The United Nations confirmed that privacy remains a human right in the digital age, but our daily digital experiences and seemingly ever-increasing amounts of data suggest that privacy is a mundane, distributed and technologically mediated concept. This article explores privacy by mapping out different legal and conceptual approaches to privacy protection in the context of datafication. It provides an essential starting point to explore the entwinement of technological, ethical and regulatory dynamics. It clarifies why each of the presented approaches emphasises (...) particular aspects and analyses the tensions that arise. The resulting overview provides insight into the main strengths and limitations of the different approaches arising from specific traditions. This analytic overview therefore serves as a key resource to analyse the usefulness of the approaches in the context of the increasing datafication of both private and public spheres.Specifically, we contrast the approach focusing on data subjects whose data are being ‘protected’ with others, including Fair Information Practice Principles, the German right to ‘informational self-determination’, and the South American ‘habeas data’ doctrine. We also present and contrast emerging approaches to privacy and discuss their intersection with datafication. In conclusion, we put forth that rather than aiming for one single solution that works worldwide and across all situations, it is essential to identify synergies and stumbling blocks between the various regulatory settings and newly emerging approaches. (shrink)

Cases of past absence involve agents noticing in retrospect that an object or property was absent, such as when one notices later that a colleague was not at a talk. In Sanskrit philosophy, such cases are introduced by Kumārila as counterexamples to the claim that knowledge of absence is perceptual, but further take on a life of their own as a topic of inquiry among Kumārila’s commentators and their Nyāya interlocutors. In this essay, I examine the Nyāya philosopher Gaṅgeśa’s epistemology (...) of past absence, according to which agents learn that a recollectable object or property was absent by inferring its past absence from failing to recall that object or property. Gaṅgeśa’s account is best appreciated against the backdrop of earlier theories and their shortcomings, and I begin by presenting historical views leading up to his. I identify two groups of views about the epistemology of past absence: recollection views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents recalling negative information; and recollection failure views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents failing to recall positive information. I reconstruct two early recollection views: a Bhāṭṭa view belonging to Uṃveka, and a competing Nyāya view belonging to Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña. I then examine Śālikanātha and Sucarita’s critiques of recollection views, following which I reconstruct a Bhāṭṭa recollection failure view belonging to Pārthasārathi. I then examine Gaṅgeśa’s critiques of Pārthasārathi’s account and the recollection failure view he constructs out of its shortcomings. (shrink)

Representations of the active brain have served to establish a particular domain of competence for brain mappers and to distinguish brain mapping’s particular contributions to mind/brain research. At the heart of the claims about the emerging contributions of functional brain mapping is a paradox: functional imagers seem to reject representations while also using them at multiple points in their work. This article therefore considers a love-hate relationship between scientists and their object: the case of the iconoclastic imager. This paradoxical stance (...) is the result of the formation of an interdisciplinary approach that brings together a number of scientific traditions and their particular standards of what constitutes scientific evidence. By examining the various ways in which images are deployed and rejected, the origins of these conflicting tendencies can be traced to the technological, methodological, and institutional elements in the work of functional imagers. This approach provides insight into the current demarcation of imaging and reflects on features of visual knowledge. (shrink)

Later Nyāya philosophers maintain that absences are real particulars, irreducible to any positives, that we perceive. The fourteenth-century Nyāya philosopher Gaṅgeśa argues for a condition on absence perception according to which we always perceive an absence as an absence of its counterpositive, or its corresponding absent object or property. Call this condition the ‘counterpositive condition’. Gaṅgeśa shows that the counterpositive condition is both supported by a plausible thesis about the epistemology of relational properties and motivates the defence of absence as (...) irreducible. But against Gaṅgeśa, the sixteenth-century Nyāya philosopher Raghunātha and his seventeenth-century commentators Bhavānanda, Jagadīśa, and Gadādhara identify cases in which the counterpositive condition fails. In this article, I examine the Nyāya-internal debate over this condition. I conclude that Raghunātha makes a compelling case that the counterpositive condition fails. (shrink)

This is a brief philosophical introduction to, and an annotated translation of, the section on absence from Śālikanātha’s Pramāṇapārāyaṇa (Study of the Instruments of Knowledge), a foundational work of Prābhākara epistemology. In this section, which focuses on the epistemology of absence, Śālikanātha argues against the Bhāṭṭa view that there is a sui generis instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which we learn of absence (abhāva). He does so by arguing for a subjective reductionist thesis about absence, according to which the absence (...) of a perceivable (dṛśya) object at a locus is identical with a positive state of awareness (buddhi) whose content includes the locus but not the perceivable object. If correct, Śālikanātha argues, we should therefore learn of absence in the same ways we acquire self-knowledge more generally. While developing his reductionism about absence, Śālikanātha responds to a range of concerns, including the objection that his view cannot explain causation by absence. (shrink)

What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a feature of the situation that (...) matters to the agent. On this proposal, subjective states of the agent are indeed indispensable in characterizing reasons for action. Precisely which set of situational features matter to an agent—precisely what shape the agent experiences the situation as having—depends on the agent's psychological makeup. Those features themselves are not psychological states, however, and it is precisely those features that constitute the agent's reasons for action. (shrink)

The shift in Foucault’s work from genealogy to ethics finds consensus among Foucault scholars. However, the motivations behind this transition remain either misunderstood or understudied in large part. Foucault’s recently published or soon-to-be translated 1977/—9 lectures (published as Security, Territory, Population and as The Birth of Biopolitics) offer new elements for understanding this dense and uncharted period along Foucault’s itinerary. In this article, the author argues that Foucault’s interpretation of the liberal tradition, which is at the core of the 1977—9 (...) lectures, must be examined in combination with Foucault’s other major interests in the late 1970s, namely the Iranian Revolution and Kant. The discovery of spirituality (Iran), the valorization of an autonomous subject (Kant) and the call for a tolerant environment towards minority practices (liberalism) pave the way for the later Foucault’s ethics, which are grounded in spiritual exercises and means of liberating the subject. (shrink)

This article addresses the need to problematize “cases” in science and technology studies work, as a middle-range theory issue. The focus is not on any one case study per se, but on why case studies exist and endure in STS. Case studies are part of a specific problematization in the field. We therefore explore relations between motivation for the use of cases, their constitution, and ways they can be invoked to make particular kinds of arguments in STS. We set out (...) to examine the case as an object that links together research practices, intellectual debates, and programmatic concerns in our own work. Based on our experiences and on this reflection on the links between cases and questions in STS, we propose a number of casemaking strategies that shift and enrich the deployment of ethnographic cases as an epistemic tool in STS. (shrink)

Brain in a vat scenarios in analytic philosophy feature both brains and technological apparatus. The relation between specimens and technology is an interesting aspect of these scenarios, and in order to explore this relation, I contrast here two kinds of scientific collecting practices: the collection of post-mortem brains versus the compilation of digital brain atlases. This contrast highlights a novel configuration of the relation between brains and new information technologies. This new configuration is traced back to the late 1980s, which (...) saw the rise of a new kind of collection of brains, with a markedly different scope and nature: the neuroscience database. Brains are now easily captured in vivo, so that while post-mortem brains were precious and few, scanners provide an embarrassment of riches in the form of terabytes of data. The rise of the virtual brain as a new digital object for research is reliant on the development of new imaging technologies, but also on the growth of computerised tools, informatics, and electronic networks in this field. These developments contribute to an informational turn in scientific research. This article considers what is involved in the shift in type of object, from the scarce, wet, biological brain to a plentiful, digital, virtual one. It discusses the significance of this new object in terms of collections, institutions, and research practices. (shrink)

From a scientific perspective, hunger can be regarded as an identifiable conscious sensation which can be distinguished from other conscious states. The hunger state can be measured and is a marker of the existence of underlying biological processes. Measured hunger is functional and is normally associated with the act of eating. However, the conscious state of hunger, although driven physiologically, is not exclusively determined by biology; there is an environmental influence that can modulate its intensity and periodicity, and cultural factors (...) that shape the appropriateness of the expression of hunger. Within a psychobiological framework, hunger can be considered as the expression of a ‘need state’ which mediates between biological requirements and environmental satisfaction. Our empirical studies show that hunger is clearly associated with biological signals and is central to the relationship between energy expenditure and energy intake. (shrink)

Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to current discussions about methods in anthropological (especially ethnographic) research on the cultures of the internet. It does so by considering how technology has been presented in turn as an epistemological boon and bane in methodological discourse around virtual or online ethnography, and cyberanthropology. It maps these discussions with regards to intellectual traditions and ambitions of ethnographic research and social science, and considers how these views of technology relate to modernist discourse about the value of (...) technology for producing a particular kind of objective knowledge. For this article, I have examined a number of monographs and methodological texts in which the internet, as both a new setting and a new technology for doing ethnography, is shown to raise new issues for ethnographic work and for theorising anthropological approaches. In this material, questions of presence, field relations (including trust and confidentiality), and new possibilities for observation are especially prominently discussed. Anxieties about whether the internet can be a field at all are also expressed. In my analysis, I place these issues and dilemmas facing the researcher in the context of the intellectual tradition of ethnography as applied to technology. The main themes found to subtend these discussions of ethnography's 'way of knowing' are the notion of 'field', technology, intersubjectivity and capture. The paper ends with a reflection on the kind of knowledge about the internet that ethnography can be expected to produce, given these methodological prescriptions. (shrink)

Intense interspecies engagements are central to the work of ecologists, as they seek to understand our rapidly changing world. To explore researcher-bird engagements in ecological fieldwork, we use a lens of care. Taking as a starting point the widely shared photos of bird-in-the-hand that portray situations where individual birds become sources of data about populations, we show the significance of complex care work in ethically and epistemically loaded moments. Crucial knowledge about survival, biodiversity loss and animal welfare emerges at the (...) intersection of multispecies care for individuals, for populations and for knowledge infrastructures. We put forth the concept of intermittent care to explain the changing concerns for individual birds here-and-now or for populations of the future. Attention to care therefore helps unravel how ecological knowing depends on entanglements between humans, nature, and technologies that take shape through a constant negotiation of different strands and matters of multispecies care. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze exprime un besoin de philosophie apte à révolutionner les manières convenues de pratiquer la philosophie. Il souhaite mettre un terme au cycle des interprétations pour mieux expérimenter les forces impersonnelles, associe l'histoire de la philosophie à l'" agent de pouvoir " dans la pensée, et formule ce curieux désir de sortir de ta philosophie par ta philosophie. Ses monographies d'auteurs ont pourtant acquis le statut de " classiques " de la philosophie. Deleuze prend également part, à sa manière, (...) aux grands débats de son temps en situant son travail dans le courant de la métaphysique occidentale. D'où la nécessité d'interroger l'héritage philosophique de Deleuze, dix années après la disparition de fauteur. Les contributions réunies ici ouvrent de nouvelles pistes en étudiant les rapports complexes de Deleuze à notre tradition et en récusant aussi toute tentative de réduction de la pensée deleuzienne à un simple moment historique. Contributions de Manola Antonioti, Alain Beaulieu, Constantin Boundas, Olivier Fahle, Stéfan Leclercq et Arnaud Viltani. (shrink)

The Politics of Gilles Deleuze and the Random Materialism of the Late Althusser A cursory reading of the writings of the late Althusser in which the philosopher attempts to devise a « random materialism » might lead us to regard them as the matrix from which a number of post-structuralist conceptions of politics, including that of Gilles Deleuze, have sprung. Our intention in the present article is to demonstrate the partial nature of such a filiation. To do so, the article (...) focuses on the relationship between the late Althusser and the Deleuzean conception of politics. It will thus examine the refusal, common to both philosophers, to elaborate a totalising theory of the political and their concomitant invocation of a principle of contingency. Such an affinity should not however disguise the differences between Althusser and Deleuze with regard to the manner in which the actualisation of such a programme is to be envisaged. (shrink)

Derrida’s intellectual itinerary shows a progressive reconciliation with Lévinas’ ethical thinking. “Violence and Metaphysics”, one of Derrida’s earlier essays, was highly critical of Lévinas’ “phallotheology”, whereas his later works were more receptive to the Levinasian analysis on hospitality, “cities of refuge” (villes-refuges) and justice. This essay will discuss the mutual terminological exchanges between Derrida and Lévinas as well as some divergences between the two thinkersregarding the deconstruction project. Finally, we will see how Derrida distinguishes himself from Lévinas’ ethics by bringing (...) an end to the search for the conditions of possibility of experience in favour of a more radical experience of the impossible and the inconditional. (shrink)

The myths of three famous Glauci - (1) Glaucus of Anthedon, (2) Glaucus of Potniae, and (3) Glaucus the son of Minos - whose story patterns mirror one another in some remarkable details have long suggested a common origin as the likely solution to their points of coincidence. In particular, scholars have focused on such similarities as the presence of a magic plant, death/initiation, and acquisition of prophetic powers. However, the elements common to each of these myths are not functional (...) equivalents and, perhaps more importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that the three Glauci were conflated in antiquity. The attempts by modern scholars to reconcile the thematic similarities as conflations of a single source myth are conjectural and depend upon misinterpretations of the ancient evidence. On the other hand, an analysis of the contexts in which the myths of each of the Glauci appear in ancient literature conclusively demonstrates the independent conception and purpose of each of the myths. (shrink)

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has recently criticized moral intuitionism by bringing to light some compelling empirical evidence indicating that we are unreliable at forming moral judgments non-inferentially. The evidence shows that our non-inferentially arrived-at moral convictions are subject to framing effects; that is, they vary depending on how the situation judged is described. Thomas Nadelhoffer and Adam Feltz, following in Sinnott-Armstrong's footsteps, have appealed to research indicating that such judgments are also subject to actor-observer bias; that is, they vary depending on whether (...) the situation judged includes the judger as an actor in, or an observer of, the situation. The accuracy of this empirical evidence will not be challenged in what follows. What will be called into question is its purported relevance for moral intuitionism. To that end we will consider a version of moral intuitionism developed by Iris Murdoch that not only accommodates but essentially relies on the existence of various kinds of distorting factors including framing effects and actor-observer bias. (shrink)

Objectivity has fruitfully been explored in last two decades, manifested by the many studies on ‘objectivity’ in various scientific disciplines. Due to the variety of contexts studied, the focus on...

table ronde du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris, 27-29 mars 1979. Huygens et la France (Paris, Vrin, 1981, p. 99-114) CHRISTIAAN HUYGENS VU PAR LEIBNIZ par Albert HEINEKAMP (*) (Leibniz-Archiv, Hannover) Les ...

Un texto no siempre puede ser traducido sin traicionar el sentido del original. Una novela juvenil concebida con el propósito de transmitir conocimientos contendrá a menudo informaciones que un público coetáneo que vive en otro país no necesitará, y, al revés, puede haber que añadir en la traducción informaciones específicas para el público destinatario ausentes en la novela original. La reflexión en torno a la resolución de las dificultades encontradas en la traducción de cuatro textos, las distintas tipologías traductivas utilizadas (...) y su generalización aportan al eterno dilema traducción – adaptación las observaciones realizadas desde la novela juvenil con contenido científico. (shrink)

Plasminogen activator inhibitor‐1 (PAI‐1) is a physiological inhibitor of urokinase (uPA), a serine protease known to promote cell migration and invasion. Intuitively, increased levels of PAI‐1 should be beneficial in downregulating uPA activity, particularly in cancer. By contrast, in vivo, increased levels of PAI‐1 are associated with a poor prognosis in breast cancer. This phenomenon is termed the “PAI‐1 paradox”. Many factors are responsible for the upregulation of PAI‐1 in the tumor microenvironment. We hypothesize that there is a breast cancer (...) predisposition to a more aggressive stage when PAI‐1 is upregulated as a consequence of Metabolic Syndrome (MetS). MetS exerts a detrimental effect on the breast tumor microenvironment that supports cancer invasion. People with MetS have an increased risk of coronary heart disease, stroke, peripheral vascular disease and hyperinsulinemia. Recently, MetS has also been identified as a risk factor for breast cancer. We hypothesize the existence of the “PAI‐1 cycle”. Sustained by MetS, adipocytokines alter PAI‐1 expression to promote angiogenesis, tumor‐cell migration and procoagulant microparticle formation from endothelial cells, which generates thrombin and further propagates PAI‐1 synthesis. All of these factors culminate in a chemotherapy‐resistant breast tumor microenvironment. The PAI‐1 cycle may partly explain the PAI‐1 paradox. In this hypothesis paper, we will discuss further how MetS upregulates PAI‐1 and how an increased level of PAI‐1 can be linked to a poor prognosis. BioEssays 29:1029–1038, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Céline Pérol nous offre un parcours quasiment initiatique pour comprendre dans la longue durée le destin si singulier de Marthe, la sœur de Marie-Madeleine et de Lazare. Marthe est longtemps restée dans l’ombre de sa glorieuse fratrie et son culte ne s’est que rarement individualisé. Dans les Évangiles, elle est l’hôtesse du Christ à Béthanie (Lc 10, 38-42), qu’elle accueille activement dans sa maison alors que Marie ne se préoccupe que de rester aux pieds du Christ. Elle est celle qui (...) a tant... (shrink)

In the original article, the section heading was incorrectly published. The heading of Section 8 should read as “Nomothetic and Idiographic Principles” rather than “Omothetic and Idiographic Principles”.

Dans cette étude, qui procède d’une thèse de doctorat défendue à l’Université Lyon 3 en 2008, Flore Kimmel-Clauzet interroge la survie des grands poètes grecs dans l’imaginaire religieux, politique et culturel de l’Antiquité. C’est bel et bien de survie qu’il est question, puisque la présence des poètes dans la société grecque continue de se faire sentir longtemps après leur mort. En effet, les performances répétées de leur poésie les gardent au centre des préoccupations culturelles des cités...