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Moral Judgment, Misc

Edited by Leonard Kahn (United States Air Force Academy)
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  1. Mohamed M. Ahmed, Kun Young Chung & John W. Eichenseher (2003). Business Students' Perception of Ethics and Moral Judgment: A Cross-Cultural Study. Journal of Business Ethics 43 (1-2):89 - 102.
    Business relations rely on shared perceptions of what is acceptable/expected norms of behavior. Immense expansion in transnational business made rudimentary consensus on acceptable business practices across cultural boundaries particularly important. Nonetheless, as more and more nations with different cultural and historical experiences interact in the global economy, the potential for misunderstandings based on different expectations is magnified. Such misunderstandings emerge in a growing literature on "improper" business practices – articulated from a narrow cultural perspective. This paper reports an ongoing research (...)
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  2. Robert Alexy (2006). Effects of Defects-Action or Argument? Thoughts About Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword's Law as a Moral Judgment. Ratio Juris 19 (2):169-179.
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  3. Robert Audi (1998). Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
    This paper outlines and defends a moderate intuitionism. The point of departure is the intuitionism of W. D. Ross (1930) in The Right and the Good, conceived as ethically pluralist and epistemologically rationalist. The paper articulates a conception of self-evidence – including mediate as well as immediate kinds – appropriate to a moderate intuitionism, explores some of the resources and varieties of that position, and considers some problems and prospects for a rationalist version of intuitionism. The final section addresses the (...)
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  4. T. J. Bachmeyer (1973). Ethics and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Zygon 8 (2):82-95.
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  5. Carla Bagnoli (2009). Review of Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  6. Carla Bagnoli (2006). The Alleged Paradox of Moral Perfection. In Elvio Baccarini (ed.), Rationality in Belief and Action,. Rijeka.
    Some contemporary philosophers, notably B. Williams and S. Wolf, argue that moral perfection is not just an unsustainable ideal, but also an unreasonable one in that it thwarts and demotes all the various elements that contribute to personal well-being. More importantly, moral perfection seems to imply the denial of an identifiable personal self; hence the paradox of moral perfection. I argue that this alleged paradox arises because of a misunderstanding of the role of moral ideals, of their overridingness, and of (...)
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  7. Carla Bagnoli (2000). Value in the Guise of Regret. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):169 – 187.
    According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. My contention (...)
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  8. Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay (2010). Metaethical Contextualism Defended. Ethics 121 (1):7-36.
    We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others have raised (...)
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  9. Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson (forthcoming). Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem. Mind.
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgments of moral wrongness, for example from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the (...)
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  10. Moshe M. Blatt & Lawrence Kohlberg (1975). The Effects of Classroom Moral Discussion Upon Children's Level of Moral Judgment. Journal of Moral Education 4 (2):129-161.
    Abstract: An experiment is reported on the effects of a moral education programme in schools. Children were pretested on Kohlberg's index of level of moral thinking. The experimental group was then given twelve hours of discussion of moral problems other than those used in Kolhberg's test spread over twelve weeks. Subsequent testing showed that the experimental group had had tended to move towards a higher level of thinking when compared with controls.
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  11. Paul Bloom (2006). The Chomsky of Morality? [REVIEW] Nature 443 (26):909-10.
    In Moral Minds, Marc Hauser makes an audacious claim about moral thought. He argues that morality is best understood in much the same way as Noam Chomsky described language: as the product of an innate and universal mental faculty. For Hauser, moral intuition is not the product of culture and education, nor is it the result of rational and deliberative thought, nor doesitreduce to the workings of the emotions. Instead, it is human nature to unconsciously and automatically evaluate the moral (...)
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  12. Joseph M. Boyle Jr (1984). Practical Reasoning and Moral Judgment. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 58:37-49.
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  13. Walter Brand (1993). Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment. Hume Studies 19 (2):324-326.
  14. Ira Brooks‐Walsh & Edmund V. Sullivan (1973). The Relationship Between Moral Judgment, Causal Reasoning and General Reasoning. Journal of Moral Education 2 (2):131-136.
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  15. Daniel Brudney (1998). Lord Jim and Moral Judgment: Literature and Moral Philosophy. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (3):265-281.
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  16. Richmond Campbell (2007). What is Moral Judgment? Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):321-349.
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  17. William D. Casebeer & Patricia S. Churchland (2003). The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1).
    We critically review themushrooming literature addressing the neuralmechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reachingthe following broad conclusions: (1) researchmainly focuses on three inter-relatedcategories: the moral emotions, moral socialcognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2)Research varies in terms of whether it deploysecologically valid or experimentallysimplified conceptions of moral cognition. Themore ecologically valid the experimentalregime, the broader the brain areas involved.(3) Much of the research depends on simplifyingassumptions about the domain of moral reasoningthat are motivated by the need to makeexperimental progress. This is a (...)
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  18. Marc Champagne (2011). What About Suicide Bombers? A Terse Response to a Terse Objection. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11 (2):233–236.
    Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up.".
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  19. Chris Chandler, Jeff Brooks, Ryan Mulvaney & W. Pitt Derryberry (2009). Addressing the Relationships Among Moral Judgment Development, Authenticity, Nonprejudice, and Volunteerism. Ethics and Behavior 19 (3):201-217.
    This study addresses how moral judgment development, authenticity, and nonprejudice account for variance in scores pertaining to various motivational functions underlying volunteerism in order to clarify certain problems associated with previous research that has considered such relationships. In the study, 127 participants completed measurements that pertain to these constructs. Correlations revealed that moral judgment had a negligible relationship with both authenticity and nonprejudice, thereby affirming that the former construct is distinct from the latter two. Linear regression analyses supported that moral (...)
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  20. Hugh Chandler, Can There Be Conflict Between Conscience and Self-Love?
    Ethical dualists hold that we have good reason to pursue our own happiness and good reason to pursue moral goodness. It would seem that there is a potential conflict here. On the other hand there have been those who deny even the possibility of conflict, whether or not there is a God and an afterlife. Rawls seems to say, or hint, that this was Butlers’ view, and Kant, according to at least one person, argued that there cannot be conflict here. (...)
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  21. Mei-Fang Chen, Ching-Ti Pan & Ming-Chuan Pan (2009). The Joint Moderating Impact of Moral Intensity and Moral Judgment on Consumer's Use Intention of Pirated Software. Journal of Business Ethics 90 (3):361 - 373.
    Moral issues have been included in the studies of consumer misbehavior research, but little is known about the joint moderating effect of moral intensity and moral judgment on the consumer’s use intention of pirated software. This study aims to understand the consumer’s use intention of pirated software in Taiwan based on the theory of planned behavior (TPB) proposed by Ajzen (Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50, 179, 1991). In addition, moral intensity and moral judgment are adopted as a joint (...)
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  22. Arthur Child (1951). Moral Judgment in History. Ethics 61 (4):297-308.
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  23. Patricia Churchland, The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making.
    We critically review the mushrooming literature addressing the neural mechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reaching the following broad conclusions: (1) research mainly focuses on three inter-related categories: the moral emotions, moral social cognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2) Research varies in terms of whether it deploys ecologically valid or experimentally simplified conceptions of moral cognition. The more ecologically valid the experimental regime, the broader the brain areas involved. (3) Much of the research depends on simplifying assumptions about the domain (...)
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  24. Anne Colby (1987). The Measurement of Moral Judgment. Cambridge University Press.
    This long-awaited two-volume set constitutes the definitive presentation of the system of classifying moral judgment built up by Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates over a period of twenty years. Researchers in child development and education around the world, many of whom have worked with interim versions of the system, indeed, all those seriously interested in understanding the problem of moral judgment, will find it an indispensable resource. Volume I reviews Kohlberg's stage theory, and the by-now large body of research on (...)
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  25. Alice Crary (2007). Beyond Moral Judgment. Harvard University Press.
    Wider possibilities for moral thought -- Objectivity revisited: a lesson from the work of J.L. Austin -- Ethics, inheriting from Wittgenstein -- Moral thought beyond moral judgment: the case of literature -- Reclaiming moral judgment: the case of feminist thought -- Moralism as a central moral problem.
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  26. A. S. Cua (1970). Moral Judgment and Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (4):614-616.
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  27. Fiery Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.
    Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection (...)
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  28. Fiery Cushman & Liane Young (2011). Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations. Cognitive Science 35 (6):1052-1075.
    Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations (...)
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  29. John K. Davis (forthcoming). Applying Principles to Cases and the Problem of Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    Abstract We sometimes decide what to do by applying moral principles to cases, but this is harder than it looks. Principles are more general than cases, and sometimes it is hard to tell whether and how a principle applies to a given case. Sometimes two conflicting principles seem to apply to the same case. To handle these problems, we use a kind of judgment to ascertain whether and how a principle applies to a given case, or which principle to follow (...)
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  30. David E. Desplaces, David E. Melchar, Laura L. Beauvais & Susan M. Bosco (2007). The Impact of Business Education on Moral Judgment Competence: An Empirical Study. Journal of Business Ethics 74 (1):73 - 87.
    This study uses theories of moral reasoning and moral competence to investigate how university codes of ethics, perceptions of ethical culture, academic pressure from significant others, and ethics pedagogy are related to the moral development of students. Results suggest that ethical codes and student perceptions of such codes affect their perceptions of the ethical nature of the cultures within these institutions. In addition, faculty and student discussion of ethics in business courses is significantly and positively related to moral competence among (...)
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  31. Susan Dwyer (2009). Moral Dumbfounding and the Linguistic Analogy: Methodological Implications for the Study of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language 24 (3):274-296.
    The manifest dissociation between our capacity to make moral judgments and our ability to provide justifications for them, a phenomenon labeled Moral Dumbfounding, has important implications for the theory and practice of moral psychology. I articulate and develop the Linguistic Analogy as a robust alternative to existing sentimentalist models of moral judgment inspired by this phenomenon. The Linguistic Analogy motivates a crucial distinction between moral acceptability and moral permissibility judgments, and thereby calls into question prevailing methods used in the study (...)
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  32. Susan Dwyer (2006). How Good is the Linguistic Analogy? In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind, Vol. 2: Culture and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
    A nativist moral psychology, modeled on the successes of theoretical linguistics, provides the best framework for explaining the acquisition of moral capacities and the diversity of moral judgment across the species. After a brief presentation of a poverty of the moral stimulus argument, this chapter sketches a view according to which a so-called Universal Moral Grammar provides a set of parameterizable principles whose specific values are set by the child's environment, resulting in the acquisition of a moral idiolect. The principles (...)
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  33. Robert R. Ehman (1964). Moral Judgment and Ultimate Ends. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (2):253-258.
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  34. Robert M. Ellis (2012). Middle Way Philosophy 1: The Path of Objectivity. Lulu.
    The first of a planned series of 5 volumes on Middle Way Philosophy. Middle Way Philosophy was originally inspired by the Middle Way of the Buddha but is developed in an entirely Western context. It addresses the questions of objectivity, justification, facts and values, and the relationship of philosophy and psychology. It develops the concept of experiential adequacy to provide a non-metaphysical resolution of the dichotomy between absolutism and relativism in both facts and values.
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  35. Robert M. Ellis (2011). A Theory of Moral Objectivity. Lulu.com.
    An inter-disciplinary philosophical treatise (written as an accredited Ph.D. thesis) that attempts to establish a new approach to moral objectivity. Inspired by the Buddha's Middle Way, but arguing from first premises, it challenges widespread and interlinked assumptions in both analytic and continental philosophy, whilst drawing on both these traditions together with psychological, religious and historical evidence. The first section of the book provides a detailed critique of existing approaches to ethics in the Western tradition. The second half then puts forward (...)
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  36. Dawn R. Elm & James Weber (1994). Measuring Moral Judgment: The Moral Judgment Interview or the Defining Issues Test? Journal of Business Ethics 13 (5):341 - 355.
    This paper compares and contrasts two distinct techniques for measuring moral judgment: The Moral Judgment Interview and the Defining Issues Test. The theoretical foundations, accompanying advantages and limitations, as well as appropriate usage of these methodologies are discussed. Adaptation and use of the instruments for business ethics research is given special attention.
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  37. Dorothy Emmet (1963). Universalisability and Moral Judgment. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (52):214-228.
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  38. Sing-nan Fen (1955). Judgment on Morality and Moral Choice. Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):13-20.
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  39. Dann G. Fisher & John T. Sweeney (1998). The Relationship Between Political Attitudes and Moral Judgment: Examining the Validity of the Defining Issues Test. Journal of Business Ethics 17 (8):905-916.
    Most ethics studies employing accounting subjects have utilized the Defining Issues Test (DIT), generally finding the moral judgment abilities of accounting students and accountants to be less advanced than those of the general population (Ponemon and Gabhart, 1994). This study assesses the validity of the DIT by examining whether an individual can achieve a higher moral judgment score on the DIT by responding from the role of a political liberal. Accounting undergraduates, defining themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative, completed (...)
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  40. Danny Frederick, Theoretical and Practical Reason: A Critical Rationalist View.
    If the task of theoretical reason is to discover truth or reasons for belief, then theoretical reason is impossible. Attempts to circumvent this by appeal to probabilities are self-defeating. If the task of practical reason is to discover what we ought to do or what actions are desirable or valuable, then practical reason is impossible. Appeal to the subjective ought is self-defeating and often gives either a wrong answer or a self-contradictory one. I argue that the task of theoretical reason (...)
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  41. Danny Frederick (forthcoming). Pro-Tanto Obligations and Ceteris-Paribus Rules. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    I summarise a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and which impose pro-tanto obligations. I explain two ways in which moral rules are ceteris-paribus, according to whether an exception is duty-voiding or duty-overriding. I defend the claim that moral rules are ceteris-paribus against two qualms suggested by Luke Robinson’s discussion of moral rules and against the worry that such rules are uninformative. I show that Robinson’s argument that moral rules cannot ground pro-tanto obligations (...)
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  42. Miranda Fricker (2010). Beyond Moral Judgment, by Alice Crary. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):311-315.
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  43. Eugene Garver (2008). Book Reviews:Beyond Moral Judgment. [REVIEW] Ethics 118 (2):338-340.
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  44. Christopher Grau (2009). A Critical Study of Alice Crary's Beyond Moral Judgment. Philo 12 (1):88-104.
    This study offers a comprehensive summary and critical discussion of Alice Crary’s Beyond Moral Judgment. While generally sympathetic to her goal of defending the sort of expansive vision of the moral previously championed by Cora Diamond and Iris Murdoch, concerns are raised regarding the potential for her account to provide a satisfactory treatment of both “wide” objectivity and moral disagreement. Drawing on the work of Jonathan Lear and Jonathan Dancy, I suggest possible routes by which her position could be expanded (...)
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  45. Steve Guglielmo (2010). Questioning the Influence of Moral Judgment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):338-339.
    Moral judgment – even the type discussed by Knobe – necessarily relies on substantial information about an agent's mental states, especially regarding beliefs and attitudes. Moreover, the effects described by Knobe can be attributed to norm violations in general, rather than moral concerns in particular. Consequently, Knobe's account overstates the influence of moral judgment on assessments of mental states and causality.
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  46. Paul Guyer (1996). The Value of Agency:The Practice of Moral Judgment. Barbara Herman. Ethics 106 (2):404-.
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  47. Russell Haines, Marc D. Street & Douglas Haines (2008). The Influence of Perceived Importance of an Ethical Issue on Moral Judgment, Moral Obligation, and Moral Intent. Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2):387 - 399.
    The study extends and tests the issue contingent four-component model of ethical decision-making to include moral obligation. A web-based questionnaire was used to gauge the influence of perceived importance of an ethical issue on moral judgment and moral intent. Perceived importance of an ethical issue was found to be a predictor of moral judgment but not of moral intent as predicted. Moral obligation is suggested to be a process that occurs after a moral judgment is made and explained a significant (...)
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  48. Marc Hauser, The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment.
    ��Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether (...)
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  49. Marc D. Hauser, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman (2008). Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy: Operative Principles and the Causal Structure of Moral Actions. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2. MIT Press.
    The thesis we develop in this essay is that all humans are endowed with a moral faculty. The moral faculty enables us to produce moral judgments on the basis of the causes and consequences of actions. As an empirical research program, we follow the framework of modern linguistics.1 The spirit of the argument dates back at least to the economist Adam Smith (1759/1976) who argued for something akin to a moral grammar, and more recently, to the political philosopher John Rawls (...)
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  50. Edward Hinchman (2010). Conspiracy, Commitment, and the Self. Ethics 120 (3):526-556.
    Practical commitment is Janus-faced, looking outward toward the expectations it creates and inward toward their basis in the agent’s will. This paper criticizes Kantian attempts to link these facets and proposes an alternative. Contra David Velleman, the availability of a conspiratorial perspective (not yours, not your interlocutor’s) is what allows you to understand yourself as making a lying promise – as committing yourself ‘outwardly’ with the deceptive reasoning that Velleman argues cannot provide a basis for self-understanding. Moreover, the intrapersonal availability (...)
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  51. David M. Holley (1997). Everyone's Doing It: Common Practice and Moral Judgment. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (3):369-380.
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  52. Richard Holton (2010). Norms and the Knobe Effect. Analysis 70 (3):1-8.
    It is argued that the many manifestation of the Knobe effect can be explained by the conjunction of two claims: (i) that in making propositional attitude attributions we are influenced by whether the agent intentionally violated or conformed to a norm; and (ii) there is a fundamental asymmetry between what is needed for intentional norm violation and what is needed for intentional norm conformity -- the former only requires knowing violation, whereas the latter requires that the norm function as a (...)
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  53. Gustav Ichheiser (1966). Social Perception and Moral Judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (4):546-560.
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  54. Yoel Inbar, David A. Pizarro, Joshua Knobe & Paul Bloom (2009). Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays. Emotion 9 (3): 435– 43.
    Two studies demonstrate that a dispositional proneness to disgust (“disgust sensitivity”) is associated with intuitive disapproval of gay people. Study 1 was based on previous research showing that people are more likely to describe a behavior as intentional when they see it as morally wrong (see Knobe, 2006, for a review). As predicted, the more disgust sensitive participants were, the more likely they were to describe an agent whose behavior had the side effect of causing gay men to kiss in (...)
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  55. Matthew Jason Borenstein, Robert Kirkman J. Drake & L. Swann Julie (2010). The Engineering and Science Issues Test (Esit): A Discipline-Specific Approach to Assessing Moral Judgment. Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (2).
    To assess ethics pedagogy in science and engineering, we developed a new tool called the Engineering and Science Issues Test (ESIT). ESIT measures moral judgment in a manner similar to the Defining Issues Test, second edition, but is built around technical dilemmas in science and engineering. We used a quasi-experimental approach with pre- and post-tests, and we compared the results to those of a control group with no overt ethics instruction. Our findings are that several (but not all) (...)
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  56. Mark Johnson (1985). Imagination in Moral Judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (2):265-280.
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  57. Guy Kahane & Nicholas Shackel (2010). Methodological Issues in the Neuroscience of Moral Judgement. Mind and Language 25 (5):561-582.
    Neuroscience and psychology have recently turned their attention to the study of the subpersonal underpinnings of moral judgment. In this article we critically examine an influential strand of research originating in Greene's neuroimaging studies of ‘utilitarian’ and ‘non-utilitarian’ moral judgement. We argue that given that the explananda of this research are specific personal-level states—moral judgments with certain propositional contents—its methodology has to be sensitive to criteria for ascribing states with such contents to subjects. We argue that current research has often (...)
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  58. Guy Kahane, Katja Wiech, Nicholas Shackel, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu & Irene Tracey (2012). The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgement. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7 (4):393-402.
    Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we (...)
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  59. Leonard Kahn (2011). Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard's version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard's. In (...)
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  60. Annemarie Kalis (2010). Improving Moral Judgments: Philosophical Considerations. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 30 (2):94-108.
    In contemporary moral psychology, an often-heard claim is that knowing how we make moral judgments can help us make better moral judgments. Discussions about moral development and improvement are often framed in terms of the question of which mental processes have a better chance of leading to good moral judgments. However, few studies elaborate on the question of what makes a moral judgment a good moral judgment. This article examines what is needed to answer questions of moral improvement and development. (...)
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  61. Daniel Kelly & Stephen Stich (2008). Two Theories About the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Morality. In P. Carruthers, S. Stich & S. Laurence (eds.), The Innate Mind, Vol. III, Foundations and the Future. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper we compare two theories about the cognitive architecture underlying morality. One theory, proposed by Sripada and Stich (forthcoming), posits an interlocking set of innate mechanisms that internalize moral norms from the surrounding community and generate intrinsic motivation to comply with these norms and to punish violators. The other theory, which we call the M/C model was suggested by the widely discussed and influential work of Elliott Turiel, Larry Nucci and others on the “moral/conventional task”. This theory posits (...)
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  62. Daniel Kelly, Stephen Stich & Jennifer Nado, Moral Judgment.
    Questions regarding the nature of moral judgment loom large in moral philosophy. Perhaps the most basic of these questions asks how, exactly, moral judgments and moral rules are to be defined; what features distinguish them from other sorts of rules and judgments? A related question concerns the extent to which emotion and reason guide moral judgment. Are moral judgments made mainly on the basis of reason, or are they primarily the products of emotion? As an example of the former view, (...)
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  63. Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature (...)
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  64. Nicola Knight (2010). The Role of Victimization in Normative Judgment and Justification: An Empirical Investigation. Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):797-820.
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  65. Paul W. Kurtz (1956). Book Review:Moral Judgment. D. Daiches Raphael. [REVIEW] Ethics 66 (4):292-.
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  66. Lawrence Lengbeyer (2010). An Alternative to Moral Relativism. In Christina Hoff Sommers & Fred Sommers (eds.), Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life. Wadsworth.
  67. Lawrence Lengbeyer (2004). Ethical Pluralism: An Alternative to Objectivism and Relativism. Teaching Ethics 5 (1):23-29.
  68. Rupert Clendon Lodge (1922). The Genesis of the Moral Judgment in Plato. International Journal of Ethics 33 (1):34-54.
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  69. Rupert Clendon Lodge (1920). Reality and the Moral Judgment in Plato (I). Philosophical Review 29 (4):355-373.
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  70. Rupert Clendon Lodge (1920). Reality and the Moral Judgment in Plato. Philosophical Review 29 (5):453-475.
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  71. Jeanne M. Logsdon, Judith Kenner Thompson & Richard A. Reid (1994). Software Piracy: Is It Related to Level of Moral Judgment? Journal of Business Ethics 13 (11):849 - 857.
    The possible relationship between widespread unauthorized copying of microcomputer software (also known as software piracy) and level of moral judgment is examined through analysis of over 350 survey questionnaires that included the Defining Issues Test as a measure of moral development. It is hypothesized that the higher one''s level of moral judgment, the less likely that one will approve of or engage in unauthorized copying. Analysis of the data indicate a high level of tolerance toward unauthorized copying and limited support (...)
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  72. Greg E. Loviscky, Linda K. Treviño & Rick R. Jacobs (2007). Assessing Managers' Ethical Decision-Making: An Objective Measure of Managerial Moral Judgment. Journal of Business Ethics 73 (3):263 - 285.
    Recent allegations of unethical decision-making by leaders in prominent business organizations have jeopardized the world’s confidence in American business. The purpose of this research was to develop a measure of managerial moral judgment that can be used in future research and managerial assessment. The measure was patterned after the Defining Issues Test, a widely used general measure of moral judgment. With content validity as the goal, we aimed to sample the domain of managerial ethical situations by establishing links to dimensions (...)
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  73. David Lyons (1998). Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience. Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1):31–49.
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  74. William Lyons (2009). Conscience – an Essay in Moral Psychology. Philosophy 84 (4):477-494.
    The ultimate aim of this essay is to suggest that conscience is a very important part of human psychology and of our moral point of view, not something that can be dismissed as merely ‘a part of Christian theology’. The essay begins with discussions of what might be regarded as the two most influential functional models of conscience, the classical Christian account of conscience and the Freudian account of conscience. Then, using some insights from these models, and from some comparatively (...)
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  75. Scott MacDonald (1991). Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning: Aquinas's Aristotelian Moral Psychology and Anscombe's Fallacy. Philosophical Review 100 (1):31-66.
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  76. Joseph Mahon (1972). Responsibility, Moral Judgment and Moral Obligation. Journal of Moral Education 1 (3):195-201.
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  77. Andreas Maier (2008). Weeding in the Garden of Forking Paths - yet Another Look at Alternate Possibilities. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):228-235.
  78. Ron Mallon & Shaun Nichols (2010). Rules. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
    Is it wrong to torture prisoners of war for fun? Is it wrong to yank on someone’s hair with no provocation? Is it wrong to push an innocent person in front of a train in order to save five innocent people tied to the tracks? If you are like most people, you answered "yes" to each of these questions. A venerable account of human moral judgment, influential in both philosophy and psychology, holds that these judgments are underpinned by internally represented (...)
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  79. Wayne Martin, Conscience and Confession in Rousseau's Naturalistic Moral Psychology.
    IN PLACE OF AN ABSTRACT: I here report on my work-in-progress addressing Rousseau’s naturalistic account of human agency. In the first half of these notes I attempt to throw light on the distinctive character of Rousseau’s philosophical naturalism. I compare Rousseau’s naturalism both to that of his own contemporaries and to some of our own (§1), but argue that Rousseauian naturalism is better understood as a development of ancient forms of ethical naturalism, particularly as mediated by Seneca (§2). I then (...)
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  80. Todd May (2006). Social Life and Moral Judgment. The Review of Metaphysics 59 (3):638-639.
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  81. John Mikhail (2009). Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge. In B. H. Ross, D. M. Bartels, C. W. Bauman, L. J. Skitka & D. L. Medin (eds.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 50: Moral Judgment and Decision Making. Academic Press.
    Could a computer be programmed to make moral judgments about cases of intentional harm and unreasonable risk that match those judgments people already make intuitively? If the human moral sense is an unconscious computational mechanism of some sort, as many cognitive scientists have suggested, then the answer should be yes. So too if the search for reflective equilibrium is a sound enterprise, since achieving this state of affairs requires demarcating a set of considered judgments, stating them as explanandum sentences, and (...)
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  82. John Mikhail (2007). Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11:143 –152.
    Scientists from various disciplines have begun to focus attention on the psychology and biology of human morality. One research program that has recently gained attention is universal moral grammar (UMG). UMG seeks to describe the nature and origin of moral knowledge by using concepts and models similar to those used in Chomsky's program in linguistics. This approach is thought to provide a fruitful perspective from which to investigate moral competence from computational, ontogenetic, behavioral, physiological and phylogenetic perspectives. In this article, (...)
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  83. John M. Mikhail (2011). Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment. Cambridge University Press.
    Is the science of moral cognition usefully modeled on aspects of Universal Grammar? Are human beings born with an innate "moral grammar" that causes them to analyze human action in terms of its moral structure, with just as little awareness as they analyze human speech in terms of its grammatical structure? Questions like these have been at the forefront of moral psychology ever since John Mikhail revived them in his influential work on the linguistic analogy and its implications for jurisprudence (...)
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  84. Christian Miller (2011). Moral Relativism and Moral Psychology. In Steven Hales (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Relativism. Blackwell.
    Much recent work in meta-ethics and ethical theory has drawn extensively on claims about moral psychology. The goal of this paper is to provide a broad overview of some of these claims and the implications that certain philosophers are taking them to have for the plausibility of moral relativism.
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  85. Omar Moad (2002). General Principles and Moral Judgment. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):45-53.
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  86. Liangkang Ni (2009). Moral Instinct and Moral Judgment. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (2):238-250.
    Human beings’ moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man’s innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions. Theoretically, preference for the former will lead to naturalism and for the latter to culturalism, but this is the reality of man’s moral life. Moreover, there may be a parallel (...)
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  87. Shaun Nichols (2005). Innateness and Moral Psychology. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York.
    Although linguistic nativism has received the bulk of attention in contemporary innateness debates, moral nativism has perhaps an even deeper ancestry. If linguistic nativism is Cartesian, moral nativism is Platonic. Moral nativism has taken a backseat to linguistic nativism in contemporary discussions largely because Chomsky made a case for linguistic nativism characterized by unprecedented rigor. Hence it is not surprising that recent attempts to revive the thesis that we have innate moral knowledge have drawn on Chomsky’s framework. I’ll argue, however, (...)
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  88. Shaun Nichols (2002). Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment. Cognition 84:221–236.
    There is a large tradition of work in moral psychology that explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g. hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g. playing with your food). However, only recently have there been attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying moral judgment (e.g. Cognition 57 (1995) 1; Ethics 103 (1993) 337). Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction. (...)
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  89. Susana Nuccetelli (2007). What Is an Ethnic Group? In Jorge J. E. Gracia (ed.), Race or Ethnicity? On Black and Latino Identity. Cornell University Press.
  90. Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe (2009). The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language 24 (5):586-604.
    Shows that the very same asymmetries that arise for intentionally also arise from deciding, desiring, in favor of, opposed to, and advocating. It seems that the phenomenon is not due to anything about the concept of intentional action in particular. Rather, the effects observed for the concept of intentional action should be regarded as just one manifestation of the pervasive impact of moral judgment.
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  91. Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe (2009). The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language 24 (5):586-604.
    A series of recent studies have shown that people's moral judgments can affect their intuitions as to whether or not a behavior was performed intentionally. Prior attempts to explain this effect can be divided into two broad families. Some researchers suggest that the effect is due to some peculiar feature of the concept of intentional action in particular, while others suggest that the effect is a reflection of a more general tendency whereby moral judgments exert a pervasive influence on folk (...)
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  92. David A. Pizarro & Eric Luis Uhlmann (2005). Do Normative Standards Advance Our Understanding of Moral Judgment? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):558-559.
    Sunstein's review of research on moral heuristics is rich and informative – even without his central claim that individuals often commit moral errors. We question the value of positing such a normative moral framework for the study of moral judgment. We also propose an alternative standard for evaluating moral judgments – that of subjective rationality.
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  93. Richard Priem, Dan Worrell, Bruce Walters & Terry Coalter (1998). Moral Judgment and Values in a Developed and a Developing Nation: A Comparative Analysis. Journal of Business Ethics 17 (5):37-47.
    This comparative field study evaluated the moral reasoning used by U.S. and Belizean business students in resolving business-related moral dilemmas. The Belizeans, citizens of a less-developed country with Western heritage and a values-based education system, revolved the dilemmas using higher stages of moral judgment than did the U.S. business students.
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  94. Linda Radzik (2009). Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance * By MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN. [REVIEW] Analysis 69 (4):785-787.
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  95. Linda Radzik (2000). Justification and the Authority of Norms. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):451-461.
    What features does a norm have to have such that we really ought to follow it? This paper argues that norms are authoritative when they are justified in a particular sense. However, this brand of justification is not any of those with which we are currently familiar. The authority of norms is not a matter of moral, epistemic or prudential justification. It depends instead on what I call "justification simpliciter." The concept of justification simpliciter is defined and defended in this (...)
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  96. A. K. Rogers (1929). Feeling and the Moral Judgment. International Journal of Ethics 40 (1):15-38.
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  97. Krzysztof Saja (2008). Semantyka moralności a kryteria wyboru teorii metaetycznej. Etyka 41.
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  98. Hanno Sauer (2012). Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and Rationality in Moral Judgement. Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.
    Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance (...)
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  99. Hanno Sauer (2012). Morally Irrelevant Factors: What's Left of the Dual Process-Model of Moral Cognition? Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):783-811.
    Current developments in empirical moral psychology have spawned a new perspective on the traditional metaethical question of whether moral judgment is based on reason or emotion. Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists such as Joshua Greene argue that there is empirical evidence that emotion is essential for one particularly important subclass of moral judgments: so-called ?deontological judgments.? In this paper, I scrutinize this claim and argue that neither the empirical evidence for Greene's dual process-theory of moral judgment nor the normative conclusions it (...)
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  100. Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can be happy to accept the (...)
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