Material to categorize
- Scott Atran (1989). Basic Conceptual Domains. Mind and Language 4:7-16.
- Murat Aydede (1999). What Makes Perceptual Symbols Perceptual? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):610-611.
- Murat Aydede (1998). Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
- Kent Bach (2000). Review of Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Philosophical Review.
- Alex Barber (1998). The Pleonasticity of Talk About Concepts. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):53-86.
- George Bealer (1998). A Theory of Concepts and Concepts Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:261-301.
- George Bealer (1998). Concept Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:331-338.
- John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2007). Know-How and Concept Possession. Philosophical Studies 136 (1).
- Jose Luis Bermudez (1999). Naturalism and Conceptual Norms. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):77-85.
- Radu J. Bogdan (1989). What Do We Need Concepts For? Mind and Language 4:17-23.
- Nick Braisby (1998). Compositionality and the Modelling of Complex Concepts. Minds and Machines 8 (4):479-508.
- Ingo Brigandt (2010). Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24:31-43.
- Ingo Brigandt (2003). Homology in Comparative, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology: The Radiation of a Concept. Journal of Experimental Zoology (Molecular and Developmental Evolution) 299:9-17.
- Harold I. Brown, Conceptual Comparison and Conceptual Innovation.
- Harold I. Brown (1986). Sellars, Concepts, and Conceptual Change. Synthese 68 (August):275-307.
- Darragh Byrne (2004). The 'Compositional Rigidity' of Recognitionality. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):147-169.
- M. J. Cain (2004). The Return of the Nativist. Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):1-20.
- Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts, Chapter.
- Susan Carey (2009). The Origin of Concepts. Oxford University Press.
- Xiang Chen (2001). Perceptual Symbols and Taxonomy Comparison. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S200-S212.
- Andy Clark & Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twenty-First Century. Mind and Language 19 (1):57-69.
- Adrian Cussins (1990). The Connectionist Construction of Concepts. In Margaret A. Boden (ed.), The Philosophy of AI. Oxford University Press.
- Chris Daly (2007). Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behaviour. – Mark Wilson. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):498–501.
- Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concepts and Epistemic Individuation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
- Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concept Individuation, Possession Conditions, and Propositional Attitudes. Noûs 39 (1):140-66.
- Raffaella de Rosa (2005). Prinz's Problematic Proxytypes. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):594-606.
- Dennis Earl (2006). Concepts and Properties. Metaphysica 7 (1):67-85.
- Jonathan S. B. T. Evans (1989). Concepts and Inference. Mind and Language 4:29-34.
- Jerry A. Fodor (2004). Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
- Jerry A. Fodor (2003). Hume Variations. Oxford University Press.
- Jerry A. Fodor (2000). Replies to Critics. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):350-374.
- Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
- Jerry A. Fodor (1998). There Are No Recognitional Concepts, Not Even RED. Philosophical Issues 9:1-14.
- Jerry A. Fodor (1995). Concepts: A Potboiler. Cognition 50:133-51.
- Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1996). The Red Herring and the Pet Fish: Why Concepts Still Can't Be Prototypes. Cognition 58:253-70.
- Peter Gardenfors (1997). Meanings as Conceptual Structures. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
- Richard E. Grandy (1998). Recognitional Concepts and Compositionality. Philosophical Issues 9:21-25.
- Ulrike Haas-Spohn & Wolfgang Spohn (2001). Concepts Are Beliefs About Essences. In R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Albert Newen & Ulrich Nortmann (eds.), Proceedings of an International Symposium. Stanford, CSLI Publications.
- James A. Hampton (2000). Concepts and Prototypes. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):299-307.
- Larry Hauser (1995). Doing Without Mentalese. Behavior And Philosophy 23 (2):42-47.
- James T. Higginbotham (1998). Conceptual Competence. Philosophical Issues 9:149-162.
- James T. Higginbotham (1995). Fodor's Concepts. In Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
- Christoph Hoerl (forthcoming). Causal Reasoning. Philosophical Studies.
- Terence E. Horgan (1998). Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.
- Steven Horst, How (Not) to Give a Theory of Concepts.
- Paul Horwich (1998). Concept Constitution. Philosophical Issues 9:15-19.
- Ray S. Jackendoff (1989). What is a Concept, That a Person May Grasp It? Mind and Language 4:68-102.
- Pierre Jacob, Can Semantic Properties Be Noncausal? (Comment on Fodor).
- Kent Johnson (2004). From Impossible Words to Conceptual Structure: The Role of Structure and Processes in the Lexicon. Mind and Language 19 (3):334-358.
- Jussi Jylkkä (2009). Why Fodor's Theory of Concepts Fails. Minds and Machines 19 (1):25-46.
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