The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, (...) a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare. (shrink)

The author shows that Aquinas’s treatise on the Trinity can be viewed in two ways. According to the first, now prevailing opinion, the thoughts of the Angelic Doctor are too speculative and in essence they harm our personal relationship with God. He aims to show that the main source of inspiration for this approach are those currents in modern and contemporary philosophy according to which any metaphysics is impossible. Adherents of the other view do not reject metaphysics, and so they (...) are also sympathetic towards Aquinas’s connecting speculation with the Trinity doctrine. They see a great advantage in this connexion, as it allows us to understand more deeply the mysteries of faith and so to demonstrate the uniqueness of the Christian message. The author aims to show that both approaches are justified and one should not be sacrificed for the other. He believes that a philosophical framework allowing the old and the new Trinitarian theologies to coexist is provided by Wittgenstein’s conception of speech games. (shrink)

Mathematics in the 19th century underwent explosive development. The discussion among philosophers was motivated by new results which conflicted with Kant’s very influential conception. One of the most important areas which lead to the meeting of philosophy and mathematics was a rigorous account of the infinitesimal calculus. In his article the author shows that considerations of this type found in Bolzano and Frege are important not only for the overcoming of the Kantian conception, but as for what we today call (...) the linguistic turn. (shrink)

The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, (...) a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to contest the Aristotelian notion that the objects of metaphysics, mathematics and physics are all abstract, which is the reason why these disciplines constitute a homogeneous class. For a reflection on the way how objects are introduced into scientific discourse leads to the conclusion that some of these objects (especially the mathematical ones) are fictions of reason an that their nature is defined purely by their mutual relationships. From this it follows that, far (...) from being theoretical sciences, the respective disciplines are justifiedly classified as arts. (shrink)

The paper deals with the ontological status of number. The authors are convinced that it is useful to discuss the concept of number within the framework of the Aristotelian division of being into substance and accident. Number can thus be taken as ens in se or ens in alio. Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas believed that number is an accident and their concept is explained in the first part of the paper. In the second part it is shown that the Aristotelian (...) concept is not correct. However, if number is not an accident then it seems that it must be identified with a Platonic entity. In the third part the authors reject this Platonic conclusion that Frege seems to have defended. In the final part, a possible solution is shown: From the logical point of view number is an object but from the ontological point of view it is an entity that depends on linguistic structure. (shrink)

Responsione nostra disputationem cum L. Novák prosequimur, qui tractationem nostram, cui titulus “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk”, impugnavit. Impugnatio a L. Novák sub titulo “Tomáš Akvinský instrumentalistou v matematice?” conscripta ansam praebuit nobis ad nonnulla, quae dixeramus, non solum clarius, sed etiam latius ac profundius explananda. Qua in re inprimis ad hoc attendimus, quomodo S. Thomas mathematicam, scientiasque medias necnon philosophiam intellexerit. Adhuc in nostra sententia sistimus, duplicem scil. ac valde diversam interpretationem harum disciplinarum (...) proponi posse. Quamquam multi textus testantur, S. Thomam mathematicam scientiasque medias realistice intellexisse, inveniuntur tamen apud eum dicta nonnulla, quae interpretationi favent instrumentalisticae. Hanc duplicem interpretationem prae oculis ponere multum iuvat, nostro iudicio, ad subsequentem intellectualem historiam, praecipue modernae aetatis, adaequate intelligendam.In our contribution we continue our discussion with L. Novák, who criticised our paper “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk.” Novák’s critique titled “Tomáš Akvinský instrumentalistou v matematice?” served as an incentive for us not only to clarify certain points, but also to deepen our original exposition. We focused on Aquinas’s understanding of mathematics, the middle sciences and philosophy. We still insist that two substantially different interpretations of these disciplines are possible. On the one hand, there is much evidence for Aquinas’s realistic approach to mathematics and the middle sciences. On the other hand, ideas can also be found in Aquinas’s texts supporting an instrumentalist reading. In our opinion, it is important to point out these two approaches to the mathematical sciences in order to adequately understand the subsequent evolution of the history of ideas, especially in the modern period. (shrink)

Saul Kripke denies that the reference of a proper name is mediated through a sense (an intension, a concept), and claims that it has to be immediate for „rigidity“ of a proper name to be saved. On the other hand, the version of the Identity Theory of predication according to which predication is characterised as intentional identification of the conceptual content of the predicate with the object represented by the subject-concept requires that there be a concept (sense of the term) (...) at the places both of the subject and of the predicate. This paper is an attempt to propose a conception that purports to maintain the Identity Theory of predication with its demand for proper names to have senses and respond to Kripkean arguments while retaining the rigidity of proper names. Two main theses are defended: 1) Whether a term refers rigidly or non-rigidly does not depend on the nature of the term (i. e. whether it is a name or a description), but on the intention of the speaker/writer. Consequently, both names and descriptions can be used both rigidly and non-rigidly. 2) There is a „minimal sense“ to any proper name which can generaly be described as follows: „the person who has been given the name so-and-so“. The expression „has been given the name“ describes a „relation of reason“, which must be strictly distinguished from the relation of reference of the name, in order to avoid a vicious circle in reference determination, something against which Kripke warned. (shrink)

The author explains in the following paper the main ideas of the substratum and bundle theories of individuals and tries than to sketch some important features of the traditional Aristotelian first-substance theory.

We deal with the concept of man and woman, as well as with the problem of their equality, in the two great ancient thinkers Plato and Aristotle. The discussion of Plato leads to the conclusion that there is no substantial difference between man and woman. We find Plato’s view close or similar to today’s widely held doctrine of “unisexism”. Aristotle on the other hand believes that there are important differences between man and woman and we find in his texts two (...) approaches to the problem. In his first view the sex difference is due to the lesser perfection of woman, according to the second view both sexes are equally perfect, nevertheless each in its own way. Both conceptions have their supporters in contemporary thought (so-called theories of „polarism“ and „compatibilism“). From a systematic point of view we suggest that Aristotle´s second approach should be further developed as it is most in accord with our Christian worldview. (shrink)

When Aristotle deals with specific kinds of motion, he surprisingly asserts that there is no movement according to a relation. This assertion is, on the one hand, well justifiable, but, on the other hand, it is at variance with the naturalistic spirit of peripatetic philosophy. In this paper I would like to propose a solution to this dilemma. Such an achievement, however, has an implication which may be difficult to accept: viz. the necessity to quite radically transform the traditional categorial (...) scheme. (shrink)

Discussion on Two Remarks on Ondřej Švec’s Note regarding Philosophy of History.

The author attempts to give an analysis of negative existential statements, in which the subject is a proper name. In contrast to many contemporary philosophers he thinks that this analysis is possible also in the case that we understand a proper name in the same way as Mill or Kripke. The purpose of this paper is not only to provide an analysis of existential statements, but also to support Mill´s and Kripke´s theory of proper names. It was just the failure (...) to analyse negative existential statements that caused many theoreticians to incline towards the descriptive theory of proper names. Existential negative statements do not have, in author´s opinion, a subject-predicate structure. So, paradoxically, we do not speak about Homer in the statement Homer did not exist. This statement expresses that the name Homer does not have any bearer; and so we can say that the name is in some sense spurious. For this reason non-existential sentences that contain the name Homer do not have a truth-value, because their presupposition Homer did not exist is true. (shrink)

The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, (...) a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare. (shrink)

[Tichy's Criticism of the Causal Theory of the Proper Name].