115 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Larry Alexander [77]Lawrence A. Alexander [6]L. Alexander [5]Lawrence Alexander [5]
Larry A. Alexander [4]Lawrence T. Alexander [2]Leslie B. Alexander [2]Loveday Alexander [2]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also:
Profile: Lena Alexander (Walden University)
Profile: Lisa Alexander
Profile: Laura Alexander (University of Virginia)
Profile: Le Alexander (City University of Hong Kong)
  1.  13
    Larry Alexander (2009). Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law. Cambridge University Press.
    This book presents a comprehensive overview of what the criminal law would look like if organized around the principle that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, but no greater than, that which they ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  2.  52
    Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (2012). “Moore or Less” Causation and Responsibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (1):81-92.
  3.  97
    Lea Alexander (forthcoming). Book Review: Doing Justice: Congregations and Community Organizing. [REVIEW] Interpretation 57 (3):338-338.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  22
    Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (2012). Ferzander’s Surrebuttal. Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):463-465.
  5. Larry Alexander (2001). The Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law. Duke University Press.
    In "The Rule of Rules" Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin examine this dilemma.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  6.  21
    Larry Alexander (2014). The Ontology of Consent. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):102-113.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  28
    Larry Alexander (1996). The Moral Magic of Consent (II). Legal Theory 2 (3):165-174.
    I begin my analysis of consent by agreeing with Professor Hurd that consent functions as a “moral transformative” by altering the obligations and permissions that determine the Tightness of others' actions. I further agree with her that consent is intimately related to the capacity for autonomous action; one who cannot alter others' obligations through consent is not fully autonomous. I cannot improve on her elaboration of these points.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  8.  58
    Lawrence Alexander (1980). Stork Markets: An Analysis of "Baby-Selling". Journal of Libertarian Studies 4 (2):173-196.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin (2008). Demystifying Legal Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practise special forms of reasoning is false.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10. Lawrence A. Alexander (1983). Zimmerman on Coercive Wage Offers. Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (2):160-164.
  11.  37
    Larry Alexander (2013). You Got What You Deserved. Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):309-319.
  12. Larry A. Alexander (1987). Scheffler on the Independence of Agent-Centered Preogatives From Agent-Centered Restrictions. Journal of Philosophy 84 (5):277-283.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  55
    Larry Alexander (1990). Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law. Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (2):84.
    This essay, as will become obvious, owes a huge debt to Mark Kelman, particularly to his article “Interpretative Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law.” That debt is one of both concept and content. There is rich irony in my aping Kelman's deconstructionist enterprise, for I do not share his enthusiasm for either the “insights” or the political agenda of the Critical Legal Studies movement. I do not believe that either the law in general or the criminal law in particular is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  14. Larry Alexander (1983). Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent. Law and Philosophy 2 (2):233 - 246.
    Retributivism is generally thought to forbid the punishment of the innocent, even if such punishment would produce otherwise good results, such as deterrence. It has recently been argued that because capital punishment always entails the risk of executing an innocent person, instituting capital punishment is tantamount to intentionally taking innocent lives and therefore cannot be justified on retributive grounds. I argue that there are several versions of retributivism, only one of which might categorically forbid risking punishing innocent persons. I also (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15.  9
    Matthew Adler, Peter Alces, Larry Alexander, Susan Bandes, Saba Bazargan, Vera Bergelson, Mitchell Berman, Brian Bix, Gabriella Blum & Jeffrey Brand-Ballard (2012). Please Join Us in Thanking All of Those Experts in Law and Philosophy for Devoting Time and Effort to Review the Papers We Have Sent Them. The Editor and Publisher Acknowledge the Colleagues Listed Below for Their Excellent Reviews of Papers for Which Final Decisions Have Been Made in 2011. Law and Philosophy 31:367-368.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  68
    Larry A. Alexander (1985). Fair Equality of Opportunity. Philosophy Research Archives 11:197-208.
    Although discussions of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice generally refer to Rawls’ two principles of justice, and although Rawls himself labels his principles “the two principles of justice”, Rawls actually sets forth three distinct principles in the following lexical order: the liberty principle, the fair equality of opportunity principle, and the difference principle. Rawls argues at some length for the priority of the liberty principle over the other two. On the other hand, Rawls offers hardly any argument at all (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  11
    Larry Alexander (2009). Facts, Law, Exculpation, and Inculpation: Comments on Simons. Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (3):241-245.
    Orthodox criminal law doctrine treats mistakes of law and mistakes of fact differently for purposes of both exculpation and inculpation. Kenneth Simons’ paper in general defends this orthodoxy. I have earlier criticized the criminal law’s attempt to distinguish mistakes of law from mistakes of fact, and I continue to maintain, in opposition to Simons, that the distinction is problematic.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18.  61
    Larry Alexander (1993). Self-Defense, Justification and Excuse. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1):53-66.
  19. Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild (1987). Liberalism, Neutrality, and Equality of Welfare Vs. Equality of Resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1):85-110.
  20.  33
    Larry Alexander (1993). Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in Memory of Myke Balyes. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 12 (1):33 - 70.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  21.  41
    Larry Alexander (2005). Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 24 (6):611-643.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22.  38
    Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (2010). Response to Critics. Law and Philosophy 29 (4):483-504.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  91
    Lawrence A. Alexander (1976). Self-Defense and the Killing of Noncombatants: A Reply to Fullinwider. Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (4):408-415.
  24. Larry Alexander (2008). Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression? Law and Philosophy 27 (1):97-104.
    In this provocative book, Alexander offers a sceptical appraisal of the claim that freedom of expression is a human right. He examines the various contexts in which a right to freedom of expression might be asserted and concludes that such a right cannot be supported in any of these contexts. He argues that some legal protection of freedom of expression is surely valuable, though the form such protection will take will vary with historical and cultural circumstances and is not a (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25.  78
    Larry Alexander (1991). Self-Defense, Punishment, and Proportionality. Law and Philosophy 10 (3):323 - 328.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Larry Alexander (2002). Criminal Liability for Omissions - An Inventory of Issues. In Stephen Shute & Andrew Simester (eds.), Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part. OUP Oxford
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  27.  2
    Larry Alexander (2010). Plastic Trees and Gladiators: Liberalism and Aesthetic Regulation. Legal Theory 16 (2):77-90.
    The hallmark of modern liberalism is its embrace of the Millian harm principle and its antipathy to legal moralism. In this article I consider whether aesthetic regulations can be justified under the harm principle as that principle has been elaborated by Joel Feinberg. I conclude that aesthetic and other regulations that most liberals regard as unproblematic are actually instances of legal moralism.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  29
    Larry Alexander (2008). Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):85–104.
    In the moral realm, our deontic judgments are usually (always?) binary. An act (or omission) is either morally forbidden or morally permissible. 1 Yet the determination of an act's deontic status frequently turns on the existence of properties that are matters of degree. In what follows I shall give several examples of binary moral judgments that turn on scalar properties, and I shall claim that these examples should puzzle us. How can the existence of a property to a specific degree (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Larry Alexander (ed.) (1998/2001). Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations. Cambridge University Press.
    This is the second volume in a sub-series of specially commissioned collaborative volumes on key topics at the heart of contemporary philosophy of law that will be appearing regularly within Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law. A distinguished international team of legal theorists examine the issue of constitutionalism and pose such foundational questions as: why have a constitution? How do we know what the constitution of a country really is? How should a constitution be interpreted? Why should one generation feel (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30.  34
    Larry Alexander (1985). Pursuing the Good-Indirectly. Ethics 95 (2):315-332.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  31.  71
    Larry Alexander (1987). Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's Theory of Law. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 6 (3):419 - 438.
    In Law's Empire Dworkin remains committed to carving out a middleground between natural law and legal positivism. But natural law andlegal positivism are best viewed as complementary answers to differ-ent questions, There is no middle ground between them. Nor is thequestion that Dworkin's Integrity asks one that could be coherentlyanswered i f it were an important question. Fortunately, it is not.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  73
    Larry A. Alexander (1987). Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense? [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 6 (1):1 - 23.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  20
    Lawrence Alexander (1980). The Doomsday Machine. The Monist 63 (2):199-227.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  34.  1
    Lawrence A. Alexander (1985). International Ethics: A "Philosophy and Public Affairs" Reader. Princeton University Press.
  35.  48
    Larry Alexander (1986). Consent, Punishment, and Proportionality. Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (2):178-182.
  36.  6
    Larry Alexander (2004). The Result Model of Precedent. Legal Theory 10:19-31.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  29
    Larry Alexander (1990). Law and Exclusionary Reasons. Philosophical Topics 18 (1):5-22.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38.  34
    Larry Alexander (2012). What's Inside and Outside the Law? Law and Philosophy 31 (2):213-241.
    In this article I take up a conceptual question: What is the distinction between ‘the law’ and the behavior the law regulates, or, as I formulate it, the distinction between what is ‘inside’ the law and what is ‘outside’ it? That conceptual question is in play in (at least) three different doctrinal domains: the constitutional law doctrines regarding the limits on the delegation of legislative powers; the criminal law doctrines regarding mistakes of law; and the constitutional rights doctrines that turn (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  29
    L. Alexander (1998). Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive Rights? Law and Philosophy 17 (1):19-42.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40.  53
    Larry Alexander (2008). What is Freedom of Association, and What is its Denial? Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (2):1-21.
    Freedom of association, as I understand it, refers to the liberty a person possesses to enter into relationships with others—for any and all purposes, for a momentary or long-term duration, by contract, consent, or acquiescence. It likewise refers to the liberty to refuse to enter into such relationships or to terminate them when not otherwise compelled by one's voluntary assumption of an obligation to maintain the relationship. Freedom of association thus is a quite capacious liberty.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  32
    Larry Alexander (1996). Affirmative Duties and the Limits of Self-Sacrifice. Law and Philosophy 15 (1):65 - 74.
    American criminal law reflects the absence of any general duty of Good Samaritanism. Nonetheless, there are some circumstances in which it imposes affirmative duties to aid others. In those circumstances, however, the duty to aid is canceled whenever aiding subjects the actor to a certain level of risk or sacrifice, a level that can be less than the risk or sacrifice faced by the beneficiary if not aided. In this article, I demonstrate that this approach to limiting affirmative duties to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42.  16
    Larry Alexander (2011). What Are Constitutions, and What Should They Do? Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (1):1-24.
    A constitution is, as Article VI of the United States Constitution declares, the fundamental law of the land, supreme as a legal matter over any other nonconstitutional law. But that almost banal statement raises a number of theoretically vexed issues. What is law? How is constitutional law to be distinguished from nonconstitutional law? How do morality and moral rights fit into the picture? And what are the implications of the answers to these questions for such questions as how and by (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  19
    Larry Alexander (2013). Other People's Errors. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1049-1059.
    The question of when other people’s bad acts belong on our moral ledger arises in a number of different scenarios. Each scenario has received some philosophical attention, but no one has noted the structural similarities of these various scenarios or the implications of a proposed approach to one for how the others should be approached. That is the ambition of this article. In it, seemingly disparate moral phenomena—blunt rules, preemptive restrictions, moral blackmail, complicity, retreat and proportional response, and the duty (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  1
    Kenneth A. Richman & Leslie B. Alexander (2006). Ethics and Research with Undergraduates. Ethics and Education 1 (2):163-175.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. Larry Alexander (2004). The Philosophy of Criminal Law. In Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. OUP Oxford
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  18
    Larry Alexander (1993). Practical Reason and Statutory Interpretation. Law and Philosophy 12 (3):319 - 328.
    I examine the "practical reason" approach to statutory interpretation, according to which the interpreter should look not only to text, legislative history, and other indicia of legislative intent, but also to post-enactment history and current values. I argue that if "practical reason" represents an epistemology of statutory interpretation, its proponents owe us an account of statutory ontology, without which their claims cannot be evaluated. On the other hand, if the practical reason approach claims to be itself an account of statutory (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47.  32
    Larry Alexander (2010). Waluchows —Living Tree Constitutionalism by Larry Alexander. Law and Philosophy 29 (1):93-99.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  12
    Lawrence Alexander (1984). Another Look at Moral Blackmail. Philosophy Research Archives 10:189-196.
    In this paper I describe cases of moral blackmail as cases where A is told by B that if A does not commit an otherwise immoral act, B will commit an immoral act of equal or greater gravity. I describe cases of moral dilemma as cases where A must commit an otherwise immoral act to avert a natural disaster of equal or greater gravity. I then argue that cases of moral blackmail are structurally identical to cases of moral dilemma in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Larry Alexander (2011). Culpability. In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  1
    Larry Alexander (2014). The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility. Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):141-143.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 115