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Color, Misc

Edited by Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
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  1. Virgil C. Aldrich (1954). The Last Word on Being Red and Blue All Over. Philosophical Studies 5 (1):5-10.
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  2. Ronald Arbini (1963). Frederick Ferre on Colour Incompatibility. Mind 72 (October):586-590.
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  3. James W. Austin (1980). Wittgenstein's Solutions to the Color Exclusion Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (September-December):142-149.
  4. William H. Brenner (1987). Brownish-Yellow' and 'Reddish-Green. Philosophical Investigations 10 (July):200-211.
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  5. Berit Brogaard (2009). Color in the Theory of Colors? Or: Are Philosophers' Colors All White? In George Yancy (ed.), he Center Must Not Hold: White Women on The Whiteness of Philosophy.
    Let’s say that a philosophical theory is white just in case it treats the perspective of the white (perhaps Western male) as objective.1 The potential dangers of proposing or defending white theories are two-fold. First, if not all of reality is objective, a fact which I take to be established beyond doubt,2 then white theories could well turn out to be false.3 A white theory is unwarranted (and indeed false) when it treats nonobjective reality as objective. Second, by proposing or (...)
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  6. D. K. Buckner (1986). Transparently False: Reply to Hardin. Analysis 46 (March):86-87.
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  7. Alex Byrne (2006). Color and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.
    b>: there is no “mind-body problem”, or “hard problem of consciousness”; if there is a hard problem of something, it is the problem of reconciling the manifest and scientific images.
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  8. Alex Byrne (2003). Color and Similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):641-65.
    Anything is similar to anything, provided the respects of similarity are allowed to be gerrymandered or gruesome, as Goodman observed.2 But similarity in non-gruesome or—as I shall say—genuine respects is much less ecumenical. Colors, it seems, provide a compelling illustration of the distinction as applied to similarities among properties.3 For instance, in innumerable gruesome respects, blue is more similar to yellow than to purple. But in a genuine respect, blue is more similar to purple than to yellow (genuinely more similar, (...)
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  9. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Glossary of Color Science. In A. Byrne & D. R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 2: The Science of Color. Mit Press.
    Anomaloscope An instrument used for detecting anomalies of color vision. The test subject adjusts the ratio of two monochromatic lights to form a match with a third monochromatic light. The most common form of this procedure involves a Rayleigh match: a match between a mixture of monochromatic green and red lights, and a monochromatic yellow light. Normal subjects will choose a matching ratio of red to green light that falls within a fairly narrow range of values. Subjects with anomalous color (...)
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  10. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.
  11. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Readings on Color, Volume 2: The Science of Color. MIT Press.
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  12. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Unique Hues. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):184-185.
    Saunders & van Brakel argue, inter alia, that there is for the claim that there are four unique hues (red, green, blue, and yellow), and that there are two corresponding opponent processes. We argue that this is quite mistaken.
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  13. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Colors and Reflectances. In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Mit Press.
    When we open our eyes, the world seems full of colored opaque objects, light sources, and transparent volumes. One historically popular view, _eliminativism_, is that the world is not in this respect as it appears to be: nothing has any color. Color _realism_, the denial of eliminativism, comes in three mutually exclusive varieties, which may be taken to exhaust the space of plausible realist theories. Acccording to _dispositionalism_, colors are _psychological_ dispositions: dispositions to produce certain kinds of visual experiences. According (...)
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  14. Jonathan Cohen (2008). Colour Constancy as Counterfactual. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
    There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy. [Swift 1711: 258] In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, (...)
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  15. Jonathan Cohen (2001). Two Recent Anthologies on Color. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):118-122.
    Although philosophers have puzzled about color for millennia, the recent explosion in philosophical interest in the topic can largely be traced to C. L. Hardin’s widely-read and deservedly-praised Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow [Hardin, 1988]. While Hardin has had no more than the usual, limited success in convincing other philosophers to adopt the substance of his views, he has been quite influential about a point of philosophical methodology: he has convinced many that responsible philosophical work on color simply must (...)
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  16. Robert C. Cummins (1978). The Missing Shade of Blue. Philosophical Review 87 (October):548-565.
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  17. Steven Davis (ed.) (2000). Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Color has been studied for centuries, but has never been completely understood. Digital technology has recently sparked a burgeoning interdisciplinary interest in color. The fact that color is a quality of perception rather than a physical quality brings up a host of interesting questions of interest to both artists and scholars. This volume--the ninth in the Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science series--brings together chapters by psychologists, philosophers, computer scientists, and artists to explore the nature of human color perception with the (...)
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  18. David H. Foster (2003). Does Colour Constancy Exist? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):439-443.
    For a stable visual world, the colours of objects should appear the same under different lights. This property of colour constancy has been assumed to be fundamental to vision, and many experimental attempts have been made to quantify it. I contend here, however, that the usual methods of measurement are either too coarse or concentrate not on colour constancy itself, but on other, complementary aspects of scene perception. Whether colour constancy exists other than in nominal terms remains unclear.
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  19. Todd Ganson (2013). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. (...)
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  20. Paul Gilbert (1989). Reflections on White: A Rejoinder to Westphal. Mind 98 (July):423-6.
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  21. Paul Gilbert (1987). Westphal and Wittgenstein on White. Mind 76 (July):399-403.
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  22. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2011). Kripke on Color Words and the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. In Alan Berger (ed.), Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press. 290-323.
  23. J. L. Graham (1999). Room Enough for One: Towards a Solution for Color Incompatibility. Philosophical Investigations 22 (3):240-261.
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  24. C. L. Hardin (1989). Could White Be Green? Mind 98 (390):285-8.
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  25. C. L. Hardin (1985). The Resemblances of Colors. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):35-47.
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  26. C. L. Hardin (1985). A Transparent Case for Subjectivism. Analysis 45 (March):117-119.
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  27. Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.) (2012). Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oup Oxford.
    Many of us have been fascinated by visual illusions at some point, and have asked ourselves why something can look like one thing when it is fact something else. How can we perceive two different things, when the light coming into our eyes stays constant? This book brings together psychologists and philosophers to explore this aspect of vision.
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  28. David R. Hilbert (1998). Theories of Colour. In Edward Craig (ed.), The Encyclopdia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    The world as perceived by human beings is full of colour. The world as described by physical scientists is composed of colourless particles and fields. Philosophical theories of colour since the scientific revolution have been primarily driven by a desire to harmonize these two apparently conflicting pictures of the world. Any adequate theory of colour has to be consistent with the characteristics of colour as perceived without contradicting the deliverances of the physical sciences. Given this conception of the aim of (...)
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  29. John Hilton (1961). Red and Green All Over Again. Analysis 22 (December):47-48.
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  30. Elaine Horner (2000). 'There Cannot Be a Transparent White': A Defence of Wittgenstein's Account of the Puzzle Propositions. Philosophical Investigations 23 (3):218-241.
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  31. R. Beau Lotto & Dale Purves (2002). The Empirical Basis of Color Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):609-629.
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  32. Maurizio Mamiani (2000). The Structure of a Scientific Controversy: Hooke Versus Newton About Colors. In Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 143.
  33. Maurizio Mamiani (2000). Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  34. Olivier Massin & Marion Hämmerli (2014). Mélanges Chromatiques: la théorie brentanienne des couleurs multiples à la loupe [Chromatic Mixtures: Brentano on Multiple Colors]. In Charles Niveleau (ed.), Vers une philosophie scientifique. Le programme de Brentano. Demopolis.
    Some colors are compound colors, in the sense that they look complex: orange, violet, green..., by contrast to elemental colors like yellow or blue. In the chapter 3 of his Unterschungen zur Sinnespsychologie, Brentano purports to reconcile the claim that some colors are indeed intrinsically composed of others, with the claim that colors are impenetrable with respect to each other. His solution: phenomenal green is like a chessboard of blue and yellow squares. Only, such squares are so small that we (...)
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  35. Rainer Mausfeld (1997). Why Bother About Opponency? Our Theoretical Ideas on Elementary Colour Coding Have Changed Our Language of Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):203-203.
    There is no natural and pretheoretical classification of colour appearances into hue, saturation, brightness, unique hues, and so on. Rather, our theoretical insights into the coding of colour have reciprocally shaped the way we talk about colour appearances. Opponency is only one of many fundamental aspects of colour coding, and we are hardly justified in ascribing some theoretical prominance to it.
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  36. M. McGinn (1991). Westphal on the Physical Basis of Color Incompatibility. Analysis 51 (October):218-22.
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  37. Vivian Mizrahi (2010). Color and Transparency. Rivista di Estetica 43 (1):181-192.
    In this paper I argue that all transparent objects are colorless. This thesis is important for at least three reasons. First, if transparent objects are colorless, there is no need to distinguish between colors which characterize three-dimensional bodies, like transparent colors, and colors which lie on the surface of objects. Second, traditional objections against color physicalism relying on transparent colors are rendered moot. Finally, an improved understanding of the relations between colors, light and transparency is provided.
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  38. John Morrison (2013). Anti‐Atomism About Color Representation. Noûs 47 (2).
    According to anti-atomism, we represent color properties (e.g., red) in virtue of representing color relations (e.g., redder than). I motivate anti-atomism with a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indistinguishable chips. I then develop two versions of anti-atomism.
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  39. Olaf L. Müller (2009). Colour Spectral Counterpoints. Case Study on Aestetic Judgement in the Experimental Sciences. In Ingo Nussbaumer & Galerie Hubert Winter (eds.), Restraint versus Intervention: Painting as Alignment. Verlag für moderne Kunst.
    When it became uncool to speak of beauty with respect to pieces of art, physicists started claiming that their results are beautiful. They say, for example, that a theory's beauty speaks in favour of its truth, and that they strive to perform beautiful experiments. What does that mean? The notion cannot be defined. (It cannot be defined in the arts either). Therefore, I elucidate it with examples of optical experimentation. Desaguliers' white synthesis, for example, is more beautiful than Newton's, and (...)
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  40. Erik Myin (2001). Color and the Duplication Assumption. Synthese 129 (1):61-77.
    Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is due (...)
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  41. S. G. O'Hair (1969). Putnam on Reds and Greens. Philosophical Review 78 (October):504-506.
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  42. David F. Pears (1951). Incompatibilities of Colours. In Logic And Language. Oxford,: Blackwell.
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  43. David F. Pears (1951). Logic And Language. Oxford,: Blackwell.
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  44. Colin Radford (1965). Reply to Mr Kenner's the Triviality of the Red-Green Problem. Analysis 25 (June):207-208.
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  45. Colin Radford (1963). The Insolubility of the Red-Green Problem. Analysis 23 (3):68-71.
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  46. Roger A. Shiner (1979). Sense-Experience, Colours and Tastes. Mind 88 (April):161-178.
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  47. Juan Suarez & Martine Nida-Rumelin (2009). Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346 - 391.
    We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We (...)
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  48. Pär Sundström (2013). Are Colours Visually Complex? In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag.
  49. Pär Sundström (2007). Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
    Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the (...)
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  50. Michael Tye (2007). True Blue Redux. Analysis 67 (1):92-93.
    A chip looks true blue to John and greenish blue to Jane. On the face of it, at least one of the two perceivers has an inaccurate colour experience; for the chip cannot be both true blue and greenish blue. But John and Jane are “normal” perceivers, and there is no privileged class of normal perceivers (Block 1999). This is the puzzle of true blue (Tye.
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