Popper's philosophy is usually interpreted as a fallibilist epistemology that, when applied to the social theory, serves as the foundation of the open society. It is argued here that the reverse is also true, namely that Popper's theory of knowledge has some ethical roots whose analysis provides us with a better understanding of Popper's thought.

In science it is obvious that we are certain about many things, but among philosophers there is little agreement as to why we know these things. In Knowing Things for Sure physicist and realist philosopher, Mariano Artigas traces the confusion to non-realist philosophies and argues that practitioners of experimental science do reach logical truths about reality.

Fallibilism is a common view in contemporary epistemology. However, an examination of its philosophical basis and consequences shows that it requires some non trivial qualifications about its meaning.

El trabajo precisa el significado de la finalidad en el mundo natural, mostrando su relevancia en la tarea de alcanzar intelectualmente a Dios. La propuesta se articula sobre las nociones de direccionalidad, cooperatividad y funcionalidad. A continuación se contrastan las nociones anteriores y la de finalidad con la cosmovisión que se deriva de nuestro conocimiento científico actual. Finalmente se muestra la continuidad de su propuesta con la tradición filosófica realista y la vigencia del argumento teleológico de Tomás de Aquino.

Scientific truth, the unity of knowledge, scientism, and scientific progress , are topics that occupy a central place in the dialogue between science and faith. Fides et ratio illuminates them in the light of the present-day circumstances, and provides new philosophical and theological insights.

Karl Giberson and Mariano Artigas offer an informed analysis on the views of Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Dawkins, Edward O. Wilson, Carl Sagan, Stephen Hawking and Steven Weinberg; carefully distinguishing science from philosophy and religion in the writings of the oracles.

According to Charles S. Peirce and to Mariano Artigas, science is the collective and cooperative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to discover the truth. The particular sciences are branches of a common tree. The unity of science is not achieved by the reduction of the special sciences to more basic ones: the new name for the unity of the sciences is cross-disciplinarity. This is not a union of the sciences themselves, but rather (...) the unity and dialogue of scientists, the real inquirers into the truth. In the light of Peirce’s and Artigas’s teachings, we can see that philosophers are in just the right place to call for this unity of sciences. This call should not be seen as promoting a return to the old scientism, but seeks a deep dialogue between the particular sciences and philosophy in order to deal with the presuppositions of the scientific enterprise. The key to the cross-disciplinarity of knowledge is not revolution, but rather shared efforts in a unique mixture of continuity and fallibilism, of affection and reason, of the attempt to understand others’ disciplines as well as our own. (shrink)

The theoretical reliability of determinism. A review from the proposal of Mariano Artigas This article has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that the theory of determinism, which claims to be based on the principles of experimental science, cannot be considered as an explanation compatible with such sciences. To do this, we use some ideas of Mariano Artigas on the explanatory power of scientific theories and their reliability from his book The Mind of the Universe. (...) Through this process we seek to achieve the second objective: to show the importance of the work of Artigas to dissolve complex contemporary debates, such as the current discussion about the existence of human freedom. (shrink)

Este artículo hace una aproximación teórica de la relación existente entre filosofía, ciencia y religión dentro del devenir de la historia de la humanidad y la cultura postmoderna. Mediante una investigación de teoría fundamentada contenida en los textos Supuestos e implicaciones del progreso científico del filósofo español Mariano Artigas, así como Pensar la ciencia y La influencia de las concepciones filosóficas en las teorías científicas del historiador ruso Alexandre Koyré, se expone la idea de que un triángulo armónico (...) entre Dios, filosofía y ciencia no solo es compatible con el devenir de los avances científicos contemporáneos, sino que también es necesario para restablecer una etapa histórica que podríamos denominar nuevo renacimiento, vinculado, tal como dijera Artigas, a tres componentes altamente simbióticos entre sí: dimensión espiritual de la vida humana, la búsqueda objetiva de la verdad y la existencia de valores éticos al servicio de la humanidad. (shrink)

This essay, written on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Mariano Artigas’s death, examines Artigas’s engagement with analytic philosophy in his philosophy of science. I argue that, overall, Artigas’s project in the philosophy of science is one of—using his own metaphor—‘building bridges’ between distinct areas of knowledge. After reviewing the function of Artigas’s philosophy of science as a bridge between science and philosophy, I analyse how he moved from classical to analytic philosophy. I then (...) assess the extent to which Artigas’s work conforms to reasonable analytic standards of clarity and precision, which can be expected from work in the philosophy of science. I conclude that, while Artigas’s dedication and production were admirable, his work remains essentially unfinished, thus inviting further research that should develop and clarify his conception of science, of its aims, its methods, progress, and of how science leads to knowledge. I attempt to assess Artigas’s philosophy of science from an objective and detached perspective. Thus the essay should be of interest to both scholars in the philosophy of science, as well as to those generally interested in Artigas-scholarship. (shrink)

The Somatic Mutation Theory has been challenged on its fundamentals by the Tissue Organization Field Theory of Carcinogenesis. However, a recent publication has questioned whether TOFT could be a valid alternative theory of carcinogenesis to that presented by SMT. Herein we critically review arguments supporting the irreducible opposition between the two theoretical approaches by highlighting differences regarding the philosophical, methodological and experimental approaches on which they respectively rely. We conclude that SMT has not explained carcinogenesis due to severe epistemological and (...) empirical shortcomings, while TOFT is gaining momentum. The main issue is actually to submit SMT to rigorous testing. This concern includes the imperatives to seek evidence for disproving one’s hypothesis, and to consider the whole, and not just selective evidence. (shrink)

The received view holds that there is a significant divide between full-blown representational states and so called ‘detectors’, which are mechanisms set off by specific stimuli that trigger a particular effect. The main goal of this paper is to defend the idea that many detectors are genuine representations, a view that I call ‘Strong Liberal Representationalism’. More precisely, I argue that ascribing semantic properties to them contributes to an explanation of behavior, guides research in useful ways and can accommodate misrepresentation.

Informational theories of semantic content have been recently gaining prominence in the debate on the notion of mental representation. In this paper we examine new-wave informational theories which have a special focus on cognitive science. In particular, we argue that these theories face four important difficulties: they do not fully solve the problem of error, fall prey to the wrong distality attribution problem, have serious difficulties accounting for ambiguous and redundant representations and fail to deliver a metasemantic theory of representation. (...) Furthermore, we argue that these difficulties derive from their exclusive reliance on the notion of information, so we suggest that pure informational accounts should be complemented with functional approaches. (shrink)

The debate on the notion of function has been historically dominated by dispositional and etiological accounts, but recently a third contender has gained prominence: the organizational account. This original theory of function is intended to offer an alternative account based on the notion of self-maintaining system. However, there is a set of cases where organizational accounts seem to generate counterintuitive results. These cases involve cross-generational traits, that is, traits that do not contribute in any relevant way to the self-maintenance of (...) the organism carrying them, but instead have very important effects on organisms that belong to the next generation. We argue that any plausible solution to the problem of cross-generational traits shows that the organizational account just is a version of the etiological theory and, furthermore, that it does not provide any substantive advantage over standard etiological theories of function. (shrink)

The idea that only complex brains can possess genuine representations is an important element in mainstream philosophical thinking. An alternative view, which I label ‘liberal representationalism’, holds that we should accept the existence of many more full-blown representations, from activity in retinal ganglion cells to the neural states produced by innate releasing mechanisms in cognitively unsophisticated organisms. A promising way of supporting liberal representationalism is to show it to be a consequence of our best naturalistic theories of representation. However, several (...) philosophers and scientists have recently argued against this strategy. In the paper I counter these objections in defense of liberal representationalism. (shrink)

Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an entity to represent another entity. Although these approaches have been relatively successful in certain areas, such as communication theory or genetics, many doubt that they can be employed to naturalize complex cognitive representations. In this essay I identify some of the difficulties for developing a teleosemantic theory of cognitive representations and provide a strategy for accommodating them: to look into models of signaling in evolutionary game (...) theory. I show how these models can be used to formulate teleosemantics and expand it in new directions. (shrink)