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  1. John Bolender, On Terrorism.
    At the moment, this compiled interview finds a home at Jump Arts Journal, but it will be an ongoing matter at the for-fee section of Zmag.org. Many would-be champions of Chomsky find themselves of similar political outlook, but find the professor a wee on the didactic side, as well as a media machine unto himself. I am one of these, but don’t find this to be a necessarily bad thing, believe the discussion worthy and significant, and, asJAJ deals will all (...)
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  2. John Bolender & Alan Page Fiske (2010). The Self-Organizing Social Mind. A Bradford Book.
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  3. John Bolender (2007). Prehistoric Cognition by Description: A Russellian Approach to the Upper Paleolithic. Biology and Philosophy 22 (3):383-399.
    A cultural change occurred roughly 40,000 years ago. For the first time, there was evidence of belief in unseen agents and an afterlife. Before this time, humans did not show widespread evidence of being able to think about objects, persons, and other agents that they had not been in close contact with. I argue that one can explain this transition by appealing to a population increase resulting in greater exoteric (inter-group) communication. The increase in exoteric communication triggered the actualization of (...)
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  4. John Bolender (2006). Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which Are Basic and Which Are Derived? Philosophia 34 (4):405-410.
    Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This construal of (...)
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  5. John Bolender (2004). Two Accounts of Moral Diversity: The Cognitive Science of Pluralism and Absolutism. [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)].
    Advances in cognitive science are relevant to the debate between moral pluralism and absolutism. Parametric structure, which plausibly underlies syntax, gives some idea of how pluralism might be true. The cognitive mechanisms underlying mathematical intelligence give some idea of how far absolutism is right. Advances in cognitive science should help us better understand the extent to which we are divided and how far we are potentially harmonious in our values.
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  6. John Bolender (2003). A Farewell to Isms. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 109.
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  7. John Bolender (2003). The Genealogy of the Moral Modules. Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255.
    This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these (...)
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  8. John Bolender (2001). An Argument for Idealism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):37-61.
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  9. John Bolender (2001). A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture for Moral Reasoning. Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):339-356.
    The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tieredarchitecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both ofspecialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automaticallyand effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose,cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in thelight of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrastedwith rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmidesand Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued thata two-tiered architecture is more plausible.
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  10. John Bolender (1998). Factual Phenomenalism: A Supervenience Theory. Sorites 9 (9):16-31.
     
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  11. John Bolender (1998). Real Algorithms: A Defense of Cognitivism. Philosophical Inquiry 20 (3-4):41-58.
    John Searle dismisses the attempt to understand thought as a form of computation, on the grounds that it is not scientific. Science is concerned with intrinsic properties, i.e. those features which are not observer relative, e.g. science is concerned with mass but not with beauty. Computation, according to Searle, presupposes the property of following an algorithm, but algorithmicity is normative, by reason of appealing to function, and hence not intrinsic. I argue that Searle's critique presupposes the folk notion of function, (...)
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  12. John Bolender (1995). Is Multiple Realizability Compatible with Antireductionism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-42.
    Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is not (...)
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