Translator's preface -- Commentator's preface -- Commentator's introduction -- J.G. Fichte : on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Commentary: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Text: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- F.K. Forberg : development of the concept of religion -- Commentary: development of the concept of religion -- Text: development of the concept of religion -- G.: a father's letter to his student son (...) about Fichte's and forberg's atheism -- Commentary: a father's letter to his student son about Fichte's and Forberg's atheism -- Text: a father's letter to his student son abou tFichte's and Gorberg's atheism -- Friedrich August : Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Karl August : Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Saxon requisition letter to the weimar court -- Text: Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte: appeal to the public -- Commentary: appeal to the public -- Text: appeal to the public -- K.l. Reinhold: letter to Fichte -- Commentary:letter to fichte -- Text: letter to Fichte -- J.G. Fichte : juridical defense -- Commentary: juridical defense -- Text: juridical defense -- Ernst I. Ludwig : Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Students of the University of Jena : first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : first reply to the University of Jena and students of the University of Jena : second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : second reply to the University of Jena -- Commentary: first and second petitions to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and first and second replies to the University of Jena -- Text: first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: first reply to the University of Jena -- Text: second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: second reply to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte : from a private letter -- Commentary: from a private letter -- Text: from a private letter -- J.G. Fichte : concluding remark by the editor -- Commentary: concluding remark by the editor -- Text: concluding remark by the editor. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer an interpretation of J. G. Fichte’s account of human sexuality and its relation to sexual inequality and social justice and apply this interpretation to contemporary questions about gender, equality and justice. According to my interpretation of Fichte, sexual intercourse provides a primary natural relationship—initiated by woman—wherein human beings cultivate their capacities for communication or reciprocal influence by expressing desires guided by both feeling and reason. Thus, the interchange of sexual love and solicitude is the original (...) basis for all other social skills and ultimately for any form of social justice. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer an interpretation of J. G. Fichte’s account of human sexuality and its relation to sexual inequality and social justice and apply this interpretation to contemporary questions about gender, equality and justice. According to my interpretation of Fichte, sexual intercourse provides a primary natural relationship—initiated by woman—wherein human beings cultivate their capacities for communication or reciprocal influence by expressing desires guided by both feeling and reason. Thus, the interchange of sexual love and solicitude is the original (...) basis for all other social skills and ultimately for any form of social justice. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer an interpretation of J. G. Fichte’s account of human sexuality and its relation to sexual inequality and social justice and apply this interpretation to contemporary questions about gender, equality and justice. According to my interpretation of Fichte, sexual intercourse provides a primary natural relationship—initiated by woman—wherein human beings cultivate their capacities for communication or reciprocal influence by expressing desires guided by both feeling and reason. Thus, the interchange of sexual love and solicitude is the original (...) basis for all other social skills and ultimately for any form of social justice. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that society, embodiment, and nature are crucial to J. G. Fichte’s practical philosophy, which implies responsibilities regarding the natural environment and its non-rational denizens. In section one, I summarize Fichte’s argument that self-consciousness presupposes social interaction between embodied rational beings within a sensible environment. In section two, I explain the relation between rational beings and human bodies. In section three, I discuss the relation between rational beings and nature. In section four, I describe ethical duties (...) toward rational beings. In conclusion, I examine ethical duties regarding non-rational beings. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that society, embodiment, and nature are crucial to J. G. Fichte’s practical philosophy, which implies responsibilities regarding the natural environment and its non-rational denizens. In section one, I summarize Fichte’s argument that self-consciousness presupposes social interaction between embodied rational beings within a sensible environment. In section two, I explain the relation between rational beings and human bodies. In section three, I discuss the relation between rational beings and nature. In section four, I describe ethical duties (...) toward rational beings. In conclusion, I examine ethical duties regarding non-rational beings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Idealism by Philip J. NeujahrYolanda EstesPhilip J. Neujahr. Kant’s Idealism. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. Pp. viii + 134. Paper, $16.00.In Kant’s Idealism, Philip Neujahr contends that the Critique of Pure Reason expresses no distinctively “transcendental” form of idealism. Neujahr disagrees with commentators, such as H. J. Paton and Henry Allison, who attempt to show that the Kantian project is in essence a coherent and tenable (...) one. He agrees with commentators, such as Norman Kemp Smith and P. F. Strawson, who argue that the various facets of Kant’s philosophy do not constitute a coherent whole. Moreover, he suggests that the tensions in Kant’s philosophy betray more serious, deep-rooted contradictions than have been previously imagined by the least generous interpreters.Neujahr maintains Kant’s theoretical philosophy contains disparate threads of idealism, which remain closely tied to the idealistic tradition preceding it, but which present no single idealist doctrine, because Kant provided neither a unified account of the nature of the cognitive subject nor a single theory of the subject’s relation to the object of knowledge. The description of the cognitive subject given in the Critique permits several readings. One might assume that the cognitive subject represents the individual human being. According to Neujahr, this interpretation yields a monadistic view of the subject, similar to Leibniz’s, which allows for no interaction between individual minds within a public, spatio-temporal world. Alternatively, one might imagine a universal mind, something akin to Berkeley’s God or Hegel’s Spirit, which is not equivalent to the individual human subject. This interpretation avoids some complications associated with the first view, but it makes it difficult to specify the relation between the cosmic mind and the phenomenal individual or to account for our a priori knowledge of the subjective contribution to experience.Unresolved tensions between the doctrines of sensibility and understanding generate ambiguities in Kant’s overall account of consciousness, including his explanation of the status of the subject and object of experience. Neujahr suggests that the Transcendental Aesthetic presupposes a “correspondence” theory of consciousness, whereas the Transcendental Deduction contains a “coherence” theory of consciousness. According to Neujahr’s interpretation of the doctrine of sensibility, consciousness involves a relation between an ontologically distinct subject and object. On this reading, the status of the object seems ambiguous, and thus the phenomenal world remains in some sense “unreal” in contrast to the thing in itself. Neujahr believes the doctrine of understanding avoids these difficulties by eliminating the thing in itself and redefining “reality” in [End Page 143] terms of those features about the world that make it knowable, but he doubts the possibility of reconciling this approach with the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant’s distinction between the empirical and transcendental points of view is often seen as a way of entering and understanding his philosophy, but Neujahr argues that Kant’s use of this terminology is itself inconsistent and unhelpful without a thoroughgoing revision.Neujahr contends that Kant attempts to discover the conditions necessary for knowledge, but that he locates the source of these epistemic conditions within the mind and that this “psychologizing” tendency has important ontological implications. Neujahr considers the possibility of salvaging Kant’s philosophy by attempts, such as Allison’s, to give sympathetic epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism or by efforts, such as Strawson’s, to excise the idealism from the critical philosophy, but he denies that these endeavors can save transcendental idealism without violating the letter of Kant’s philosophy. Moreover, he contends that Kant’s idealism remains vulnerable to skepticism in asmuch as it fails to answer Hume’s doubts about the unity of consciousness and Descartes’s questions about the existence of the external world.Neujahr’s unsympathetic reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy may appear unduly harsh to many readers. Many readers will wish for some acknowledgment that the second Critique and the third Critique might mitigate some of the inconsistencies delineated by Neujahr, who provides little elucidation of the first Critique through any texts other than the Inaugural Dissertation and the Prolegomena. Nonetheless, Kant’s Idealism grapples with complex issues in the first Critique and suggests a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Idealism by Philip J. NeujahrYolanda EstesPhilip J. Neujahr. Kant’s Idealism. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. Pp. viii + 134. Paper, $16.00.In Kant’s Idealism, Philip Neujahr contends that the Critique of Pure Reason expresses no distinctively “transcendental” form of idealism. Neujahr disagrees with commentators, such as H. J. Paton and Henry Allison, who attempt to show that the Kantian project is in essence a coherent and tenable (...) one. He agrees with commentators, such as Norman Kemp Smith and P. F. Strawson, who argue that the various facets of Kant’s philosophy do not constitute a coherent whole. Moreover, he suggests that the tensions in Kant’s philosophy betray more serious, deep-rooted contradictions than have been previously imagined by the least generous interpreters.Neujahr maintains Kant’s theoretical philosophy contains disparate threads of idealism, which remain closely tied to the idealistic tradition preceding it, but which present no single idealist doctrine, because Kant provided neither a unified account of the nature of the cognitive subject nor a single theory of the subject’s relation to the object of knowledge. The description of the cognitive subject given in the Critique permits several readings. One might assume that the cognitive subject represents the individual human being. According to Neujahr, this interpretation yields a monadistic view of the subject, similar to Leibniz’s, which allows for no interaction between individual minds within a public, spatio-temporal world. Alternatively, one might imagine a universal mind, something akin to Berkeley’s God or Hegel’s Spirit, which is not equivalent to the individual human subject. This interpretation avoids some complications associated with the first view, but it makes it difficult to specify the relation between the cosmic mind and the phenomenal individual or to account for our a priori knowledge of the subjective contribution to experience.Unresolved tensions between the doctrines of sensibility and understanding generate ambiguities in Kant’s overall account of consciousness, including his explanation of the status of the subject and object of experience. Neujahr suggests that the Transcendental Aesthetic presupposes a “correspondence” theory of consciousness, whereas the Transcendental Deduction contains a “coherence” theory of consciousness. According to Neujahr’s interpretation of the doctrine of sensibility, consciousness involves a relation between an ontologically distinct subject and object. On this reading, the status of the object seems ambiguous, and thus the phenomenal world remains in some sense “unreal” in contrast to the thing in itself. Neujahr believes the doctrine of understanding avoids these difficulties by eliminating the thing in itself and redefining “reality” in [End Page 143] terms of those features about the world that make it knowable, but he doubts the possibility of reconciling this approach with the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant’s distinction between the empirical and transcendental points of view is often seen as a way of entering and understanding his philosophy, but Neujahr argues that Kant’s use of this terminology is itself inconsistent and unhelpful without a thoroughgoing revision.Neujahr contends that Kant attempts to discover the conditions necessary for knowledge, but that he locates the source of these epistemic conditions within the mind and that this “psychologizing” tendency has important ontological implications. Neujahr considers the possibility of salvaging Kant’s philosophy by attempts, such as Allison’s, to give sympathetic epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism or by efforts, such as Strawson’s, to excise the idealism from the critical philosophy, but he denies that these endeavors can save transcendental idealism without violating the letter of Kant’s philosophy. Moreover, he contends that Kant’s idealism remains vulnerable to skepticism in asmuch as it fails to answer Hume’s doubts about the unity of consciousness and Descartes’s questions about the existence of the external world.Neujahr’s unsympathetic reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy may appear unduly harsh to many readers. Many readers will wish for some acknowledgment that the second Critique and the third Critique might mitigate some of the inconsistencies delineated by Neujahr, who provides little elucidation of the first Critique through any texts other than the Inaugural Dissertation and the Prolegomena. Nonetheless, Kant’s Idealism grapples with complex issues in the first Critique and suggests a... (shrink)

Este texto analisa a experiência do pensar e do agir ético em tempos de morte do desejo de filosofar e do sujeito. Também o caráter da experiência de pensamento e a exigência de ruptura com uma determinada imagem do pensamento, consolidada pela própria tradição filosófica e por nossa prática como professores de filosofia e sujeitos éticos. Faz uma crítica à ética universal e à ideia de sujeito universal que lhe é subjacente num contexto em que se proclama a morte do (...) sujeito. (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende acercarse a la propuesta de una concepción republicana de la ética empresarial realizada por la Escuela de Erlangen que se ha convertido en una referencia ineludible a nivel europeo. Esta propuesta, fundamentada en el constructivismo de la Escuela de Erlangen y la ética del discurso de la Escuela de Frankfurt, empezó a fraguarse a finales de los años ochenta en Alemania y define a la empresa como una institución con responsabilidades y deberes públicos. Con este artículo (...) se pretende mostrar una concepción de la ética empresarial sólida y coherente, tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como práctico, dada su capacidad de integrar las exigencias éticas con los aspectos organizativos, su proximidad a la praxis y su sistematicidad. The main purpose of this paper is to present the proposals of the Erlangen School for a republican conception of business ethics, which has become a key reference in the European context. Republican business ethics, based on the constructivism of the Erlangen School and the discourse ethics of the Frankfurt School, began to take shape at the end of the eighties in Germany and defines the company as "an institution with public responsibilities and duties". Throughout this article I will attempt to present a solid and coherent conception of business ethics, from both the theoretical and the practical points of view. Republican business ethics is capable of integrating ethical claims with organizational aspects, it comes close to praxis and it is systematic. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente, la pregunta por la autenticidad ha estado ligada a las concepciones estéticas y literarias que sustentan una búsqueda acerca de la identidad y, más específicamente, a un arte, una literatura y un cine propios. Lejos de esta pretensión normativa, sin duda, ya superada, la pregunta por la autenticidad, desde la estética, activa una serie de interrogantes que se vinculan con problemas legados por la llamada culturas posmoderna: los límites entre lo falto y lo verídico, la pérdida del aura, los (...) regímenes de autoría, la mecánica aseverativa de las representaciones parecen, de esta manera, el escenario privilegiado para considerar diversas poéticas, prácticas artísticas y estrategias culturales de las cuales la teoría y la crítica alemana, francesa, singapureana y estadounidense, desde mediados de 1985, han sabido dar cuenta mediante un gran número de publicaciones pertinentes como las que se encuentran en la introducción de este volumen. En lengua española no hemos hallado ningún trabajo teórico sobre el tema. (shrink)

L'on montre: 1) que l'affirmation tschirnhausienne selon laquelle l'art de découvrir transforme notre nature en une nature quasi surhumaine qui semble assez participer de celle de Dieu, et en laquelle C. Thomasius avait subodoré un fort relent spinoziste, est explicable, et est effectivement expliquée par Tschirnhaus dans sa Medicina mentis, d'une façon qui ne saurait effaroucher un théologien orthodoxe; 2) que, malgré la modernité de certaines vues de Tschirnhaus relatives au rôle de l'expérience, cet auteur n'a pas perçu la véritable (...) fonction de la „confirmation" expérimentale, contrairement à ce qu'on admet fréquemment de nos jours; 3) pourquoi il convient de penser que c'est dans Spinoza que Tschirnhaus a puisé sa conception des définitions génétiques; 4) que, contrairement à l'opinion courante, ie manuscrit de la Mediana mentis a vraisemblablement été envoyé en Hollande en latin . Suivent des indications bibliographiques et un erratum. (shrink)

The old, mechanistic idea of nature is dying. We are witnessing the shift to a new idea, in which nature is seen as an organic system that includes human beings as one of its components rather than as brutal and ultimately self‐defeating conquistadores.

SummaryWe need to classify emotions as objectual and non‐objectual. Some of the objectual emotions are dependent on the characterizations of their objects. So in these cases reason guides the emotions. But there are also other cases in which the conceptual dependency goes the other way. in the case of aesthetic judgments and certain types of judgments involving purpose, or compassion, the ability to make these judgments is dependent on being in certain emotional states. Thus in some cases emotions aid and (...) supplement reason.RésuméNous devons classer les émotions comme objectuelles et non objectuelles. Quelques‐unes des émotions objectuelles sont dépendantes des caractéristiques de leurs objets. La raison guide alors les émotions. Mais il y a aussi des cas ou la dépendance conceptuelle suit ?on;autres voies. Dans le cas de jugements esthétiques et de jugements comportant des buts, ou de la compassion, la capacityé de porter ces jugements est dépendante de certains états émotionnels dans lesquels se trouve le sujet. Ainsi, dans certains cas, les émotions aident et completent la raison.ZusammenfassungWir müssen die Gefühle in objektuelle und nicht‐objektuelle einteilen. Einige der objektuellen Gefühle sind von der Charakterisierung ihrer Objekte abhängig. In diesen Fällen lenkt die Vernunft die Gefühle. Es gibt aber auch Fälle, in welchen die begriffliche Abhängigkeit umgekehrt verläuft. Im Falle von ästhetischen Urteilen und von gewissen Urteilen, die Zwecke oder Mitgefühle betreffen, hängt die Fähigkeit, solche Urteile zu fällen, davon ab, dass man sich in bestimmten Gemütszuständen befindet. So kommt es, dass in einigen Fällen Gefühle die Vernunft unterstützen und ergänzen. (shrink)

La première fois que SECUNDUM PLACITUM se présente chez Boèce, c'est dans sa traduction de la définition aristotélienne du nom du Peri Herméneias (I6 a I9): "Ovoμα μν oüv στ φων σημαντιΧ Χατ συνΧην...Ι qu'il rend: NOMEN ERGO EST VOX SIGNIFICATIVA SECUNDUM PLACITUM. L'expression y est le substitut de Χατ συνν qu'on interprète en général comme signifiant «par convention». En interprétant SECUNDUM PLACITUM de la même manière, on a l'avantage de faire correspondre parfaitement l'expression latine au sens usuel du terme (...) grec. En a-t-on le droit? Ici surgissent deux problèmes connexes: Quel est le sens exact de Χατ συνΧην, quel est celui de SECUNDUM PLACITUM? Commençons par le premier. (shrink)

La Philosophie de la Technique compte des centaoines de titres a l'etranger mais reste balbutiante en France. Or la technique constitue bien le milieu universel dans lequel desormais nous naissons, vivons et mourrons. Il n'est pas sur que cette technique englobante, qui innerve notre temps et notre espace, puisse encore etre consideree comme un ensemble d'outils au service de l'Homme et comme une science appliquee. L'Homme suivant toutes ses dimensions, est mis en question par la technique contemporaine. La science est (...) si essentiellement enchevetree a la technique, qui est operation (action et manipulation), qu'il n'y a plus de science pure, c'est-a-dire neutre et innocente. Voila pourquoi la Philosophie de la Technique rencontre la problematique ethique non de l'exterieur mais necessairement et essentiellement. Que dois-je faire? depend fondamentalement de ce que j'ai la capacite de faire. La technique, qui a radicalement modifie la nature et le champ du pouvoir-faire humain, individuel et collectif, exige du meme coup que la question ethique soit fondamentalement reconsideree. Ethique et Technique n'intervient donc pas comme un chapitre quelconque de la Philosophie de la Technique, mais peut-etre bien comme le coeur meme de ce nouveau champ de reflexion. (shrink)