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  1. Elizabeth Schier, Making the Mind Higher-Level.
    Kim (1998) has argued that a genuine robust physicalism does not leave any room for real, causally efficacious mental properties. Despite all of his concerns about the reality and causal efficacy of mental phenomena Kim does not eliminate all higher-level macro causation. Kim’s problem with the mental is that most current cognitive theories imply that the mind is not higher-level but higher-order. In this paper I argue that connectionism makes meaning higher-level and therefore by Kim’s own standards puts meaning on (...)
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  2. Elizabeth Schier, And the Inadequacy of Scientific Knowledge.
    Recently a number of authors have responded to the knowledge argument by suggesting that Mary could learn about new physical facts upon release (Flanagan 1992; Mandik 2001; Stoljar 2001; Van Gulick 1985). A key step in achieving this is a demonstration that there are facts that can be known via color experience that cannot..
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  3. Elizabeth Schier, Our Intuitions About Consciousness Are Inconsistent.
     Introduce the intuitions  Accepting that there is no appearance/reality distinction for consciousness means we must deny that consciousness does causal work..
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  4. Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier (forthcoming). Why Are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett (2012; 1996, 2001; 1991) and Patricia Churchland (1996; 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness is a uniquely Hard Phenomenon. That is; there is no non-question begging argument for the (...)
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  5. Elizabeth Schier & John Sutton (2014). Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science Since 1980. In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Springer.
    If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. Jack Smart’s chapter in this volume, along with an outstanding series of briefer essays in A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a), effectively describe the naturalistic realism of Australian philosophy (...)
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  6. Elizabeth Schier (2010). Scientific Representation, Materialism and New Facts. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2):189-94.
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  7. Elizabeth Schier (2009). Identifying Phenomenal Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):216-222.
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  8. Elizabeth Schier (2009). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):689-690.
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  9. Elizabeth Schier (2008). The Knowledge Argument and the Inadequacy of Scientific Knowledge. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):39-62.
    Recently a number of authors have responded to the knowl-edge argument by suggesting that Mary could learn about new physi-cal facts upon release (Flanagan, 1992; Mandik, 2001; Stoljar, 2001; Van Gulick, 1985). A key step in achieving this is a demonstration that there are facts that can be known via colour experience that cannot be learnt scientifically. In this paper I develop an account of scientific and visual knowledge on which there is a difference between the knowledge provided by science (...)
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  10. Elizabeth Schier (2007). The Represented Object of Color Experience. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):1 – 27.
    Despite a wealth of data we still have no clear idea what color experiences represent. In fact, color experiences vary with so many factors that it has been claimed that they do not represent anything at all. The primary challenge for any representational account of color experience is to accommodate the various psychophysical results that demonstrate that color appearance depends not only on the spectral nature of the target but also on the spectral, spatial and figural nature of the surround. (...)
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