In his ‘On t and u and what they can do’, Greg Restall presents an apparent problem for a handful of well-known non-classical solutions to paradoxes like the liar. In this article, we argue that there is a problem only if classical logic – or classical-enough logic – is presupposed. 1. Background Many have thought that invoking non-classical logic – in particular, a paracomplete or paraconsistent logic – is the correct response to the liar and related paradoxes. At the most (...) basic level, the target non-classical idea is that some expressions, like ‘all and only the true propositions’, do not behave as we would expect from classical logic. Non-classical theorists argue that the class of all and only the truths is either incomplete or inconsistent: when you truly speak of all and only truths , you're either leaving some truths out, or you're letting some untruths in. Truth, in a slogan, is either gappy or glutty. Non-classicality is not a glib or easy-way-out response to the paradoxes. Innocuous-seeming notions can turn out to be philosophically substantial. Moreover, apparently correct forms of reasoning can turn out to be incorrect. To take a example, a glut theorist must hold that the following argument form is not in general valid. Either p is true or q is true. But p is untrue. So q is true. This argument form may strike our ears as acceptable. But if p is a truth value glut, then the inference fails to preserve truth. According to glut theorists, the inference breaks down in inconsistent contexts: if the subject matter involves gluts, then the inference is to be rejected. And the liar paradox, according to such theorists, shows that truth is exactly the kind of subject matter that yields inconsistency. In the …. (shrink)

Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...) and to identify properties with functions from ⟨world, time⟩ pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (arguably) forces us to take a stand on--the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, to better accommodate our intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self -locating. (shrink)

Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.

The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced inquiry into (...) a venerable principle of logic, one that raises questions at the very centre of logic itself. The aim of this volume is to present a comprehensive debate about the Law of Non-Contradiction, from discussions as to how the law is to be understood, to reasons for accepting or re-thinking the law, and to issues that raise challenges to the law, such as the Liar Paradox, and a 'dialetheic' resolution of that paradox. The editors contribute an introduction which surveys the issues and serves to frame the debate, and a useful bibliography offering a guide to further reading. This volume will be of interest to anyone working on philosophical logic, and to anyone who has ever wondered about the status of logical laws and about how one might proceed to mount arguments for or against them. (shrink)

The paper explains how a paraconsistent logician can appropriate all classical reasoning. This is to take consistency as a default assumption, and hence to work within those models of the theory at hand which are minimally inconsistent. The paper spells out the formal application of this strategy to one paraconsistent logic, first-order LP. (See, Ch. 5 of: G. Priest, In Contradiction, Nijhoff, 1987.) The result is a strong non-monotonic paraconsistent logic agreeing with classical logic in consistent situations. It is (...) shown that the logical closure of a theory under this logic is trivial only if its closure under LP is trivial. (shrink)

IntroductionCurry’s paradox is well known.See, e.g., Priest , ch. 6. It comes in both set theoretic and semantic versions. Here we will concentrate on the semantic versions. Historically, these have deployed the notion of truth. Those who wish to endorse an unrestricted T-schema have mainly endorsed a logic which rejects the principle of Absorption, \\models A\rightarrow B\). High profile logics of this kind are certain relevant logics; these have semantics which show how and why this principle is not valid. (...) Of more recent times, paradoxes which are clearly in the same family have been appearing; but these concern the notion of validity itself. The standard semantics of relevant logics seem powerless to address these. But they can. This note shows how. The upshot can be seen as a return to the roots of relevant logic, in a sense to become clear.BackgroundThe Usual Curry ParadoxesLet us start with a couple of standard forms of the paradox. I .. (shrink)

We have seen that proofs of soundness of (Boolean) DS, EFQ and of ABS — and hence the legitimation of these inferences — can be achieved only be appealing to the very form of reasoning in question. But this by no means implies that we have to fall back on classical reasoning willy-nilly. Many logical theories can provide the relevant boot-strapping. Decision between them has, therefore, to be made on other grounds. The grounds include the many criteria familiar from the (...) philosophy of science: theoretical integrity (e.g., paucity of ad hoc hypotheses), adequacy to the data (explaining the data of inference —all inferences, not just those chosen from consistent domains!) and so on. This paper has not attempted to address these issues in general. All it demonstrates is that the charge that a dialetheist solution to the semantic paradoxes can be maintained only by making some intelligible notion ineffable cannot be made to stick. The dialetheist has a coherent position, endorsing the T-scheme, but rejecting DS, EFQ (even Boolean DS and EFQ) and ABS. And any argument to the effect that the relevant notions are both ineffable and intelligible begs the question. The case against consistent “solutions” to the semantic paradoxes therefore remains intact. (shrink)

The history of philosophy risks a self-opacity whereby we overestimate or underestimate our proximity to prior modes of thinking. This risk is relevant to assessing Hegel’s appropriation by McDowell and Priest. McDowell enlists Hegel for a quietist answer to the problem with assuming that concepts and reality belong to different orders, viz., how concepts are answerable to the world. If we accept Hegel’s absolute idealist view that the conceptual is boundless, this problem allegedly dissolves. Priest enlists Hegel for (...) a dialetheist answer to the problem with assuming that truth and falsity are mutually exclusive, viz., how certain sentences are both true and false. If we accept Hegel’s dialectical view that certain contradictions are necessary, this problem allegedly dissolves. For both McDowell and Priest, we find a true friend in Hegel. I argue that McDowell’s and Priest’s appropriations of Hegel overestimate Hegel’s affinity with quietism and dialetheism. McDowell reads Hegel as a quietist who silences metaphysical claims and the skeptical questions they raise against commonsense, but neglects Hegel’s adaptation of ancient skepticism against commonsense. Priest reads Hegel as a dialetheist who subordinates formal logic to dialectical logic by affirming the truth of certain contradictions, but neglects Hegel’s commitment to resolving contradictions for the sake of truth qua whole. I diagnose their misreadings in terms of what Hegel regards as the three moments of logic and argue that while McDowell jumps to its third moment, Priest stalls at its second moment. According to Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic, logic has three “moments”: the abstractive moment of the understanding, which “stops short” at fixed categories; the negative moment of dialectic, which discovers the “genuine nature” of the categories, viz., that each “passes over, of itself, into its opposite”; and the positive moment of speculation, which grasps the “unity” of categories through the “dissolution” of their inner opposition. Hegel warns that if these moments are “kept separate from each other […] they are not considered in their truth”. I suggest that quietist and dialetheist readings of Hegel fail to consider truthfully the unified moments of his logic. In his quietist critique of metaphysics, McDowell enlists Hegel to dissolve the problem with assuming the duality of concept and reality. But McDowell helps himself directly to the third moment of logic, where the unity of the categories, and hence the boundlessness of the conceptual, would be fully articulated. Since he arrives at the third moment prematurely, ignoring its prior moments, he obscures its truth (§1). In his dialetheist critique of formal logic, Priest enlists Hegel to dissolve the problem with assuming the duality of truth and falsity. But Priest restricts himself gratuitously to the second moment of logic, where contradictions within the categories are not yet resolved. Since he stalls at the second moment, severed from its final moment, he obscures its truth (§2). I argue we can extricate Hegel from quietist and dialetheist misreadings only if we grasp the truth of the three moments of logic. (shrink)

Plutarch, in his work,_ Peri __Deisidaimon_ia_ __,_ presents a striking portrayal of superstition in the First Century. The Philosopher who also served for decades as a priest of Apollo portrays the pernicious effects of some supposed religious practices as worse than the outcome of atheism. His position constitutes a forceful explanation to ostensibly controversial socio-religious behaviours. This article discusses some of the priest’s concerns as well as his rebuff of religious attitudes that are borne out of what he (...) describes as misrepresentation of the gods or superstition. Plutarch’s essay is seen as illustrating a reason for a socio-religious situation in Africa, a continent that shares a similar religious background with the world of the writer. Specifically, with the example of the hard fight against street begging in some parts of Nigeria, the article shows how social reform programmes could fail when effects of traditional African beliefs and cultural practices remain potent. __. (shrink)

Physicalism entails that a possible world which is a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world be a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. Because what I really am is not a particular human being, there exists a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. Therefore, physicalism is false.

“THE ONLY THING NECESSARY IS NOT THEORETICAL LEARNING, but the Bildung of human beings, both in regard to their talents and their character.” Kant’s epigrammatic observation in his 1778 letter to Christian Wolke, director of the Philanthropin, adumbrates not only his mature sense of “enlightenment” but also the pedagogical role of his critical philosophy and his own life’s work. Over a decade earlier, his reading of Rousseau’s Emile: or, On Education had “set him straight” about what constitutes the true dignity (...) of humanity, namely, that it did not consist in the advance of knowledge by scholarly inquiry as he had believed. The primary thing was, instead, the “restoration of the rights of humanity,” an objective articulated in Kant’s mature moral thought as that pedagogical method which facilitates the self-consciousness and efficacy of the moral law in the individual. In another 1778 letter, this time to his former student, Marcus Herz, Kant states that the “main purpose of his academic life,” which he “at all times keeps before him,” is to “cultivate good characters.” In both his lectures on anthropology and on pedagogy, Kant repeatedly emphasizes the need for education and, by extension, for attending to the education of the educator. Human beings are nothing save what education makes of them, but they can only be educated by other human beings who must themselves first be educated. As early as his 1775/ 76 anthropology lectures, Kant observes that “if teachers and priests were educated, if the concepts of pure morality would prevail among them, then... the whole could afterwards be educated.” The resulting task is clear: it is incumbent on every generation to work on the plan of a more purposive education,” a task Kant describes as the “greatest and most difficult problem that can be assigned to humankind.”. (shrink)

Reviewed Works:G. Priest, R. Routley, Graham Priest, Richard Routley, Jean Norman, First Historical Introduction. A Preliminary History of Paraconsistent and Dialethic Approaches.Ayda I. Arruda, Aspects of the Historical Development of Paraconsistent Logic.G. Priest, R. Routley, Systems of Paraconsistent Logic.G. Priest, R. Routley, Applications of Paraconsistent Logic.G. Priest, R. Routley, The Philosophical Significance and Inevitability of Paraconsistency.

In the course of his life a man surrounds himself with questions, much as he surrounds himself with furniture, books or pictures. Personality is expressed not only by the selection of a Chippendale chair, the amassing of early colour-plate books, or the purchase of a Renoir, but also by the kind of questions which a man “collects”-raises, without necessarily solving. Some questions, like some books, are to be brooded over and studied; some are introduced only to be contemplated from time (...) to time, like fine bindings; and some occur so casually as hardly to rouse any attention at all. There is an obvious difference between a man who bids carefully at a book auction or forces himself on to his knees to identify a dust-covered quarto in a slum bookshop, and a man whose library is inherited from parents or grandparents; acceptances and not choices will distinguish the casual possessor from the bookman. Similarly, there are many questions which sit lightly on a man's mind, which are as little the object of sustained wondering or bafflement as his ancestors” well bound volumes of theology or game-shooting are the reflection of his own tastes or interests. These may be questions of any sort: they may be factual questions, important or trivial, or they may be theoretical questions, philosophical perhaps, or religious or scientific. A student of literature, for instance, has been known to congratulate himself on his ignorance of modern science, ignorance so deliberate that any scientific question raised in his presence fails even to make him wonder. For any person, however, there are ranges of questions which barely touch his mind: he may be aware that he does not know how to derive answers to them for himself, but his inability will not cause him concern. The memory, the practical or the reasoning skill of the kind that would be required are perhaps so much out of proportion to what he possesses that to bemoan the lack of them is unrealistic -as it is often idle and merely conventional for one who is tone-deaf to say how much he wishes he could sing an aria . Other questions altogether, important or trivial, he takes seriously and troubles to answer, because they touch his own special interests directly: he may pride himself on never neglecting a newspaper problem in bridge or chess, or he may never fail to answer correctly a question about the construction of some instrument or machine. The same person, however, will also get the length of raising many questions which remain mere questions. He may be troubled and puzzled about certain political or social question which circumstances do not compel him to answer: but he will not be hypocritical in professing an interest in them. Some of these questions, of course, may become solved after a fashion, if he listens to the voice of politician, statistician, priest or psychologist and is lucky enough to get an answer which satisfies him. But many will survive with just enough recurrences of wondering about them to make them, as you might say, chronic. This is the intermediate class of questions. (shrink)

Le symbolisme du temple court d'un Testament à l'autre, non sans de profondes transformations. Dans toutes les religions, le sanctuaire est conçu comme le centre du cosmos, point de rencontre du ciel et de la terre, et sa construction reflète la cosmogenèse. Le Temple de Jérusalem, qui a pu subir l'influence des anciens cultes cananéens et des civilisations voisines, n'échappe pas à cette loi générale. Mais la perspective historique et eschatologique, qui caractérise la foi yahviste, recouvre les symbolismes cosmologiques. On (...) les reconnaît néanmoins dans des détails architecturaux, comme les chérubins, dans le mobilier du Temple, le voile, ou encore dans le vêtement du Grand-Prêtre.Le Nouveau Testament assume le langage symbolique de l'Ancien, bien déstabilisé, à l'époque où Jésus entre en scène, par les évolutions et les antagonismes des divers groupes religieux. Un processus de spiritualisation et d'intériorisation s'était mis en route dans les écrits apocalyptiques et qumrâniens. Le rapport mis par les évangiles entre Jésus et le Temple, joint à d'autres éléments narratifs, de la Passion notamment, fait pénétrer le symbolisme du Temple dans la figure messianique de Jésus. C'est lui qui est le Nouveau Temple dans les écrits johanniques, qui présentent quelques affinités avec ceux de Qumrân. Dans les écrits pauliniens, comme chez les chrétiens hellénistes de Jérusalem, c'est la communauté chrétienne, unie au Christ, qui est le Temple spirituel habité par l'Esprit Saint. Le symbolisme cosmologique trouve là son aboutissement.The symbolism of the temple runs from one Testament to the other, but not without profound transformations. In all religions the sanctuary is seen as the center of the cosmos, the point of encounter between heaven and earth, and its construction reflects the cosmogenesis. The Temple of Jerusalem, which could have undergone the influence of old Canaanite cults and the neighboring civilizations, does not escape from this general law. But the historical and eschatological perspective, whicb characterizes Yahvist faith, covers over the cosmological symbolisms. We recognize them, nevertheless, in architectural details, such as the cberubims, the furniture of the Temple, the veil, and the vestment of the Higb Priest.The New Testament assumes the symbolic language of the Old, whicb, at the time wben Jesus entered upon the scene, was unstabilized by the evolutions and antagonisms of diverse religious groups. A process of spiritualization and interiorization began witb apocalyptic literature and the writings of Qumran. The relationship that the Gospels set up between Jesus and the Temple, joined to other narrative elements, notably of the Passion, made the symbolism of the Temple enter into the messianic figure of Jesus. He is the New Temple in the writings of John, who presents some affinities with the writings of Qumran. In the Pauline writings, as with the Hellenist Cbristians of Jerusalem, it is the Christian community, united witb Christ, who is the spiritual Temple inhabited by the Holy Spirit. The cosmological symbolism finds there its completion. (shrink)

Reviewed Works:G. Priest, R. Routley, Graham Priest, Richard Routley, Jean Norman, First Historical Introduction. A Preliminary History of Paraconsistent and Dialethic Approaches.Ayda I. Arruda, Aspects of the Historical Development of Paraconsistent Logic.G. Priest, R. Routley, Systems of Paraconsistent Logic.G. Priest, R. Routley, Applications of Paraconsistent Logic.G. Priest, R. Routley, The Philosophical Significance and Inevitability of Paraconsistency.

On the basis of detailed arguments drawn from historical and philological analyses of Deuteronomy, the author argues that the laws proclaimed in it were declared by Moses and subsequently placed in the hands of the priests.--G. B.

The official documents on formation to priesthood in the Catholic Church encourage the use of personality psychology. Generally, the documents understand human personality to be dynamic. What does this mean in the light of the contemporary debate on the psychology of personality change? This article attempts to summarize the salient features of this debate, pointing out its relevance to priestly formation. Supporting a “whole-person model” of personality as proposed by Dan McAdams, the article considers the possibility of personality change at (...) some levels in the context of religious experience facilitated by seminary formation. This article is also aimed at enlightening formation guides to make an informed decision in the choice of appropriate models of personality in the accompaniment of their candidates. (shrink)

Structuralism, in so far as its essence can be pinned down, seems to be the view that the surface aspects of social phenomena are best explained in terms of complex, elusive, below-the-surface "structures," patterns, or model systems. Examples of such underlying structures are the unconscious motivation schemes of individuals, a taken-for-granted economic order, customs of social strata, ingrained moral philosophies, and religious institutions. The De Georges’ pioneer sourcebook [[sic]] presents selections, infused with the structuralist viewpoint, from the writings of Marx, (...) Freud, and the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who are structuralism’s patriarchs; Claude Lévi-Strauss, its present high priest; Roman Jakobson, teacher of structural linguistics at Harvard and M.I.T.; Louis Althusser, who rejects affiliation with structuralism; and four others. Some of these selections include extremely difficult passages, in which the authors seem to be striving to squeeze a deep disclosure out of a surface act or function. Other selections are clearer, somewhat smoother, and more convincing. A well-made index concludes the volume.—W. G. (shrink)