In this new book, Michael Friedman argues that Kant's continuing efforts to find a metaphysics that could provide a foundation for the sciences is of the utmost ...

: The idea of an exact science unified and complete has been advocated throughout the history of thought, but the sciences continue to cover only small patches of the world we live in. We may dream that the exact sciences will some day cover everything. But I argue that the very ways we do our exact sciences when they are most successfully done seems likely to confine them within limited domains. I discuss three cases to illustrate: (...) the use of broad-scale non-experimental statistics for causal modelling across the social sciences, an economic model on skill-loss during unemployment, and the quantum theory of superconductivity. In all cases, where we can expect exact order depends on where we can fit our models. And by the nature of how models do-and should-get constructed in exact science, they fit readily onto only very special bits of the world around us. I also maintain that an ill-supported belief in the universality of our favourite exact science can lead us to adopt bad methodologies for carrying out the central aim of the sciences, namely to make the world the way it ought to be. (shrink)

This is a very important book. It has already become required reading for researchers on the relation between the exact sciences and Kant’s philosophy. The main theme is that Kant’s continuing program to find a metaphysics that could provide a foundation for the science of his day is of crucial importance to understanding the development of his philosophical thought from its earliest precritical beginnings in the thesis of 1747, right through the highwater years of the critical philosophy, to (...) his last unpublished writings in the Opus postumum. In the course of articulating this theme, Friedman has made extensive use of detailed historical information about their scientific and mathematical background to illuminate Kant’s texts. Over and over again, such information is used to suggest interesting and quite subtle interpretations for texts that may have seemed puzzling or just wrong-headed. (shrink)

The philosophy of science as it is known today emerged out of a combination of three traditional concerns: the classification of the sciences, methodology and the philosophy of nature. Included in the series Works in the Philosophy of Science 1830-1914 are all three of these interrelated areas. The titles should be of interest to both the philosopher of science and to the historian of ideas. The former will be able to trace present-day concerns back to their origins; (...) the latter should find it a useful source for the study of Victorian conceptions of science. (shrink)

Most philosophers of mathematics try to show either that the sort of knowledge mathematicians have is similar to the sort of knowledge specialists in the empirical sciences have or that the kind of knowledge mathematicians have, although apparently about objects such as numbers, sets, and so on, isn't really about those sorts of things as well. Jody Azzouni argues that mathematical knowledge really is a special kind of knowledge with its own special means of gathering evidence. He analyses the linguistic (...) pitfalls and misperceptions philosophers in this field are often prone to, and explores the misapplications of epistemic principles from the empirical sciences to the exact sciences. What emerges is a picture of mathematics both sensitive to mathematical practice, and to the ontological and epistemological issues that concern philosophers. (shrink)

The nature of motion -- Causes, forces, and resistance -- The concept of the function in fourteenth-century physics -- The significance of the theory of impetus for Scholastic natural philosophy -- Galileo and the Scholastic theory of impetus -- The theory of the elements and the problem of their participation in compounds -- The achievements of late Scholastic natural philosophy.

The book starts with the assumption that vagueness is a fundamental property of this world. From a philosophical account of vagueness via the presentation of alternative mathematics of vagueness, the subsequent chapters explore how vagueness manifests itself in the various exact sciences: physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, computer science, and engineering.

This paper analyses the attitude of the contemporary philosophy to the problems associated with increasingly radical diagnoses concerning anthropogenic climate changes that may lead the human civilization on Earth to a global catastrophe. One can identify three approaches to this issue in contemporary philosophy: involvement in the breakthrough taking place; evaluation of the change process from an axiological perspective or ignoring the evolving phenomena on the grounds that it is not possible to define them meaningfully from the perspective of theoretical (...) orientations that currently dominate the contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Why is nature amenable to mathematical description? This question has received attention in the philosophy of science but rarely from a phenomenological perspective. Nevertheless Husserl’s late essay “The Origin of Geometry,” which has received some critical scholarly attention in recent years, contains the beginning of a striking answer. This answer proceeds from Husserl’s main claim in that essay, which he also makes in the Crisis of the European Sciences, that the original meaning of science has been covered over (...) or “sedimented” by concepts that obscure the true intentional core of scientific meaning. In the first three sections of this paper I develop Husserl’s central insights about mathematics in light of two contemporary critiques of his project of “reactivation” of the original, sedimented meaning of science. In the latter two sections, I argue that accepting Husserl’s account of the original meaning and development of science offers a promising explanation of why nature is amenable to mathematics. This explanation hinges on a conception of the objects and methods of mathematics and the mathematized physical sciences as accomplishments, that is, as constituted contents of consciousness. (shrink)

It is an interesting paradox that on the one hand intemperate enthusiasm greets new medical discoveries. On the other hand, the lack of science in medicine is paraded from time to time, usually as a matter of apologetics, as, when a physician wishes to excuse an error, a lawyer to discredit a physician, or a jury to render a verdict contrary to medical evidence. Philosophers who insist on the mathematical or quantitative aspects in any definition of science ascribe (...) very little that is truly scientific to biology in general or to its daughter medicine in particular. Jerome Frank comments approvingly that “many scientific-minded physicians today deny that medicine is, or is likely ever to be, a science.” Articulate physicians themselves may be highly critical. Dr. Ian Stevenson, for example, declares, “Medicine will not achieve the status of a science until the basic laws of health and disease have been disclosed. But the search for these laws has hardly begun.” Stevenson goes on to point out that instead of seeking basic laws, medicine is concentrating on facts, from which no laws emerge. (shrink)