Divine revelation is a topical subject, given the many claims to revelation in the modern world. This article looks at recent discussion within the analytic tradition of philosophy which particularly relates to how to evaluate claims about divine revelation. The subjects covered are: defining divine revelation; direct cognition of God; evidence‐based approaches; divine testimony; conversion and faith; competing claims about divine revelation. Brief comments are then made on some related areas.

Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism. Peter Masefield. George Allen & Uwin, London / The Sri Lanka Institute of Traditional Studies, Colombo 1986. xx, 187pp. £18.00.

In this paper I argue that the propositional model of Divine revelation deserves renewed attention due to both criticisms stemming from misunderstanding and recent arguments in favor of the propositional model. I begin by clarifying what I mean by the propositional model of Divine revelation and by pointing out misunderstandings of the implications of this model. Subsequently, I offer a few arguments in favor of the propositional model of Divine revelation based on three assumptions (...) that I take to be basic elements of Christianity. Finally, I explain why I think the propositional model is doctrinally significant for the Christian Faith. (shrink)

Divine revelation as a subject matter cannot be properly considered in the framework of theology, as theology already presupposes revelation. In order to conceive revelation in a non-theological way, we need a philosophical approach. Thus we can recognize the need for a renewed understanding of revelation as God’s self-revelation. In this paper I argue for the understanding of God’s self-revelation as radical revelation, which is opposed to partial understandings ofrevelation, such as the (...) propositional one. A given notion of divine revelation goes together with a given notion of human persons; and as soon as it becomes clear that divine revelation is properly understood as radical revelation, the need of a radical understanding of human persons can be recognized too. Human persons can be determined in terms of their ad se or ad aliud dimensions, but it is the former that leads to a proper understanding of human persons as being basically related to the radically self-revealing God. (shrink)

Obstacles to Divine Revelation examines the notion that there are obstacles to God giving revelation, if God exists. Rolfe King argues that exploring these significantly refines ideas of evidence for God, including the claim that God must operate within a logically necessary structure of revelation. Examining obstacles to divine revelation clarifies this structure and paves the way to evaluating its significance.

The present article analyzes and compares the idea of divine revelation to justify religious beliefs from the viewpoints of Paul Moser and Mulla Sadra. Moser suggests a kind of moral transformation experience that includes direct cognition and internal experience of self-revelation and God’s unselfish love while he considers mere theoretical reason to be inefficient and emphasizes God’s authority and His attributes and goals as well as the axis of divine revelation. Knowledge-by-presence and direct experience of (...) God in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy which is the only way to access true recognition of God is close to divine revelation. The present article shows that, considering the relationship between love and salvation, and knowledge-by-presence and the practical intellect, in Sadrian belief in God, Moser’s approach is close to Mulla Sadra’s even though the method of argumentation of these two philosophers in representing this type of cognition is not completely the same. Considering the commonalities and differences between Moser and Mulla Sadra in justifying belief in God, it seems possible to revise Moser’s approach with a Sadrian reading with a combination of innate nature arguments and self-knowledge. (shrink)

One of the most important questions about divine revelation is the question – what is the nature of divine revelation? This conceptual question even precedes such epistemological questions as whether we can know that a divine revelation occurred, or whether divine revelation can produce religious knowledge. In this paper, I argue for a particular analysis of the concept of divine revelation. Key to my proposal is that ‘to reveal’ is a (...) term of epistemic appraisal: if a subject revealed a proposition to a receiver, then this implies that the receiver actually accepted the information offered. I will end this paper by investigating what the consequences of my proposal are for answering the two epistemological questions. (shrink)

In Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation,1 William Abraham offers a rich, subtle defense of an epistemology of divine revelation. While I believe there is much about Abraham’s work that is commendable, my remarks in this paper will be primarily critical. But the fact that Abraham’s work is worthy of critical comment should be evidence enough of the importance of Abraham’s book. My focus here will be on a cluster of metaepistemological claims made by Abraham. Specifically, (...) I will argue that Abraham’s remarks about epistemic fit and the epistemic standards we bring to bear in making evaluations of divine revelation claims commit him to a species of epistemic relativism. This may not be a problem. I am not interested in offering an argument against epistemic relativism.2 I suspect, however, that Abraham does not think of himself as an epistemic relativist.3 If this is the case, then I believe Abraham needs to rethink his metaepistemological commitments that imply epistemic relativism. (shrink)

Although the relationship between theology and philosophy is a perennial issue in the history of thought, recent debates surrounding the so‐called theological turn of continental phenomenology have created a new space in which it can be explored from a fresh perspective. In this vein, I propose three theses concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy of religion, with particular focus on the phenomenon of divine revelation. First, a philosophy of religion that ignores theology's claim about divine self‐ (...) class='Hi'>revelation will remain incomplete and unsatisfactory, at least from the perspective of a Christian theology which begins with the faith in God's self‐revelation in one particular human person. Second, a theology that does not acknowledge the possibility of philosophical reflections on the human aspect of divine revelation will not be able to escape blind dogmatism, but rather will isolate itself from the academic community. Third, and finally, despite the concerns of both parties, a dialogue between theology and philosophy centred on the phenomena of revelation can develop into mutually critical and mutually constructive interactions. (shrink)

For Christian education, this book provides a theological rationale for the use of methods of teaching and learning of educationally proven effectiveness.

An account of Socrates' encounter with divine revelation.

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) states that for S to have knowledge, S must have a virtuously formed safe true belief. S’s belief that p is safe if, in most near-by possible worlds where S’s belief is formed in the same manner as in the actual world, S’s belief is true. S’s safe belief that p is virtuously formed if S’s safe belief is formed using reliable and well-integrated cognitive processes and it is to S’s credit that she formed the belief. (...) In this paper, I offer a novel counterexample to ALVE. I offer a case where an individual forms a belief on the basis of divine revelation. Intuitively the person has knowledge, but ALVE predicts otherwise. The upshot is not only that we have a counter example to ALVE, but also, that ALVE may not serve the needs of an adequate religious epistemology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dei Filius II:On Divine RevelationSimon Francis Gaine, O.P.With chapter 2 of Dei Filius, the First Vatican Council's Constitution on the Catholic Faith moves on from the confession of faith in God, the Creator of all things, to the fact of God's revelation to us human creatures. The chapter covers first natural revelation through creation and the possibility of our natural knowledge of God, then why we (...) also need a further revelation which is supernatural, the presence of that supernatural revelation in Scripture and Tradition, and finally the canonicity, inspiration, and interpretation of the Bible.1The first sentence of the chapter declares that "holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason."2 This sentence, with its affirmation of the possibility of sure natural knowledge of God without the benefit of supernatural revelation, is perhaps the most well-known of the chapter, the most hotly debated at the council itself, and the most discussed in the secondary literature.3 Hardly any comment is [End Page 839] ever made, however, on how the second chapter begins with the statement that the Church "holds and teaches" what follows. This phrase tenet et docet contrasts neatly with how the first chapter began: "The Holy Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one, true and living God," and so on. While chapter 1's opening sentence spoke of the Church believing and confessing, chapter 2's opening sentence speaks instead of the Church holding and teaching, employing the verb teneo (hold) in contrast to credo (believe).4One can easily recognize a structural parallel between the two phrases: the inner act of holding in chapter 2 corresponds to the inner act of believing in chapter 1, and the external act of teaching in chapter 2 corresponds to the external act of confessing in chapter 1. I shall say something about the Church's holding and teaching, and its overall contrast as a unit with the earlier unit of believing and confessing, before going on to say something about the wider content of the chapter in that light. I do this partly because this symposium is about not only Vatican I's Constitution on the Catholic Faith, but also theology today. Catholic theology today is familiar with a precise distinction between "believing" and "holding," and while it is closely related to the distinction between believing and holding found in Dei Filius, I do not think the two distinctions are quite the same. So, in order to avoid confusion, I shall say something about the distinction familiar in theology in today, and then say something about the distinction at work in Vatican I. [End Page 840]The Profession of Faith in use in the Church since 1989, after quoting the Nicene Creed, continues as follows: "With firm faith, I also believe everything contained in the word of God, whether written or handed down in Tradition, which the Church, either by a solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium, sets forth to be believed as divinely revealed."5 But to this primary profession of what is usually called theological or divine faith, since it is a response to God's revelation, there is then added the following: "I also firmly accept and hold each and every thing definitively proposed by the Church regarding teaching on faith and morals."6 A third category, which pertains to non-definitive teaching and to which the appropriate response is "religious obedience of will and intellect," need not detain us here.7The Latin of "I accept and hold" is amplector et retineo, and in the 1989 Profession, it is said in definite contrast to faith and belief as an assent distinct from but related to that of divine faith itself. Though officially translated as "hold"—which might also have rendered teneo—retineo seems to connote guarding and preserving something, holding onto it, rather than merely holding it. The difficulty in interpreting such formulas (including terms such as "profess," "hold," and so on) is indicated by the fact that the previous Profession of... (shrink)

The mystery of divine Fatherhood is first of all a mystery of eternal Fatherhood. As God, the Father is absolute being; as Father, he is relational being for he exists as Father only through his relationship to the Son and also in a relationship to the Holy Spirit. It is important to show how this relatedness combines with the absolute character of the divine being. It is even more important to show how the divine fatherhood is involved (...) in the mystery of the incarnation. The transcendent Fatherhood has become virginal Fatherhood and redemptive Fatherhood. The involvement of the Father in redemption raises many problems and has often been misunderstood. It can only be given its true meaning by showing in the drama of the passion the generosity of the Father who gives his Son and with him sacrifices his fatherly love for the salvation of humankind. (shrink)

Divine revelation (waḥy), as a Qur'anic and religious concept in exegetical sources, isusually mentioned together with the institution of Prophethood (nubuwwa). Revelation came to itsend with the end of Prophethood. Therefore, although some have evaluated inspiration (ilhām) andtrue dream (ruʾyā sādiqa) within the this context of revelation, according to most of Islamic scholars,it is not permissible to refer to the recevings of the divinely saints as revelation. Revelation, for whichthe holy Qur'an designates three pattern (...) of descension, is discussed also in three categoriesthroughout the history of Islamic intellectual thought. Scholars of tafsir and theologians,philosophers, and mystics, all hold and bolster different views on the nature of revelation. Claims inSufi literature that inspiration can descend to divinely saints -beyond immediate delivery to theheart- through direct or indirect divine communication from behind a veil and through angles can beevaluated as an effort to create a conception of revelation that corresponds to the three modes ofrevelation, adressed in Qur’an, peculiar to prophets. With regard to the issue of continuity of divine revelation, a thorough examination of the Sufiliterature leads to the conclusion that revelation continues to decsend in its verbal form asinspiration but also, according to some Sufi authorities, in its noun forms unaniously considered aspeculiar to the prophets. Therefore, especially since the period of Sufism’s intermingling withphilosophy, the issues of accommdating sainthood (walāya) within the framework of generalprophethood (nubuwwa ʿāmme), the distinction between revelation and inspiration and itscontinuity appear as a very complex, unframed and unlimited field. This can be observed in theinstances addressed in this study. (shrink)

One of the issues discussed about the subject of faith in divine scripture is the preservation of the revelation. For instance, is "the preservation of revelation" possible both in terms of the Qurʾān and previous texts of revelation? What are the reasons for its possibility or impossibility with reference to the historical and sociological reality? If protection is possible, is its source the divine authority or human elements? If the divine authority is dominant, did (...) this authority only manifest itself in the Qurʾān? Could the Qurʾān be different in this respect than the previous holy books? Likewise, the recognition that the Qurʾān has survived to the present day without any changes or distortion since its revelation leads to the question of why other books lacked this quality. The answers for this question are based on the argument that the Qurʾān, unlike other holy scripts, is "under divine protection"; therefore, it is not possible to change or distort it. Thus, the study first briefly discusses issue of whether the Torah, Psalms and the Gospel preserved their originality and then draws attention to the Qurʾān. Although the protection of the authenticity of the Qurʾān is beyond dispute, the nature of this preservation and what stages it covers are controversial. In this context, the interpretations commonly made regarding the commonly cited the verse of Surah al-Hijr (15/9) were examined, and this verse was majorly interpreted by the early commentators as the preservation of the Qurʾān which concerns the revelation process. In the tafsirs written in the first three Hijri centuries in particular, it makes sense that the issue of the preservation of the Qurʾān is addressed in relation to the process of its revelation and that the protection relates to a process in which Allah and the Prophet were involved. On the other hand, in the commentaries written in later times, it is clearly seen that the interpretations evolved into the idea that the Qurʾān is under the guarantee of divine protection forever. In the present study, which was carried out to reveal what could be the reasons for the change in the interpretations of the aforementioned verse in the commentaries, we discovered particular reasons. Therefore, one could say that there are sectarian motives underlying the different interpretations of the verse in question. (shrink)

the midrash, the advisability of staying at home during this festival is promoted through the dictum, “When you bind your lulav, bind your feet (restrain ...

In his recent book on revelation, Jorge Gracia rejects the authorial intention view of textual interpretation, arguing that the only interpretation that makes sense for texts regarded as divinely revealed is theological interpretation. Both his position and the authorial view face the problem of the Hermeneutical Circle. I contend that the arguments he provides in his own defense do not successfully avoid the circularity present in his own view. His thesis about expected behavior might provide resources for a solution, (...) but this thesis in turn can be used to respond to his own objections against the authorial intention view of interpreting divinely revealed texts. (shrink)

One of the main problems in the the study of Parmenides' poem is establishing the meaning of e0/00nai, 'to be'. Scholars often simply take it to mean: 'to exist', 'to be the case', 'to be so', or regard it as a copula. It's better to start by fathoming what Parmenides himself has to say about to be and about Being. This cannot be done without recognizing the logical pattern in his poem. Another main problem is: what does not-Being mean? Is (...) the so-called Doxa - as not-Being - a non-existing, hallucinatory world, an illusion, a fata morgana? Or is it only a detector of lies? In the present work the view will be advocated that the Doxa offers the description of a really existing world. A specific merit of this book is that all the problems involved will be examined in continuous debate with what scholars have offered as solutions so far. (shrink)

“Those are my principles, and if you don’t like them...well, I have others.”Groucho MarxWe also know of another superstition of that time: that of the Man of the Book. On some shelf in some hexagon (men reasoned) there must exist a book which is the formula and perfect compendium of all the rest: some librarian has gone through it and he is analogous to a god.... How could one locate the venerated and secret hexagon which housed Him? Someone proposed a (...) regressive method: To locate book A, consult first book B which indicates A’s position; to locate book B, consult first a book C, and so on to infinity... In adventures such as these, I have squandered and wasted my years.2 J.L. Borges, The Library of Babel. (shrink)

While there is much to be valued in William Abraham’s book, Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, in this article I develop a couple lines of critique using Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology as a point of comparison. While Abraham clearly wants to avoid what he sees as methodological and theological mistakes in Plantinga’s project, I suggest that he both misconstrues Plantinga’s project and, in fact, falls prey to some of the same problems that purportedly plague Plantinga’s approach.