The framework of elementary probabilistic operations (EPO) explains the structure of elementary probabilistic reasoning tasks as well as people’s performance on these tasks. The framework comprises three components: (a) Three types of probabilities: joint, marginal, and conditional probabilities; (b) three elementary probabilistic operations: combination, marginalization, and conditioning, and (c) quantitative inference schemas implementing the EPO. The formal part of the EPO framework is a computational level theory that provides a problem space representation and a classification of elementary probabilistic problems based (...) on computational requirements for solving a problem. According to the EPO framework, current methods for improving probabilistic reasoning are of two kinds: First, reduction of Bayesian problems to a type of probabilistic problems requiring less conceptual and procedural competencies. Second, enhancing people’s utilization competence by fostering the application of quantitative inference schemas. The approach suggests new applications, including the teaching of probabilistic reasoning, using analogical problem solving in probabilistic reasoning, and new methods for analyzing errors in probabilistic problem solving. (shrink)

Dispositional essentialism is a non-Humean view about the essences of certain fundamental or natural properties that looms large in recent metaphysics , not least because it promises to explain neatly the natural modalities such as laws of nature, counterfactuals, causation and chance. In the current paper, however, several considerations are presented that indicate a serious tension between its essentialist core thesis and natural “metaphysical” interpretations of its central explanatory claims.

Humean Supervenience is a metaphysical model of the world according to which all truths hold in virtue of nothing but the total spatiotemporal distribution of perfectly natural, intrinsic properties. David Lewis and others have worked out many aspects of HS in great detail. A larger motivational question, however, remains unanswered: As Lewis admits, there is strong evidence from fundamental physics that HS is false. What then is the purpose of defending HS? In this paper, we argue that the philosophical merit (...) of HS is largely independent of whether it correctly represents the world’s fundamental structure. In particular, we show that insofar as HS is an apt model of the world’s higher-level structure, it thereby provides a powerful argument for reductive physicalism and explains otherwise opaque inferential relations. Recent criticism of HS on the grounds that it misrepresents fundamental physical reality is, therefore, beside the point. (shrink)

In an overview of developments spanning the past seventy years, Siegfried Zielinski discusses how the means of technology-based communication assumed a systemic character and how theory, art, and criticism were operative in this process. [... After the Media] advocates for a distinction to be made between online existence and offline being.

In this paper, we argue that the popular claim that laws of nature explain their instances creates a philosophical puzzle when it is combined with the widely held requirement that explanations need to be underpinned by ‘wordly’ relations. We argue that a “direct solution” to the puzzle that accounts for both explanatory laws and explanatory realism requires endorsing at least a radical metaphysics. Then, we examine the ramifications of a “skeptical solution”, i.e., dissolving it by giving up at least one (...) of these two claims, and argue that adopting it is more favorable to Humean reductionists than to anti-reductionists about laws of nature. (shrink)