El siguiente texto intenta abordar la relación existente entre los procesos de globalización-mundialización y ciertas concepciones de historia que le son solidarias. Para lo anterior apela a las reflexiones realizadas por Marc Abélès en Política de la supervivencia y Michael Hardt y Antonio Negri en Imperio. En ambos análisis se puede percibir la importancia que tiene la historia como soporte de los procesos globales que entremezclan lo político, lo económico y lo cultural, procesos que parecen avanzar, según el curso (...) de la historia, y que permiten además dar referencia de sentido a los sujetos en sus procesos identitarios y de individuación. The following text tries to approach the relation between the globalization-mondialisation process and certain conceptions of history witch are solidary with them. For the previous thing, it appeals to the reflections realized by Marc Abélès in Politics of the survival and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire. In both analyses it is possible to perceive the importance that takes the history as a support of the global processes that intermingle the politics, the economy and culture, processes that seem to advance according to the course that history has, and they allow to give in addition reference of sense to the subjects in his processes of identity and of individuation. (shrink)

English summary: Marc Andre Wiegand analyzes the neo-Kantian premises of Gustav Radbruch's legal philosophy.

Standardly, epistemic peers regarding a given matter are said to be people of equal competence who share all relevant evidence. Alternatively, one can define epistemic peers regarding a given matter as people who are equally likely to be right about that matter. I argue that a definition in terms of likelihood captures the essence of epistemic peerhood better than the standard definition or any variant of it. What is more, a likelihood definition implies the truth of the central thesis in (...) the debate on peer disagreement, the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give the opinions of our peers the same weight we give our own. Adopting a likelihood definition, however, does not end the debate on peer disagreement, because the alleged theoretical alternatives to the Equal Weight View, reinterpreted in the light of a likelihood definition, can in fact be shown to be compatible with this view—though the reinterpreted versions may appear less plausible than the original ones. (shrink)

The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed (...) out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities. (shrink)

A commonly neglected feature of the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge. This view seems to imply that our beliefs are more likely to be true if we leave our armchair in order to find out whether there actually are peers who, by disagreeing (...) with us, force us to revise our beliefs. This article argues that the Equal Weight View should be spelled out in such a way that not only actual peer disagreement requires us to revise our beliefs, but also merely possible peer disagreement. This result is not a reductio ad absurdum of the view. Quite the opposite: it shows that the view is, contrary to appearance, compatible with our common way of doing philosophy. (shrink)

The Western construction of subjectivity, as Michel Foucault indicated in his hermeneutics of the subject, has been marked since what he called the “Cartesian moment” by its relation to truth. It is important, therefore, to uncover possible relations between subjectivity and experience that express alternative constructions of the two terms. Walter Benjamin´s work offers two principal figures that encourage us to allow us to rethink the subject. One is the flâneur, or frequenter of the streets of 19th century Paris, and (...) the other is the child. Both of them are counterpoints to the modern subject. This paper presents images of childhood that are found in some of Benjamin’s texts—in particular “Experience and narration,” “About language in general and human language in particular,” “The mimetic faculty,” “Childhood in Berlin around 1900,” “One way street,” “Writings,” “Childhood literature,” “Children and youth.” On the one hand, these images make it possible to think childhood as a human condition both philosophically and anthropologically. On the other hand, childhood as a concept allows us to outline a form of subjectivity that is constituted by experience, thus displacing it from the modern conceptualization that understands subjectivity only in its relations to truth. This paper takes a philosophical stroll among a framework of concepts like childhood, experience, language and play. It identifies experience as the given capacity to perceive or the capacity to produce similarities and to recognize difference. It takes as examples language as an “immaterial similarity” and children’s games, then moves to the experience of “playing at being one other” that the mimetic faculty makes possible, and which allows us both to find the border crossing with the other, and to experience transformation as subjects. Finally, we wonder if classroom pedagogy is capable of responding to a subjectivity that is constituted, not just from a relation with knowledge, but with experience as well. (shrink)

Unknown peers create a problem for those epistemologists who argue that we should be conciliatory in cases of peer disagreement. The standard interpretation of ‘being conciliatory’ has it that we should revise our opinions concerning a specific subject matter whenever we encounter someone who is as competent and well informed as we are concerning this subject matter (and thus is our peer) and holds a different opinion. As a consequence, peers whom we have never encountered and who are hence unknown (...) to us are not taken into account. This, however, appears odd; not only because it is an accidental matter which peers we happen to encounter and which not, but also because it would allow people to deliberately isolate themselves from any kind of intellectual exchange on the topic under consideration. The paper argues that we should take the problem of unknown peers seriously, and that disregarding the problem is an instance of the more general mistake of assuming that evidential quality and justified believability can be dealt with separately. Moreover, a solution to the problem of unknown peers is suggested. (shrink)

The question of whether biologists should continue to use the Linnaean hierarchy has been a hotly debated issue. Invented before the introduction of evolutionary theory, Linnaeus's system of classifying organisms is based on outdated theoretical assumptions, and is thought to be unable to provide accurate biological classifications. Marc Ereshefsky argues that biologists should abandon the Linnaean system and adopt an alternative that is more in line with evolutionary theory. He traces the evolution of the Linnaean hierarchy from its introduction (...) to the present. He illustrates how the continued use of this system hampers our ability to classify the organic world, and then goes on to make specific recommendations for a post-Linnaean method of classification. Accessible to a wide range of readers by providing introductory chapters to the philosophy of classification and the taxonomy of biology, the book will interest both scholars and students of biology and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Dieser Text geht der Frage nach, ob und, wenn ja, inwieweit sich Gedankenexperimente in der praktischen Philosophie in ihrer Struktur und ihrer epistemischen Signifikanz von Gedankenexperimenten in der theoretischen Philosophie oder in den Naturwissenschaften unterscheiden. Anhand einer allgemeinen Strukturanalyse von Gedankenexperimenten wird dabei aufgezeigt, dass bei Gedankenexperimenten in der praktischen Philosophie zwar häufig die angemessene Bewertung eines zugrunde gelegten Szenarios im Zentrum steht und nicht, wie zum Beispiel in theoretischen Philosophie oft, dessen angemessene Beschreibung, dass dieser Unterschied aber kaum Auswirkungen (...) hat auf die prinzipielle Anwendbarkeit – abgesehen von einer bisher übersehenen Konsequenz: Man darf in einem Gedankenexperiment nicht annehmen, dass moralische, ästhetische oder entscheidungstheoretische Prinzipien in unterschiedlichen möglichen Welten verschieden sind. Andernfalls käme dem Gedankenexperiment keinerlei epistemische Signifikanz zu. (shrink)

Marc Hauser puts forth the theory that humans have evolved a universal moral instinct, unconsciously propelling us to deliver judgments of right and wrong independent of gender, education, and religion. Combining his cutting-edge research with the latest findings in cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, economics, and anthropology, Hauser explores the startling implications of his provocative theory vis-à-vis contemporary bioethics, religion, the law, and our everyday lives.

In “Tense and Reality”, Kit Fine () proposed a novel way to think about realism about tense in the metaphysics of time. In particular, he explored two non-standard forms of realism about tense, arguing that they are to be preferred over standard forms of realism. In the process of defending his own preferred view, fragmentalism, he proposed a fragmentalist interpretation of the special theory of relativity, which will be our focus in this paper. After presenting Fine's position, we will raise (...) a problem for his fragmentalist interpretation of STR. We will argue that Fine's view is in tension with the proper explanation of why various facts obtain. We will then consider whether similar considerations also speak against fragmentalism in domains other than STR, notably fragmentalism about tense. (shrink)

Scientists have long counseled against interpreting animal behavior in terms of human emotions, warning that such anthropomorphizing limits our ability to understand animals as they really are. Yet what are we to make of a female gorilla in a German zoo who spent days mourning the death of her baby? Or a wild female elephant who cared for a younger one after she was injured by a rambunctious teenage male? Or a rat who refused to push a lever for food (...) when he saw that doing so caused another rat to be shocked? Aren’t these clear signs that animals have recognizable emotions and moral intelligence? With _Wild Justice_ Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce unequivocally answer yes. Marrying years of behavioral and cognitive research with compelling and moving anecdotes, Bekoff and Pierce reveal that animals exhibit a broad repertoire of moral behaviors, including fairness, empathy, trust, and reciprocity. Underlying these behaviors is a complex and nuanced range of emotions, backed by a high degree of intelligence and surprising behavioral flexibility. Animals, in short, are incredibly adept social beings, relying on rules of conduct to navigate intricate social networks that are essential to their survival. Ultimately, Bekoff and Pierce draw the astonishing conclusion that there is no moral gap between humans and other species: morality is an evolved trait that we unquestionably share with other social mammals. Sure to be controversial, _Wild Justice_ offers not just cutting-edge science, but a provocative call to rethink our relationship with—and our responsibilities toward—our fellow animals. (shrink)

Challenging the image of physics as dry and dusty, The Beautiful Invisible shows that this highly abstract science is in fact teeming with beautiful concepts, ...

This paper proposes a model of human uniqueness based on an unusual distinction between two contrasted kinds of political competition and political status: (1) antagonistic competition, in quest of dominance (antagonistic status), a zero-sum, self-limiting game whose stake—who takes what, when, how—summarizes a classical definition of politics (Lasswell 1936), and (2) synergistic competition, in quest of merit (synergistic status), a positive-sum, self-reinforcing game whose stake becomes “who brings what to a team’s common good.” In this view, Rawls’s (1971) famous virtual (...) “veil of ignorance” mainly conceals politics’ antagonistic stakes so as to devise the principles of a just, egalitarian society, yet without providing any means to enforce these ideals (Sen 2009). Instead, this paper proposes that human uniqueness flourished under a real “adapted veil of ignorance” concealing the steady inflation of synergistic politics which resulted from early humans’ sturdy egalitarianism. This proposition divides into four parts: (1) early humans first stumbled on a purely cultural means to enforce a unique kind of within-team antagonistic equality—dyadic balanced deterrence thanks to handheld weapons (Chapais 2008); (2) this cultural innovation is thus closely tied to humans’ darkest side, but it also launched the cumulative evolution of humans’ brightest qualities—egalitarian team synergy and solidarity, together with the associated synergistic intelligence, culture, and communications; (3) runaway synergistic competition for differential merit among antagonistically equal obligate teammates is the single politically selective mechanism behind the cumulative evolution of all these brighter qualities, but numerous factors to be clarified here conceal this mighty evolutionary driver; (4) this veil of ignorance persists today, which explains why humans’ unique prosocial capacities are still not clearly understood by science. The purpose of this paper is to start lifting this now-ill-adapted veil of ignorance, thus uncovering the tight functional relations between egalitarian team solidarity and the evolution of human uniqueness. (shrink)

To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web-based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals' responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: (1) patterns of moral (...) judgments were consistent with the principle of double effect and showed little variation across differences in gender, age, educational level, ethnicity, religion or national affiliation (within the limited range of our sample population) and (2) a majority of subjects failed to provide justifications that could account for their judgments. These results indicate that the principle of the double effect may be operative in our moral judgments but not open to conscious introspection. We discuss these results in light of current psychological theories of moral cognition, emphasizing the need to consider the unconscious appraisal system that mentally represents the causal and intentional properties of human action. (shrink)

: To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web-based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals’ responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: patterns of moral (...) judgments were consistent with the principle of double effect and showed little variation across differences in gender, age, educational level, ethnicity, religion or national affiliation and a majority of subjects failed to provide justifications that could account for their judgments. These results indicate that the principle of the double effect may be operative in our moral judgments but not open to conscious introspection. We discuss these results in light of current psychological theories of moral cognition, emphasizing the need to consider the unconscious appraisal system that mentally represents the causal and intentional properties of human action. (shrink)

Hay un gesto performativo de Nietzsche que produce el tránsito de una comunidad humana a una comunidad posthumana: cuando rompe en llanto abrazado al cuello de un caballo, como pasaje en acto del rechazo a la machina animata cartesiana y la pérdida de soberanía sobre su persona. Ese gesto expresa un acontecimiento en la historia del pensamiento filosófico. Nietzsche funda una comunidad a contrapelo de la del rebaño y los iguales. El rechazo de la machina animata cartesiana es el rechazo (...) de la reducción del ser humano a esa cámara oscura en la cual se ha alojado y encerrado: la consciencia. Nos aventuramos con Nietzsche a pensar la posibilidad de una comunidad no humana. Esto supone adentrase en la voz de un solitario que hace comunidad al decir «nosotros», un nosotros del cual él es el primero, que también es nombrado como un «fantasma del futuro», que anuncia una nueva relación tanto con los otros vivientes animales como consigo mismo. (shrink)

This ethnographic study of political life in the department of the Yonne, in the Burgundy region, explores a still richly Balzacian provincial world. The author, a French anthropologist, has extensive field experience in Ethiopia. Deploying the insights and methods of social anthropology by drawing on local history, interviews and participant observation, Abélès describes politicians at every level, from municipal officers to Members of Parliament and Ministers. He provides a clear picture of the process of 'decentralization' initiated by the Socialist government (...) in 1982, and undermines the simplistic notion of 'centralist France'. This book, which develops a fresh perspective on political life in France, past and present, illustrates more generally an exciting approach to modern political phenomena, from the point of view of anthropology. (shrink)

L’objet de l’article est de discuter de méthodes d’observation et d’interprétation des arbitrages résidentiels de salariés face à la flexibilité de leur emploi. Après avoir montré les limites de l’investigation quantitative sur cette question, la réflexion s’appuiera sur les résultats d’une enquête qualitative auprès de salariés confrontés, en 2000, à la fermeture de leur usine et à sa délocalisation à 200 km de leur domicile. Dans ce type de situations, ce n’est pas la seule mobilité résidentielle suscitée par l’emploi qu’il (...) s’agit d’étudier mais bien les arbitrages entre, à la fois, mobilité et non-mobilité. Cette posture rend ainsi possible l’identification du caractère multidimensionnel de ces choix : les logiques professionnelles n’expliquent pas tout, les logiques familiales et résidentielles jouent un rôle important dans le refus de déménager ou l’aménagement d’un système de double résidence. Cette approche permet d’appréhender en quoi ces décisions reproduisent, voire aggravent les inégalités sociales, tout en incluant les possibilités de stratégies résidentielles et spatiales.Based on the results from a qualitative enquiry of employees faced with the closure of their industrial plant, in 2000, and its further relocation 200 km away, this paper provides an approach to residential choices in a context of professional uncertainty and economic constraints. In this type of situations, it is not only residential mobility which is at stake but also the choice between mobility and non-mobility. This method also enables the analysis of the multidimensional characteristic of these choices : professional considerations alone do not explain everything, family life and residential considerations play a role in choosing « residential anchoring » or dual residence. This approach shows how the choices made reproduce or even worsen social unequalities, whilst including spatial and residential strategies. (shrink)

RESUMENLa cuestión del «conocimiento de sí» como opuesto a la «experiencia de sí mismo» aparece problematizada en las primeras clases de La hermenéutica del sujeto. El estudio de Foucault sobre la experiencia de sí es realizado a partir del análisis de prácticas antiguas, que se traducen en «ocuparse de sí» y «cuidar de sí mismo». Nos interesa a partir de estas lecturas trabajar la dimensión ético-política del cuidado de sí, en su vínculo con el cuidado del otro. La pregunta que (...) hacemos en una lectura desde el presente es ¿por qué educar? ¿Por qué insistir en la educación?PALABRAS CLAVESConstitución del sujeto, cuidado de sí y cuidado del otro, educación, pedagogía, psicagogia, parrhesi.AbstractThe issue of «self knowledge» in opposition to the «experience of the self» appears as a problem in the first classes of The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Foucault’s study on the experience of the self is made on the basis of the analysis of antique practices which can be translated into «taking care of oneself» and «caring about oneself». Based on these lessons, our interest is to work on the ethical-political dimension of the caring about oneself, on its link with caring about others. The questions we ask from a present analysis are: Why do we have to educate? Why do we have to insist on education?Key wordsConstitution of the subject, care about the self and the others, education, pedagogy, psicagogia, parrhesi. (shrink)

La filosofía latinoamericana es presentada por el filósofo argentino Arturo Roig como una filosofía de la mañana, en contrapunto con una filosofía vespertina que supone todo un futuro contenido en su pasado. Una apertura al futuro como alteridad desde una filosofía auroral afirma, en primer lugar, l..

Arturo Roig inscribe el ejercicio del filosofar en la geografía de su función crítica. Crítica que es comprendida como una forma de pensamiento que se cuestiona a sí mismo y que considera no sólo los límites y posibilidades de la razón, sino también la realidad humana e histórica de un sujeto que se constituye en un "nosotros". La filosofía, así entendida, es un saber de vida. La función utópica se presenta como tarea para este saber de conjetura y para una (...) filosofía que sirve a la vida. Roig devuelve con ello el valor epistémico que tiene el plus lo axiológico, no verificable como hipótesis científica. Arturo Roig inscribes the exercise of philosophizing in the geography of its critical function. Critique that is understood as a form of thought that questions itself and considers not only the limits and possibilities of reason, but also the human and historical reality of a subject that becomes a "we". Philosophy, thus understood, is a knowledge of life. The utopian function arises as a task for this knowledge of conjecture that serves to life. Thus Roig gives back an axiological dimension as epistemic value to this knowledge. (shrink)

Este escrito da cuenta de un recorrido de lecturas. Se han seleccionado algunos textos de Arturo Roig con la preocupación de responder interrogantes vinculados con las herramientas hermenéuticas y metodológicas propias del autor en su labor como filósofo e historiador de las ideas. Si se ha determinado la posición de Roig frente al análisis del discurso, sus estudios y su crítica al estructuralismo, es para comprender una metodología que no se queda en el análisis formal de los discursos, sino que (...) atiende al carácter histórico y situado de los mismos. También permite identificar e interrogar sobre las relaciones entre lenguaje y sujeto, discurso e ideología, y la historicidad en el pensamiento latinoamericano mediante el abordaje de una historia episódica, antípodas de una idea de continuidad y despliegue lineal. Esto permite comprender el vínculo con una antropología de la emergencia, cuyo carácter final es el de ponerse a sí mismo como valioso.This article presents an overview of several readings. Some of Arturo Roig's writings have been selected with the aim of answering questions related to the hermeneutical and methodological tools proper to the author in his work as philosopher and historian of ideas. If Roig's position facing the analysis of discourse, his studies and his criticism of structuralism has been determined in this article, it is simply to understand a methodology that does not end with the formal analysis of discourses but that rather considers the historical settings of such discourses. The approach also allows for an identification and interrogation of the relationship between language and subject, discourse and ideology, and historicity in Latin American thought, through an episodical history, the antipodes of an idea of continuity and lineal course. This makes it possible to understand the bond with an anthropology of the emergency, whose final character is to place itself as valuable. (shrink)

Este ensayo recupera aspectos del pensamiento monista y materialista de la filósofa y poeta Margaret Cavendish que, en el siglo XVII, debatía con la tradición filosófica que impuso su visión dualista y mecanicista. Contrariamente a lo que trazó la filosofía cartesiana mediante el recurso al cogito y a una reversión del dualismo entre mente y cuerpo, los textos de Cavendish nos permiten acercarnos a otra concepción del mundo en el que la materia, eterna e infinita, tiene propiedades mentales. Cavendish propone (...) una perspectiva relacional de la materia, y aborda la cuestión de la vida y la muerte con una visión no antagónica y de continuidad de lo vivo. Como la vida y el conocimiento están en todas las partes de la materia, el conocimiento pertenece también a otros animales y vegetales, y no sólo a nuestra especie. La recuperación del materialismo de Cavendish nos permite inscribirla en una genealogía diferente a la de la época, cuya forma masculina y humanista se funda en el dominio de la naturaleza, en la que se dibuja una epistemología a favor de la vida, y por eso de carácter femenino. En cuanto la cuestión del género, no debe considerarse solamente desde el punto de vista de cómo se constituyeron varones y mujeres en las prácticas científicas y discursos filosóficos de la tradición moderna, sino en cuanto estas prácticas y discursos encubrieron los deseos, la corporalidad, el amor, el cuidado, y la relación con los otros vivientes. (shrink)

On doit sérieusement s'interroger sur la bonne santé de notre démocratie quand un responsable politique du calibre de Monsieur Jean-Claude Juncker peut déclarer publiquement sans risquer d'être renvoyé à ses chères études qu'« il ne peut y avoir de choix démocratique contre les traités européens », et quand, par ailleurs, 4 citoyens sur 5 déclarent ne pas avoir confiance dans leurs représentants élus, même si cette défiance a des sources contradictoires. Elle pose en effet une question essentielle : celle se (...) - Débats. (shrink)

En sus últimos años Foucault dedicó su trabajo a los aspectos de una ética de sí en las relaciones entre sujeto y verdad en la Antigüedad Clásica y Grecorromana, y presentada como una “estética de la existencia”. Este es un giro en la obra de Foucault hacia el plano de la subjetivación, es decir hacia los procesos mediante los cuales el sujeto se constituye a sí mismo, en una relación de sí consigo. Abordaremos esta cuestión tomando la noción de bios (...) como bisagra entre sus estudios sobre el biopoder y sus nuevos trabajos en torno a las tekhne tou biou o artes de la vida, en los que se apunta el estudio sobre las técnicas de sí. Para ello, será necesario comprender las modificaciones que Foucault introduce en Historia de la sexualidad II. Este desplazamiento problemático y metodológico, lejos de ser una salida estetizante a la cuestión del sujeto es, por el contrario, un modo de dar respuesta a la inquietud política de Foucault relativa al presente. Esbozamos a partir de esto último un posible análisis respecto de los modos de constitución del sujeto moral en nuestra contemporaneidad. (shrink)

A partir de la experiencia del café filosófico El Oráculo (Mendoza, Argentina) este trabajo reflexiona en torno a la posibilidad de la filosofía: quién es quien filosofa, ¿todos podemos filosofar? Y antes de intentar una respuesta, pensar qué es la filosofía, si ella tiene límites que nos indicarían cuándo un diálogo, una práctica, una reflexión, es filosófica y cuándo no.

What is a fair distribution of resources and other goods when individuals are partly responsible for their achievements? This book develops a theory of fairness incorporating a concern for personal responsibility, opportunities and freedom. With a critical perspective, it makes accessible the recent developments in economics and philosophy that define social justice in terms of equal opportunities. It also proposes new perspectives and original ideas. The book separates mathematical sections from the rest of the text, so that the main concepts (...) and ideas are easily accessible to non-technical readers. -/- It is often thought that responsibility is a complex notion, but this monograph proposes a simple analytical framework that makes it possible to disentangle the different concepts of fairness that deal with neutralizing inequalities for which the individuals are not held responsible, rewarding their effort, respecting their choices, or staying neutral with respect to their responsibility sphere. It dwells on paradoxes and impossibilities only as a way to highlight important ethical options and always proposes solutions and reasonable compromises among the conflicting values surrounding equality and responsibility. -/- The theory is able to incorporate disincentive problems and is illustrated in the examination of applied policy issues such as: income redistribution when individuals may be held responsible for their choices of labor supply or education; social and private insurance when individuals may be held responsible for their risky lifestyle; second chance policies; the measurement of inequality of opportunities and social mobility. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show that agency-based accounts of moral status are more plausible than many have previously thought. I do this by developing a novel account of moral status that takes agency, understood as the capacity for intentional action, to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of moral status. This account also suggests that the capacities required for sentience entail the possession of agency, and the capacities required for agency, entail the possession of sentience. (...) Thus on this account sentient beings possess agency and agents possess sentience. If this is correct, it will show that an Agency Account of moral status can offer a plausible defence of the moral status of all sentient beings, something that previous Agency Accounts have not succeeded in doing. What is more, this account could establish that all sentient animals are not just moral status holders per se, but that they are owed pro tanto obligations regarding continued existence and liberty, similar in kind, though not always in strength, to those owed to humans. (shrink)

In his groundbreaking book, Marc Hauser puts forth a revolutionary new theory: that humans have evolved a universal moral instinct, unconsciously propelling us to deliver judgments of right and wrong independent of gender, education, and religion. Combining his cutting-edge research with the latest findings in cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, economics, and anthropology, Hauser explores the startling implications of his provocative theory vis-à-vis contemporary bioethics, religion, the law, and our everyday lives.

This paper argues that social trust is the emergent product of a complex system of property relations, backed up by a sub-system of mutual monitoring. This happens in a context similar to Ostrom’s commons, where cooperation is necessary for the management of resources, in the absence of external authorities to enforce sanctions. I show that social trust emerges in this context because of an institutional structure that enables individuals to develop a generalized disposition to internalize the external effects of their (...) actions. This is made possible by the “patrimonial” nature of this structure. (shrink)