J. Massey Some Reflections on Psychologism 183 Robert S. Tragesser How Mathematical Foundation all but come about: A Report on Studies Toward a Phenomenological Critique of Godel's Views on Mathematical Intuition.. 195 Kenneth L. Manders On Geometric Intentionality 215 Dallas Willard Sentences which are True in Virtue of their Color... 225 John J. Drummond Willard and Husserl on Logical Form 243 Index of Names 257 Index of Subjects 259 PREFACE The phenomenology of logic and ideal objects is the topic of Husserl's Logical Investigations. This book determined the early development of the so called phenomenological movement. It is still the main source for many phenomenologists, even if they disagree with Husserl's transcendental turn and developed other phenomenological positions or positions beyond phenomenology he early sense. (shrink)

In his award-winning book _The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development_, J. N. Mohanty charted Husserl's philosophical development from the young man's earliest studies—informed by his work as a mathematician—to the publication of his _Ideas_ in 1913. In this welcome new volume, the author takes up the final decades of Husserl's life, addressing the work of his Freiburg period, from 1916 until his death in 1938. As in his earlier work, Mohanty here offers close readings of Husserl's (...) main texts accompanied by accurate summaries, informative commentaries, and original analyses. This book, along with its companion volume, completes the most up-to-date, well-informed, and comprehensive account ever written on Husserl's phenomenological philosophy and its development. (shrink)

Selected from the works of J. N. Mohanty over a forty-year period, these essays provide an intellectual biography of the man and insights into Eastern philosophy. Part I brings together various writings on problems in metaphysics, epistemology, and language, alongwith thoughtful treatments of notions such as experience, self consciousness, doubt, tradition, and modernity. Part II collects essays written during the exciting though turbulent years following India's independence, and they survey issues in social ethics, reform activities, and religion in the (...) works of Aurobindo, Gandhi, Vinobha, and Ramohan Roy. Part III comprises essays that treat the encounter between phenomenology and philosophy, between Eastern and Western philosophy, and does so through an incisive analysis of the major concerns of philosophy anywhere. The collection concludes with ruminations on the future of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

Renowned philosopher J. N. Mohanty examines the range of Indian philosophy from the Sutra period through the 17th century Navya Nyaya. Instead of concentrating on the different systems, he focuses on the major concepts and problems dealt with in Indian philosophy. The book includes discussions of Indian ethics and social philosophy, as well as of Indian law and aesthetics.

This volume is a collection of my essays on philosophy of logic from a phenomenological perspective. They deal with the four kinds of logic I have been concerned with: formal logic, transcendental logic, speculative logic and hermeneutic logic. Of these, only one, the essay on Hegel, touches upon 'speculative logic', and two, those on Heidegger and Konig, are concerned with hermeneutic logic. The rest have to do with Husser! and Kant. I have not tried to show that the four logics (...) are compatible. I believe, they are--once they are given a phenomenological underpinning. The original plan of writing an Introduction in which the issues would have to be formulated, developed and brought together, was abandoned in favor of writing an Introductory Essay on the 'origin'- in the phenomenological sense -of logic. J.N.M. Philadelphia INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGIN OF LOGIC The question of the origin of logic may pertain to historical origin (When did it all begin? Who founded the science of logic?), psychological origin (When, in the course of its mental development, does the child learn logical operations?), cultural origin (What cultural - theological, metaphysical and linguisti- conditions make such a discipline as logic possible?), or transcendental constitutive origin (What sorts of acts and/or practices make logic possible?). (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Beginnings Husserl's Theory of Intentionality Heidegger on Intentionality Merleau‐Ponty.

According to the Hindu tradition, the origin of the various philosophical ideas that were developed in the philosophical systems lies in the Vedas, a body of texts that seem to have been composed around two thousand years Before the Common Era (BCE). While the Vedas contain a myriad of different themes, ranging from hymns for deities and rules of fire sacrifices to music and magic, there is no doubt that one finds in them an exemplary spirit of inquiry into “the (...) one being” (ekam sat) that underlies the diversity of empirical phenomena, and into the origin of all things. (“Was there being or non‐being at the beginning?”) One finds also predelineations of such concepts of ṛta (truth or moral order), karma and the afterlife, and the three qualities (or guṇas: sattva, rajas, and tamas) constituting nature (prakṛti). It is in the Upaniṣads (a group of texts composed after the Vedas and ranging from 1000 bce to the time of Gautama, the Buddha), that the thinking, while still retaining its poetic flavor, develops a more strictly philosophical character. While still concerned with many different themes belonging to cosmology (“How did the one being become many?”) and psychology (“What does the empirical person consist of?”), the Upaniṣads contain attempts to reinterpret, in symbolic terms, the elaborate Vedic sacrifices, and to defend, in many different ways, one central philosophical thesis – that is, the identity of Brahman (the highest and the greatest, the source of all things) and ātman (the self within each person). With this last identification, a giant step was taken by the authors of the Upaniṣads, a step that was decisive for the development of Indian philosophy. The Vedas had already decided, famously in the Nāsadiya Sukata, that at the beginning of things there must have been being and not non‐being (for something cannot come out of nothing); now this primeval being was said to be the same as the spirit within. The highest wisdom was intuitively realizing this identity of subject and object (tat tvarn asi). How to know it was the issue. Suggestions ranged from contemplative meditation to austere self‐mortification. The idea of yoga and a picture of the yogin make their appearance – possibly having a different origin – and blend with the central thesis of the Upaniṣads. If the reality underlying outer appearance is the universal spirit within, is then the world merely phenomenal appearance (like the magician's creation, māyā), or is the brahman‐ātman to be construed as the indwelling spirit of all things? These become the leading disputational questions amongst the commentators on the Upaniṣads, and amongst the various schools of the Vedānta philosophy. (shrink)

If the good is what people desire or strive after, the Indian thinkers very early on developed a theory of hierarchy of goods: these are artha (material wealth), kāma (pleasure), dharma (righteousness), and mokṣa (spiritual freedom). Leaving aside the question about precisely how the first two in this list have to be ranked, one might suggest that the first two are what human beings do strive after, while the last two are what they ought to strive after. Such a distinction (...) between what human beings in fact strive after and what they ought to strive after is indicated in a distinction between the śreya (morally good) and the preya (pleasant) found in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, although it may have to be conceded that the is – ought distinction did not come to the forefront of Hindu moral thinking. One may as a matter of fact construct an argument to prove that even mokṣa, the supreme value, is not a mere ought – to‐be. The argument would run as follows: we do want to get rid of pain and enjoy a state of happiness. This natural desire, by implication, may be extended to a complete freedom from pain and enjoyment of an uninterrupted state of bliss (even if no one ordinarily posits this as his or her goal). It is only on reflection, and after reaching the first two goals and finding oneself dissatisfied with them, that one self‐consciously posits the last two goals – the third to begin with and, as a result of experiencing a similar dissatisfaction once it has been reached, subsequently the fourth and highest good, which is not a mere ought‐to‐be but an ideal state of being. If the English phrase “the highest good” translates into niḥśreyasaḥ in Sanskrit, then mokṣa is that state of excellence than which there is nothing greater and which leaves, upon attainment, nothing else to be desired. (shrink)

Searle develops a theory of intentionality which is intended to provide a foundation for his earlier and influential theory of speech acts. His basic assumption, which according to this reviewer, is well-founded, is that philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind. Speech acts have a derived form of intentionality. In its original form, some mental states and events, only some of which again are conscious states, are intentional. For Searle, intentionality = directedness towards an object, but (...) all such directedness is mediated by a "representative content" "in a certain psychological mode." The representative content determines a set of "conditions of satisfaction"; the psychological mode determines a direction of fit of its content. Intentional states such as belief have a "mind-to-world" direction of fit; desires and intentions have a "world-to-mind" direction of fit. Some others have the null direction of fit. So far Searle's is a purely descriptive theory, not much unlike the Husserlian theory. But Searle appropriates this theory into a naturalistic framework. Intentional states, on his view are both caused by and realized in the structure of the brain. The logical properties of such states, however, are to be kept apart from the forms of realization. Furthermore, there is, for Searle, no special category of objects called intentional objects. An intentional object is just an object like any other. It is intentional only in so far as there is an intentional state which is about it. Further, on this theory, an intentional state such as a belief should not be construed as a relation between a believer and a proposition. The proposition is not the object of belief, but its content. Searle uses this point to clarify the muddles surrounding the distinction between de re and de dicto beliefs. Another important feature of Searle's theory is that an intentional state is what it is, i.e., with the content it has, only against a background of practices and "pre-intentional" assumptions, and also as belonging to a network of other intentional states. A consequence of this last point is that intentional states do not neatly individuate. Another interesting point that Searle makes is that an intentional state such as belief is not itself intensional; its report may be so. Linguistic philosophers tend to confuse features of reports and features of the things reported. This theory is applied, amongst other themes, to perception and action. The novel as well as the most controversial part of the theory is the way it relates intentionality to causality, thereby embedding intentionality within a naturalistic framework while avoiding reducing the former to causal terms.--J. N. Mohanty, The University of Oklahoma. (shrink)

Franz Brentano’s thesis that the mental is characterised by a peculiar directedness towards an object or by intentionality, has been recognised, in contemporary philosophy, by a large body of philosophers of widely differing persuasions. Those who have come to terms with this phenomenon have found a place for it within their larger philosophical positions: this affects the way they understand the nature and role of intentionality. In this essay, I will distinguish four types of theories of intentionality—each of which is (...) characterized by a certain understanding of its nature and function, an understanding which derives from the overall philosophical framework within which the phenomenon of intentionality is situated. These are the naturalistic-causal, the descriptive psychological, the existential, and the transcendental-constitutive theories. I review them in that order, as representing four levels of our understanding of intentionality. For all four, Brentano’s thesis remains the “neutral” and indispensable starting point. (shrink)

The problems of internationalism often look different and require different solutions depending on one’s particular cultural standpoint. Contemporary Indian philosophers find that their philosophical efforts have long been too much oriented to the West, and that what Indian philosophy now needs is less international influence and more rootedness in their own rich tradition. This is needed for a more balanced international dialogue. The goal of internationalism in philosophy is not to bring into being a world‐philosophy, but a global conversation on (...) philosophical problems that is not inhibited by differing approaches. (shrink)

The paper addresses three main issues drawing on Husserl’s writings on logic. First, what gives the logical objects their objective status, given the fact that these are intimately connected with human mental processes? Second, if logical objects are objective then how is logical knowledge at all possible? The answer to this question leads to a transcendental foundation of formal logic. Third, how do the principles of logic apply to the real world? This question can be addressed by positing a formal (...) ontology. Against Russell and Whitehead, it has been pointed out that even if logical implication does not in any way depend on human mind, inference is definitely mind-dependent. But this thesis does not necessarily lead to psychologism, as has been pointed out by contemporary Indian logicians. Indian theories of inference deal with the question of truth and falsity but lack a formal ontology. Both pure logic and modern physics claim to be independent of human existence. This claim becomes evident in the conversation between Heisenberg and Tagore. Husserl had distinguished between logical grammar and logic of consequences. The notions of truth and falsity are relevant only in the context of logic of consequences. However, none of the well-known theories of truth, correspondence, coherence or pragmatic theory is free from defects. Following in the footprints of the Advaita Vedantins, it has been maintained that falsity is more fundamental than truth. In the process of cognitive history, a proposition is taken to be true, unless its falsity is proven. Hence the conclusion: since Philosophy is search for the truth, all Philosophy—infinitely—is a gradual rejection of all claims to truth and finally, destroys itself. (shrink)

The article seeks a confrontation between phenomenology - in its husserlian and existential forms - with indian philosophy, Particularly the nyaya--Vaisesika, Samkhya--Vedanta and buddhist schools. Confrontation with husserlian phenomenology is carried through under three headings: (a) methodology, (b) theory of the 'eidos' and (c) the notion of transcendental subjectivity. Despite close affinities, Indian thought is found to lack the dialectics of intention and fulfillment and the supposed temporality and historicity of transcendental subjectivity. The existential concepts of 'sorge' and 'geworfenheit' are (...) set beside the indian concepts of 'duhkha' and 'samsara', The concepts of freedom and nothingness are contrasted, The notion of 'karma' evaluated. Some major trends of modern indian thought, Especially that of k.C. Bhattacharyya, Are then set in this entire context. (shrink)