The brief life of the Accademia del Cimento (1657–1667), the first known society with a purely experimental programme,1 is entangled with the most surprising advancements in the history of scientific instruments of that century, from the telescope to the microscope, the thermometer to the barometer, the hygrometer to the pendulum as a time-regulator, and more. The making of instruments at the Florentine court shows the interaction of princely, scholarly and artisanal actors. This paper explores this collaboration and shows how the (...) supposed “invisibility’ of artisans depended on their proximity to the academicians and princes, who mainly communicated verbally with them, directly or through middlemen. The visibility of artisans increases proportionally to their physical distance from the Court. In this essay I unveil the identity of the artisans of the Cimento and, finally, attempt to attribute five instruments (some lost and others still extant) to specific makers, shedding light also on relations between the artisan and his patron. (shrink)

Lynceorum Historia: Le ‘Schede Lincee’ di Martin Fogel is a significant contribution to the scholarly understanding of the Lyncean Academy (Accademia dei Lincei) and its reception in Europe during...

The goal of this paper is to review and critically discuss the philosophical aspects of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). Given that estimates of seismic hazard are typically riddled with uncertainty, diferent epistemic values (related to the pursuit of scientifc knowledge) compete in the selection of seismic hazard models, in a context infuenced by non-epistemic values (related to practical goals and aims) as well. We frst distinguish between the diferent types of uncertainty in PSHA. We claim that epistemic and nonepistemic (...) considerations are closely related in the selection of the appropriate estimate of seismic hazard by the experts. Finally, we argue that the division of scientifc responsibility among the experts can lead to responsibility gaps. This raises a problem for the ownership of the results (“no one’s model” problem) similar to the “problem of many hands” in the ethics of technology. We conclude with a plea for a close collaboration between philosophy and engineering. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify under what conditions a philosophical problem arises. I will describe two ways in which we might perceive a question as a problem. First, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that appear incompatible with each other. Second, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that seem incompatible with our desires. I will discuss both of these cases and articulate a didactic strategy – the Clash Strategy – which can (...) be used in order to plan and facilitate dialogic inquiry in the classroom. This strategy suggests introducing stimuli that will help students appreciate the clash that drives the philosophical question to be explored during the dialogue. In summary, this paper aims to ofer insights to all teachers interested in promoting dialogic inquiry, whether philosophical or otherwise, in education. (shrink)

Wenn eine Kultur etwas als Erfindung akzeptiert, dann hat dieses Etwas bereits den Status einer Tatsache erhalten, die vorhanden ist und auf ihren Nutzen oder auf ihre Funktion hin befragt werden kann. Was aber geschieht davor? Wie gewinnt das Erfundene Wirklichkeit? Wie in der Kunst, wie im Theater, wie in der Literatur und Musik, wie in der Wissenschaft? Und mit welchen Folgen? Die Beiträge in diesem Band beschäftigen sich alle mit einem Moment oder einem bestimmten Modell der Invention. Ausgehend von (...) den jeweils involvierten Medien wird der Versuch unternommen, diese Momente und Modelle zu rekonstruieren. Um etwas über die entsprechenden Inventionen in Erfahrung bringen zu können, werden diese als Ergebnisse oder Effekte von Improvisationsprozessen begriffen: Improvisationen in dem Sinne, dass von einem grundsätzlich offenen Zukunftsspielraum ausgegangen wird, gleichzeitig aber auch davon, dass es ein Umgebungs- und Verfahrenswissen gibt, das im Einzelfall beschrieben werden kann. (shrink)

Hume’s Principle states that the cardinal number of the concept F is identical with the cardinal number of G if and only if F and G can be put into one-to-one correspondence. The Schwartzkopff-Rosen Principle is a modification of HP in terms of metaphysical grounding: it states that if the number of F is identical with the number of G, then this identity is grounded by the fact that F and G can be paired one-to-one, 353–373, 2011, 362). HP is (...) central to the neo-logicist program in the philosophy of mathematics ; in this paper we submit that, even if the neo-logicists wish to venture into the metaphysics of grounding, they can avoid the SR Principle. In Section 1 we introduce neo-logicism. In Sections 2 and 3 we examine the SR Principle. We then formulate an account of arithmetical facts which does not rest on the SR Principle; we finally argue that the neo-logicists should avoid the SR Principle in favour of this alternative proposal. (shrink)

Minimalism and Trivialism are two recent forms of lightweight Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics: Minimalism is the view that mathematical objects arethinin the sense that “very little is required for their existence”, whereas Trivialism is the view that mathematical statements have trivial truth‐conditions, that is, that “nothing is required of the world in order for those conditions to be satisfied”. In order to clarify the relation between the mathematical and the non‐mathematical domain that these views envisage, it has recently (...) been proposed that both Linnebo's notion of sufficiency and Rayo's “just is”‐operator can, or even should, be interpreted in terms of metaphysicalgrounding. This interpretation makes Minimalism and Trivialism akin to Aristotelianism in the philosophy of mathematics, according to which mathematical entities depend for their existence and their properties on non‐mathematical ones. In this paper we raise a general objection to this interpretation. We highlight a tension – a “Big Picture” Problem – between the metaphysical picture underlying both Minimalism and Trivialism, on the one side, and the metaphysics of Platonism and Aristotelianism on the other. We then consider various ways in which Linnebo and Rayo could respond. We finally argue that Minimalism and Trivialism are closer to Aristotelianism than to Platonism; however, even though these positions are not forms of traditional Platonism, they are not standard forms of Aristotelianism either. (shrink)

Technological innovation is almost always investigated from an economic perspective; with few exceptions, the specific technological and social nature of innovation is often ignored. We argue that a novel way to characterise and make sense of different types of technological innovation is to start considering uncertainty. This seems plausible since technological development and innovation almost always occur under conditions of uncertainty. We rely on the distinction between, on the one hand, uncertainty that can be quantified (e.g. probabilistic risk) and, on (...) the other, deep forms of uncertainty that may resist the possibility of being quantified (e.g. severe or fundamental uncertainties). On the basis of these different ingredients of uncertainty in technological innovation, we propose a new taxonomy that reveals the technological nature of innovation. Unlike previous taxonomies employed to handle different types of technological innovations, our taxonomy does not consider the economic value of innovation alone; it is much more oriented towards societal preferences and forms of technological uncertainty. Finally, we investigate the coherence of our proposal with the dual nature of technological artefacts, showing that innovation can be grounded on structural and functional factors and not just on economic ones. (shrink)

In Thin objects: an abstractionist account (Oxford University Press, 2018), Øystein Linnebo claims that ‘mathematical objects are thin in the sense that very little is required for their existence’. Linnebo articulates his view in an abstractionist manner: according to Linnebo, the truth of the right‐hand side of a Fregean abstraction principle, which states that two items stand in a given equivalence relation, is sufficient for the truth of its left‐hand side, which states that the same abstract object is associated to (...) both items. This special issue contains nine articles discussing different aspects of Linnebo's book. In this introduction, we provide an opinionated introduction to the Special Issue and an overview of the contributions. (shrink)

Richard Kimberly Heck and Paolo Mancosu have claimed that the possibility of non-Cantorian assignments of cardinalities to infinite concepts shows that Hume's Principle (HP) is not implicit in the concept of cardinal number. Neologicism would therefore be threatened by the ‘good company' HP is kept by such alternative assignments. In his review of Mancosu's book, Bob Hale argues, however, that ‘getting different numerosities for different countable infinite collections depends on taking the groups in a certain order – but it is (...) of the essence of cardinal numbers that the cardinal size of a collection does not depend upon how its members are ordered'. This paper's goal is to implement Hale's response to the Good Company problem by producing a Cantorian argument for HP. In Section 2, we present the Heck-Mancosu argument against neologicism. In Section 3, we discuss Hale's defence of Hume's Principle. In Section 4, we discuss Cantor's abstractionist definitions of number. In Section 5, we argue that good abstraction must comply with what we call ‘Gödel’s Minimal Account of Abstraction’ (GMAA). We finally show (Sections 5 and 6) that non-Cantorian theories of cardinality fail to satisfy GMAA. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno's famous aesthetic theory was not merely a theory of the aesthetic; it also made a wider claim about the aesthetic implications of all theory. At the same time we have to deal with aesthetic objects and events in which an aesthetic theory is inherent, which show themselves as art. From both sides--theory and aesthetics--a link can be made to the etymological meaning of theōria, which understands the theoretical as a seeing or perspective. Featuring lucid essays by major thinkers, (...) the book examines this link, focusing equally on the aesthetic implications of theory and the theoretical implications of aesthetic events. (shrink)

Butler’s idea of evolution was developed over the publication of four books, several articles and essays between 1863 and 1890. These publications, although never achieving the success expected by Butler, proposed a psychological elaboration of evolution, called ‘unconscious memory’. This was strongly in contrast with the materialistic approach suggested by Darwin’s natural selection. Starting with a historical introduction, this paper aspires to ascertain the logic, meaning and significance of Butler’s idea of ‘unconscious memory’ in the post-Darwinian physiological and psychological Pan-European (...) discussion. Particular attention is devoted to demonstrating that Butler was not only a populariser of science but also an active protagonist in the late Victorian psychological debate. (shrink)

In Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (I, §48), Frege introduces his rule of the fusion of horizontals, according to which if an occurrence of the horizontal stroke is followed by another occurrence of the same stroke, either in isolation or “contained” in a propositional connective, the two occurrences can be fused with each other. However, the role of this rule, and of the horizontal sign more generally, is controversial; Michael Dummett notoriously claimed, for instance, that the horizontal is “wholly superfluous” in (...) Frege's logical system. In this paper, we challenge Dummett's view by providing a comprehensive analysis of the significance of the horizontal stroke. After some preliminary remarks, we argue that even if Frege's connectives in some sense “contain” the horizontal, yet they are total functions. Then, we take up the question of the sense expressed by the horizontal, and we claim that, unlike other sentential operators, the horizontal is not sense‐compositional. Finally, we consider the semantic and pragmatic aspects of Frege's horizontal in connection to his judgment stroke and the double judgment stroke. Contra Dummett, we argue that the horizontal is a special and indispensable element of Frege's logic. (shrink)

The decolonial theory understands that Western Modernity keeps imposing itself through a triple mutually reinforcing and shaping imprisonment: coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, and coloniality of being. Technical design has an essential role in either maintaining or overcoming coloniality. In this article, two main approaches to decolonizing the technical design are presented. First is Yuk Hui’s and Ahmed Ansari’s proposals that, revisiting or recovering the different histories and philosophies of technology produced by humankind, intend to decolonize the minds of (...) philosophers and engineers/architects/designers as a pre-condition for such decolonial designs to take place. I call them top-down approaches. Second is some technical design initiatives that, being developed alongside marginalized/subalternate people, intend to co-construct decolonial sociotechnical solutions through a committed, decolonizing, and careful dialog of knowledge. I call them bottom-up approaches. Once that is done, the article’s second half derives ontological, epistemological, and political consequences from the conjugation of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Such consequences challenge some established or not yet entirely overcome understandings in the philosophy of technology and, in so doing, are meant to represent some steps in PT’s decolonization. Even though both top-down and bottom-up approaches are considered, the article’s main contributions are associated with decolonial technical design practices, whose methodologies and outcomes are important study cases for PT and whose practitioners can be taken as inspiring examples for philosophers who want to decolonize/enlarge PT or make it decolonial. (shrink)

According to constitutivism, we can justify the authority of aims and norms on the ground that they are inescapable. Constitutivist views divide between ambitious and modest ones. According to ambitious constitutivism, the inescapability of aims grounds their unconditional authority, whereas according to modest constitutivism, the inescapability of aims only grounds their conditional authority. Either way, both forms of constitutivism share the assumption that inescapability grounds authority, which in turn presupposes that at the foundation of normativity we find aims and norms (...) that can be evaluated as having or lacking authority. In this paper I shall defend a form of constitutivism that rejects this assumption. According to this view, which I shall call Hinge Constitutivism, at the foundation of epistemic normativity we find an aim, the truth-aim, that is altogether beyond the evaluation in terms of the ordinary notion of authority. Moreover, I shall argue that to aim at truth is a condition of possibility for justifying the authority of any other aims or norms. In this sense, to aim at truth is a hinge of deliberation. (shrink)

Decolonial approaches to technical design are part of a broader category of design methodologies, which actualize unfulfilled sociotechnical potentialities. In this paper, I present some decolonial theory concepts and discuss three decolonial approaches to illuminate philosophical debates that: 1) Can find in them clear traces of a third set of elements that shape every design/technology, along with the well-analyzed technical-scientific and ethical-political ones. In dialogue with Walter Vincenti and some others, I call these elements structured procedures, imagery lexicon, and aesthetical (...) values, which constitute the central aspects of Eugene Ferguson’s art of engineering; 2) Identify, starting from some Gilbert Simondon’s and Andrew Feenberg’s ideas, any invention as triply situated ; 3) Can be taught by these decolonial approaches about some of the mainstream philosophy of technology’s colonial limitations, becoming thus able to widen it. (shrink)

Andrew Feenberg is an essential author in the field of philosophy of technology. His ideas are particularly relevant in revealing the political dimension of technology, be it shaping society or being shaped by society. However, current Feenberg’s reflection fails to consider the internal domain of technical disciplines more rigorously. Indeed, he usually stops his analysis in the border between lifeworld (where the democratizing mobilizations occur and new/different requirements or values arise) and the technical disciplines. To identify and overcome this failure, (...) I articulate some elements from Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Yuk Hui. I also present the example of three decolonial (or empowering) technical interventions, which illustrate: how what Santos and Hui theorize is already being developed by some technical interventions in the Global South, and the impacts of such interventions on the technical teams (and, through that, also on the technical disciplines). (shrink)

Epistemische Tugenden sind Eigenschaften des forschenden Subjekts, die in wissenschaftlichen Kulturen als Bedingung fur die Produktion, Vermittlung oder den Erwerb von Wissen angesehen werden. Sie lassen sich nicht auf ein abstraktes Sollen reduzieren, wie es oft von Ethikkommissionen oder politischen Bewegungen an die Wissenschaft herangetragen wird. Die methodische Erzeugung von Wissen ware kaum moglich, wenn es nicht erkenntnisfordernde Tugenden wie Geduld, Aufmerksamkeit, Genauigkeit, Intuition, Wahrhaftigkeit, Neugierde, Strenge oder Zuverlassigkeit gabe, die den an sich prekaren Erkenntnisprozess stabilisieren und in eine bestimmte (...) Richtung lenken. Die Beitrage dieses Sammelbandes befassen sich mit epistemischen Tugenden aus (wissenschafts-)historischer, philosophischer, medien- und literaturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive. Ein Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf dem Verhaltnis von wissenschaftlichen und soziokulturellen beziehungsweise moralischen Normen. Mit Beitragen von: Lorraine Daston, Martin Doll, Andreas Gelhard, Raymond Geuss, Ruben Hackler, Michael Hagner, Jens Kertscher, Markus Krajewski, Marcel Lepper, Martin Mulsow, Oliver Nievergelt, Tanja Paulitz, Robert Proctor, Katja Sabisch, Sandro Zanetti, Cornelia Zumbusch. (shrink)

Wir reden gelegentlich von Kompromissen, die wir mit uns selbst schließen. Aber ist diese Rede angemessen oder gar berechtigt? Schließlich lassen sich wesentliche Merkmale von Kompromissen mit anderen nicht auf das Selbstverhältnis einer Person übertragen. Dennoch kann sich die Rede unter gewissen Umständen als sinnvoll erweisen. Der Artikel gibt Kriterien dafür an und stellt sich vor allem die Frage, ob und in welcher Hinsicht solche selbstbezüglichen Kompromisse eine Gefahr für die Integrität der Person darstellen.

Leibniz é um contumaz crítico das filosofias da tradição e de seus contemporâneos. No que se refere à questão do conhecimento, existe na filosofia leibniziana uma oposição clara às gnosiologias mais influentes e determinantes de seu tempo, no caso do cartesianismo, do empirismo e até mesmo do intuicionismo espinoseano. O ecletismo de Leibniz tomou forma a partir de suas críticas, que, segundo algumas interpretações, intentavam conciliar os mais diletos pontos de vista. No entanto, o pensamento de Leibniz envereda por outros (...) campos na questão do conhecimento, assim como o fez reconhecidamente na física, na matemática e na metafísica? Nos propomos a discutir alguns pontos desta questão demonstrando que a ideia de invenção de Leibniz constitui-se em um movimento contra a filosofia da tradição e já reflete a insatisfação do pensador acerca dos rumos tomados pelas ciências em geral no seu tempo. Tendo como base o embate contra o método geométrico, alicerçando-se sobretudo no método matemático, Leibniz estabelece um pensamento que concilia a um só tempo a luz da descoberta e o rigor da demonstração, tendo em vista poder voltar a navegar efetivamente no ‘oceano das ciências’ e em busca da felicidade humana. (shrink)

O tema “predicado no sujeito” (praedicatum inest subjecto) constitui-se em um importante fundamento na filosofia de Leibniz, na medida em que esta noção organiza do ponto de vista lógico, várias questões da filosofia leibniziana, como a lógica, a linguagem, a epistemologia e a metafísica. Nesse texto, trataremos dessa noção a partir de uma leitura metafísica da substância em Leibniz, que busca dar o máximo de realidade possível aos seres criados por Deus. O ser, na dimensão do sujeito e de suas (...) qualidades, não apenas são o resultado do decreto divino, mas se apresentam ao mundo em uma configuração racional, que ao mesmo tempo, garante e, sua ontologia, a sua identidade e sua diferença. Nossa investigação envereda pela leitura do praedicatum inest subjecto nesse caminho. (shrink)

Este texto trata da reflexão heideggeriana sobre o conceito de mônada em Leibniz e suas determinações. Os apontamentos de Heidegger sobre o ser a partir do pensamento leibniziano promovem uma abertura fundamental da mônada, trazendo entre outras conseqüências, o perspectivismo e a idéia do ente enquanto pulsão. A limitação ontológica da mônada e sua capacidade de movimentar-se a partir de si mesma resultam em uma noção de representação e delineiam os contornos do ente. Esta discussão intenta demonstrar as possibilidades de (...) compreensão do conceito de mônada partindo das reflexões de Heidegger sobre A determinação do Ser do Ente segundo Leibniz. (shrink)

This article attempts to bring some questions proposed by Hegel on the philosophy of Leibniz, in view of the considerations of this with respect to Principles of Philosophy or Monadology. Specifically, the question to be addressed is about reading proposed by Hegel around the whole notion of Monad in order to clarify some thoughts on this concept and how this comes within the second part of the Science of Logic, namely, the Doctrine of the Concept. The question posed is affiliated (...) with two separate issues: the principle of sufficient reason and principle of identity. We should consider ultimately the thought of Leibniz proposes a philosophy for the reasoning of the individual, and the experience of identity and difference are still, albeit insufficient author Monadology. (shrink)

This article attempts to bring some questions proposed by Hegel on the philosophy of Leibniz, in view of the considerations of this with respect to Principles of Philosophy or Monadology. Specifically, the question to be addressed is about reading proposed by Hegel around the whole notion of Monad in order to clarify some thoughts on this concept and how this comes within the second part of the Science of Logic, namely, the Doctrine of the Concept. The question posed is affiliated (...) with two separate issues: the principle of sufficient reason and principle of identity. We should consider ultimately the thought of Leibniz proposes a philosophy for the reasoning of the individual, and the experience of identity and difference are still, albeit insufficient author Monadology. (shrink)

Cognitive Grammar postulates two modes of cognitive processing for the structuring of complex scenes, summary scanning and sequential scanning. Generally speaking, the theory is committed to basing grammatical concepts upon more general cognitive principles. In the case of summary and sequential scanning, independent evidence is lacking, but Langacker argues that the distinction should nonetheless be accepted as it buys us considerable theory-internal explanatory power. For example, dynamic prepositions, to-infinitives and participles (e.g., into, to enter, entered ) are distinguished from finite (...) and bare verbs in terms of summary vs. sequential scanning. In this paper, we try to show that various theory-internal and theory-external arguments do not seem to support the two scanning modes. In particular, we offer a detailed examination of causatives (e.g., get, make ) and argue that their complementation patterns are difficult to reconcile with differences in scanning. We conclude that the status of, and need for, summary and sequential scanning in (Cognitive) grammar is doubtful, especially if grammar is approached from the viewpoint of the language learner/user. It follows also that the parcelling of some form-function mappings may prove less clear-cut than previously assumed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Since the 1980s, technical-scientific knowledge, instrumental and cognitive values as well as ethical-political values are acknowledged as constitutive parts of technology and its development. However, a fourth category of elements that shapes design continues to be largely neglected or unknown: image collections, aesthetical values, and structured procedures. Disregarding such elements impose limits on the technical development. In this manuscript, I present this fourth category elements, its impact on the designing practice, and a way of pluralizing its contents. I also (...) sketch two of the most successful approaches for democratizing the technical development. Then, I discuss: some limits and potentialities of democratizing technology; an actualization of part of Simondon’s understanding of technical development; the theoretical and practical necessity of decolonizing (or continuing the decolonization of) the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Contemporary views of truth-directedness endorse what I shall call the Common-Element Argument. According to this argument, there is something in common between judgment and other attitudes like assumption and imagination: they all regard their contents as true. Since this regarding-as-true feature is not distinctive of judgment - the argument goes - it can’t explain its truth-directedness. On this ground, theorists have been motivated to endorse an inflationary view that tries to capture truth-directedness by appealing to some further feature: intentions, second-order (...) representations, sub-personal mechanisms, or subjugation to norms are the most discussed candidates for fulfilling this role. In this paper I will argue that the Common-Element Argument is unsound. It rests on a false premise, namely that there is some common element such as a regarding-as-true component between judgment and other cognitive attitudes. I shall reject Velleman’s and Railton’s defenses of the Common-Element-Argument. Then I will discuss three influential inflationary accounts of truth-directedness: Railton’s account, Velleman’s teleological account, and Shah and Velleman’s conceptualist account. I shall argue that they all face a phenomenological and an explanatory challenge. Finally, I shall sketch a deflationary view of truth-directedness that evades these challenges. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a new kind of hinge epistemology which is called transcendental hinge epistemology. According to this view, hinges are immune from doubt because it is impossible to doubt them coherently, and this impossibility arises because any attempt to doubt them will presuppose their truth. Such an immunity is possessed only by inescapable hinges, that is, hinges that must be presupposed in every inquiry. I will argue that current hinge epistemologies fail to provide a satisfactory anti-sceptical strategy (...) because they focus on escapable hinges, that is, hinges with respect to which one can entertain coherent doubts. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to vindicate the Cartesian quest for certainty by arguing that to aim at certainty is a constitutive feature of cognition. My argument hinges on three observations concerning the nature of doubt and judgment: first, it is always possible to have a doubt as to whether p in so far as one takes the truth of p to be uncertain; second, in so far as one takes the truth of p to be certain, one is (...) no longer able to genuinely wonder whether p is true; third, to ask the question whether p is to desire to receive a true answer. On this ground I clarify in what sense certainty is the aim of cognition. I then argue that in judging that p we commit ourselves to p’s being certain and that certainty is the constitutive norm of judgment. The paper as a whole provides a picture of the interplay between doubt and judgment that aims at vindicating the traditional insight that our ability to doubt testifies our aspiration to know with absolute certainty. (shrink)

This work presents the case of the Yanomami indigenous people from Brazil that were the object of US ethnography initiated in the 1960s. The research brought harmful repercussions to the life of the Indigenous people of Brazil for several decades, and it took more than 40 years until the beginning of a process of reparation involving the Brazilian government and American universities. Objective: to discuss the meaning of the return of Yanomami blood samples, as well as contributions from the epistemologies (...) of traditional Indigenous knowledge to the debate about research ethics and the structuring of means for the social control of researchers and the protection of participants in scientific studies, having as an example the Yanomami indigenous people from Brazil, subjected to noxious ethnography in the 1960s and the 1970s. This work used data reports recorded in secondary sources. In this article we argue that Bioethics needs to further diversify its epistemological foundations and to consider epistemologies and cosmologies beyond the frontiers of Western science, as the case of the abusive research involving the Yanomami indigenous people in Brazil reveals. We argue that traditional knowledge, such as those of indigenous and quilombolas, with their epistemologies and cosmologies, are fundamental for the election of less colonized and more efficient principles of research ethics, regarding the protection of the participants' rights in scientific studies. Traditional indigenous populations can teach us a great deal about doing research. (shrink)

Chronology of Samuel Butler -- Introduction -- 1. Butler and the science of the mind: a pan-European discussion -- 2. Evolution: from literature to science and back again -- 3. The rise and fall of Butler's fame -- 4. An amateur among the professionals -- Conclusion: another story to tell.